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Science has a special relationship with the term “open” and its connotations. A 
traditional story about scientific openness goes as follows: if scientists share their 
findings, scientific communities can collectively build upon these findings and a 
progressive corpus of knowledge emerges. But since the turn of the twenty-first 
century, a distinctive, online “open science” has rapidly gained global salience, 
incorporating practices from open access publishing and open research data, to open 
preprints, open peer review, and open notebook science. Movements towards such 
practices have often been led from within scientific communities – by scientist-
activists and entrepreneurs. Such actors see the Internet as an unprecedented 
opportunity to “open” science, and fix seemingly broken aspects of the scientific 
system: inaccessibility, opacity, irreproducibility. More recently, the “open” 
imperative is also top-down, as funding and research organisations increasingly treat 
open practices as desirable or mandatory.  
 
This work focuses on academic, biological scientists in the UK and Australia whose 
professional and epistemic worlds are undergoing transformation in this open science 
“revolution” – in whose communities openness may have long-standing meaning, but 
wherein “open science” may have risen from obscurity to salience in the space of only 
15 or 20 years. While some scientists are the leaders of open movements, many are 
said to be ambivalent and slow to adopt open practices, forming a “cultural” barrier to 
openness that is rarely explored in systematic empirical studies. This disparity has a 
moral dimension, as openness is positioned a quality of good science and scientists. 
My research questions consider how scientists’ constructions sit in relation to 
historical, advocacy and policy framings; why scientists may be disengaged from 
contemporary open science movements; and the extent to which they construct and 




The thesis begins with an analysis of openness in science as a concept and practice 
with historical depth as well as contemporary salience; I then explore its 
contemporary framing in advocacy and policy contexts through document analysis. In 
both I consider how “open” (or “openness”) is being constructed, and the significance 
of its flexibility and expansiveness. These analyses set the scene for the empirical core 
of the work: 40 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with biologists, purposively 
sampled for disciplinary, generational, gender, and attitudinal diversity. For context 
and counterpoint, I conducted 14 similar interviews with open science advocates and 
policymakers. Through these interviews, I attend to how a broad population of 
scientists, as well as advocates and policymakers, construct “open” in science.  
 
My findings focus on the three most common categories of scientific openness 
emerging from interviews with biologists: open access, data openness, and 
interpersonal openness. The first two of these have close connections with policy and 
advocacy movements, whereas the third appears to be anchored only in scientists’ 
experiences and implicit conceptualisations. Nonetheless, interpersonal openness is 
constructed in consistent ways and with conviction: it refers to the practice and 
principle of “talking freely” about unpublished ideas and data in small-scale 
interpersonal situations, or the contextual withholding of such information. I 
characterise scientists’ constructions of each of these three categories as indicators of 
how scientists encounter and enact top-down and bottom-up forms of scientific 
openness. 
 
In my discussion and conclusion, I bring these three categories of scientific openness 
into conversation, using them to theorise the variety of relationships that scientists 
form with scientific openness under the contemporary open science “revolution” - 
including whether and how different forms of openness are internalised as epistemic 
virtues. In turn, this allows commentary about: the apparent disconnectedness of 
scientists from certain agendas of openness; the significance of generational 






In the last twenty years, “open” has become a prominent buzzword in science. Many 
movements supporting open science have arisen within communities of researchers 
and overlapping groups interested in Web technology and research communication. 
Open science has also become a top-down policy agenda. Many governments, 
research funders, universities, and publishers worldwide now ask or insist that 
researchers adopt “open” practices. Open practices and concepts are diverse. Two of 
the most prominent are open access and open data, which entail free, unrestricted 
online access to published research findings, and to underlying datasets, respectively. 
More ambitious visions of open science evoke “revolution”, and press for online 
transparency of entire research processes including plans, methods, and real-time 
results. Open science has other interesting features: it resonates with an older, 
traditional notion that openness is essential to science. It is also curiously difficult to 
define, as its scope continues to expand. It is sometimes characterised simply as “good 
science”. Yet, many scientists do not seem to understand open science in the same 
way as its advocates, and seem slow or ambivalent in their uptake of open practices. 
 
In this research, I investigate these interesting social features of open science. I begin 
in historical contexts, tracing traditional ideals of scientific openness, and the roots of 
today’s open science movements. I also examine present-day policy and advocacy 
documents, to make sense of current meanings of “open”. This provides context for an 
interview study with 40 biological scientists and 14 advocates or policymakers about 
their understandings of openness in science. These were mainly based in the UK and 
Australia. The most prominent “openness” topics for scientists were open access, data 
openness, and interpersonal openness. The last of these topics is not part of today’s 
open science movements – and is not an online practice – but has special importance 
to many of the scientists interviewed. I provide in-depth qualitative analysis of how 
scientist interviewees understood each topic. This allows me to reflect in a nuanced 
way about whether – and how – scientists see open science as good science, and why 
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Chapter 1 | Introduction 
 
 
Science has a special relationship with the term “open” and its connotations. I first 
encountered “open” in science in 2011, as a new biology graduate, when I became an 
employee of an open access publisher that sought to change the world: specifically, to 
make scientific knowledge free to anyone, online. I spent three years happily 
representing this vision of a better, more open science – mostly to scientists. Over 
time, I became curious about the weight of meaning carried by “open”: it seemed to 
speak for itself, to hold myriad hopes, and to be irreproachable. And yet, opening 
science was a battle: even as open science policies gained traction, scientists 
themselves often seemed to hold back. This research is the result of a curiosity about 
openness in science that got out of hand.  
 
To introduce the topic of analysis, I will present six observations about openness in 
science that captured my interest early on, and convinced me that it was worthy of 
study. The first observation is salience: “open” discourses have rapidly risen to 
prominence in twenty-first century science, both bottom-up through scientific 
communities, and top-down through organisations that govern research. As these 
discourses lead to policy, they become salient to progressively larger populations of 
scientists. Secondly, I saw that open science carries big claims and promises: we are 
said to be in the midst of – or shortly expecting – an “open science revolution” 
comparable with the birth of modern science (Bartling and Friesike 2014b; Nielsen 
2011; The Royal Society 2012), that transforms practices and cultures of science. And, 
as open science looks forward, it also looks back: my third observation is of deep 
historical resonance. Interpretations of historical sources and narratives suggest 
that science is defined by openness, and contemporary movements seek to restore 
and elevate this archetypal state. My fourth observation was of an absence: despite its 
salience, and the great promises it makes, open science is hard to pin down. It seems 
to shift enigmatically in meaning, to be more than the sum of its parts, and to resist 
definition. Whatever open science may be, however, it is taken to be good science: a 
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virtuous epistemology. This is my fifth observation. Sixth and finally, there seemed to 
be a gap in perspective between advocates of open science – those invested in its 
virtue and promise, including scientist–activists – and a broader population of 
scientists. This constitutes a “cultural problem” for the imminent “revolution” towards 
scientific openness. 
 
Having established my reasons for studying this topic, I will detail the research 
questions that become the common threads structuring this work. I will then outline 
my theoretical position and methods, and the positioning of this research in the 
literature. Finally, I explain the thesis structure.  
 
1.1 The contemporary salience of “open” in science 
 
“Open science” and related “open” discourses have risen from obscurity to become 
salient for researchers, policymakers, governments and (some) citizens worldwide in 
the space of only 15 to 20 years. Movement has often been, initially, bottom-up: from 
research, tech, and scholarly communication (BOAI 2002; Murray-Rust et al. 2010; 
OKF n.d.; PLOS 2000). It is now significantly top-down: from research funders, 
universities, learned societies, big publishers, and international organisations such as 
the European Commission, OECD, and G7 (EC 2016; G7 2017; HEFCE et al. 2016; LERU 
2018; OECD 2014; The Royal Society 2012; Wellcome Trust n.d.). This rise in salience, 
which seems slow to many open science advocates, but is rapid in historical terms, is 
my first reason for considering it worthy of study. Here I sketch key developments 
marking the ascent of open science. 
  
Established early within these discourses and ever more prominent is open access 
(OA): the concept and practice of making scientific and other scholarly research – 
especially in the form of research articles – free to access online. Liberal reuse rights 
are often considered an essential part of this definition (Eve 2014; Suber 2012). 
Consensus grew around this idea the early 2000s through a series of international 
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agreements (Berlin Declaration 2003; Bethesda Statement 2003; BOAI 2002). This 
period of time was also marked in the global north by the establishment of PubMed 
Central – “a free archive of biomedical and life sciences journal literature”– by the US 
National Institutes of Health (NCBI n.d.); the mass signing by scientists of a petition 
supporting free access, and opposing restrictions by publishers (PLOS 2000); and the 
related founding of two internationally influential open access publishers, BioMed 
Central (BMC), and PLOS. Universities were also beginning to set up repositories for, 
and even to mandate, freely accessible research (e.g. QUT n.d.; Steele 2013). 
Grassroots activism continued: in 2011, Kazakhstani graduate student Alexandra 
Elbakyan launched of Sci-Hub, a “pirate” website that now provides free access to 
most scholarly literature (Himmelstein et al. 2018). The following year, UK 
mathematician Timothy Gowers started the Cost of Knowledge protest against 
Elsevier (Gowers 2012). And in 2013, the suicide of US computer programmer Aaron 
Swartz – who was facing harsh criminal charges brought by the US Attorney’s office 
for having systematically downloaded JSTOR articles for public release - brought 
tragic significance to the cause of open access (Greenwald 2013). 
 
From the mid-2000s into the 2010s, major research funders and governments in some 
parts of the world began encouraging, and then insisting upon, open access for the 
work they fund (e.g. Finch 2012; NHMRC 2018; RCUK 2013; Wellcome Trust 2012). Big 
commercial publishers, including Springer and Elsevier, began to adapting to this 
landscape – and assimilating themselves into an “open” discourse – by providing 
options for open access amongst their otherwise subscription-access content (Björk 
2012). Landmark open access policies continue to radiate and intensify. On a national 
scale, the UK’s next national research assessment – REF2021 – has required 
researchers to meet strict open access requirements since 2016 (HEFCE 2014). And on 
a global scale, “Plan S” – backed by an international alliance of research funders, 
including the World Health Organization, European Commission, Wellcome Trust, 
and UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) – is due, from 2021, to mandate immediate, 
liberally licensed open access on an unprecedented scale (European Science 
Foundation n.d.; Van Noorden 2020). Collectively, these developments will have 




The idea of open data has also risen rapidly in salience in research contexts over this 
time period (Murray-Rust 2008; The Royal Society 2012). “Open” again refers to free 
online access with liberal reuse rights, and applies in this case to data underlying 
reported results. Conceptually, ‘open data’ is not completely separate from long-held 
practices of publishing evidence to support scientific results (Leonelli 2013); however, 
it is associated with relatively new technological capabilities to produce larger 
volumes of data, together with digital and online capability to store and communicate 
those data. The Human Genome Project (HGP), spanning the turn of the twenty-first 
century, can be positioned as a close forerunner of the contemporary open data 
phenomenon in research: it established in genomics a practice of making large-scale 
datasets publicly available online for reuse by a wider community (HGP Information 
Archive 1997). Momentum towards open data has built through bottom-up and top-
down movements, as for open access. Funders and journals increasingly encourage or 
require researchers to make their underlying data openly available. In the UK, this 
stance is articulated in the Concordat on Open Research Data (HEFCE et al. 2016).  
 
Open access and open data are two of the most prominent instantiations of “open”, 
but do not encompass the whole phenomenon of open science. Fecher and Friesike 
(2014) characterise open science as an “umbrella term encompassing a multitude of 
assumptions about the future of knowledge creation and dissemination” (p. 17) and 
divide it into five schools of thought (infrastructure, public, measurement, 
democratic, pragmatic). Following a systematic literature review on the topic, 
Vicente-Saez and Martinez-Fuentes (2018) define open science as “transparent and 
accessible knowledge that is shared and developed through collaborative networks” 
(p. 1). These schemes and definitions include open access and open data, as well as 
movements and practices as diverse as: citizen science; science blogging; open peer 
review; open code; pre-registration; alternative metrics or reputation systems; 
networked collaborative tools and infrastructures; and open notebook science. 
Preprints – research manuscripts posted openly prior to publication – are also 
commonly associated with open science (Desjardins-Proulx et al. 2013). These tend to 
be grassroots and entrepreneurial movements, but the European Commission (2016) 
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and other major institutional actors have played a role in solidifying and advocating 
the language and concept of “open science”.  
 
1.2 The “open science revolution”: promises of a transformed 
future 
 
“Open” discourses have not only become highly salient in the last two decades; they 
also tend contain grand, expansive claims about the future of science. Texts from both 
individuals and institutions conjure visions of an “open science” future that entail vast 
transformations to research practice and culture – transformations that are currently 
under way, or impending. One of the clearest instances appears in Reinventing 
Discovery (2011) by Michael Nielsen, who writes about a “second open science 
revolution extending and completing the first open science revolution, of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries” (p. 184). The influence of this idea and 
language can be seen in its adoption by the Royal Society the following year, in their 
report Science as an open enterprise (2012): “The internet […] may pave the way for a 
second open science revolution, as great as that triggered by the creation of the first 
scientific journals.” (p. 7). Nielsen’s language of revolution also appears in Bartling 
and Friesike’s edited volume Opening Science (2014a), that begins with a chapter titled 
“Towards Another Scientific Revolution” (p. 3). Open science is thus envisioned as a 
transformation comparable in scale and profundity to the birth of modern science 
itself: an upending of centuries’ worth of tradition. 
 
This transformation is depicted not only as historically significant, but ambitious in 
scope: its trajectory is towards complete, or extreme, scientific openness. The Royal 
Society (2012) states: “We are now on the brink of an achievable aim: for all science 
literature to be online, for all of the data to be online and for the two to be 
interoperable” (p. 7). Even this superlative ambition is dwarfed by statements that 
extend beyond open access and open data. A 2018 report from the European 
Commission’s Open Science Policy Platform included the following expectation: 
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“For Open Science to be successful, it must become embedded at 
every level and in every aspect of the scientific endeavour […] Open 
Science requires a systemic shift in current practices to bring 
transparency across the system…” (2018:4) 
Years earlier, Nielsen (2009) had already conjured a vision of systematic scientific 
openness, which for him was an online, networked, techno-utopia: 
 “We should aim to create an open scientific culture where as much 
information as possible is moved out of people’s heads and labs, onto 
the network and into tools that can help us structure and filter the 
information. This means everything – data, scientific opinions, 
questions, ideas, folk knowledge, workflows and everything else.”  
(p. 32) 
In the mid-2000s, chemist Jean-Claude Bradley pioneered an approach of this kind: 
open notebook science “expos[es] a researcher’s complete record of progress to the 
public in near real time” (Bradley, Owens, and Williams 2008:1). Bartling and Friesike 
(2014a) encourage their readers to imagine a world in which approaches like these 
have transformed science into a rapid, seamless, universal flow of knowledge: 
“Picture a situation in which scientists would be able to publish all 
their thoughts, results, conclusions, data, and such as they occur, 
openly and widely available to everybody. […] Imagine the potential 
for interactions between researchers. Knowledge could flow quickly, 
regardless of institutions and personal networks. Research results 
could be published as they occur. There would be no need to wait 
until results are complete enough to support a full paper.” (p. 8) 
These enthusiastic renderings of completely open, revolutionised scientific futures 
add weight and intensity to the rising salience of open science – and make critical 
study of the topic particularly important.   
 
1.3 The long history of scientific openness 
 
My third observation was that contemporary open science discourse is oriented both 
to the future, and to the past. Nielsen (2011) characterises centuries worth of science 
as essentially open by describing the so-called scientific revolution – the birth of 
modern Western science – as the “first open science revolution” (p. 184). I found that 
this view was a common one, anchored in traditional narratives about the workings of 
science: if researchers collectively share their results, they can build upon the findings 
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of others and a progressive, self-organising corpus of knowledge emerges (Polanyi 
1962). Openness is thus understood as essential to – and definitive of – the function of 
science. The early sociologist of science Robert Merton became an influential source 
of this narrative when he identified “communism” (or “communalism”, 
Vanderstraeten and Eykens 2018) as a characteristic value in the ethos of science: “the 
substantive findings of science are a product of social collaboration and are assigned 
to the community” (Merton 1973 [1942]:274). The same idea is embedded in Newton’s 
aphorism, “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants” (Newton 
1675). This form of openness is recognisable to a wide audience. Polanyi (1962) writes 
that much of what he has to say “will be common knowledge among scientists” (p. 
54). The Royal Society (2012) present this type of openness as a foundation for their 
contemporary advocacy of open science. 
 
This observation suggested that openness resonates deeply through the history of 
science, piquing my curiosity about the relationship between historical openness and 
the rapid, enthusiastic embrace of contemporary open science. Chapters 3 and 4 
became an in-depth exploration of this relationship, in which I draw both upon 
historians’ accounts of scientific openness, and upon broader socio-technological 
histories that contextualise the emergence of contemporary open science. Historical 
accounts (e.g. David 2008; Eamon 1985) show that openness was not an inevitable 
cultural achievement for science, but contingent on a particular history. For me, 
accounts like these also raised questions about the assumed meaning of openness in 
past science, and its significance in a contemporary context. This social–historical 
dimension was my reason for studying openness specifically in relation to the natural 
sciences, even though its relevance is not exclusive to scientific fields. 
 
1.4 The elusive, expansive definition of open science 
 
Despite its remarkably deep history, contemporary salience, and future promise, I 
found that it was difficult to summarise open science. The definitions I have cited 
(Section 1.1) are laudable, but have a nebulous, elusive quality. Another, from the EU-
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funded FOSTER Open Science project, is perhaps more grounded, but loses some 
scope as a result, despite its breadth: “Open science is the movement to make 
scientific research, data and dissemination accessible to all levels of an inquiring 
society” (FOSTER n.d.). Bartling and Friesike (2014b) mention their struggle to define 
open science and related “umbrella terms”, and at one point collapse into circularity, 
describing open science as: “a scientific culture that is characterized by its openness. 
Scientists share results almost immediately and with a very wide audience” (p. 10). A 
later document that sets out an international strategy for open scholarship – a 
discipline-inclusive version of open science – eschews definition altogether, instead 
“recognis[ing] that it is a holistic term that encompasses many disciplines, practices, 
and principles” (Tennant et al. 2019:1).  
 
To some degree, anchoring can be achieved by looking under the open science 
“umbrella”, to concepts such as open access and open data – as I have done above. 
However, this is insufficient as a summary, since the umbrella continually expands to 
include additional “open” concepts, movements and practices. As Catriona 
MacCallum, Director of Open Science at the publisher Hindawi, put it in interview: 
“...open science is the box, and it’s very hard to define what goes in that box, because I 
think the goalposts are continually shifting”. The contents of the “open” box do have a 
concrete feature in common, however: they tend to be enabled by digital and internet 
technologies. My early observations of open science suggested it was also valued for 
abstract qualities that made it more than the sum of its parts. The PLOS website at 
one time described “open” as “a mindset that represents the best scientific values” 
(PLOS 2017). Tennant et al. (2019) proposed an open scholarship strategy based on 
shared values and principles, despite acknowledging “numerous competing, parallel, 
or overlapping definitions of what Open Scholarship comprises in terms of both 
research principles and practice” (p. 14).  
 
This elusive, expansive, holistic quality of open science made it interesting to me as a 
topic for social research. The meaning of open science seems to be actively under 
construction and negotiation through its rapid rise to salience, as more and more 
social groups take part in shaping it. As Fecher and Friesike (2014) note, “each peer 
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group discussing the term has a different understanding of the meaning and 
application of Open Science” (p. 18). I reasoned that we are at an illuminating 
historical time for the study of scientific openness and its construction by different 
groups, as consensus has not been reached: it remains messy, unsettled, out in the 
“open”. It also occurred to me that the elusive expansiveness of open science may 
perform and reflect a social function: it leaves room for new meaning, as specific 
definitions quickly become obsolete. However, my fifth observation suggested that 
“open” in science was not an empty signifier. 
 
1.5 “Open science is just good science!” 
 
Through my involvement with open publishing, I observed that “open” tended to 
signal – without explanation, at least in some social settings – the worth of a 
knowledge practice, and the virtue of those pursuing it. This has been made explicit 
in some advocacy communication, including the PLOS’ “mindset” statement in the 
previous section (PLOS 2017). Similarly, Jon Tennant, an influential advocate of open 
science, used the phrases “open science is just good science” and “open science: just 
science done right” to make his case on social media and in talks (e.g. Tennant 2018). 
This may have been inspired by bioinformatician Mick Watson’s (2015) article titled 
When will ‘open science’ become simply ‘science’, in which he concludes, “open science 
isn’t a movement, it’s just (good) science” (p. 2). Screenshots of these three illustrative 
cases are shown in Figure 1.  
 
In these examples, “open” has moral overtones because it considered the “best” or 
“right” way to do science. For me, this evoked the work of historians of science Daston 
and Galison (2007), who use the term “epistemic virtue” to capture a quality in which 
knowledge-making and morality are inseparable: a truth-making quality that comes, 
in social and historical context, to be taken for granted. Daston and Galison 
conceptualise objectivity as an epistemic virtue, and trace its emergence in the 
nineteenth century. I thought it would be particularly illuminating – and novel – to 
explore openness through the lens of epistemic virtue: to consider, that is, whether we 
10 
 
are currently witnessing a cultural shift that redefines good science as open science. 
Epistemic virtue as rendered by Daston and Galison also places emphasis on the role 
of the scientific self, showing that such cultural shifts alter not only a social consensus 
about qualities of good science – but also collective, internalised understandings of 
the virtues that make good scientists.  
 
Figure 1 | Examples of discourse that frame open science as good science – a part or extension of doing 
science well, “right”, or in “the best” way. (a) A screenshot from Who We Are PLOS website several years 
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ago (PLOS 2017); (b) The start of Mick Watson’s (2015) article in which he argues that open science is 
“just (good) science” (p. 2); (c) Open science advocate Jon Tennant’s use of a similar framing. 
 
1.6 A gap between advocates and scientists 
 
This final observation was my human and pragmatic motivation for conducting this 
study. I noted, again from my involvement in open publishing, that scientists were 
among those most enthusiastically leading open science movements. I also noted that 
a many other scientists – including those with whom I interacted in the course of 
managing an open access journal – were less invested in “open”, and seemed 
disconnected from its promises of a better future for science. I am far from alone in 
making this observation: it seemed to be a common refrain amongst open science 
advocates1, who routinely encounter ambivalence or resistance from researchers. For 
example, in their international open scholarship strategy, Tennant et al. (2019) have a 
section on “research awareness and apathy”, in which they note that “awareness of 
Open Scholarship is still often very low among certain research communities” (p. 30). 
This is in line with a study by Proctor et al. (2010) which, nearly a decade earlier, 
found that “only a small group of enthusiastic open researchers – 5% of our 
respondents – publish their outputs and their work in progress openly, using blogs 
and other tools” (p. 6). One of many related comments that I heard in the course of 
this research (at an open access event) was, from an advocate: “researchers need 
constant and repetitive advocacy of the way the world is changing”2. 
 
This observation is connected with a widespread advocacy and policy discourse in 
which progress towards open science is framed as a “cultural” issue. Nielsen (2009) 
spoke of “major cultural barriers preventing scientists from getting involved” (p. 31), 
and much more recently, the League of European Research Universities produced a 
                                                     
1 “Advocates” come from many overlapping domains including (scientific) research, library, 
publishing, open source, digital innovation, and research funding/policy communities. 
Experiences of open science advocacy are diverse, but seem to have some common threads. 
For more detail about the advocates/policymakers I interviewed, see Section 2.3.4.7. 
2 Recorded in my notes from the event. 
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“roadmap for cultural change” (LERU 2018) to guide universities on practical steps 
towards embracing open science. It includes the statement: 
“There are real dangers in trying to introduce new practices without 
carrying the academic community with the leaders of those changes 
[...] In many ways, cultural change is the most difficult outcome to 
achieve in embracing Open Science…”  (p. 21) 
These discourses oscillate between identifying researchers themselves as cultural 
barriers, and laying blame upon a system of incentives governing researcher 
behaviour, sometimes combining the two arguments. For instance, Ali-Khan et al. 
(2017) describe the provision of appropriate incentives for individual researchers as 
the “key-rate limiting step” in successful implementation of open science (p. 1), and 
Tennant et al. (2019) at one point comment that much is “dependent on the 
willingness of researchers themselves to contribute to scholarly research in an open, 
collaborative, and collective manner”, which is “largely down to whether such 
researchers perceive this process as being advantageous to them in some way” (p. 23). 
However, open advocate Cameron Neylon has pointed out that despite the common 
“desire for cultural change” from a policy perspective, “there is little engagement with 
the concept of culture” (Neylon 2017:2). 
 
I thus considered it especially important to study open science from a social science 
perspective that might shed further light on these “cultural” issues. Moreover, it 
seemed to me that the gap in perspective between advocates and (many) scientists 
represented a gap in knowledge about scientists’ experiences and constructions of 
scientific openness. To me, the assumption that scientists’ ambivalence or resistance 
stems from a lack of appropriate awareness, knowledge, or incentives was reminiscent 
of assumptions made by scientists about the public in the 1980s as part of the UK’s 
public understanding of science (PUS) movement: that if only the public understood 
science and technology, they would be inclined to trust and accept it (Yearley 
2005:102–14). Sociologists of science countered that public disengagement might not 
reflect an absence of understanding, but the presence of other understandings, such 
as knowledge – and distrust – of institutions representing science; and forms of public 
knowledge with particular relevance in local contexts (ibid.). Open science turns the 
tables: (many) scientists are disengaged, but have local, contextual knowledge; and 
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open advocates are technical experts recommending “revolution” of scientists’ 
professions and lives. The politics of this analogy might be debated, but it suggests 
that scientists’ absence of engagement could be productively understood as a 
complex, context-informed position, mediated by trust in institutions, with its own 
understandings of openness in science. I reasoned that a broad-minded exploration of 
scientists’ positions on this topic might “open” up new and fruitful narratives and 
conversations between scientists, advocates, and policymakers.  
 
1.7 The research questions 
 
My six observations above show that open science is an interesting, timely, and 
important topic, on which significant insight might be gained from a social studies of 
science perspective. I distilled these observations into a series of research questions 
that that guide my investigations and shape this thesis. I have one broad, overarching 
research question that addresses the common factor in my observations: that the 
meaning of openness in science is actively under construction at present through 
multiple discourses and interactions. This question allows that issue to be explored in 
an open-ended way and has the capacity to receive unexpected responses: 
1. How is the meaning of “open” (or “openness”) being constructed in the 
context of science? 
My attention is then further guided and structured by a series of sub-questions: 
a) How do contemporary “open science” discourses relate to older, historical 
discourses about the essential value of openness in science?  
This question guides exploration of my third observation (p. 6), that openness in 
science has deep historical resonances that appear in contemporary discourses. 
 
b) How has “open” in science recently gained such salience and discursive power, 
despite its multiple meanings and lack of specificity? 
This question notes my first and second observations (pp. 2, 5) about the rapidly 
rising salience and future promise of open science, and guides exploration of my 
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fourth observation (p. 7) – of elusive, expansive qualities – in that context. 
 
c) To what extent is “open” (or “openness”) being constructed as an epistemic 
virtue? 
This question is sensitised by my fifth observation (p. 9) that the rise to salience 
of open science may represent a shift in assumed qualities of “good science”.   
 
d) Why does it appear that many academic scientists are disengaged from “open” 
discourses and practices? 
This question guides exploration of my sixth observation (p. 11), of a gap in 
perception between advocates and (many) scientists on this topic. 
 
1.8 Theoretical approach and methods 
 
A detailed explanation of my approach is given in Chapter 2. The research is broadly 
situated by the field of science and technology studies (STS), according to which 
science – its institutions, ways of working, and knowledge – is considered to be 
“irredeemably human” (Edge 1995:5). Beyond this, my study is grounded in the sense 
that it emphasises data exploration over the application of any detailed, prescribed 
theoretical framework. My analytical attention is guided, however, by the 
observations and research questions above, and in particular the idea of epistemic 
virtue (Daston and Galison 2007), which I adopt as a sensitising concept.  
 
In order to explore meaning in a broad way, I adopted two main qualitative methods:  
1. Analysis of academic, advocacy and policy documents that have shaped 
the meaning of scientific openness both recently and over a longer history. 
2. Semi-structured interviews with 40 biological scientists and 14 open science 
advocates and policymakers. 
The first of these methods produces some novel analysis, blended with a more 
traditional literature review process (Chapters 3-5), and the second method produces 
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novel data and forms the empirical core of the thesis (Chapters 6-8). The interview 
study was largely set the UK and Australia, and thus had most relevance to open 
science movements and research settings in these countries, with some relevance to 
an international – but particularly global north and Anglophone – context. Biological 
scientist interviewees were based at research-focused, prestige-oriented academic 
institutions. Selection of scientists was purposive, aiming to include diversity in sub-
discipline, gender, race and ethnicity, research group size, and extent of commercial 
affiliation. This was with the intention of representing a broad range of perspectives 
on scientific openness, within the study scope. Interviews with advocates and 
policymakers added context from fields including scholarly communication and 
publishing; freelance research, advocacy, and consultancy; university leadership, 
administration and libraries; and research funding and policy.  
 
1.9 Positioning this research in the literature 
 
A very wide range of literatures are conceivably relevant to my analysis. There are new 
and fast-growing academic and policy literatures on different aspects of the topic, 
from fields as diverse as economics; life sciences; science communication; history of 
science; library, management, communication, and education studies; and many 
interdisciplinary fields. This is in part because open science is concerned with a 
transformation of research. As a result, scholars in many fields are increasingly 
advocating and/or analysing this idea through media familiar to them: journal articles 
and books. Only a small proportion of this literature, however, takes a step back to 
question broad social and historical aspects of open science as a holistic phenomenon, 
as I hope to do. The intersection between STS and studies of open science in 
particular is sparsely populated. However, there are an increasing number of studies 
that occupy these critical spaces, and they have proven very valuable as I have worked 
towards my own contribution. 
 
Studies from several fields have analysed open science as a holistic, contemporary 
phenomenon, and worked towards defining or classifying it, usually with normative 
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aims (e.g. Bowman and Keene 2018; Fecher and Friesike 2014; Vicente-Saez and 
Martinez-Fuentes 2018). Some authors have also contributed holistic social, historical 
and political analyses of the whole phenomenon (David 2008, 2014; e.g. Delfanti 2010, 
2013; Strasser 2019; Willinsky 2005). Kelty (2012) and Grand et al. (2012) illuminate 
open science by bringing it into conversation with concepts familiar in STS: moral 
economies, and trust technologies, respectively. There are also, increasingly, wide-
ranging critical analyses on particular open movements, especially open access and its 
history in a publishing context (Eve 2014; Fyfe et al. 2017; Guédon 2001; Lawson 2019; 
Moore 2017, 2019a), and open data (Gabrielsen 2020; Leonelli 2013). Šimukovič (2020) 
argues that STS is well-suited to address the topic of open access, but that so far, 
scholars in the field have shown only limited interest. Where many – or most – critical 
analyses come from an advocacy position, Mirowski (2018) instead delivers a scathing 
critique of open science as an “artifact of the current neoliberal regime of science” (p. 
172). He makes valuable STS-relevant points, confirming many of my impressions: 
about the ambiguity and multiplicity of open science discourse; its tendency to 
technological determinism; and capacity to reinforce power asymmetries.  
 
I aim to contribute to this growing literature an analysis of open science is sensitised 
to both breadth (its holistic, expansive qualities) and depth (its historical, social 
nuances), and brings with it an STS sensibility (an alertness to human entanglements 
of science and technology). I also contribute a perspective that is not primarily 
normative or aimed towards open science advocacy – although of course, I am not a 
neutral analyst. Nor is my perspective shaped by an antipathy towards open 
movements as is shown by Mirowski (2018). Instead, have come to this research 
through close professional and personal experience with both biological science and 
open science (see Reflexivity, Section 2.3.10) and my aim has been to care for both of 
these worlds through my work (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). 
 
An empathetic approach is particularly important because the main empirical 
contribution I will make is on (biological) scientists’ understandings of openness in 
science. In this area, my work is aimed towards a clear gap. There are a wealth of 
studies that characterise or measure researchers’ practices and attitudes in relation to 
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particular categories of openness (e.g. Cragin et al. 2010; Piwowar 2011; Wallis, 
Rolando, and Borgman 2013; Weckowska et al. 2017), but very little prior research 
that: i) explores what “open” or “openness” in science means to researchers in a broad 
way; ii) captures and prioritises qualitative depth. In recent years there have been 
some in-depth qualitative studies of the kind I believe to be important, most of which 
have been published after I set out on this PhD: those I am aware of are by Scheliga 
and Friesike (2014), Levin and Leonelli (2016), Levin et al. (2016), Van den Eynden et 
al. (2016; commissioned by the Wellcome Trust), and Ali-Khan et al. (2017). These 
studies provide valuable, relevant findings, many of which resonate with my own, 
through qualitative interviews or focus groups. Several of these studies approached 
scientific openness in an exploratory way, allowing participants to frame the issue, 
and each study brings contextual insights.  
 
1.9.1 Position in relation to similar studies 
 
Levin et al. (2016) in particular employed a framing and methodology similar to my 
interview study: through semi-structured interviews they asked 22 principal 
investigators (PIs) in biomedical fields about “their understanding of ‘openness’ in 
science and experiences with Open Access, Open Data, and Open Innovation” (p. 3). 
The article reports key themes from these interviews; additionally, Levin and Leonelli 
(2016) analysed specific elements of these interviews in more depth. The latter article 
conceptualises openness “as a mode of valuing the research process and its outputs” 
(p.1, original emphasis) in which policies codify the value of certain “open” outputs 
and practices, often in tension with the more varied, nuanced and intangible ways 
that researchers value research as a process. These papers are an excellent comparison 
point for my study findings; I explore the similarities and differences in Section 9.6.  
 
However, it should be noted that this study was conceived independently from my 
own and there are key differences in theoretical lens and method as well as findings. 
Where Levin and Leonelli (ibid.) write about value in relation to openness, I use the 
concept of epistemic virtue (Daston and Galison 2007). Both theoretical lenses are 
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clearly relevant to the context and add insight from different perspectives. They are 
also consistent with one another – epistemic virtue is a particular lens through which 
to understand how value in knowledge-making is assigned and performed. I chose 
epistemic virtue as a sensitising lens because it adds extra depth to my understanding 
of scientists’ relationships with – and subjective experiences of – openness, due to its 
foregrounding of the scientific self and accordingly, identity. Thus, my research 
explores openness not only as a mode of valuing science and its outputs, but a mode 
of being in science, in which the person doing the “valuing” comes into focus. From 
this perspective, scientists are valuing not only aspects of research process and 
output, but valuing and cultivating aspects of their scientific self; their idea and 
feeling of being a good scientist. The lens of epistemic virtue also aids understanding 
of the moralised quality of “open” discourse, and contextualises ways of valuing 
openness within a long social history of science, in which other knowledge-making 
“virtues” co-exist and arise contingently in different times and places (for more on 
epistemic virtue, see Section 2.2.1).  
 
Other comparable studies (e.g. Ali-Khan et al. 2017; Van den Eynden et al. 2016; 
Scheliga and Friesike 2014) tend to have a narrower framing methodologically, 
initially asking participants about “open science” or “open research” thus evoking 
established concepts rather than adopting the broader framing of “openness”, which 
makes a key difference to responses3. Additionally, comparable studies including 
Levin et al. (2016), either i) speak only to participants with an existing connection to 
open science, or ii) are conducted from the advocacy perspective of a funder or 
institution in relation to their open science policies. In contrast, I contribute a study 
with a degree of distance from institutional open science agendas that includes 
participants without existing connections to open science. This allowed me to elicit 
and depict aspects of researchers’ stories that tend to be obscured by a focus on 
incentivising open science.  
 
                                                     
3 See Section 8.3 for an analysis of how scientist interviewees understood “open science” 
differently from “openness in science”. 
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Approaches to analysis also differ across this set of similar studies: all employ some 
kind of qualitative, thematic approach, but the degree of conceptualisation around 
and between these themes varies, as does the theoretical lens. My analysis adds in-
depth conceptualisation through a focus on three overarching themes (open access, 
data openness, and interpersonal openness). By sensitising to epistemic virtue, with 
an attendant focus on scientific self and openness as framed and understood by 
scientists, I contribute an analysis sensitive to diversity, complexity and affect in 
scientists’ relationships with (different types of) openness. This allowed unearthing of 
systemic factors – beyond immediate “drivers” or “obstacles” – that condition 
engagement with open practices. My study framing, choice of participants and 
analytical approach also led to the identification of a novel category of openness 
(interpersonal openness, Chapter 8) that was important to scientists but not salient 
either in advocacy or policy framings, or in other similar studies.  
 
1.10 Chapter outlines 
 
Following this Introduction, the thesis comprises eight chapters. Chapter 2 details my 
theoretical approach and methods, which are relevant to all of the subsequent 
chapters. It includes an explanation of my sensitising concept – epistemic virtue – its 
relevance in the study context, and its positioning within a broader STS perspective. 
The rest of the chapter explains how I chose and carried out the methods: most 
attention is given to the semi-structured interviews, which generate new data, but I 
also address document analysis and an incidental role for ethnographic observation. 
Detail is provided on the sampling and characteristics of interviewees, the interview 
procedure, ethical considerations, analysis process, limitations, and reflexivity. 
 
Chapters 3-5 provide in-depth context on the study topic that situates the interview 
study. These chapters begin to address directly the research questions and establish 
findings, by blending literature review with an analysis of documents as empirical 
materials. In Chapter 3 I consider the meaning of scientific openness in a centuries-
long historical context. This addresses research sub-question (a) about the 
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relationship between contemporary “open science” and older, historical discourses 
about the essential openness of science. In Chapter 4 I take a closer look at 
developments of the twentieth century as background for the emergence of 
contemporary “open science” in the 2000s. This allows me to address research sub-
question (b), which asks how “open” in science has recently gained such salience and 
discursive power, despite its multiple meanings and lack of specificity. In Chapter 5, I 
move to a narrower focus on the twenty-first century, and the way in which open 
access, open data, and overarching open science movements have unfolded in the last 
two decades. I focus particularly on these topics owing to their relevance in the 
interview study, and I focus on UK and Australian contexts. I illustrate the unfolding 
of these movements through nine case studies of advocacy and policy documents, 
which I analyse in relation to all of the research sub-questions. 
 
Chapters 6-8 present the main empirical research findings, structured according to 
the three most salient categories of scientific openness raised by biological scientist 
interviewees: open access (Chapter 6), data openness (Chapter 7), and interpersonal 
openness (Chapter 8). The first two categories are closely linked with policy and 
advocacy discourse; the third emerges entirely from scientists’ reports of their 
experiences and their implicit conceptualisations of “openness in science”. I 
characterise the main themes and patterns in scientists’ constructions of each of these 
openness categories. In particular I consider the range of relationships that scientists 
seem to have with each category; the attitudes, emotions and experiences of scientific 
self that accompany these relationships; and the contextual factors that seem to 
mediate these relationships. 
 
Chapter 9 is a discussion and conclusion in which I bring the three categories of 
scientific openness considered in Chapters 6-8 into conversation with one another. 
This sheds light on differences and similarities between kinds of scientific openness as 
experienced by scientist interviewees. I draw on my sensitising concept, epistemic 
virtue, as a way of theorising these differences and similarities, and consider whether 
openness may encompass a variety of distinct epistemic virtues that have different 
roles in the present “open science revolution”. In this chapter – though foreshadowed 
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in those leading up to it – I directly address research sub-questions (c) and (d) that 
consider the extent to which openness is constructed as an epistemic virtue, and the 
reasons why scientists may often be disengaged from “open” discourses. 
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Chapter 2 | “Views from somewhere”  





This thesis is primarily composed of chapters that analyse and synthesise qualitative 
data about scientific openness, whether these data are in the form of academic 
literature, policy and advocacy documents, or interview responses (Chapters 3-9). 
This chapter explains my theoretical and practical approaches to these upcoming 
chapters. The first part of the chapter addresses my theoretical position, which is 
primarily a grounded one, meaning that I do not bring an established theoretical 
framework to this research against which results are tested or interpreted. Instead 
this work is exploratory, and aims to be receptive to new ways of thinking on a topic 
that has not typically been explored in a broad, qualitative, “open” way. My research 
questions are designed to be receptive to the unexpected, whilst also focusing 
attention on areas I know to be interesting, as introduced in Chapter 1. I also 
introduce a sensitising concept: not a fixed theoretical position, but an idea to that 
can be brought into fruitful conversation with all of the research data. This concept is 
epistemic virtue as conceived by Daston and Galison (2007). Earlier parts of this 
chapter explain this concept and its relevance to scientific openness. 
 
The second, larger part of this chapter is a guide to my methodological choices and 
methods. This section addresses document analysis, as well as the empirical core of 
the thesis, an interview study. I explain how and why I recruited certain interviewees, 
and summarise features of the interviewee group. I draw attention to methodological 
choices that I made and their intended effects, describe my interviewing procedure, 
and address ethical considerations as well as – reflexively – my own “openness”. I also 




The chapter finishes with reflexivity section in which I lay out the perspective from 
which I conceived and carried out this research. It shows how – from a feminist STS 
perspective – the knowledge I produce is not a universal truth, but a “view from 
somewhere” (Haraway 1988:590). Haraway proposes a feminist objectivity in which 
knowledge can be understood as situated, using vision as a metaphor: 
 “Feminist objectivity is about limited location and situated 
knowledge, not about transcendence and splitting of subject and 
object. It allows us to become answerable for what we learn to see […] 
There is no unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in 
scientific accounts of bodies and machines; there are only highly 
specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully detailed, active, 
partial way of organizing worlds.” (p. 583) 
It is this accountability for what I have learned to see that I seek to cultivate through 
reflexivity and other forms of care in my research. 
 
2.2 Theoretical position 
 
My study is broadly situated in the interdisciplinary field of science and technology 
studies (STS), which began to take form in the 1960s, and is diverse both in its 
disciplinary origins – which include history and philosophy of science, sociology, and 
anthropology – and in the range of theoretical and methodological approaches with 
which it is associated (Edge 1995). There is a common focus in STS, however, upon 
the analysis of science as a social phenomenon: 
“…STS holds out the “new” view of science and technology as 
essentially and irredeemably human (and hence social) enterprises—
both in the context that nourishes, supports, and directs them and in 
their inner character. And this is a triumphant, positive humanism: 
not the miserable confession that “scientists are only human” 
because you can catch them making mistakes, getting angry, being 
secretive and fraudulent.” (ibid., p. 5, original emphasis) 
An acknowledgement of scientists’ humanity extends to an understanding in STS that 
knowledge is constructed through social processes. This means challenging 
traditional boundaries: between the social and the technical; science and society, 
nature and culture; facts and values; and objective and subjective. For any readers 
who are scientists – an identity that I and many STS scholars have also occupied – this 
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position can be provocative, but need not be so. It does not mean that all knowledge 
is relative or flawed, or that scientists are irredeemably biased, but that knowledge 
can be better understood as entangled with the circumstances of its creation: as 
situated (Haraway 1988), in the way that I conceive of my own research. 
 
I take this broad positioning from STS into my work while not aligning with any 
specific theory, so as not to bring a prescribed worldview to my study. Instead I 
intended this study as a grounded one: guided by exploration, situated analysis, and 
the building up of concepts from empirical data, rather than by deduction or 
explanation from theory. The other reason why I do not adopt a particular STS theory 
is that understanding knowledge is not the purpose of my research, although its socio-
technical quality is assumed and adjacent. Instead, my interest is in overtly social 
aspects of science: scientists; research communities, cultures, institutions and 
funders; and the scientific norms, ethos, and practices prevalent in these contexts. 
This is arguably an old-fashioned approach reminiscent of work by pre-STS 
sociologist of science Robert Merton (1973 [1942]): I will argue in due course why a 
return to Merton’s topics of interest, with a new STS sensibility, is warranted in the 
case of scientific openness.  
 
Although it can be difficult to grasp how knowledge is socially constructed, this is not 
the case for a concept like “open science” that clearly – as I show in Chapter 1 – is 
value-laden, actively evolving, shaped by a multiplicity of specific historical and 
cultural influences. Part of my theoretical position is to acknowledge that I am not 
attempting to detect an essential nature of “open” in science – or to dictate what it 
should mean – but to study its meaning and significance, in a particular context, to 
those who shape and are impacted by it. Many truths can be told about openness in 
science: I aim to tell several that I believe to be useful and underrepresented. Whilst I 
am not working within a specific theoretical framework, I do adopt a sensitising 
concept (Blumer 1954) that “suggest[s] directions along which to look” rather than 




2.2.1 Sensitising concept: epistemic virtue 
 
Epistemic virtue is one of many potential framings for scientific openness, and I 
adopted it early on, more as a provocation than a solution. I found that it added depth 
and insight to my interpretations of scientists’ perspectives. I refer to epistemic virtue 
as characterised by Daston and Galison (2007): an ethos implicit within a way of 
knowing. The concept proposes that epistemology is value-laden; that it is not 
possible to construct knowledge without a moral compass, which itself is socially 
constructed. It therefore by definition relates knowledge-making closely to the person 
producing that knowledge – the “knower”. 
 
Daston and Galison’s virtue of interest is objectivity: the removal of oneself and one’s 
biases from a scientific process in the belief that a better, more truthful kind of 
knowledge will result. The authors’ detailed study of visual representation in the 
history of science locate an origin for this virtue in the mid-nineteenth century, when 
they argue that a new relationship emerged between knower and knowledge. This 
emergence related to broader socio-technical changes but could be traced in the 
intimate domain of the self. It was a shift from a passive self, flooded with sensations, 
that could be corrected by virtues of focus and selectivity (“truth-to-nature”); to an 
active, integrated self that required self-restraint (“mechanical objectivity”): 
“The true savant was a ‘genius of observation’ whose directed and 
critical exercise of attention could extract truth-to-nature from 
numerous impressions, as the smelter extracts pure metal from ore. 
In contrast, the subjective self of nineteenth-century scientists was 
viewed as overactive and prone to impose its preconceptions and pet 
hypotheses on data. Therefore, these scientists strove for a self-
denying passivity…” (p. 203) 
Daston and Galison give a visual example of a droplet of liquid falling onto a surface, 
depicted in the 1870s as perfectly symmetrical, and in the 1890s – with the aid of 
photography – as irregular and varied. These images were produced by the same 
scientist, British physicist Arthur Worthington, who viewed each as the most truthful 




Epistemic virtue is a subtle, powerful idea because it can conceive of an inward 
striving by scientists towards methods and attitudes of “good” science, in combination 
with a performative rhetorical endorsement of these principles (the latter is often 
noted in STS, e.g. Gieryn 1983). Daston and Galison (2007) write that “what had 
originally struck us as an oddly moralizing tone […] now made sense” (p. 39), because 
the creation of knowledge was simultaneously a technical matter and a responsibility. 
This is an important acknowledgement because – ironically – of objectivity’s cultural 
legacy: the best science is often assumed to be a “view from nowhere” in Haraway’s 
(1988) terms: valueless, disembodied, amoral. To contend that the opposite is true 
assigns appropriate credit to scientists, who knowingly or unknowingly labour under 
the weight of techno-moral expectation. It also exposes the moral framework of 
science to appropriate scrutiny. For as Daston and Galison make clear, epistemic 
virtues are not immutable: they change and accrue over time, and are socio-
technologically entangled. 
 
Ideas related to epistemic virtue are not without precedent, even in the earliest social 
study of science. Merton (1973 [1942]) famously identified four norms underpinning 
an “ethos of science”, and wrote that “they are moral as well as technical 
prescriptions” (p. 270). However, many analysts later took Merton’s account to be a 
false empirical description of science (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000:116), or argued 
that he was crafting an unimpeachable image for science out of a much more 
ambivalent reality (Mulkay 1976). Studies of norms and ethos fell out of favour in STS, 
and were treated as “performative utterances of a rather old fashioned scientific 
culture that was disrobed in the 1970s and 1980s…” (Holden 2014:4). Merton did have 
a strong motive for presenting science in a way that promoted its purity and asserted 
its autonomy: he was writing in the context of Nazi science and Lysenkoism 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). However, with the dismissal of his normative 
framework, the idea of a morality embedded in epistemology – and its role in 
scientists’ own images of their work – fell into neglect (Holden 2014). 
 
By overcoming some key limitations, Daston and Galison revive valuable aspects of 
Merton’s thesis in a manner that is compatible with present-day STS scholarship. 
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Firstly, they remove any hint of essentialism. While Merton implied that “the” ethos 
of modern science existed, and could be fulfilled to greater or lesser extent by 
institutional conditions, Daston and Galison show that just as scientific knowledge is 
constructed in a social context, so too is its moral framework. The authors’ rich 
theoretical language can speak to a contemporary STS audience. Secondly – although 
this is arguably not Merton's failing – they make it clear that epistemic virtues are not 
descriptions of scientific practice, nor are they straightforward behavioural outcomes 
of rules and reinforcement. A final important difference is the theoretical emphasis 
that Daston and Galison place on the epistemic subject: the scientist. 
 
2.2.2 Theorising the scientific self 
 
The concept of epistemic virtue centres the “knower” who strives towards the virtue 
in question for themselves and the knowledge they produce. This is a valuable 
contribution of Daston and Galison's concept, because the person of the scientist and 
their internal experience is under-theorised in STS. Merton (1973 [1942]) did not 
neglect this area despite his focus on institutional structure and function. He made 
the following telling comment about the mechanism by which his norms operate: 
“These imperatives, transmitted by precept and example and 
reinforced by sanctions are in varying degrees internalized by the 
scientist, thus fashioning his scientific conscience…” (p. 269) 
Post-Merton, STS has largely turned its attention to the construction of scientific 
knowledge, rather than those producing it. Actor-network theory, for example, has 
made a point of a radical theoretical symmetry that breaks down the social and treats 
human and non-human “actants” similarly in explanations of scientific knowledge 
production (Latour 2005). It is only more recently that scientists’ subjective 
experiences have come back into focus, this time as dynamic constructions alongside 
scientific knowledge: 
“The primary concern of most science studies accounts is to 
understand how such apparatus shapes the kind of scientific 
knowledge that is produced. Making the production of the epistemic 
subject the focus of empirical investigation highlights how 
‘machineries of knowing’ (Knorr Cetina 1999) function as disciplining 
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technologies that constitute both the subjects and objects of 
epistemic work.” (Bulpin and Molyneux-Hodgson 2013:93) 
Scientific self in Daston and Galison’s account refers to a way of being a scientist that 
is enabled and constrained by history and context – “the character and conduct of the 
scientist as a recognisable human type” (p. 198).  
 
According to Daston and Galison (2007) and Bulpin and Molyneux-Hodgson (2013), 
the construction of the self is a daily, micro-act in the lives of scientists as everyday 
discourses and practices of science continuously shape inner life and bodily habit. 
Both sets of authors draw upon Foucauldian concepts to theorise this process: 
“We pay close attention to what the historian-philosopher Michel 
Foucault called “technologies of the self”: practices of the mind and 
body (more often the two in tandem) that mold and maintain a 
certain kind of self.” (Daston and Galison 2007:198–99) 
 
 “…institutional routines, discursive and material practices of 
particular epistemic settings are not only performed by scientists in 
the everyday work of knowledge production, but also operate as 
mechanisms of power. These apparatus organise, regulate and 
discipline the ways in which scientists think, behave and act.”  
(Bulpin and Molyneux-Hodgson 2013:93) 
If a scientific self is characterised by certain ways of thinking, feeling and acting, 
constructed by immediate, day-to-day experiences and filtered through wider social 
influences, then the question arises of how this entity relates to wider epistemic 
cultures and institutional settings. These dynamics are not fully explicated by Daston 
and Galison, who focus upon “intrinsic” explanations, in which “explanans and 
explanandum” are “on the same level” (i.e. the self: pp. 197, 205). However, the 
professionalization and institutionalisation of science was only just beginning around 
the time at which Daston and Galison place the construction of objectivity, in the 
nineteenth century (Pandora and Rader 2008), whereas now multiple institutions – 
including universities, national research assessors, funding bodies and publishers – as 
well as larger-scale collaborative dynamics, govern the daily and career-long 




Bulpin and Molyneux-Hodgson (2013) provide an example of how the practices, values 
and identities of science students are “disciplined” in larger community and 
institutional settings, in the case of the International Genetically Engineered Machine 
(iGEM) competition. This is not one-way, deterministic process: these authors 
document occasional resistance to incentives to standardize biological parts, where 
students instead prioritise the local needs of their project (pp. 100-101). This shows 
how the relationship between community/institutional structures and scientific self is 
plural and negotiated. Consistent with this, Savransky (2014) argues that “the process 
of subjectification is more complex and unstable that the analytics of [Foucauldian] 
governmentality suggest” (p. 106), and that a messiness and multiplicity of governing 
influences creates space for resistance, agency and perhaps systemic change.  
 
In the current context, this allows one to conceive of scientific selves (and the 
epistemic virtues they uphold) both as products of social systems – e.g. laboratory 
groups, scientific communities, or universities – and as agents of change who may 
play a role in reconfiguring them. The sociologist Margaret Archer (2003) also argues 
that subjects, while influenced by the opportunities and constraints of social 
structures, possess agency to resist or change those structures. Further, she argues 
that it is their subjectivity – or “internal conversation” – that mediates this 
relationship between structure and agency. Archer’s perspective is useful for 
understanding of how the scientific self might be both personally meaningful, and an 
explanatory factor in continuities or transitions in science’s moral framework. 
 
2.2.3 Openness as a candidate epistemic virtue 
 
I have introduced epistemic virtue as a sensitising concept because of the striking 
ways in which scientific openness is currently framed (introduced in Chapter 1, and 
analysed in Chapter 5). One such framing is the phrase “open science is just good 
science”, popularised by open science advocate Jon Tennant (2018). Such rhetoric is 
direct in its claim that “open” is, or must become, a taken-for-granted element of 
good science. In this context, “good” may not be intended to carry moral weight 
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beyond technical competence, but the epistemic virtue concept invites us to consider 
the two as part of one another. The moralising tone of this rhetoric is also reminiscent 
of Daston and Galison's account of objectivity. Beyond explicit rhetoric about the 
inherent or inevitable openness of (good) science, the moral and truth-making 
qualities of “open” are implicit in a much wider range of discourse, as subsequent 
chapters will show. To the best of my knowledge there is no precedent in the 
scholarly literature for conceptualising openness as an epistemic virtue in Daston and 
Galison's terms. Freese and Peterson (2018) think along similar lines, however, and 
demonstrate the relevance of the concept to contemporary research. They describe 
“statistical objectivity” as an emerging epistemic virtue related to reproducibility 
concerns in science, which are in turn related to “open” movements.  
 
A significant challenge to adopting epistemic virtue as a sensitising concept was its 
operationalisation. What did it mean to observe openness being constructed as an 
epistemic virtue? This question was both easy and difficult to answer. In many cases it 
was readily apparent: Tennant’s (2018) meaning above, and many others, were 
unambiguous. But for the most part, epistemic virtue operated precisely as a 
sensitising concept, “suggest[ing] directions along which to look” (Blumer 1954:7) in a 
grounded exploration of qualitative data, without knowing precisely where this would 
lead. In a process of sensitising to epistemic virtue I found the following useful guides 
for my attention: i) a “moralizing tone” (Daston and Galison 2007:39) in relation to 
openness; ii) implications that science is improved fundamentally – in its truthfulness 
– by openness; and especially iii) implications that scientists themselves are improved 
by openness; adopt open identities; internalise openness; and/or report moralised 
“internal conversations” (Archer 2003) on the topic.  
 
2.3 Methodology and methods 
 
Key features of this research make it best suited for a qualitative methodology. Firstly, 
it is exploratory and invites the emergence of perspectives that may be unanticipated 
both to me as the researcher, and to advocacy and policy communities. To this end 
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my overarching research question was intentionally broad: How is the meaning of 
“open” (or “openness”) being constructed in the context of science? The research sub-
questions (Section 1.7) provided focus and structure, but did not place limits on this 
breadth of inquiry. Qualitative methods are suited to this kind of exploration because 
they do not require parameters of measurement to be set out in advance. They 
instead ask what these parameters might be and why, allowing input from 
participants that may challenge the researcher's assumptions and reframe the study. 
Secondly, the research explores social construction of meaning, asking “how” 
questions about discourses, practices, values, and virtues. These questions are best 
addressed with qualitative data, which allows the capture of  nuanced, “thick” 
descriptions that are sensitive to the “contextual understanding of social behaviour” 
(Bryman 2012:401). Thirdly, a key purpose of this study is to understand scientific 
openness “through the eyes of the people being studied” (ibid., pp. 399-401), in this 
case from the perspective of scientists. Qualitative research allows these perspectives 
to be recorded in participants’ own words, and to be studied with empathy, context 
sensitivity, and an acknowledgement that people reflect upon and shape the worlds 
they inhabit. This is important given there seems to be a gap in understanding 
between many scientists and those who advocate open practices (see Section 1.6).  
 
Qualitative methods suited to generating these in-depth, exploratory, social data 
include interviewing, ethnographic observation, and focus groups; documents are also 
a valuable data source for qualitative analysis (Bryman 2012:383). I chose the semi-
structured interview as my primary empirical method, accompanied by document 
analysis to provide contextual depth. Occasional ethnographic observations also 
contributed to my interpretations. The following sections give more detail on my 
choice of methods. 
 
2.3.1 Document analysis 
 
Documents were important sources of qualitative data for this study. In Chapter 3, 
which would traditionally be a literature review, relevant texts were treated both as 
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sources of information, and as social objects that reflect and shape the research 
context. I explore long histories of scientific openness in this chapter, drawing on 
academic history and social science articles, as well as occasional policy texts, in an 
attempt to understand established knowledge on the topic. I then consider how 
scientific openness is constructed by these documents, and begin to view them as 
products of historical context in their own right, that have shaped discourse. I 
particularly consider framings, narratives, and intertextual dynamics. Chapter 4 is 
analytical in a different way: it brings together texts from a wide variety to contexts to 
synthesise an understanding the breadth, salience, and apparently rapid emergence of 
contemporary open science at the start of the twenty-first century. 
 
Most instances of document analysis appear in Chapter 5, which narrates twenty-first 
century developments in open science advocacy and policy. To add qualitative depth 
and exemplify these developments, I include analyses of nine advocacy and/or policy 
documents from the period 2000-2019. These documents indicate key characteristics 
and patterns in the contemporary construction of open science, addressing my 
research aims and situating the interview study. I consider the themes of the research 
sub-questions in relation to these documents. Qualitative patterns across the 
documents add depth to a narrative about the rise in salience, in turn, of open access, 
open data, and the overarching category of open science.  
 
2.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviewing involves a flexible set of questions (Bryman 2012:471). 
Adjustments can be made to phrasing and order, and spontaneous questions can be 
added. This flexibility allows the researcher to explore responses beyond surface level, 
following up potentially illuminating responses. The semi-structured format also 
fosters a responsive, conversational interaction with potential for rapport and mutual 
trust. It contrasts with a structured interview, in which the same questions are asked 
in the same order, and with an unstructured interview. Structure is thought make 
responses of different interviewees more comparable (ibid., p. 210). However, 
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especially in an exploratory context, it would be misleading to imagine that the 
context of the interview can be standardised. Thus, I have embraced the flexibility 
and the richness of an uncontrolled research setting. However, a degree of structure 
in the form of prepared questions aided organisation and focus. It also allowed a 
degree of context-mediated comparison. 
 
Calvert (2001, 2006) was able to effectively explore the construction of “basic” science 
through semi-structured interviews with scientists and policymakers. I considered a 
similar approach to be promising for “open” because both descriptors of science are 
ambiguous and value-laden. They also each have particular significance in research 
and policy settings, and are each conditioned by long and complex social histories. 
Interviews do not, of course, reveal how open scientists “really” are, nor do they 
directly convey experiences of openness. What goes on is a type of social 
performance: a “dance of expectations” (Dingwall 1997:56) in which the respondent is 
cast in a role and “put on notice to talk” (ibid., p. 58) in a manner appropriate to the 
setting and topic. This does not make the interview a false account, however, only a 
situated one. Moreover, I do not expect “openness in science” to exist in scientists’ 
lives in any single, stable way. In Chapter 3, I show how scientific openness is 
relational, subjective, and conditioned by intention: thus, key dimensions of the topic 
can only be captured through scientists’ first-person accounts. I consider performative 
dynamics in my interpretations, including e.g. the possibility that interviewees expect 
openness to be more acceptable than closure. However, I also observed that 
interviewees seemed relatively unconstrained by their allocated role, perhaps due to 
critical/independent academic sensibilities. They often raised topics that did not 
conform to dominant discourses on scientific openness (one of which features in 
Chapter 8). And my initial studied concern about “leading” questions began to feel 
out of place; interviewees seemed resistant to being “led”. 
 
It was not immediately clear how to engage with epistemic virtue, with its implied 
links to the scientific self, through interviews. The most obvious challenge is that our 
“inner lives” are “knowable only by our first-person selves” (Archer 2003:22). 
Nonetheless, Archer was able to study participants’ inner lives using semi-structured 
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interviews. She acknowledged that both interviewee and interviewer must make 
theory-laden interpretations, but argued that “imperfectly successful” communication 
of this kind underpins all interpretations in the social sciences: “Are not the opinions 
and attitudes that we venture in any interview also ‘digests’ of a long and imperfectly 
self-analysed process of their formation?” (p. 155).  Archer’s argument and empirical 
work indicate that there is no in-principle problem with studying the internal life of 
the subject via interview.  
 
2.3.3 Ethnographic observations 
 
My knowledge and interpretations were shaped to a smaller degree by participant–
observer experiences. Some of these occurred before I conceived of the research: I 
have previously worked in biological research and open access publishing, and my 
observations from these contexts were informative (see Reflexivity, Section 2.3.10). I 
also made observations in relevant contexts that arose parallel to the research, such as 
conferences or events related to open science; conversations; and online interactions, 
for example on Twitter. This was not part of my data-gathering method, but I made 
notes for myself as circumstances allowed, and reflections on these experiences 
shaped my interpretative mind-set. I did not adopt ethnographic observation as a 
primary method because it was not clear, at the outset, how “openness” – or lack 
thereof – would look in practice, or in which settings, if any, it would be meaningfully 
observable. Research planning would have involved assumptions about these 
parameters, whereas I intended to prioritise participants’ framings of openness. 
Ethnographic observation would be a suitable method for follow-up studies on 
specific types of openness, e.g. interpersonal openness at scientific conferences. 
 
2.3.4 Research participants 
 
I recruited interview participants from two partially overlapping domains: academic, 
biological research science (40 interviewees); and open science advocacy and/or 
policymaking (14 interviewees). The emphasis was on the first of these domains – 
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biological science – as guided by research sub-question (d) that notes apparent 
widespread disengagement from “open” discourses and practices amongst academic 
scientists. Accordingly, I aimed to include scientists with a wide range of relationships 
to open science, some of whom had no prior connection with the topic. 
 
Advocate and/or policymaker interviewees were working in fields including scholarly 
communication and publishing; university leadership, administration and libraries; 
and research funding and policy. Some were working freelance or as consultants on 
community-led open science advocacy projects; one had additionally become a 
humanities scholar. Some had engaged in several of these domains. These interviews 
were primarily intended to add context rather than forming the core empirical 
material of the study, but in reality took on a varied role, contributing both 
supplemental and core empirical data. They added breadth and depth to my 
knowledge of policy and advocacy perspectives; disclosed and reflected the latest 
developments in these areas; and provided informal, frank reflections on the policy 
and advocacy landscape that would be unlikely to appear in documents.  
 
The boundary between these two categories of interviewees was not entirely clear. 
Many advocates and policymakers were former, retired, or freelance scientists whose 
careers had come to be defined by open science advocacy. Additionally, a small 
number of those I categorised primarily as biological scientists could be considered 
open science advocates. It was not necessary to draw a strict boundary during the 
interviewing process: I adjusted my script of questions for each individual to explore 
scientist and advocate roles as and where they applied. When it came to counting 
interviewees in each category, I considered interviewees’ ways of presenting 






2.3.4.1 Why academic scientists? 
 
I interviewed scientists working primarily in academic rather than commercial or 
government settings, while acknowledging that the three often overlap (see concepts 
such as “Mode 2” and “Triple Helix” science: Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). This 
was primarily to maintain a realistic scope. It would also be interesting to explore e.g. 
commercial scientists’ constructions of scientific openness. However, varied data 
could be gathered in academic contexts. Several participants had commercial 
collaborations, or previous/current experience in industry. Moreover, academia, with 
its historical links to norms of communal, “public” knowledge-sharing (see Chapter 3) 
was a pertinent setting from which to begin questioning meanings of openness. More 
tangibly, academics are more likely than scientists in the private sector to be governed 
by recent open science policies, as they are often funded by public or charity money, 
which comes with an obligation to be “open” and accountable to wider society. 
 
2.3.4.2 Why biological scientists? 
 
Biological science was a manageably bounded, but sub-disciplinarily diverse, setting 
in which to explore relationships between openness and epistemic culture. My 
background in biology (see Section 2.3.10) was more than a convenience: it increased 
my access to potential interviewees through professional and personal networks, and 
contributed to my understanding of interviewees’ work, and thus the rapport and 
meaning I was able to build in interview. It also added to my empathy and purpose in 
conducting the study.  
 
Biology also has a distinctive position in relation to open science. Historically, 
biological fields have been shaped by cultural tensions and transformations related to 
openness. These are detailed in Chapter 4, and include the development of communal 
moral economies in twentieth century model organism biology (Kohler 1999); the 
commercialisation of molecular biology in the 1970s and 1980s (Wright 1986); and the 
Human Genome Project (HGP) in the 1990s and 2000s (Chow-White and Garcia-
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Sancho 2011; Maxson Jones, Ankeny, and Cook-Deegan 2018). Perhaps owing to these 
growing tensions and transformations, open science movements of the early 2000s 
had a particular association with biomedical fields. Academic scientists established in 
these fields are thus likely to have encountered open science trends as a distinct 
change in the last 10-15 years, and are likely to have witnessed or participated in 
relatively rapid changes in discourse and practice within their field. UK biological 
scientists are also particularly likely to have encountered a moving frontier of open 
science policies governing their research output during this timeframe.  
 
2.3.4.3 National contexts 
 
Open science movements have become salient at a global scale and thus there is no 
uniquely informative national or institutional context for this study. For the same 
reason, any national or institutional context sheds some light on the phenomenon as 
a whole as well as situated features. This study was primarily conducted in the UK 
and secondarily in Australia. The UK is home to particularly vocal, developed and 
influential open science advocacy and policy movements, including those influentially 
led by the Wellcome Trust. The UK has also been influenced by the embrace of an 
ambitious open science policy platform in the EU. Australia provides an interesting 
comparison as its open science movements have been shaped by global trends, but it 
has taken a less top-down, regulated approach than the UK, and a less directive 
position than that of the EU. As an indicator of the contrast between Australia and 
the UK, an international analysis by Robinson-Garcia et al. (2020) shows that: 
“British universities have by far the largest share of OA [open access] 
publications (median = 74%) […] Except for the United States 
(median = 51%) and Brazil (median = 47%), all countries above world 
median are European. Asian countries, as well as Canada and 
Australia show OA shares below the world median.” (p. 6) 
This is only one mode and measure of openness, but it could be expected to reflect 




Choice of national context is also related to my background, and again it is more than 
a matter of convenience. My research questions were inspired by professional 
involvement with open science movements in the UK, and thus have particular 
relevance to that context (see Section 2.3.10). Moreover, this past experience made it 
easier to recruit open science advocates in the UK than elsewhere. The comparative 
dimension arose from my dual nationality and undergraduate training, through which 
I was connected with a biologists in Australia. This allowed me to conduct a pilot 
interview phase with familiar individuals, easing recruitment and rapport, and 
creating a flexible space in which to develop interview structure and technique. 
Moreover, my connection to these biologists arose before my involvement with open 
science and thus represented a privileged point of access to scientists ambivalent 
towards the topic, who were harder to recruit – but particularly important in the 
study context. 
 
It became clear that interviewees, particularly scientists, did not have a simple 
relationship with national context. While they were largely based in the UK or 
Australia, many had done scientific training or research elsewhere. There was nothing 
homogeneous about the national experiences of a typical interviewee: both across 
their careers and in any given moment their experience blended national research 
cultures. National comparisons were thus primarily a means to increase the diversity 
of my sample and to retain awareness how contextual specificity interacts with 
experiences of a global movement. Notably however, this heterogeneity of experience 
was largely limited to the global north and to English-speaking contexts. 
 
2.3.4.4 Institutional and funding contexts 
 
Institutional and funding contexts in many cases had a more direct influence upon 
experiences of open science policy. The perspective of this study is partial in this 
regard: across national contexts, scientist interviewees worked at relatively well-
funded institutions that cultivated prestigious research reputations. Interviewees 
tended to have received grants from various sources including national research 
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councils, and in the UK, the Wellcome Trust and European Commission, as well as 
any commercial collaborators. Each interviewee was subject to a mixture of different 
open science policies, from both their funders and their institution.  
 
2.3.4.5 Sampling strategy 
 
Amongst biological scientists, I sampled purposively for diversity (Bryman 2012:418) 
primarily according to sub-discipline, career length, gender, and race and ethnicity. 
Secondarily I aimed to include scientists in research groups of different sizes, and 
variably related to industry. This approach could also be called “theoretical sampling”, 
a strategy of representing categories that are theoretically meaningful, as opposed to 
“statistical sampling”, which samples a population randomly (Glaser and Strauss 
1967:62). This strategy was intended to increase the diversity of stories, experiences, 
and reactions that I would record in interview, and to increase the visibility of 
perspectives that might be marginalised using a proportional approach. The factors 
that I considered in the approach were those which I suspected would have a 
relationship with scientific openness, as well as those which relate to social diversity. I 
expected these factors, and others I had not anticipated, to intersect in complex ways 
for each interviewee. My goal was not to disentangle and measure the influence of 
these factors, but to create a situation in which rich, varied, contextual relationships 
with openness could be observed. These factors are listed and expanded in Table 1. 
Advocates and policymakers were selected based on their roles in open science 
advocacy/policy. I mapped relevant organisations and communities based on past 








Table 1 | Factors used to guide purposive sampling of scientist populations. 
Primary factors guiding purposive sampling 
Biological sub-discipline: I referred to classifications of these sub-disciplines (e.g. 
subject divisions in universities; biorxiv.org list of subject areas) during recruitment 
and targeted new invitations to scientists in under-represented areas.  
Length of career: Established scientists may have different orientations to 
openness from early career scientists, perhaps linked to the recent rise of open 
science. I recruited from different academic “generations”, gauged according to 
decade of doctoral training. 
Gender: Balancing gender is a vital part of any study seeking to represent 
scientists’ experiences. Women face well-known systemic inequalities in science 
(Etzkowitz, Kemelgor, and Uzzi 2000), and non-binary or transgender scientists 
may face greater barriers.  
Race and ethnicity: Black, Asian, and minority ethnic scientists also face systemic 
inequalities (Wadman 2012), so I aimed to over-represent these groups compared to 
the study population (with limited success: see Section 2.3.4.7) 
Secondary factors guiding sampling 
Research group size: I sought to include scientists from both small and large 
groups, and those who typically publish with smaller or larger groups of co-authors.  
Commercial links: I sought to include scientists both with and without 
commercial links, as this may be related to scientific openness in multiple ways. 
 
2.3.4.6 Recruitment strategy 
 
I recruited interviewees via (i) “cold” emailing, i.e. contacting individuals without a 
prior connection; (ii) my professional and personal networks; and (iii) snowballing 
(Bryman 2012:202–3) – asking for recommendations from prior interviewees. I 
employed all three strategies to recruit scientists, which ensured that a variety of 
motivations to participate (not all based on an interest in openness). Cold emailing 
was better for purposive sampling, as diverse characteristics of scientists could be 
researched in advance. However, it was less effective for recruiting junior scientists, 
who less often had up-to-date profiles on their institution or laboratory websites. The 
response rate to cold emails was also relatively low (approx. 20%; higher for men than 
women). I anticipated this challenge from preliminary research (Attenborough 2015) 
in which individuals from disadvantaged/minority groups were less likely to accept a 
cold email invitation, for myriad possible reasons: e.g. limited time due to direct or 
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indirect burdens of minority status and systematic inequality. I therefore increased 
the proportion of invitations to individuals in these groups in the current research, 
with more success in relation to gender than race and ethnic minority status (see 
Section 2.3.4.7). Networking and snowballing were more effective for recruitment – 
nearly all such invitations were accepted – so I employed these as well, and attempted 
to steer them towards gaps in my purposive sampling, albeit imperfectly. These were 
also my main strategies for recruiting advocates and policymakers, where it was 
important to speak to specific individuals. 
 
2.3.4.7 Interviewee characteristics 
 
Scientist interviewees were working in a wide range of biological fields, listed with 
relevant details in Table 2. I did not question interviewees about their gender, racial 
or ethnic identities in association with the interview as this seemed needlessly 
intrusive for the study purpose (see Limitations, Section 2.3.11). I gauged and 
attempted to balance demographic diversity according interviewees’ professional self-
presentations, including e.g. pronouns on university profiles, according to which 17 
scientist interviewees were women (~42%) and 23 were men (~58%). Although 
relatively balanced overall, gender representation was uneven across the career length 
category (decade of PhD completion). I tended to be able to recruit more established 
men and more early-career women, reflecting population characteristics that likely 
result from both historical gender disparities and a “leaky pipeline”. At present, 
women tend to be highly represented at doctoral training stages in biological fields, 
but are less represented thereafter (Shaw and Stanton 2012). Genders are not specified 
in Table 2, but are indicated by pseudonyms or names, as well as pronoun use where 
quotations are reported4. Figure 2 visualises the characteristics of the scientist group 
by gender, career length, and location.  
 
                                                     
4 One female interviewee opted for a traditionally male pseudonym for a variety of reasons 
other than gender identity, but is recorded (anonymously) as a woman in Figure 2. 
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Between four and six (10-15%) scientist interviewees were visible5 to me as individuals 
from Black, Asian, or racial or ethnic minority backgrounds (the majority were men 
and non-Black). This is roughly in line with the representation of racial and ethnic 
minority academics in UK higher education in 2018/19 (approx. 15% BAME, including 
2% Black, 9% Asian, 2% mixed, 2% other; Higher Education Statistics Agency n.d.). 
Therefore although this study included some racial and ethnic diversity, it did not 
over-represent BAME individuals compared with the study population, which would 
have been better for representing diverse perspectives. This shortcoming is related to 
extremely low representation of BAME scientists in the institutions from which I 
recruited. It proved insufficient to send more invitations to underrepresented groups, 
because it was possible to exhaust the pool of possible BAME interviewees at a given 
institution. These individuals were likely overburdened and had no duty to participate 
in exercises – such as this research – that reached for diversity in deeply unequal 
settings. Addressing this issue in the future would require a study design with a 
focused and prioritised effort at racial and ethnic minority inclusion.  
 
Eight (20%) scientist interviewees were based in Australia, with the majority, 29 
(~72%), based in the UK (Scotland and England). Networking and snowballing 
recruitment techniques also led to the inclusion of two interviewees based in the US, 
and one based in Saudi Arabia (the latter with institutional and personal ties to 
Australia and the UK). I decided it would be beneficial to include these interviewees 
given I had the privilege of access, even though their national settings were not a 
primary research focus. UK interviewees were from seven different institutions (19 
interviewees were from one of these). Australian interviewees were from mainly from 
one institution (two overall). The specific institutions are not named to increase 
interviewee anonymity.  
 
Advocate and policymaker interviewees are listed in Table 3. Most of these 
individuals had a professional base in the UK, but all had international networks, and 
                                                     




two were Australians with professional knowledge of Australian open science 
contexts. The remaining two advocates were based in Germany, one having begun his 
advocacy career in the UK. Eight of these interviewees were men and six were women. 
The group was not racially or ethnically diverse, likely reflecting features of open 
science movements in the global north, as well as the tendency for snowballing 
network-based recruitment methods to homogenise representation. 
 
Table 2 | List of scientist interviewees and contextual information in alphabetical order by 
pseudonym/real name. Country corresponds to their institutional base at the time of interview. 





Country Disciplinary keywords 
Month of 
interview 
Adam 1980s Australia 
Parasitology, biochemistry, 
molecular biology, physiology 
Jan 2017 
Andrea PhD current UK Immunology, microbiology Oct 2018 
Arthur 2010s UK 
Analytical chemistry, cell 
biology 
Jul 2018 
Ben 1990s UK Applied conservation genetics Jan 2018 
Cedric 1960s UK 
Agricultural botany, 





Comparative genome function, 
immunology 
Dec 2017 
Elliot 2010s UK 
Molecular, computational 












Ernie 1970s UK 
Cell biology, chromosome 
structure 
Oct 2017 





*Gregory P. Copenhaver 
1990s US Genetics Feb 2018 




Ian 1980s Australia 
Human genetics, genomics, 
policies and ethics 
Sep 2017 
Jacqueline 1980s Australia Ecophysiology, climate Jan 2017 
Jason 
*Jason Gellis 












Jude 1970s Australia 
Zoology, developmental 
molecular biology, genomics 
Jan 2017 
Julia 2000s UK 
Immunology, evolutionary 
biology, ageing research 
Jun 2018 












Luke 2010s UK 
Evolutionary biology, ageing 
research, behavioural ecology 
Nov 2018 
Madison PhD current UK 





1980s Saudi Arabia 






Organic chemistry, open 
source medicine development 
Apr 2019 








Miriam 2000s UK 
Quantitative genetics, data 
science 
Jan 2018 












Olivia PhD current UK Epidemiology, data science Jul 2018 




Richard 1980s US 
Developmental, evolutionary 
genetics, genomic medicine 
Mar 2018 








Steve 1970s UK Plant biochemistry Nov 2017 
Thomas 1990s UK 
Systems biology, plant science, 
data management 
Oct 2017 
Yvonne 1970s UK 







Figure 2 | Characteristics of the scientist interviewee group by gender, career length (PhD/DPhil 
completion decade), and location of home institution at the time of interview. The distribution of 




Table 3 | List of advocate and policymaker interviewees and contextual information in alphabetical order 
by pseudonym/real name. Underlined country indicates their location at the time of interview, other 




Professional role / 
organisation 








Prof of Research 
Communications, influential 
open science advocate and 









Director of Open Science at 
publisher Hindawi, former 
PLOS Advocacy Director, 
trained biological scientist  




policy & admin, 
scholarly 
communication 
Head of Scholarly 
Communication, University 
of Cambridge, PhD on open 







Scientist with contextual 
knowledge of the Royal 
Society’s Science as an Open 
Enterprise report (2012) 





Open science policymaker 
and advocate at major UK 
research funder 





Researcher and high profile 
advocate of open approaches, 
trained biological scientist 






High profile freelance open 











and advocating compliance 
with open access, university 
biological science context 






Leader in pioneering open 
access publishing contexts 
(Director at PLOS and eLife), 
trained biological scientist 







(Library Services, Office for 
Open Science & Scholarship), 
European policy connections 







pioneering advocate for open 
source approaches to science, 
particularly open data  





Senior journal editor, trained 
biological scientist  
UK Jan 2018 
                                                     
† I acknowledge with sadness the death of Dr Jonathan P. Tennant. Jon was not yet 32 years old 








CEO of the platform 
ScienceOpen, academic 
publishing background, 









Publishing Director at the 
Royal Society and advocate of 
open science, trained 
scientist 
UK Feb 2018 
 
 
2.3.5 Interview procedure  
 
Interviews were semi-structured and guided by a schedule (see Appendix B: Interview 
schedule, and Figure 3). The majority were conducted in person, at a location chosen 
or guided by the interviewee: typically their office or a meeting room. A significant 
minority [16, ~30%] were conducted via online video chat. Most interviews lasted 
around one hour. All but one were audio recorded, which allowed me to take minimal 
notes, focusing my attention on listening and remaining visibly attentive. This 
promoted social connection, as well as the presence of mind that I needed to 
formulate follow-up questions and shape the interview as it unfolded. 
 
Figure 3 | Interview materials. The notepad shows my typical interview schedule, visible across one page 
spread to maximise my focus on the interview, with main questions in bold. Legible detail is available in 




Full details of the interview procedure are given in Appendix B: Interview schedule, but 
the main elements were as follows: 
 Preamble: I introduced myself, the interview premise, informed consent 
information, and made space for questions. I sought consent, and with 
approval, began the audio recording and interview. 
 Biographical questions, to develop context and social ease: The first question 
was about interviewee’s research or current role. For scientists, I asked about 
disciplinary identity and experiences of community.  
 Core question: “What first comes to mind when you think about openness in 
science?”, designed to encourage a wide range of responses including those 
not anticipated from policy and advocacy. This proved so: it also shaped my 
findings in distinctive and worthwhile ways (see Section 8.3). Follow-up was 
flexible, aiming to explore the response. 
 Other exploratory, “opening up” questions: “Does openness feel like something 
relevant to you?”, followed by, “Does it make you feel any particular way? e.g. 
interested, passionate, bored, worried…”. “Do you recall when you first came 
across the term ‘open’ or ‘openness’ used in relation to science – or has it always 
been used, in your experience?”. “How would you describe science that is open?” 
and “What does it look like for you, in practice?”. Each approached from a 
different angle, encouraging expression of complex or conflicting meanings 
and experiences. Part-way through interviews, I added: “Is there a difference 
between “openness in science” and “open science” as far as you are concerned?”. 
 Targeted questions: I asked about types of scientific openness established in 
policy and advocacy contexts. This gauged awareness, attitude, and practice 
around e.g. open access, open data, open preprints, open peer review, and 
open notebook science, if these had not already arisen.  
 Early on, I found that some questions evoked “interpersonal openness” (see 
Chapter 8): “In your everyday work (e.g. talking to colleagues at conferences) is 
openness something you have tended to think about?” and “Are you making 
decisions about what to say or not say to others?”. Once the category had 
emerged in earlier interviews, I used these as prompts for interviewees who 
had not raised it initially. 
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 Concluding question, sensitised to epistemic virtue: “Think about a scientist 
who you know and really admire, who you think is a really good scientist,” then 
describe their “good” characteristics. This question was added after the pilot. 
 Advocates and policymakers: Many of the same questions were useful, 
allowing a degree of comparison. Otherwise, I asked role-specific questions, 
and about changes they wished to see in science and society; their specific 
policy or advocacy activities; perceived successes or challenges of engaging 
with scientists; and whether/how they envisaged an “open scientist”. 
 
2.3.6 Research ethics 
 
I obtained ethics approval from the School of Social and Political Sciences, University 
of Edinburgh. All participants gave informed consent (see Appendix C: Ethics 
approval; Appendix D: Sample information sheets and consent forms). The study was of 
minimal risk to participants. Interviewees were adults with a full capacity to consent; 
they were also highly educated and were relatively empowered both societally and in 
the interview context. They ranged from being my peers – fellow PhD researchers – to 
being professional elites: professors, department heads, and project or university 
leaders. I could reasonably expect interviewees to understand explanations of the 
study and their role, and to ask questions or withdraw if concerned. One area of 
ongoing ethical reflection was reflexive “openness” around anonymity and data 
archiving, which became a methodological consideration in its own right. 
 
2.3.7 Methodological reflexivity: openness and closure 
 
I developed a reflexive alertness to “openness” in my own research, without assuming 
that openness would be good for this particular form of knowledge-making. With this 
in mind, I considered the appropriateness of participant anonymity, which is often 
treated as a cornerstone of ethical practice in the social sciences (e.g. Bryman 
2012:146). Anonymity is protective and is not only a form of closure: it enables the 
participation of individuals who might otherwise feel uncomfortable, leading to the 
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representation of a broader set of views. It also enables a certain freedom in the 
interview space (a form of interpersonal openness with parallels in Chapter 8). 
However, using participants’ real names enables acknowledgement of their 
contributions, and is a form of methodological transparency that may help readers to 
understand the data. Moreover, it enables participants with certain “open” principles 
to contribute in a way that is consistent with their own ethics and epistemology.  
 
To navigate this tension, I offered interviewees a choice between anonymity (by 
default) and use of their real name. The choice was signposted before the interview 
but offered afterwards, together with an opportunity to view the interview transcript. 
This led to a mixture of anonymous and attributed responses: either condition could 
be interpreted as more “open” or credible. To represent these two categories evenly, I 
include only first names, for scientists, in the results Chapters 6-8 – whether they are 
real first names or pseudonyms.  
 
For similar reasons, I offered a choice about the interview transcript: by default it 
remained confidential, but interviewees could opt for secure online archiving (access 
for research purposes) or public online archiving. This acknowledges the importance 
of open data principles to some interviewees: at least one participant viewed their 
transcript as a potential “historic artefact”. I also value such principles – conditionally 
and experimentally – and recognise their value to my PhD funder:  
“Whilst not compulsory, ESRC-funded students are strongly 
encouraged to offer copies of data created or repurposed during their 
PhD for deposit at the UK Data Service as it is considered good 
research practice.” (ESRC n.d.) 
Offering a choice – with confidentiality as a default – was important because of the 
rich, personal, deeply contextual qualities of interview data, and the permanent, 
public, discoverable qualities of online archiving. The interview is a social interaction 
that occurs in a private space; making it “open” had the potential to be discomfiting if 
not risky to interviewees. One interviewee commented, upon receiving the transcript, 
that he had been somewhat unguarded as I had “got him to relax”, whereas 
immediately after the interview he had spoken of standing by his responses publicly. 
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This underlined the importance of providing the transcript and allowing an 
opportunity for reflection before enacting data (transcript) openness.  
 
Some interviewees opted for secure or public transcript archiving. Some also wished 
to go by their real names. This degree of transparency – which compounded the risks 
and benefits of both forms of openness – prompted a particular ethical attention on 
my part. I sought written assurance from these interviewees that they had considered 
the implications of their comments being widely and indefinitely attributable online, 
and I examined transcripts for sensitive content. It was challenging to negotiate this 
aspect without unintentionally signalling that I view either openness or closure as 
problematic. Significant labour was involved in realising this reflexive engagement 
with openness and closure, but I felt that it was worthwhile. Two transcripts that have 
been approved for public sharing are included in the Appendices both as data and as 
examples of method (see Appendix E: Interview transcripts). 
 
There are an almost unlimited number of additional avenues for reflexive 
experimentation with open research practices. One obvious consideration is open 
access to this PhD thesis, and to any scholarly publications that arises from it. I intend 
to arrange this, while acknowledging that open access does not render my work 
automatically understandable, receptive, or ethical. It does, however, increase the 
ability of interested parties to find and read this work, to discuss it with me or others, 
and use it in their own work. This is especially important as I hope my work will be of 
interest in open science communities who value and sometimes rely on online 
accessibility. Subsequent sections include reflexive engagements with openness 
during my analytical process, during which it becomes clear that methodological 
openness for grounded, situated social research may need to be different from that 





2.3.8 Interview transcription 
 
I transcribed most of the interviews myself within the software package NVivo, which 
took 6-8 hours per interview. This established my familiarity with the data, which was 
part of the analytical process. For time efficiency, I used my studentship funding 
allocation to pay for professional transcription of the final 17 interviews; I re-
familiarised myself with these interviews at later stages of analysis.  
 
2.3.9 Interview analysis 
 
I took a grounded approach to interview analysis, with an emphasis on exploring data 
rather than applying a top-down theoretical framework. A prevalent approach of this 
kind is grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967) which formalises a progressive 
building up of “theory” from close, iterative examinations, categorisations (“coding”), 
and conceptualisations of qualitative data. I took some guidance from this approach – 
of which there are several versions – but did not adopt it wholesale. My reasons for 
avoiding prescribed qualitative methods align with those of Thomas and James 
(2006). They argue that grounded theory “misses the best”: that in “hankering after 
order”, it fractures and relegates the original voice of both participant and researcher, 
“constraining and distorting qualitative inquiry” (pp. 767, 790). This results in a 
“mirage of some kind of reliable knowing” (p. 791), which has been key to the success 
of grounded theory and its continued popularity: 
“Grounded theory, and other techniques of analysis in qualitative 
inquiry, are bound to be popular, because they meet a need. For while 
qualitative inquiry is absolutely valid, it is difficult to do […] Such 
ways of doing research can lead to a floating feeling, a lack of 
direction. What does one do with one’s data? Surely one can’t just 
talk about it.” (p. 768) 
After grappling with qualitative data, I found that Thomas and James’ argument rang 
true. My attempts to apply any one structure – especially one that breaks down 
narratives in order to build up concepts – led to feeling that I was missing the forest 
for the trees: losing context, subtext, and connections between micro and macro 
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textual elements. I turned away from prescribed analytical methods primarily out of 
concern that they were suppressing both obvious and subtle creative insights.  
 
What is the alternative to prescription? Thomas and James (2006) assert that “the 
argument for qualitative research now stands in its own right” (p. 790) and that 
although qualitative analysis requires systematic effort, imagination, and skill, its core 
processes need not be elevated above everyday reasoning: 
“…the tacit and spoken tools of normal sense-making, or of what 
Schatzman (1991, p. 304) calls ‘common interpretative acts’ – of 
review, rehearsal, of talking about it with friends, of employing 
practical syllogism, recognition, evaluation, coming to a conclusion.” 
(pp. 788-789) 
This position is arguably one of methodological openness (and the authors refer to it 
in passing as “open qualitative inquiry”, p. 770). It requires an admission that there is 
no formula for truth-telling about social worlds.  
 
My eventual interview analysis arose from combination of techniques and reflections 
that evolved over the research period (for detail and visualisations, see Appendix F: 
Approach to interview analysis). My approach was anchored by close attention to the 
same data at multiple stages, allowing insight to emerge progressively both within 
and across a growing set of interviews. Analysis began in the interview interaction 
itself and immediately afterwards through attention, exploratory questioning, and 
reflective note-taking. It continued during transcription, which allowed me to attend 
precisely to each question-and-response while taking interpretative notes. I then 
experimented with several techniques for transcript analysis, including close reading 
with line-by-line annotation; mind-mapping (using Coggle.it); and coding in NVivo. 
These techniques helped me achieve an initial depth of insight with each interview: 
familiarity not only with content, but with tone and context; patterns of narration; 
and the relationship of the interviewee with the topic and interview setting. 
 
NVivo coding brought breadth as well as depth, as this process allows systematic 
comparison across interviews. I went through several phases of expansive coding that 
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evidenced the breadth of the topic and interviewees’ associated experiences. It 
became manifest at this point that the interviews contained multitudes: there were 
many valid, valuable routes to a final analysis. No single route would emerge through 
coding and refinement of codes: an overarching decision was required about the focus 
and purpose of the analysis. To do this, I reflected systematically on my analyses in 
relation to my overarching research question: How is the meaning of “open” (or 
“openness”) being constructed in the context of science? I noted that three stand-out 
categories characterised scientists’ constructions from early on: (1) open access, (2) 
data openness, and (3) interpersonal openness. These were not the only categories of 
“openness” constructed by scientists, but they gave an accurate indication of where 
interviews were focused and offered broad, cross-cutting entry points for more in-
depth analysis. They were “obvious” categories: the first two were well-established 
categories in “open science” discourse, and all three arose with exceptional frequency 
in scientists’ responses. 
 
From this point I structured my analysis according to these three categories, which 
eventually became Chapter 6-8. Once I could focus on each category separately, the 
common and varied characteristics of scientists’ relationships with these types of 
openness became clearer. I analysed each category in a different way, to best illustrate 
these relationships. For example, I found that relationships with open access were 
best captured through identification of common framings across scientists’ 
experiences (e.g. a financial framings). Reactions to data openness were instead 
extremely varied and more emotional: this prompted me to conceptualise the 
circumstances and internalised experiences that mediate relationships with data 
openness, as distinct from open access. Interpersonal openness was a novel category 
and thus a novel analysis, but had features in common with data openness, which 
added depth to both analyses. These analytical choices: my focus on the meaning of 
openness to interviewees; my decision to break down the analysis according to three 
common scientist-identified categories, and my focus on relationships with openness, 
all shaped my findings. The third choice in particular was honed by my sensitising 
concept, epistemic virtue, which draws attention to openness in relation to 




The final phase of analysis involved several techniques that helped me achieve both 
depth and a systematic overview. This included tabulating the salience of each 
category of openness in each scientist’s account; re-reading transcripts; and writing 
summaries to characterise individuals’ relationships with each type of openness. I 
completed this analysis through drafting and finalising Chapters 6-8, because the 
writing itself prompted reflection, revisiting of transcripts, and higher-level synthesis 
with each revision. This process is represented in Chapter 9 as well, which contains 
analysis bringing together the previous three chapters, and conceptualisation that 




As a social researcher I am attempting to make sense of meanings, attitudes, concepts 
and cultures through the lens of my own social worlds: reflexivity about my own 
position is thus particularly important. As Malterud (2001) writes: 
“A researcher's background and position will affect what they choose 
to investigate, the angle of investigation, the methods judged most 
adequate for this purpose, the findings considered most appropriate, 
and the framing and communication of conclusions.” (p. 483-484) 
This research is strongly shaped by my broader life experience. This makes it 
distinctive, partial, enriched, and insightful in ways that I will attempt to capture. 
 
2.3.10.1 Conceiving of the research 
 
This research brought together at least three threads of my past experience. The first 
was my identity as a biologist, which I developed as an undergraduate with the 
opportunity to conduct primary research, and as a laboratory technical assistant prior 
to this. The second was a fascination with the social in science that I did not 
understand as such during my undergraduate degree: biological theories seemingly 
tinged with social ideals; trust and care in experimental setups; the necessity and 
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power of publishing (well). This led me an entry-level job in scientific publishing: an 
opportunity to make sense of behind-the-scenes work that legitimised knowledge. I 
was hired by PLOS, a small non-profit publisher focusing on biomedical sciences that 
– then eight years old as a business – had recently consolidated its financial and 
reputational success. This serendipitously added a third thread to my experience: 
PLOS, an open access publisher, was one of the most significant and symbolic actors 
in a growing movement promoting openness of scientific knowledge. I stepped into 
this world naive about “open” but enthused by the embrace of a moral mission in 
science.  
 
Working at PLOS for three years honed my knowledge of – and care for – both “open” 
movements, and biological science communities. My job was to support and manage 
a “community” journal: it was run by and for practising scientists from a particular 
biological discipline. This meant daily communication with biologists as authors, 
reviewers, and editors. As a representative of an “open” organisation I witnessed, in 
everyday interactions, a meeting between open ideals and the daily priorities of 
scientists. I observed what many advocates of open science have noted, which is that 
scientists who actively pursue “open” practices and values seem to be small minority 
in a population for whom such concerns are at most secondary. This tension between 
open advocates and a wider scientific community was one that I identified with – on 
both sides. I was also fascinated by the advocacy discourse that gave “open” meaning; 
the moral imperative that “open” seemed to hold; and the way that PLOS’ mission 
shifted from open access towards data openness and other “open” practices during my 
time there (2011-2014). By the time I left PLOS it was with a sense that I had been part 
of a fascinating social–scientific phenomenon that merited systematic reflection. I 
became aware of STS, and embarked on postgraduate study that, by the time of my 
PhD application, led me back to scientific openness. My experiences at PLOS were the 





2.3.10.2 My position as a researcher 
 
For the reasons above, I have more than a theoretical relationship with open science 
movements and biological science communities. In this research I step back from 
open science discourses to examine them, but I am not a neutral investigator. My 
experiences at PLOS led me to view science as a domain in flux, in which scientists 
and open advocates alike perceive major problems with the integrity of knowledge 
production and scientific career structures. At PLOS, I embraced open science as a 
solution to many of these problems. Since then my view has been tempered by 
attention to many meanings of “open” in practice, and their varied effects in scientific 
lives. However, I carry with me a conviction that scientific systems require critique, 
care, even transformation, and that open science discourses and practices can be part 
of a helpful change in that direction. Moreover, I hold many open science advocates 
in great esteem; some are my personal acquaintances, and interviewees in this 
research. Although, as a researcher, I do analysis – a safe, equivocal position – my 
hope is to do so in a way that supports rather than undermines those who advocate 
for better science and scientific lives.  
 
My position is no less shaped by my connection to biological science. Despite my 
move away from biology, I have found that my scientific identity is deeply embedded, 
and scientific ways thinking are blended into my social research lens. Perhaps the 
most important influence from this background is the empathy that I feel for varied 
experiences of scientific life: for over ten years, I have been close to practising 
biological scientists as bosses, supervisors, mentors, colleagues, friends, and family. 
Several have contributed to this research as interviewees. My sister is a biologist who 
is writing her PhD as I write mine: our conversations have allowed me to check my 
interpretations against an ongoing life in science. I have adopted a purposefully 
empathetic position as a counterpoint to tendencies in both STS and open advocacy 
to be cynical in interpreting (other) scientists’ behaviour as, for example, primarily 
self-interested (e.g. Gieryn 1983). This sharpens my attention to the human element of 
this study; any temptation I might have to make one-dimensional interpretations of 
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interview data is checked. This is not the same as being uncritical; empathy means 
acknowledging depth and complexity.  
 
2.3.11 Limitations and potential to broaden scope 
 
Although the interview findings have potential relevance beyond the immediate 
contexts studied, they are a partial perspective on scientists’ constructions of 
openness. As I have noted, extending the study into commercial or government 
science contexts, beyond biological fields, and outside privileged institutional and 
national settings would yield valuable and complementary perspectives. In particular, 
this study lacks non-Anglophone and global south perspectives, which would 
challenge and/or align with the current findings in multiple and unexpected ways. 
Constructions of open access in particular (see Chapter 6) are tied to variable local 
conditions such as institutional access to subscription journals; and open access 
policy, administration, and fee support. Interpersonal openness in science (see 
Chapter 8), meanwhile, is likely related to broader cultures of interpersonal 
communication that vary between nations and regions.  
 
Interviewing at prestige-oriented universities may emphasise particular dynamics of 
openness related, for example, to competition. Research institutions that cultivate a 
different type of image – or citizen science settings – would likely tell contrasting 
stories. There are also some professional perspectives that I would emphasise more in 
any future study: those of laboratory technicians, librarians, and administrators of 
open policy/practice. It would also be pertinent to do an equivalent study of a 
humanities or social science context. This was outside the present scope, which is 
contextualised by a long history of openness in the natural sciences: but “open” policy 
now applies across a spectrum of scholarship, and rich histories of openness could be 
told across a spectrum of knowledge-making. I would also consider, in future, 
recording intersectional identities (e.g. gender, ethnicity, race, class, disability, sexual 
orientation) if this could be done in a non-intrusive way around interviews. This 
would increase awareness and accuracy of the range of views included in the study. 
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Generational differences were important in this study and were well-represented, but 




Chapter 3 | “On the shoulders of giants” 
Historical framings of openness in science 
 
 
“Openness is a catch-all term that is deployed in many different ways, 
for different purposes, and with different reasons and motivations […] 
[It] is sometimes deployed as being very new: it’s all about the web, 
and the internet, and what we can do today. [..] And at the same 
time, it’s also frequently deployed […] as something that’s very old, 
that sits in the roots. And that deliberate pointing out – that these 
two things [new and old] are the same – also has deep roots.” 6 
 





In this chapter, I explore the historical construction of scientific openness. This would 
be a key dimension of any social-conceptual analysis; in this case, my motivation to 
study openness in science came in part from the historical resonance it seemed to 
carry (see Section 1.3). I commonly encountered the assertion that openness is an 
enduring, inevitable, even defining characteristic of science – one that goes back for 
centuries. This created a curious juxtaposition: scientific openness appeared to be 
both as old as science itself, and so new that social and policy movements embracing 
it have taken form in only a few recent decades. This juxtaposition led to the 
formulation of my first research sub-question: how do contemporary “open science” 
discourses relate to older, traditional discourses about the essential value of openness in 
science? This question guides the current chapter, which is in part a review of texts 
about scientific openness in past historical periods. It is also an analysis, in the sense 
that it examines both these and other relevant texts as artefacts of a certain time and 
place that reflect and construct historically situated ideas about scientific openness. 
                                                     
6 Comments from a panel discussion in February 2019, part of an Openness and Reproducibility 
in Science workshop that I co-organised with staff at the Australian National Centre for the 
Public Awareness of Science and the ANU Research School of Biology. 
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The aim is to comment both upon the past of scientific openness, and upon the 
construction of that history.  
 
The chapter begins with two contrasting accounts of scientific openness: firstly as an 
enduring, apparently traditional, and essential characteristic of scientific culture; and 
secondly as the contemporary, internet-associated phenomenon of “open science” – a 
diverse yet congruent set of movements and practices that seek to revolutionise 
science, redeeming its open character. I then analyse literature to contextualise these 
two accounts and the relationship between them. I interrogate the traditional ideal of 
scientific openness by considering its historically contingent origins; its intermingling 
with secrecy and closure across and within scientific cultures; and the social, 
relational roles that are played by openness and secrecy in context. Reflecting upon 
these analyses, I consider how accounts of science as inevitably or essentially open 
may be constructed through boundary work (Gieryn 1983) that delimits both “science” 
and “open”. I present more tangible ways to characterise and situate historical 
traditions of “openness” in science – in relation to community, professional status, 
and publication practices. These analyses culminate with an argument that histories 
of scientific openness are difficult to disentangle from the contemporary “open 
science” lens that now shapes them. 
 
3.2 Traditional openness: enduring, inevitable, and essential 
 
Traditional stories of scientific openness go as follows: if scientists communicate – 
that is in some form share, make visible, or be “open” about – their results, scientific 
communities can collectively build on upon these findings and a progressive, self-
organising, even self-correcting corpus of knowledge emerges. The scientist and 
philosopher Michael Polanyi (1962) tells a version of this story when he asserts that 
the work of individual scientists – “freely making their own choice of problems and 
pursuing them in the light of their own personal judgment” – is coordinated by their 
awareness of one another’s results, without which “scientific progress would come to 
a standstill”  (p. 54). He likens this system to the collaborative completion of a jigsaw 
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puzzle, in which each worker can see and adjust to the contributions of the others (p. 
55). In stories like these, openness is an organising principle, and a necessary 
condition for the production of science that is collective or cumulative – rather than 
individual or idiosyncratic – in character. Such stories and logics are not rare, esoteric 
or derived from a single source: Polanyi writes that much of what he has to say “will 
be common knowledge among scientists” (p. 54). The widespread appropriation of 
Newton’s aphorism, “If I have seen further, it is by standing on the shoulders of 
giants” (1675) – including in the tagline of the Google Scholar search engine – 
indicates that a story of science as communal, cumulative, and predicated on the 
availability of past knowledge, is well acknowledged in scholarly and public discourse.  
 
The sociologist of science Robert Merton tells his version of this story with an extra 
twist: he theorises that the open communication and communal sharing of scientific 
findings is not only a technically efficient way of building knowledge, but a norm 
institutionally reinforced in scientists. This “communism” (later “communalism”, 
Vanderstraeten and Eykens 2018), is one of four norms defining the ethos of modern 
science according to Merton (1973 [1942], pp. 267–275), and he describes it as follows: 
“The substantive findings of science are a product of social 
collaboration and are assigned to the community […] The 
institutional conception of science as part of the public domain is 
linked with the imperative for communication of findings. Secrecy is 
the antithesis of this norm; full and open communication is its 
enactment.” (pp. 273-274) 
Merton himself identifies Newton’s “shoulders of giants” aphorism with his norm of 
communism, observing that it “expresses at once a sense of indebtedness to the 
common heritage and a recognition of the essentially cooperative and selectively 
cumulative quality of scientific achievement” (p. 275). Merton’s assertion is not that 
open, communal knowledge sharing is universally practised by scientists, but that 
optimally functioning systems of science will encourage these norms, which will be 
“in varying degrees internalised by the scientist” (p. 269). Merton’s perspective goes 
beyond scientific openness as an abstract logic governing the accumulation of 
knowledge: he situates it as a cultural ideal with which scientists are trained to have a 
meaningful relationship. Merton has many critics: his ethos of science is often seen as 
an outmoded and flawed (e.g. Barnes and Dolby 1970; Mulkay 1976; Rothman 1972). 
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Mulkay in particular, argues that Merton’s norms can be better understood as 
“vocabularies of justification” that have an ideological function, promoting the status 
of science and scientists to government (pp. 653-654). However, Merton himself 
recognised that normative structures do not preclude ambivalence and the operation 
of “counter-norms” (as documented and developed by Mitroff 1974). Merton’s 
articulation of science as ethos-driven, including by open, communal ideals, seems to 
have popular resonance beyond its academic life in social studies of science: “If the 
classic Mertonian norms of science […] do not exist, then it seems today’s scientists 
intend to invent them” (Kelty 2012:159). 
 
Fifty years after Polanyi described communally built jigsaw puzzles, the UK’s Royal 
Society – of which he had been a Fellow – produced a report reinforcing a 
commitment to openness in science, titled Science as an open enterprise (2012). In 
reflecting on over 300 years of scientific activity, the authors cite Polanyi (1962) and 
re-tell a familiar story: 
“Much of the remarkable growth of scientific understanding in recent 
centuries is due to open practices; open communication and 
deliberation sit at the heart of scientific practice. Publishing scientific 
theories, including experimental and observational data, permits 
others to scrutinise them, to replicate experiments and to reuse data 
to create further understanding...” (p. 13) 
In the report, this statement is a prelude to a new and different narrative about 
openness in science: the story of “open science” that unfolds in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
3.3 Twenty-first century “open science” 
 
I have shown above that the idea of openness in science is not new in the twenty-first 
century, but rather deeply embedded in traditional stories about both the logic and 
culture of science. Since the turn of the twenty-first century a new set of stories 
concerning scientific openness have emerged. Where traditional stories are reassuring 
about the essential openness of science, new stories are less sanguine: after affirming 
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that openness sits “at the heart of scientific practice”, the Royal Society report (2012) 
raises concern that “much of today’s scientific practice falls short of the ideals of 
intelligent openness” (p. 16). Simultaneously, the report presents a grand new 
opportunity for scientific openness: “The internet […] may pave the way for a second 
open science revolution, as great as that triggered by the creation of the first scientific 
journals” (p. 7). Similarly in the US, the website of the National Institutes of Health 
(NIH) features a video titled “open science” that identifies deep problems with 
current scientific communication systems, and a need to “ensure the central values of 
the scientific process, which are openness, integrity, and reproducibility” (Nosek 
2014). The video associates a need to redeem the values of science with the 2013 
founding of a Center for Open Science, based in Virginia. Stories of crisis, opportunity 
and revolution in the relationship between science and openness are characteristic of 
an “open science” discourse that has rapidly gained traction in international scholarly 
research contexts over the last twenty years. 
 
Twenty-first century “open science” is associated with a diverse but interrelated set of 
practices, often explicitly labelled as “open”, each of which is supported by social 
movements, technological innovations, and in some cases, research policy directives 
(Fecher and Friesike 2014). Some of the most salient are: 
 open access: free, public, online access to – and reusability of – published 
research, especially in the form of scholarly journal articles (Suber 2012);  
 open research data: free, public, online access to primary research data 
including reusability (Murray-Rust 2008); 
 open preprints: free, public, online access to scholarly journal articles before 
their formal publication (Desjardins-Proulx et al. 2013);  
 open peer review: free, public, online transparency about aspects of editorial 
review that are traditionally hidden (e.g. reviewer identities or comments, 
Ford 2013); and 
 open notebook science: in which detailed research notes – including 
ongoing primary data, ideas, plans, and actions – are documented in an 
online, cost-free, and publicly-available format (Bradley et al. 2008). 
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This is a partial selection, and the list continues to expand. For example, the 
involvement of lay publics in science, including an “opening up” of traditional 
boundaries separating lay from expert scientific communities, is sometimes 
considered to be a component of open science, under headings such as citizen 
science, science blogging and “wisdom of the crowds” (Fecher and Friesike 2014:19–
25). Moreover, there are components of open science that focus on “opening” discrete 
aspects of research processes or products beyond those above: these include 
preregistered open research proposals (Nosek et al. 2018); open methodologies or 
protocols (e.g. Teytelman et al. 2016); and open software, code, or models 
(Easterbrook 2014). Open science is associated with claims that traditional structures 
of scientific communication, in particular the journal article, need to be 
supplemented or replaced by new formats (e.g. Nielsen 2009:32). Further elements of 
open science relate to the way that research is indexed, measured and assessed, 
including the “opening up” of citation data (Shotton 2018), and challenges to the 
journal impact factor as a proxy for of research impact (DORA 2012). Open science is 
often explained using visual metaphors, especially an umbrella, but also e.g. a rainbow 
or a wheel, indicating that multiple practices, movements, technologies or policies are 




Figure 4 | Diagrams that use visual metaphors to explain open science. (a) A commonly used drawing of 
open science as an umbrella (지우 황 2013) CC BY 2.0; (b) open science “wheel” created by the European 
Commission’s Open Science Monitor (EC 2017:6); “rainbow of open science practices” by Kramer and 
Bosman (2018) CC BY 4.0. 
 
Despite the breadth and diversity of open science concepts, nearly all are strongly 
associated with Internet technology and cultures, and have arisen in their present 
forms following the invention of the World Wide Web in the 1990s. The speed, 
breadth and accessibility of information-sharing enabled by the Internet is seen as a 
step-change opportunity: Nielsen (2009) describes it as the “first major opportunity to 
improve” the way science works after 300 years of “surprisingly little” change (p. 30). 
Although each “open” practice or movement is pursued in its own right, there is a 
tendency for them to be viewed not only as congruent elements of whole, but as 
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extensions of one another; even a moving frontier that extends “openness” 
throughout scientific practice and systems. This tendency is evident in talk of an open 
science “revolution” (Bartling and Friesike 2014b; Nielsen 2011:184; The Royal Society 
2012:7) that evokes all-encompassing transformation of science, as well as the 
implication that science should be on a path towards “complete” or “extreme” 
openness through the progressive opening up of different elements. Nielsen (2009) 
urges the creation of an open scientific culture in which “everything – data, scientific 
opinions, questions, ideas, folk knowledge, workflows and everything else” (p. 32) is 
present in an online network. He expresses his vision as a logical extension of the 
older, traditional story about communal knowledge-sharing when he writes that: 
“…extreme openness is the ultimate expression of the idea that others 
may build upon and extend the work of individual scientists in ways 
that they themselves would never have conceived.” (ibid.) 
A moving frontier is also in evidence when advocates of “open” shift or expand their 
attention progressively from one “open” practice and concept to another. This can be 
observed in a broad chronological shift in advocacy, technology and policy focus that 
begins in many contexts – certainly in the UK – with open access to the research 
literature, progresses through the opening up of primary data underlying research 
findings, and moves towards the incorporation practices that are currently on the 
fringe of mainstream research culture in many fields, such as open peer review and 
sharing of research articles – preprints – prior to publication (see Chapter 5). 
 
Contemporary open science, then, can be understood as a set of diverse yet congruent 
components – sometimes framed as extensions of one another – directed towards the 
pursuit of a transformed open science future, and operating largely via the Internet. It 
can also be understood as a set of social movements and practices that have 
developed in the grassroots of research and entrepreneurial communities, but are 
increasingly endorsed, encouraged and even enforced top-down by institutions that 
govern research. Each component of open science is associated with its own material 
practice, cultural history, and relationship with research policy: collectively, these 
would be too extensive and intricate to include in this thesis. However, some of these 
details are particularly relevant for contextualising my empirical research findings. 
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Chapter 5 is devoted to a close examination of open access and open research data in 
particular, as part of a framing analysis of “open” in advocacy and policy contexts.  
 
3.4 Tracing traditional narratives of scientific openness 
 
I have now introduced two dominant accounts of scientific openness that appear in 
scholarly and policy literature, and have compelling narrative qualities. The 
traditional narrative conjures a seemingly timeless image of communal knowledge-
sharing. It is followed in the twenty-first century by an explicitly “open” narrative that 
reaffirms and extends the traditional one. In doing so, it evokes a future in which 
today’s flawed science has been restored or elevated to an ideal state of openness – 
using the Internet. I present these narratives as powerful sources of meaning for open 
science movement(s): stories that seem to have been told and re-told, shaping 
scientists’, policymakers’, and open science advocates’ worldviews and constructions 
of scientific openness. In this sense, my initial answer to research sub-question (a) is 
that the relationship between traditional and contemporary “open science” discourses 
is a complementary and additive one. Accounts of scientific openness as very old 
strengthen very new “open science” by rooting it authentically in history, as the 
contemporary pursuit of age-old principles that define science. Contemporary “open 
science” narratives do not discard traditional narratives: they build upon them.  
 
This analysis is not intended to imply falseness or strategy in the framing of scientific 
openness, or to suggest that that contemporary “open science” is without a rich 
history. Nor does my use of the words “narrative” and “story” imply that accounts of 
old or new scientific openness are untruthful. Rather, I use “narrative” to indicate that 
common, overarching threads of meaning run through accounts of scientific openness 
and hold the intuitive appeal of a story – one which has often been based in evidence, 
but can easily be distanced from it. Stories have their own effects: Haraway writes, “it 
matters what stories we tell to tell other stories with […] It  matters  what  stories 
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make worlds, what worlds make stories” (1988:12)7. The relationship between these 
narratives – the framing of one by the other – shows how they interact at an intuitive 
level. I have distilled these narrative threads to make them visible; in the subsequent 
sections I will begin to unravel them, reintroducing contextual detail that can be 
elided by a narrative focus, in an attempt to tell a more complex and nuanced history 
of scientific openness. I begin by contextualising – through literature review and 
analysis – the older, traditional narrative. 
 
3.4.1 Historical origins of openness in science 
 
The idea that science is built through open, communal knowledge-sharing has a 
familiar, logical appeal – at least from a contemporary Western perspective – which 
belies its contextual features and its contingent place in history. Attempts to trace the 
origin of ideas, practice or cultures of openness in science quickly encounter the 
flexible boundaries of both “science” and “open”. For instance, McMullin (1985) argues 
that the origins of science as an open, public enterprise can be found “in the Greek-
speaking world more than two millennia ago” together with the shaping of “science” 
itself (p. 14). He considers an early, Platonic, Aristotelian ideal of science to be open 
because of its emphasis on knowledge creation via the public realm: “Any assertion 
which lays claim to being epistēmē (science) must be justified, and the process of 
justification is in principle a public one” (ibid., original emphasis). Eamon (1985), on 
the other hand, considers that scientific openness was not evident in classical Greece 
despite the “paradigm of competitive public debate”, because it “tended to solidify 
knowledge into separate schools” (p. 321). Thus even given similar historical reference 
points, McMullin and Eamon reach different conclusions because of their varying 
specifications of scientific openness: for Eamon, “collaboration among scientists 
directed towards a single goal” (ibid.) is an implied requirement, whereas a public 
locus of knowledge-making is sufficient for McMullin.  
 
                                                     
7 I am telling another story about these stories of openness, of course. 
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Eamon’s view aligns with the “traditional” story of scientific openness that I told at 
the beginning of this chapter, with the accounts of Polanyi (1962) and Merton (1973 
[1942]), and with some other histories (e.g. David 2008), in that openness is assumed 
to be communal, collaborative and directed toward the accumulation of knowledge. 
Eamon (1985) and David (2008) place the emergence of this well-recognised form of 
scientific openness in sixteenth and seventeenth century Europe, and each author 
reconstructs its socio-technical development. There is a common understanding that 
this form of openness arose in contrast with prevailing cultures of secrecy in medieval 
Europe – cultures that not only concealed knowledge, but rationalised secrecy as an 
epistemic priority. Literary traditions portrayed the goddess Natura as being “modest, 
covered with a veil, and hostile to an open disclosure of her secrets”; social hierarchies 
and surrounding political and religious attitudes encouraged the withholding of such 
secrets from the “vulgar”; and alchemical writers used an esoteric language – “obscure 
symbols, paradoxes, allegories and secret names” – to protect their knowledge, which 
was considered divine and personal, rather than public (Eamon 1985:321, 325). The 
appearance of an “open” knowledge culture in this context was not inevitable: David 
(2008) in particular emphasises the “extended, intricate and contingent historical 
process” by which it took hold (p. 6).  
 
The invention of the printing press in the fifteenth century is identified as a 
background condition that later enabled more “open” dissemination of scientific 
knowledge, but not a significant turning point (David 2008:52; Eamon 1985:322). 
According to Eamon, gradual cultural-conceptual changes mark the rise of 
communal, cumulative openness. New metaphors for science saw it is a hunt, an 
“aggressive pursuit after the deepest secrets of nature” (p. 334), and the idea of 
scientific progress emerged. This latter idea, so familiar in scientific cultures today, 
was “almost totally absent from the great philosophical systems of classical antiquity” 
(p. 335) which emphasised refinement of classical truths rather than innovation8. 
McMullin (1985:17) also notes this as a shift in epistemic culture evident between 
medieval and renaissance cultures. In the seventeenth century Francis Bacon 
                                                     
8 The idea of progress as a quality of modern science is also open to critique; I note that the 
late twentieth century, when these histories were written, featured much theorising on the 
topic of scientific progress (e.g. Kuhn 1962; McMullin 1979). 
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influentially critiqued scientific secrecy and promoted a new rhetoric of progress via 
“co-operation and communication within the scientific community” (Eamon 1985:334, 
338–39). Bacon’s ideas apparently inspired the formation of “informal study clubs” in 
England and France who communicated their research through personal 
correspondence – letters (ibid., p. 342). The establishment in 1660 Royal Society of 
London represented an institutionalisation of this informal arrangement in which the 
secretary, Henry Oldenburg, 
“…vastly expanded the Royal Society's contacts with the European 
virtuosi, and within the space of only a few years made the Society an 
international centre for the exchange of scientific and technical 
information.” (Eamon 1985:343) 
The contents of correspondence to the Royal Society were aired at its meetings, and 
detailed notes of these meetings were recorded and kept; thus a communication 
network based on private letters became a systematic and “public” scientific record 
(ibid., pp. 342, 344) – albeit one limited to a certain gentlemanly class, race and 
gender. Simultaneously it became a means for establishing priority – the status of 
having been first to make a discovery – and according to Eamon this “induced many 
natural philosophers to accept the new norm of free communication of scientific 
information” (ibid., p. 344). This association between openness and recognition of 
priority is core to norm of communism as conceptualised by Merton (1973 [1942], pp. 
267–275). This norm was further institutionalised and materialised through scholarly 
journals: the Royal Society’s Philosophical Transactions was one of the first of these, 
initially published and circulated in 1665.  
 
In his economic-historical analysis of same period and concept of scientific openness, 
David (2008) argues that it was not the appeal of institutionalised knowledge-sharing 
and recognition alone that set in motion a broad cultural change away from secrecy 
(pp. 31-32). He concludes that a fragmentation of political power in post-feudal 
Western Europe was a pivotal factor promoting an institutionalisation of “open 
science”. In this context, aristocrats sought competitive advantage by sponsoring 
natural philosophers of exceptional skill. Because these powerful patrons were unable 
to assess skills personally due to increasingly complex mathematics, a demand grew 
for public advertising and peer assessment of intellectual feats, conducted through 
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networks of correspondence visible to the ruling classes:  “challenges could be issued, 
contests and competitions could be staged, and collegiate reputations could be both 
secured and widely broadcast” (ibid., p.69). It was in this fragmented and competitive 
context, David argues, that scholarly societies and academies began to institutionalize 
knowledge-sharing in a familiar form. David introduces his argument with a 
“Presentist” prologue emphasising the fragility of the open culture that came about in 
this contingent manner, perceiving it as vulnerable to reductions in public funding or 
incursions from infrastructures of private property (ibid., pp. 4-5). 
 
3.4.2 Openness, secrecy and closure in social and historical context 
 
Some of the historical accounts above observe that practices or cultures of scientific 
openness are not, and did not become, ubiquitous – whether in classical Greece or in 
renaissance Europe. Cultures of secrecy flourished alongside them: McMullin (1985), 
for instance, contrasts “open” Platonic, Aristotelian knowledge cultures with Eastern-
inspired “mystery religions” of the Greek world in which knowledge was apparently 
constituted by its “occult and hidden character” (pp. 14-15) – much like medieval 
cultures of epistemic secrecy. And Eamon stresses that in renaissance Europe, 
“traditional exhortations against ‘forbidden knowledge’ were still widespread, in 
particular against looking into the secrets of nature, the secrets of God, and the 
secrets of the state” (p. 333). Although Eamon describes a cultural shift towards 
openness at least in regard to “secrets of nature”, craft knowledge was not governed 
by the same institutional norms as established by the Royal Society. The Society’s 
attempts, from 1660, to document craft knowledge and offer recognition to inventors 
fell flat when craftsmen proved unwilling to reveal trade secrets (Eamon 1985:344–45; 
Iliffe 1992:31). Mathematical traditions at the end of the seventeenth century were also 
far from open and contrasted with some knowledge-witnessing conventions of the 
Royal Society. It was routine to announce a mathematical result in cypher – code – in 
order to claim priority while protecting the discovery from “appropriation by 




The story of scientific openness is thus not as clear as it first appears. Different 
definitions and traditions of openness can be identified with different historical 
starting points, and despite their apparently compelling ideological qualities – at least 
in the case of the communal, progressive openness of the European Renaissance – 
they become dominant only in particular knowledge contexts. And indeed, it may 
only be through accidents of history – such as the fragmentation of scientific 
patronage regimes – as David (2008) claims, that such cultures gain momentum. 
However, if one examines the history of scientific openness still further, a more 
elementary observation becomes inescapable: cultures of secrecy not only run parallel 
to cultures of openness; they flourish within them. Moreover, through a fine-grained 
contextual lens, the flexible boundaries of scientific openness start to crumble: 
secrecy or closure are intermingled with openness at the level of a culture, an 
institution, an individual, or even a single action.  
 
3.4.2.1 Historical example of openness and closure in practice 
 
Iliffe (1992) writes a compelling account of a controversy between two Fellows of the 
Royal Society, Robert Hooke and Christiaan Huygens, at a time, 1675, and within an 
institutional setting credited with the establishment of openness cultures. Each man 
claimed invention of the balance-spring watch. In principle, the Royal Society had 
mechanisms in place to air and adjudicate these claims to priority. In practice, these 
natural philosophers each deployed tactics involving varied forms of openness and 
closure in an attempt to secure acknowledgement and patenting rights. Huygens 
initially circulated knowledge of his watch in closed form: a cypher was sent to 
Oldenburg, the Society secretary, who was entrusted to register receipt of such claims 
to priority. Huygens was pushed to reveal the meaning of the cypher early, when the 
watchmaker he trusted betrayed a vow of secrecy and attempted to claim the 
invention. When Hooke learned of Huygens’ watch, he leaned on the records of the 
Royal Society and the testimony of trusted members to claim that he had invented a 
comparable watch years previously – whilst immediately and privately getting to work 
on a new version. Having been drawn into a defensive position, the burden of 
evidencing claims was placed on Huygens, who was asked to send increasingly 
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detailed documentation – and the watch itself – for consideration by the Society. 
Hooke was able to build a competing watch while hiding its mechanism – some 
versions may even have been engineered to break if opened – by leveraging his 
connection with the King Charles II, who could vouch for the watch’s functionality. 
This prevented an assessment of similarity between the two watches, which in all 
likelihood worked differently and thus need not have competed. 
 
This is an example of Hooke successfully bypassing the authority and “open” 
conventions of the Royal Society to secure his invention according to secretive trade 
norms. “From Hooke’s point of view, no craftsman would ever have made such a 
secret public, and once Huygens had done so, Hooke assumed he was fair game…” (p. 
54). It also an example of how cultures of openness can not only contain secretive 
instances and individuals, but systematically engender particular kinds of secrecy. 
Announcement and full disclosure of discovery were not necessarily simultaneous. In 
fact they were routinely decoupled, and the conventions of the Royal Society enabled 
this. Members could submit cyphers – as Huygens did – or sealed letters in attempt to 
establish their priority without revealing the key details. Even hints dropped in 
personal correspondence or conversations with other members of the Society could 
be presented as evidence of prior discovery. A dichotomy between openness and 
closure is unravelled in such contexts. Early intimations of knowledge designed to 
secure priority represent partial openness and partial closure depending on factors 
such as the depth of communication, manner of encoding or concealment, and the 
size and character of the receiving audience. These degrees of openness and closure 
are exposed in context as performances that do socio-technical work, asserting or 
ceding power. The precise manner of simultaneously revealing and hiding a discovery 
can buy one time to “perfect” it and an assurance of priority; it can alarm, quell or 
motivate one’s competitors; and can elicit counter-moves that also mix openness with 
closure. In showing his watch to the King, Hooke selectively revealed his knowledge 
in a way that wields power, simultaneously ensuring he does not need to reveal the 
secrets manifest within the physical object – but that Huygens must, in order to 
respond. These power dynamics of intermingled openness and closure around claims 
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to priority are recognisable in the twenty-first century experiences of the scientists I 
interviewed, and are discussed particularly in Chapter 8. 
 
3.4.2.2 Theorising openness and secrecy in the history of science 
 
Such reflections on the contextual and intertwined nature of openness and secrecy 
have not been conventional in the historiography of science according to Vermeir 
(2012), who examines these subtleties in early modern European science. Balmer 
(2012) does similarly in relation to UK government science during the Cold War. Both 
authors show through case studies the ways in which “open” and “secret” do not 
function in a binary manner, as states with an inside and outside, or as polarised 
opposites. Balmer and Vermeir both refer to “degrees” of openness or secrecy: Balmer 
invites us to “…think of a concentric circle as a zoned metaphor for secrecy and 
openness. When a secret is revealed, there is always going to be something left 
concealed…” (p. 146). Vermeir considers “…a range of gradations between full 
openness and extreme secrecy” (p. 170). Neither imagines these to be fixed or inert 
states; both characterise openness and secrecy as constructed in relation to particular 
objects, temporalities, geographies, and people; and importantly, as conditions that 
contribute to constructing those realities. Balmer, for instance, writes that: 
“Secrecy changes science. A close reading of events in the history of 
chemical and biological warfare research and policy demonstrates 
how it is difficult to maintain the idea of secrecy as simply a veil 
drawn around an immutable activity. Secrecy is enacted or 
performed; it produces, alters, re-configures whatever comes within 
its ambit. Different questions get asked, different lines of research are 
pursued, normative judgements are altered and actions are taken…” 
(p. 145) 
Vermeir similarly refers to the active, formative roles of openness and secrecy, for 
example: “openly showing that there is secrecy involved, is the best way to spur your 
readers on, to fascinate them” (p. 188, original emphasis). Balmer’s and Vermeir’s 
observations and arguments are consistent with the case above documented by Iliffe 




Vermeir in particular argues that openness and secrecy should not be seen in 
opposition to one another, but rather as two positive categories that “are often 
interlocked, impossible to take apart […] they might even reinforce each other” (p. 
165). Newton, for instance, pursued strategic forms of openness and secrecy 
simultaneously by disseminating his ideas widely in several forms – conversations, 
letters and manuscripts – whilst intentionally restricting them from some audiences 
including close competitors (p. 175). Vermeir and Balmer both test and explore the 
idiosyncrasies and limits of openness and secrecy, exposed in examples and thought 
experiments: e.g. a “secret” kept by over a hundred people, or an “open” conversation 
between ten people in a classroom (Vermeir 2012:169–70); an author unable to access 
his own government work when its secrecy is reclassified, and a group of missile 
technicians finding confidential design details – denied to them – on models 
accessible at toy shops (Balmer 2012:1): 
“Someone on the inside inadvertently finds himself on the outside; 
people excluded from a secret later find they had unknowingly 
accessed the inside by the most unlikely means.” (ibid.) 
These authors make it clear that openness and secrecy elude absolute definition; their 
manifestations and effects can be counterintuitive; they can coexist; and they are 
given meaning in subjective context, by those who enact and encounter them. In this 
vein, Vermeir (2012) provisionally concludes that an intentional pursuit of openness or 
secrecy defines these categories (pp. 171-176); whereas Long (2001) defines openness as 
a lack of restrictiveness. In this thesis I more often use the term “closure”, which 
implies intention to a lesser extent than secrecy, anticipating in contemporary 
scientists’ accounts gradations not only of openness and closure – including overlaps 
– but gradations of intention in producing them. 
 
3.4.3 Boundary work and the construction of openness in science 
 
An awareness of the situated, equivocal role of openness in the history of science 
makes traditional stories of openness “at the heart” of science (The Royal Society 
2012:13) all the more remarkable. There is an eagerness to elide messy relationships 
with closure and secrecy in order to find within science an essence of openness. This 
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is despite a temporal and cultural closeness of science to secret knowledge-making; 
and despite the interweaving of openness and secrecy in the everyday actions and 
intentions of scientists pursuing a public or private accumulation of knowledge. This 
leads me to two observations: firstly, I suggest that boundary work (Gieryn 1983) is a 
useful concept for understanding what is taking place: social, rhetorical work is being 
done to delimit the boundaries of “science” despite its inherently flexible qualities. 
Secondly, although the relationship between science and openness is empirically 
messy, a widespread subjective valuing of openness by scientists – that involves 
boundary work – could be considered an important part of (some) scientific cultures.  
 
The boundary work being done in histories of openness in science is of the traditional 
type described by Gieryn (ibid.): a particular quality – in this case openness – is 
established rhetorically as a distinguishing factor between science and non-science. 
That which is not open, is, in this view, not truly science9. Then in addition, an 
extended, circular form of boundary work can also occur, because of the inherent 
flexibility of not only science, but of openness: almost any practice or culture which is 
felt to be truly scientific can also be found, by some definition, to be open. Instances 
or patterns of closure and secrecy can be found in most activities and used to question 
their scientific status. Gieryn associated boundary work with a pursuit of partisan 
interests, for example scientists’ interests in presenting their own field of work as 
more truly scientific than others in order to gain funding. Through this interests-
based theoretical framing, Gieryn creates the impression that boundary work is 
performed instrumentally – a superficial rhetorical device that cannot be based in the 
true character of science, as no such essential character exists.  
 
Such interests no doubt participate in the boundary work around openness: Hooke, 
for instance can be found espousing the value of openness in his publication 
Micrographia: “the Arts of life have been too long imprison’d in the dark shops of 
Mechanicks themselves, & there hindered from growth, either by ignorance, or self-
interest…” (cited by Iliffe 1992:55). This may be strategic rhetoric, as Hooke acted 
                                                     
9 For an interview-based example, see footnote 10, p. 99. 
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secretively on many occasions including in relation to the watch, and may have had 
some interest in contrasting an illuminated academic science with the “dark shops” of 
craftsmen. In the contemporary context of my interviews, scientists would often 
espouse the essential openness of their research or identity, while in the same 
conversation acknowledging patterns of closure in their day-to-day practice10.  
 
3.4.4 Beyond boundary work: scientific openness a discursive culture 
 
However my interpretation of boundary work in relation to openness cannot, like 
Gieryn’s, end with interests: rhetoric is situational and inconsistent for many reasons; 
it cannot be assumed that scientists are adopting tactical stances rather than 
expressing deeply held convictions about the value of openness when they do 
boundary work. My suggestion is that boundary work is in operation, but as more of a 
discursive tradition than a rhetorical device – one that has meaning for scientists, and 
is itself part of (some) scientific cultures. A culture of valuing or idealising openness 
could exist in tandem with patterns of practice that include or even prioritise 
situational closures. Such a culture would shape a sense of professional identity and 
ethos in scientists, and condition practice indirectly. 
 
My contention is, then, that widespread subjective, discursive valuing of scientific 
openness could be considered part of a culture of openness in science. This may be of 
little interest to scholars who are most concerned with evidence of openness in 
practice: with what scientists do, rather than what they say. Barnes and Dolby (1970) 
for example distinguish between “professed” norms, which are “enjoined or celebrated 
in tract or speech”, and “statistical” norms, “observable as a pattern of positively 
sanctioned activity” (p. 8). These authors described professed norms as of little value 
for understanding “ongoing scientific activity”, except to the limited extent that they 
guide scientists’ actions. Their article is a critique from Merton’s norms (1973 [1942], 
                                                     
10 For instance, Gavin asserted that “science is science if it's open. Whereas the things that 
corporations do is...I hate to go into the divide, it's almost like technology”. At other times, he 
spoke about the necessity of certain forms of closure in (academic) science, including his own. 
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pp. 267–275), which are portrayed as unreliable extrapolations of professed norms. 
Their characterisation treats discursive acts as mere epiphenomena of real, 
“statistical” scientific activity, and turns away from ideas of ethos and identity in 
science because they are not considered necessary for theoretical explanations (ibid., 
pp. 23-24) when science is viewed as a sum, variety, or pattern of practices producing 
knowledge. However, I contend that the way scientists talk about their practice and 
profession is a component of scientific activity, even if it is not categorised as a 
“statistical” behaviour or a useful predictor thereof. Moreover, where openness in 
science is understood to be relational, subtly blended with closure, and conditioned 
by intention, scientists’ subjective accounts offer insights that cannot be gained by 
observation from the outside: scientists’ discursive constructions of openness, 
however complex their influences, must be taken seriously as instantiations of 
scientific culture. When the subject of the scientist is centred in this way, ethos and 
identity – and virtue – become relevant theoretical tools, albeit without Merton’s 
essentialist framing (see Chapter 2). 
 
3.4.5 Boundary work in scholarly histories of scientific openness 
 
I maintain, however, that a cultural valuing of scientific openness results in – or is 
blended with – rhetorical boundary work that persists in simplifying and eliding a 
complex relationship between science, openness, and closure. This consideration is 
particularly acute in historical analysis, because of the rhetorical medium of historical 
narratives, and the subtle yet potent effect of present-day influences on views of the 
past. I suggest that key, influential scholarly histories of scientific openness reflect 
and participate in a cultural valuing of scientific openness, through a performance of 
boundary work. This is evident from the outset of my historical literature review 
(Section 3.4.1), where scholars co-locate the origins of “open” knowledge traditions 
with the origin of science – despite varying definitions of both openness and science.  
 
McMullin (1985) does this by asserting that the idea of science “as an open enterprise 
[…] goes back to the very beginnings, to the time with the notion of ‘science’ first took 
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shape” in classical Greece (p. 14). Eamon (1985) and David (2008) perform a variation 
on McMullin’s boundary work through a rhetorical co-construction of openness and 
modern science. Eamon’s paper for example begins by describing various forms of 
openness as “essential features of modern science” (p. 321). David’s account is 
particularly notable because he argues that “open science” ideas and practices were “a 
distinctive and vital organizational aspect of the Scientific Revolution” (p. ii) – the 
period synonymous with the birth of modern Western science. However, the 
existence of the scientific revolution as a “singular and discrete event, localized in 
time and space” is disputed by many historians (Shapin 1996:3). David’s maintenance 
of this historical construct allows him to associate the origins of “open science” not 
only with a gradual emergence of modern science, but with the moment and cause of 
its conception – a powerful notion. While these histories depict complexity, scientific 
secrecy, and a contingent emergence of openness, they still in their narrative outlines 
use openness to reinforce the boundaries of science as we know it today. This 
scholarly boundary work is significant not only because it seems to reflect a cultural 
valuing of scientific openness – from the 1980s at least – but also because it influences 
today’s constructions of scientific openness in open science movements.  
 
3.4.6 Presentist applications of “openness” and “open science” to history 
 
Boundary work in key histories of scientific openness has an additional feature that is 
worthy of note. These histories appear to introduce or add new emphasis to the terms 
“openness” or “open” as descriptors of public, communal, or cumulative knowledge-
making, where such language was not necessarily central in past discussions of 
science – even those in English-language contexts of only a few decades previously. 
For instance, Merton (1973 [1942]) first wrote about the ethos of science including 
“communism” the 1940s and Polanyi (1962) evoked science as a communal jigsaw 
puzzle in the 1960s (see Section 3.2). Neither focused upon “open” terminology in 
these texts: Merton used “open” only once, in passing, in his characterisation of 
communism: “full and open communication” (p. 274); Polanyi did not use it at all in 
his article. When these texts are later interpreted, however, they are seen as 
foundations for “openness”: Eamon (1985) and David (2008) both draw on Merton to 
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anchor their histories of “openness in science” (Eamon) and “open science” (David); 
and Polanyi’s article is cited by the Royal Society (2012) to support a claim that “open 
communication and deliberation sit at the heart of scientific practice” (p. 13).  
 
These instances suggest that both the word “open” and its conceptual connotations 
are – subtly – presentist framings, reflecting more recent vocabularies and concerns 
associated with science. McMullin (1985), Bok (1982) and Long (2001), as well as 
Eamon (1985) and David (2008), all centre “openness” in their histories of public, 
communal, cumulative science. While this could be coincidental or part of a localised 
scholarly trend, it may reflect wider evolutions of language connected with societal 
developments from the 1980s onwards that make the “openness” a pressing concern11 
– for example, a rise in neoliberal politics, and private science (Agar 2012:440; 
Marginson 1996; Thackray 1998). Indeed, David (2008) explicitly frames his historical 
analysis with a “Presentist” prologue warning of incursions from the private realm (p. 
4-5). And strikingly, David – whose history is the most recently written of the set, in 
2008, centres the contemporary buzz phrase “open science” in his title, where the 
other authors use “openness”. Thus, he introduces a phase connoting twenty-first 
century open science movements, and uses it to once more reframe the traditional, 
communal science that once may never have been characterised as “open” – and 
certainly not with the term’s contemporary connotations.  
 
As Vermeir (2012) observes, presentist or transhistorical analyses of openness and 
secrecy have an advantageous breadth of scope, but they divert emphasis from “the 
values as well as the practices of openness and secrecy [that] have varied strongly 
throughout history” (p. 167). Vermeir’s recommendation is that: 
“In order to historicize the discussion of openness and secrecy, we 
must pay close attention to [historical] actors’ categories of analysis, 
the distinctions and oppositions they make, and we must differentiate 
between kinds of secrecy [or openness] … This should allow us to 
enrich the relevant historiographical vocabulary, to be more sensitive 
                                                     
11 In his history and analysis of Free Software, Kelty (2008) writes: “In the 1980s everyone 
seemed to want some kind of openness, whether among manufacturers or customers, from 
General Motors to the armed forces” (p. 148). 
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to lexical changes and relations between concepts of actors and 
historians, as well as to include a wider array of historical practices in 
our analysis.” (ibid.) 
Analyses like David’s (2008) and those listed above are rich in detail and 
historiographic reflection. Their “open” framings tend to be just that – framings, 
present in terminology and narrative outlines. However, they remain powerful: 
particularly because they condition way these histories travel, no more so than in the 
present online era when new and influential “open science” movements seek to 
understand their histories, and literature searches for the history of “open” in science 
readily yield a backstory. David’s work in particular is drawn upon in contemporary 
advocacy of “open science” and has contributed to the framing of science as open at 
heart for example by Nielsen (2011), who was subsequently cited by the Royal Society 
(2012). 
 
It would be an exaggeration to say that past ideals of science as open are figments of 
our contemporary imagination; however, I have shown here that the interpretative 
flexibility of both “science” and “open” make it easier to conclude that the pursuit of 
scientific openness has been continuous historically or has always meant the same 
thing at heart. Moreover, broad outlines of historical analyses such as David’s (2008) 
have been incorporated into contemporary discourses, where they position open 
science movements as reassertions of essential truths about science. On a reflexive 
note, this very movement of information, eased along tracks laid by “open” 
terminology, undoubtedly shaped the manner in which I came to construct its 
history: this chapter begins with the historical narrative that I first encountered as a 
researcher familiar with contemporary open science, searching for its history. 
 
3.4.7 Situating and specifying historical “open science” 
  
Following Vermeir’s (2012) recommendation above, we can make sense of past modes 
of openness in science by seeking out and emphasising specific, historically situated 
qualities of “openness” – and also of “science”. This builds a bridge between neat and 
messy accounts of the relationship between these two words and concepts. Some of 
83 
 
these qualities I have articulated from the outset, but they warrant emphasis. 
Portrayals of past openness in science (e.g. David, 2008; Eamon, 1985; Merton, 1973 
[1942]; Polanyi, 1962; The Royal Society, 2012, p. 13) – whether labelled as “open” or 
later interpreted as such – depict a public, communal, centralised accumulation of 
knowledge rather than individual, idiosyncratic, local, or unsystematised knowledge 
work. These qualities are not abstract, but conditioned by historically located socio-
technical infrastructures: scholarly societies; their coordinated systems of written 
correspondence; and ultimately the systematic verification, compilation, publication, 
and circulation of physical scientific papers in scholarly journals. Communal and 
public features of past science can be historicized by examining notions of “scientific 
community” and “the public” – their origins, and their limits. These specifics allow a 
clearer view of how past science could be considered “open”, and how this may differ 
from, or align with, contemporary “open science”.  
 
There is a well-acknowledged link, including in contemporary advocacy discourses 
(Bartling and Friesike 2014b; Nielsen 2011) between past scientific openness and the 
history of journal publication. This aligns with a historicized reading of Merton (1973 
[1942]) and Polanyi (1962). Both, in their oblique references to publication, portray it 
as the taken-for-granted medium through which knowledge becomes communal. An 
article by Zuckerman and Merton (1971) confirms that the “technological basis” for the 
Mertonian norm of communism is the printed word (p. 69)12. Thus it appears that by 
the mid-twentieth century, journal publication had become a practice that defined 
public, communal, cumulative science. This does not mean that journal systems then 
held the same status as early as the seventeenth century, when the earliest of them 
began; but it does anchor an historical vision of scientific openness that predates 
today’s phenomenon. 
 
The communal setting of early “open” science must be acknowledged alongside its 
infrastructural basis in publication systems, because the two are intimately 
                                                     
12 However, Merton’s famous evocation of “full and open communication” (1973 [1942]:274) 
makes his norm of openness highly appropriable outside the print/publication context. 
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connected: scholarly publishing was established by academies and learned societies 
which were operating as communities, establishing group identities; and in turn, 
scholarly publishing practices have shaped notions of community. This means that 
the history of scientific openness is the history of scientific community as much as it 
is the history of scholarly journals, or the history of written communication or 
publication of science. The development of collective social structures and 
relationships in science has arguably been as important for the emergence of 
historical “openness” as technical, conceptual or political precursors such as the 
invention of the printing press, ideas of scientific progress, or the fragmentation of 
power in post-feudal Western Europe (see Section 3.4.1). A focus on scientific 
community also brings to the fore a situated characteristic of historical openness that 
is often left implicit: communities are bounded. “Openness” of this kind is practised 
by, and for, certain people: an in-group. It is illuminating that framings of community 
and communality are far more central to Merton (1973 [1942]) and Polanyi’s (1962) 
accounts of science than any mention of “openness”. Moreover, the openness, 
communication, visibility and collaboration they describe are not universal but 
located between community members. 
 
A contemporary interpretation might be that in the past, scientific “openness” 
occurred between scientists – members of “the scientific community”– and not with 
“the public”13, distinguishing it from publicly-oriented values and goals of today’s 
open science movements. However, early scholarly societies and academies pre-date 
the professionalization and systematic state funding of science, meaning that 
boundaries between scientists and the public were drawn differently. The early 
members of the Royal Society tended to be gentlemen, distinguished not primarily by 
their expertise but by their social class: Skinner (1969) described it as “like a 
gentlemen’s club” (p. 238). Shapin (1988, 1994) shows that during this time and place, 
notions of truth and trustworthiness were bound up with codes of English gentility 
such that class was treated as a qualification for knowledge-making: “roughly 
speaking, the distribution of credibility followed the contours of English society…” 
(1988:376). Similarly, the witnessing of experiments in the Royal Society’s “public” 
                                                     
13 Both phrases used by Polanyi (1962). 
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rooms was open – to a certain echelon of society – and the houses of gentlemen 
scientists were “open to the legitimate visits of other gentlemen” as a “point of 
honour” in codes of gentility (Shapin 1984:488, 1988:387). It was not until late 
nineteenth or early twentieth century that comparable boundaries were drawn 
according to professional qualification and expertise, and “the public” was configured 
as a distinct outside group: “the professional world of science and the popularization 
of science to a variety of publics emerged together […] before 1900 there was no 
professional science from which we would distinguish popular science” (Pandora and 
Rader 2008:355). Therefore early scientific communities, to the extent that they 
resembled the Royal Society, had a public, vocational character that was closer to the 
“lay” realm than today’s professional science – chiming with notions of past scientific 
openness. However, this past openness was exclusive according to class, gender, and 
race at the very least – forms of closure with a degree of continuity to the present day. 
By the mid-twentieth century, Merton and Polanyi were characterising a science 
significantly altered not only by professionalization, but by the introduction of 
systematic state funding, endowing some settings of science with a new “open” 
orientation associated with the taxpaying public. This public orientation is again, 
historically located rather than an essential scientific quality. 
 
These points are not exhaustive, but demonstrate how past scientific “openness” is 
configured in relation to particular social and historical circumstances. Narratives 
that frame science as traditionally or essentially open – as distilled at the opening of 
this chapter – can in this way be taken to describe specific, situated kinds of 
“openness”. Descriptors like public, communal, and cumulative – and socio-technical 
settings, like scholarly journal publishing and scientific community – can be used to 
characterise some scientific traditions of decades or centuries ago without the 
implication that they are essentially open in a way that we would recognise today. 
This distinction is important because of the particular weight that “open” holds in 





3.5 Conclusion: relating older, traditional “openness” to 
contemporary “open science” 
 
Having evoked, unpacked, and situated historical openness in science, I address my 
first research sub-question in several ways. How do contemporary “open science” 
discourses relate to older, traditional discourses about the essential value of openness in 
science? My first observation has been that these two discourses are not independent, 
and cannot be clearly separated. They both tell a story of openness as a core, defining 
feature of science – in one case defining science in its earliest form, whether in 
ancient Greece or in renaissance Europe; and in another defining what has been lost, 
and must be regained, in today’s science. In a narrative sense, traditional discourses 
about a long history of open science seem to have a function: strengthening 
contemporary narratives by supplying depth and authenticity. Flexible qualities of 
both “open” and “science” ease this alignment. This interpretative flexibility also 
makes it difficult to trace the history of scientific openness. Many accounts trace it to 
seventeenth century Western Europe, co-locating it with the first scholarly journals 
and the birth of “modern science” – and with a repudiation of secret, obscure 
knowledge. Closer examination of openness and secrecy as social practices, however, 
shows that the two are often intermingled at the level of a culture or an individual, or 
even a single action. It is important, then, to understand seventeenth-century 
Western science as open in specific and situated ways. I have suggested that it is the 
public, communal, cumulative qualities of some science in this period – enabled in 
particular by journal publishing and community structures – allow us to identify it as 
“open”. This traditional kind of scientific openness, however, is distinguishable from 
today’s open science – it has shifted as the contexts that define it have changed.  
 
Interpretative flexibility allows a circular kind of boundary work: openness 
distinguishes science from non-science or bad science, where both openness and 
science are in the eye of the beholder. I argue, however, that this is not necessarily an 
instrumental or purely rhetorical ploy to co-define science and openness. A culture of 
valuing or idealising openness despite the messy reality of scientific practice seems to 
be an important subjective dimension of professional identity and ethos for scientists, 
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albeit one that it difficult to trace historically. This difficultly arises partly because 
some historians participate in a cultural valuing of scientific openness, engaging 
subtly in boundary work. Through this route, “open” terminology itself seems to 
emerge from present-day concerns, and be carried into retellings of the past. As late 
as the mid-twentieth century, Merton’s choice of words for his norm was 
“communism” rather than “openness”. But by the 1980s, scholarly histories of 
“openness” in science were being written; by the 2000s, David’s (2008) was a history 
of “open science” – today’s buzz phrase. My suggestion therefore is that discourses 
about an older, traditional openness in science do not only – in a narrative sense – 
add depth to contemporary “open science” discourses. I propose that these “older” 
discourses are part of a recent phenomenon that re-imagines past science in relation 
to “openness” and subsequently “open science” – in response initially to neoliberal 
societal trends from the 1980s, and then in response to an explicit and organised 
pursuit of “open” in science from the 2000s.  
 
I conclude therefore that a long history of scientific openness is undoubtedly 
important: traditions of public, published, communal, cumulative science can be 
traced back hundreds of years. This history, however, is deeply entangled with our 
present perspective that places great and specific contemporary value on “openness”, 
and is eager to see this unusually flexible quality reflected in the past. In their outlines 
and emphases therefore, historical accounts of openness accounts illuminate the 
present. In their specific details, they situate past science, allow continuities and 
contrasts to be drawn. I turn in the next chapter towards a more recent history, 




Chapter 4 | “Open science is the box…” 
Twentieth century preludes to “open science” 
 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Contemporary open science is animated by powerful narratives, reviewed at the 
opening of the previous chapter. These narratives tend to evoke a long history of 
openness, affirming its essential place in science, and to communicate two types of 
subtext: firstly, that openness of science is now lacking, and must be restored; and 
secondly, that the Internet provides an opportunity to reach an unprecedented, even 
ideal, state of openness in science. Unlike their historical counterparts, these 
contemporary narratives and discourses make explicit and frequent use of the term 
“open”: e.g. open access, open research data, open peer review, open notebook 
science. These narratives, movements and practices seem to appear suddenly in 
historical terms, rising to salience in international scientific discourses around the 
turn of the twenty-first century, seemingly prompted by the technological capacity of 
Internet technologies – in particular the World Wide Web from the 1990s (Berners-
Lee et al. 1994) and subsequently the more interactive qualities of Web 2.0 (Procter et 
al. 2010:4039). 
 
While Internet-based technologies have undoubtedly been a key and proximal 
influence enabling the emergence of contemporary open science, my purpose in the 
coming sections is to document a much richer social and technological twentieth 
century history that set the stage for this phenomenon. Each element of this history is 
well known in certain fields, but these elements have not typically been gathered 
together as a holistic backstory to the emergence of “open science” – perhaps because 
they do not all have clear links to openness, and some are more linked with closure or 
secrecy. Aspects of this history have been traced in a holistic way, however (e.g. 
Delfanti and Pitrelli 2015; Prainsack and Leonelli 2018; Strasser 2019). I aim to add 
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capture extra breadth in order to orient towards research sub-question (b): How has 
“open” in science recently gained such salience and discursive power, despite its multiple 
meanings and lack of specificity? As well as addressing this question, I show in this 
chapter that the significance of both “open” and “science” shifts during the twentieth 
century. This means that the appearance of “open science” in the 2000s is not 
straightforwardly an “opening” of science. Despite my aim to capture breadth, it is 
important to note that this history is not exhaustive, and is centred in the global 
north. 
 
4.2 Changes in scale: big science  
 
During the twentieth century, the growth of science – “perhaps its most notable 
historical characteristic” (Capshew and Rader 1992:3) – became a topic of study under 
the heading “big science”. This concept was established by physicist Alvin Weinberg 
(1961, 1967) and extended by historian of science Derek de Solla Price (1963). The term 
refers to growth across multiple dimensions, including the size of scientific teams; the 
ambition and cost of projects; and the physical scale, complexity, and expense of 
scientific instruments: “money, manpower, and machines” (Capshew and Rader 
1992:4). It can also refer to generalised statistical growth, for example in numbers of 
professionally trained scientists and scholarly journals (Price 1963:6–7); as well as 
intensified qualitative features such as centralisation, industrialisation, 
internationalisation, and multi-disciplinary collaboration (Vermeulen 2016:199–200). 
Although science has grown throughout its history and there are earlier examples of 
large-scale scientific ventures (Capshew and Rader 1992:19–22; Price 1963:1–32), “big 
science” was conceptualised in relation to types of twentieth century physics that 
were centrally organised, concentrated around large and expensive machinery, and 
supported by government as a source of power in relation to war (Vermeulen 
2016:207). Vermeulen shows that “big biology” emerged towards the end of the 
twentieth century – the Human Genome Project is an iconic case – but tends to be 
decentralised across virtual collaborative networks, and has been shaped by a more 
conditional, neoliberal funding environment. Big science is not self-evidently skewed 
90 
 
towards openness or closure, but is an altered form and context of science, with 
different relationship to society.  
 
4.3 Organisational “openness” and preprints in big physics  
 
Archetypal big physics created social structures far removed from the self-
coordinating community of independent scientists idealised in Polanyi’s (1962) 
account. Agar (2012) refers to the “large-scale hierarchical teamwork” of wartime and 
post-Cold war physics in which researchers work as “managed populations” (pp. 309-
310). Agar quotes an academic administrator, who stated in 1953: 
“There was a time when scientific investigation was largely a matter 
of individual enterprise but the war taught scientists to work together 
in groups; they learned to think of a common project, they were 
impressed by the progress to be made through unified action. A 
notable degree of this spirit has been transfused into the life of our 
larger universities…” (quoted in Agar 2012:309–10) 
These organisational features have the potential to strengthen community ties and 
decrease competitive pressures, encouraging and enabling earlier, faster, less 
formalised communication: a form of openness in today’s discourse. Kling and McKim 
(2000) described such patterns in the iconic big science of high energy physics: more 
willingness by physicists to trust and circulate unpublished working papers – partly 
due to internal institutional review processes – and more “mutual visibility of ongoing 
work” than in other fields (p. 1313).  
 
These are the kinds of conditions under which preprints became a traditional 
communication format for high energy physics communities from the 1960s. 
Originally preprints were paper manuscripts, photocopied and bulk-mailed to other 
physicists and their institutions, simultaneously with their submission to peer-
reviewed journals (Aymar 2009:36; Taubes 1993). Librarians at the major facilities 
created a “bibliographic infrastructure” of preprints: a more extensive and more 
immediately available resource for scientific knowledge than could be gained via the 
selective and formal processes of scholarly journals (Kling 2001:597–98). This preprint 
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system preceded the rise of online open science by many decades, and provides an 
example of a cultural transformation towards openness that did not require the Web; 
and in which cultural, organisational, and economic aspects of big science had 
particular influence. This culture did, however, translate well into an online context in 
1990s in the form of arXiv, a ubiquitous reference point in mathematical, physical, 
and other quantitative fields (see Section 4.8). 
 
4.4 Secrecy and openness in wartime 
 
While big science had the capacity to engender organisational openness, it is also 
associated with conspicuous instances of scientific secrecy during wartime. The 
Manhattan Project, an emblem of big science, was not only secret to outsiders; groups 
within the project were forbidden from communicating openly with one another 
(Vermeir and Margócsy 2012:159). However, this secrecy was not universal, nor was it 
mutually exclusive with certain forms of openness (as discussed, p. 72). Some 
academic scientists experienced a kind of opening up through their involvement in 
wartime efforts: enriched connections with fellow scientists and a wider community; 
closer familiarity with contexts of application; and a sense of efficacy and freedom 
associated with increased funding. Irish crystallographer and molecular biologist J. D. 
Bernal reflected in 1975: 
“As the war proceeded the scientific workers found themselves less 
and less isolated and more and more part of a general directed effort. 
By coming closer to actual experience, they learned the existence of 
problems at first hand […] It was most astonishing and invigorating 
to the academic scientist, cramped for years in a small laboratory 
and perpetually begging from this or that charitable fund for minute 
grants, to be allowed to spend thousands of pounds where he had 
previously spent ten pounds…” (pp. 557-558) 
Bernal also described how networks of scientific communication in WWII played a 
role previously fulfilled by scientific societies, but with a more strategic focus (ibid., p. 
558). This illustrates a profound upheaval of factors that situated “traditional” 
scientific openness – community, communication, and relationship with the public – 
during world wars of the twentieth century. 
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4.5 A post-war “scientific information crisis” 
 
Emerging out of WWII there was “the perception of a scientific information crisis”, 
according to Wykle (2014:1), which challenged the primacy of journals as the arbiters 
of scientific communication. Bernal (1975) wrote that publication systems had already 
been “completely overloaded” before WWII and were ill-equipped to tackle a rising 
tide of knowledge, not to mention having been damaged by wartime shortages of 
paper and labour, and a loss of indexing and summarising functions from Germany 
(p. 571). However, Bernal also wrote that by the end of the war, “a far more effective 
system of scientific communication […] than most scientists had enjoyed before the 
war” was in place (p. 560). This was an intersecting background context for the rise of 
preprint culture in high energy physics in the 1960s, and one which demonstrates that 
there was a widespread desire for alternatives to traditional publication. By 1959, 
UNESCO was studying “the increasing inadequacy of the scientific research periodical 
as a method of communication” (Wykle 2014:3).  
 
In fact, in the same decade as preprints were established in big physics – the 1960s – 
they were trialled in biology as part of an experiment by the US National Institutes of 
Health (NIH). Seven “Information Exchange Groups” (IEGs), each based in a different 
specialist community, were funded to exchange preprints (ibid., p. 4). Although most 
of the IEGs were “successfully accomplishing rapid informal selective 
communications”, the NIH ended the experiment in 1967 citing an inability to fund its 
growth (Confrey 1966). One IEG chairman reported that “opposition from scientific 
journals had a crucial influence on the decision to terminate the IEGs”: this included a 
refusal by the editors of several major biochemical journals to publish articles that 
had circulated through IEGs, or to allow published articles to circulate subsequently 
(Till 2001:10).  
 
Thus, in the mid-twentieth century many scientific fields were caught in tension 
between the infrastructures of traditional journal-based communication, and more 
immediate, informal practices that could be described as open. It was not only the 
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organization of a field – “big” or little, close-knit or diffuse – that weighted this 
tension, but also, perhaps decisively, how power was wielded by actors controlling the 
publication system. 
 
4.6 Big, commercial publishing and the “serials crisis” 
 
When biochemical journal editors opposed IEG preprints, they were not merely 
preserving the established role of journal publication in legitimising knowledge: they 
were protecting a type of commercial interest that gained particular value during the 
latter half of the twentieth century. After WWII, a number of factors combined to 
make scholarly publishing into big business. Previously the publication of journals by 
societies and university presses tended not to yield profit: costs of production were 
significant, the market was small and uncertain, and subsidies were required to 
continue a mission of scholarly dissemination (Fyfe et al. 2017; Guédon 2001). After 
the war, academic research expanded, associated with growth in both publications 
and the budgets of university libraries, and creating a ready market (Fyfe et al. 2017; 
Guédon 2001) . Commercial publishers were adapting by taking on the publication of 
primary research rather than news and short reports; by selling directly to institutions 
who could afford higher costs per subscription; and by expanding into an 
international market (Fyfe et al. 2017:9). Economies of scale incentivised corporate 
growth, and from the 1960s larger commercial publishers began to gain control of 
publication previously in the hands of societies and other smaller publishers. By 2017, 
via acquisitions and mergers, an “oligopoly” of four corporations – Springer Nature, 
Elsevier, Wiley-Blackwell, and Taylor & Francis – had emerged, each of which now 
publishes thousands of journals (ibid., pp. 9-10). 
 
The transformation of scholarly publishing into big business was also influenced by 
metrics that reconceptualised and filtered a growing literature. In the 1960s, Eugene 
Garfield created the Science Citation Index (SCI): a list that drew attention to a “hard 
core” (Garfield 1970:670) of journals capturing the “essential scientific literature” 
(Gaudet 2014:6–7). In association with the SCI, Garfield also created the journal 
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impact factor (Garfield 2006) – a metric which has gained particular power as a 
marker of prestige, as is evident in my interviews with scientists (see Chapter 6). The 
construction of “core” journals guided library subscription policies, resulting in an 
“inelastic market” in which publishers could increase prices without reducing demand 
(Guédon 2001:28); as a result, large publishers established extremely high profit 
margins (Gaudet 2014:7). Also in the 1960s, journals were positioned as exclusive news 
sources by the “Ingelfinger rule”: a policy of rejecting papers that been published in 
some form previously (named after the then-editor of the New England Journal of 
Medicine; Altman 1996; Gaudet 2014:6). This was the kind of editorial stance that 
suppressed experimentation with preprints in the biological sciences (Till 2001:10). 
The Ingelfinger rule also reinforced peer review as a dominant marker of credibility, 
and decreased the authority of knowledge exchanges outside the “merchant relation” 
of journal subscription (Gaudet 2014:6), tightening the grip of commercial publishers.  
 
These developments set the scene for the “serials crisis” beginning in the early 1970s, 
in which the cost of journal subscriptions rose at a rate above inflation that made 
them less affordable to academic libraries (Eve 2014:13; Fyfe et al. 2017:14; Suber 
2012:29). As well as price increases, this crisis was fuelled – again – by a growth in the 
production of academic research (Eve 2014) and a reduction in university funding in 
the 1980s (Fyfe et al. 2017). This escalating struggle to afford subscriptions, resulting 
in restricted and unequal access to research on an institution-by-institution basis, is a 
highly recognisable “closure” of science that has directly motivated open access 
movements (Suber 2012). Eve (2014) identifies this economic history of journal 
publishing as one of two converging antecedents to open access, the other originating 
in computer software cultures (see p. 103).  
 
However once again it is clear that during this period the meanings of both science 
and openness changed. Scientific communities had grown and been enabled by 
commercialisation to disseminate more findings – greater “openness”, in one sense. 
But the scholarly societies around which they had been organised were reconfigured 
by a profit motive. Corporations had the power to reshape communities – now, as 
markets for exclusive content – whilst retaining the allegiance of academics as 
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authors, editors, peer reviewers and readers who seek association with “core” 
prestigious journals. If publishing was considered a traditional form of community 
openness, it had now become metrics-driven, internationally competitive, and 
exclusive. It was not merely act of dissemination, but a symbol of status and success 
beyond the published finding – driven also by output- and metrics-based evaluations 
of academics’ professional reputations (Fyfe et al. 2017:3–4, 7, 13). Under these 
conditions, there was not only an overt curtailing of scientific openness according to 
institutional affiliation and wealth. There was also a narrowing of avenues for 
legitimate and well-regarded scholarly communication, and a circumscribing of good 
quality or successful science – and scientists – according to prestige-driven branding14. 
Alongside the serials crisis, these broader historical features shape the science that 
was ripe to be “opened” in the twenty-first century. When Nielsen (2009:30) asserted 
that publication systems have “changed surprisingly little in the last 300 years”, he 
was referring to the technology of publication, rather than these social and economic 
transformations that profoundly altered the significance of publishing as “openness” 
before its move online. 
 
4.7 Shifting modes of knowledge production, and commercial 
biology 
 
Multiple studies have theorised a late twentieth century shift in modes of knowledge 
(reviewed in Hessels and van Lente 2008). One of the most influential accounts 
argued that there has been a rise in “Mode 2” science, which – instead of being 
primarily academic, disciplinary, and autonomous (Mode 1) – is heterogeneous, 
socially accountable, transdisciplinary, and “carried out in a context of application” 
(Gibbons et al. 1994:3). Other analysts have proposed a new “post-academic science” 
(Ziman 2000:67–82); a rise in “academic capitalism” in which university science is 
increasingly market-driven (Slaughter and Leslie 1997); and the “Triple Helix” model 
in which industry, university and government sectors are increasingly interlinked 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000). The concept of Mode 2 has been critiqued, 
                                                     
14 Parts of open science movements that aim to move away from narrow, metrics-based 
prestige have their roots here (e.g. DORA 2012) 
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including by the latter authors, who point out that science has been situated in 
contexts of application – including industry – for centuries, and argue that Mode 1 
arose later, with a nineteenth century institutionalisation of academic science (ibid., 
pp. 115-116). Similarly, historian Jon Agar argues that “science, located in working 
worlds, has always, typically, been more mode 2 than mode 1” (2012:434). However, 
even though Mode 2 has a long history, the latter decades of the twentieth century 
have featured changes – including an intensification of market-driven activity in 
universities - that are significant on a shorter timescale and in particular disciplines. 
Certainly, such changes shape the collective memories and identities of today’s 
academic scientists, as documented by Holden (2014) in a UK biomedical context. 
 
A shift towards entrepreneurial, application-focused research may seem particularly 
significant to scientists in biological fields due to the rapid commercialization of 
molecular biology in the 1970s and 1980s (Wright 1986). Between the early twentieth 
century and the invention of recombinant DNA techniques in the 1970s, molecular 
biology was “almost exclusively an academic field” (Wright 1986:303); it thus 
witnessed a form of the originally proposed transition from Mode 1 to Mode 2. In 
these latter decades its promise of practical applicability led to a boom in private 
investment, and there was a rapid cultural change in which molecular biologists 
became “equity owners, corporate executives, and consultants” (ibid.). This 
transformation was centred in the US, encouraged by a shifting relationship between 
science and government: market deregulation policies encouraged private investment 
in research with little oversight (ibid., p. 345). Commodification was stimulated by the 
1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which allowed universities to patent discoveries or inventions 
arising from government funding (Agar 2012:440). Deregulation agendas affecting 
university research became widespread around this time, including – pertinent to my 
study – in the UK and Australia (Abir-Am 1997:514; Marginson 1996:78–81). By 1990 
the Human Genome Project had begun, establishing an era of “new biology” in which 
molecular life sciences not only scaled up, but gave rise to an interdisciplinary, cross-
sectoral, capitalist “bioeconomy” focused on health, and featuring upheavals to the 




These shifting modes of knowledge production, and intensified networks of 
academic–industry relationships, may set the stage for “open science” in multiple, 
contrasting ways.  On one hand, traditional commercial contexts bring in patenting, 
trade secrets and other competitive practices that conflict with the notional 
Mertonian norm of communism (1973 [1942], p. 275). Where such practices inhibit 
publication or other expected ideals and practices of “openness”, especially in 
traditional academic settings, they may add to a sense of breakdown in science – 
similar to the loss of a “golden age” lamented by biomedical scientists in Holden’s 
(2014) analysis. On the other hand, neoliberal economics strike a chord with other 
narratives around openness in science: for instance, the idea that circulation of 
knowledge should be as regulation-free as possible in order to maximise scientific, 
economic, and societal benefits. Polanyi (1962) made explicit his view that the 
“invisible hand” of the market produces “maximum advancement of science” when 
scientists are acting freely and independently, and sharing their findings (p. 56). The 
neoliberal appeal of openness, which has been noted on multiple occasions (Lawson, 
Sanders, and Smith 2015; Mirowski 2018; Moore 2017; Tkacz 2012) no doubt influenced 
the form and political acceptability of “open science” as it emerged into a neoliberal 
political environment in the twenty-first century, even though some forms of 
openness intend to counteract commodification (e.g. Moore 2019b). 
 
4.8 Networked computing and the early Internet 
 
Alongside these late twentieth century dynamics, the Internet was in development. 
Like early big science projects, it began with generous funding from military sources: 
ARPANET, the foundational architecture of the Internet, was founded by the US 
Defense Department in the 1950s (Castells 2002:2–3). From the beginning, the project 
was close to science and academia: it drew on the expertise of an “informal, yet 
exclusive” network of university researchers, engineers and computer scientists who 




The Internet, email, and the World-Wide Web – all developed in research contexts – 
were obvious mechanisms for scientific communication, and especially for responding 
to existing calls for faster, more systematic sharing of ongoing work. Particle physics 
communities were in an excellent position to respond to this opportunity; and indeed, 
the Web was designed with them in mind (Berners-Lee et al., 1994:76). In 1991, the 
theoretical physicist Paul Ginsparg brought his field’s preprint culture online by 
building an email-based system to automatically receive, distribute and store full-text 
articles (Taubes 1993:1247). This system, called arXiv, is now the central tool of 
scientific communication for particle physics, as well as other physical and 
mathematical fields (Delfanti 2016). As well as fostering and speeding up previously 
established networks, arXiv “democratized” networks which previously favoured a 
more exclusive set of individuals and institutions (Taubes 1993:1247). However, these 
early online spaces preceded the rise of explicitly “open science”, and were spaces of 
experimentation. Moore (2017:9) suggests that the free accessibility of arXiv was a by-
product rather than an intention; contingent upon an early Web which was not a 
global resource but “something of a private playground for academics” (Ginsparg 
2011:5). An analogy could perhaps be drawn with the “openness” of the early Royal 
Society; gentlemen conducting science in the public realm, where the public was 
differently and much more exclusively configured (see Section 3.4.7). 
 
As physics communities evolved in close correspondence with the early Internet – a 
mutual shaping of technology and culture – other areas of science including biology 
seem to have been more distanced from such an interaction (Walsh and Bayma 
1996:682). November (2012) described life sciences as “the least computerized area of 
science” in the 1960s, the technological and large-scale collaborative opportunities of 
WWII having bypassed biomedical fields (p. 6). This changed over subsequent 
decades, through a series of contingent developments (ibid.), and some biological 
fields – in particular those working with DNA sequences – developed close and 
mutually constitutive relationships with computing (Chow-White and Garcia-Sancho 
2011). However, Strasser (2019) is careful to note that these formative relationships – 
with fields such as genomics and bioinformatics – cannot be generalised to all of 
biology (p. 7). Moreover, biology as it developed in the twentieth century has a more 
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pluralistic, disunified character than physics or chemistry (Mittra 2016:6). Together 
these observations suggest that many scientists in biological fields, or other fields 
outside particle physics, would have been neither technologically nor culturally 
positioned to embrace the widely accessible, cheap, rapid scientific communication 
opportunities of the early Internet and Web: without either a cultural blueprint for 
systematic preprint exchange, nor socio-technological immersion in digital, 
networked spaces.  
 
Following non-profit community ventures such as arXiv, big commercial publishers 
quickly adapted to the Web, continued to charge subscriptions, and adopted new 
revenue-generating strategies such as bundled subscriptions – “Big Deals” (Fyfe et al. 
2017:15). This meant that scientists without established online communities and 
communications in the late twentieth century were likely positioned more as 
consumers than designers of Web-based scientific communication – a tendency 
reinforced by editorial leadership, commercial forces and metrics that maintained 
position of traditional journals as exclusive content vendors. Thus in many fields of 
biology, a desire for new sharing mechanisms that seems to have existed since at least 
WWII (see Section 4.5) may have remained in tension with inapposite cultural and 
technological circumstances even as the Web unfolded. Meanwhile, not-for-profit 
“DIY publishers” – working academics – established some of the first online open 
access journals in the late 1980s and 1990s: in contrast to arXiv, many of these were in 
the humanities and social sciences, consciously critiqued commercial publishing, and 
were interested in reaching new audiences (Moore 2019b). Moore argues that these 
journals form a “neglected prehistory of OA [open access]” – they came to be 
overshadowed by the rise to salience of open access movements in the sciences, 
particularly the biomedical sciences (see Section 5.2). In this way, the rise of “open” 
journal articles has come to be associated with biomedical fields despite – or in 
reaction to – a contingent historical path that steered many of these fields away from 




4.9 Model organism communities, and resource sharing in 
biology 
 
Positive antecedents to online openness in the life sciences can instead be found in 
histories of epistemic communities formed by biologists, and their resource sharing 
cultures. Communities formed around a “model organism” approach have been 
particularly well-studied (Ankeny 2010). Model organisms are species studied, often in 
standardised form, both as “samples of nature” and as representatives of a broader 
range of organisms and biological principles (Leonelli 2007), and they are associated 
with distinctive epistemic goals and social conventions (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011). As 
a selective use of species, the approach is centuries old (ibid.), but particularly 
characterised experimental life sciences from the late nineteenth century (Strasser 
2019:29) and gained popularity in the 1960s and 1970s with the rise of molecular 
biology (Ankeny 2010:93). Robert E. Kohler (1999) famously studied the community of 
fruit fly (Drosophila) geneticists established by Thomas Hunt Morgan in the US in the 
early twentieth century. The “fly group” had a distinctive, self-aware communality and 
egalitarianism: shared access to physical resources including stocks of mutant flies; 
collective ownership of ideas with credit to those who accomplished them; and 
distributed authority. They went on to shape a wider fly community through a “moral 
economy” in which mutant stocks were generously shared with outsiders, with an 
expectation of reciprocal sharing, disclosure of research intentions, and limited 
ownership of research problems: “no trade secrets, no monopolies, no poaching, no 
ambushes” (ibid., p. 254).  
 
Kohler linked this culture and moral economy with the co-shaped features of the fly 
and the community: Drosophila can be produced rapidly and in abundance, and its 
use for genetic mapping threw up a “cornucopia” of research problems – enough for 
everyone. Additionally, Morgan came from a tradition of US experimental biology in 
which mutual aid was valued. Benefits came from apparent altruism: the fly group 
spread its reputation and way of doing science by making their fly the “standard fly”. 
They also had an ongoing knowledge of others’ research through moral economy 
exchanges. This communal culture is described as persistent through generations of 
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fly researchers, in the way that a culture of preprint exchange has persisted in particle 
physics. It is an offline tradition of “openness” in science that is bounded and 
historically situated – traceable within the twentieth century – enabled by key social 
and material conditions. 
 
The fly community was one of several prominent model organism communities that 
grew in the twentieth century: others assembled, for example, around the mouse 
(Rader 1998), the nematode worm Caenorhabditis elegans (Ankeny 2001; de 
Chadarevian 1998), and the flowering plant Arabidopsis thaliana (Leonelli 2007). Like 
the fly group, these communities have each tended to foster a group identity and an 
ethos of co-operation and resource sharing (Ankeny and Leonelli 2011:317–18), 
although each in a distinctive and evolving way, with features that mix openness and 
closure. For example, Rader (1998) described the founding “mouse people” as bound 
together through shared experiences of scarcity, in contrast to the abundance that 
enabled communalism for the “fly people”. W. E. Castle, the mouse group leader of 
the early 1900s, managed scarcity through sequential and centralised graduate 
training – an “extended one-on-one apprenticeship period with the master professor 
himself”– allowing each student equal, uncompetitive access to resources (p. 340). 
This built a “group-oriented but individualistically organized” culture in which 
graduates were taught to be self-sufficient and flexible (pp. 342, 345). In contrast, the 
Arabidopsis community – which blossomed later, in the 1980s – began with a group of 
young researchers who were able to create a collaborative, co-ordinated community 
through centralised committee leadership that attracted generous funding (Leonelli 
2007). This mirrors qualities of the fly community – but ironically, the Arabidopsis 
community emerged after success and growth had made fly research competitive and 
less hospitable – less open, perhaps – for newcomers (ibid., p. 201).  
 
Openness as established in model organism communities is therefore conditional – 
and mixed with closure – in interesting ways. One of the typical pre-digital means of 
communication in these communities, beyond individual laboratories and institutes, 
was the newsletter: the Drosophila Information Service (DIS); the Mouse Newsletter; 
the Worm Breeder’s Gazette; the Arabidopsis Newsletter; and many others (Kelty 
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2012:144). Through newsletters, organism-specific information was shared and 
standardised, manifesting and reinforcing communities. In a thoughtful analysis of 
the DIS in particular, Kelty (ibid.) identifies newsletters as a “meso-scale” of scientific 
practice between the lab notebook and “purified” scientific publications, where 
ongoing work could be communicated on the understanding that it was provisional, 
unpublished, and to be treated with sensitivity – something akin to a personal 
conversation or letter, where one might seek permission or acknowledgement to 
share further (pp. 141, 152). In this way the information shared was not universally 
“open”, and nor was the community. Kelty describes it as “partially porous”, as the 
newsletter was for “those actively engaged in Drosophila research” (pp. 152, 156-157). 
Outsiders could theoretically join – but were expected to contribute. This echoes the 
establishing context of Morgan’s group (Kohler 1999), in which an apparently open 
exchange of materials and knowledge was predicated on reciprocity, trust, and 
disclosure of ongoing work. It also rings true with the observation that fly 
communities – at least in their later twentieth century form – could be unwelcoming 
to outsiders (Leonelli 2007:201). These qualities of community openness have 
particular resonance with my empirical results, notably those reported in Chapter 8. 
 
The establishment of model organism communities in the twentieth century is an 
important prehistory to the emergence of twenty-first century “open science” on three 
grounds. Firstly it demonstrates that a cultural valuing of openness has been 
embedded in many biological research communities that have continuity to the 
present day – even if those cultures are “open” in qualified and contingent ways, and 
do not date back to the seventeenth century. Secondly, these communities have been 
important sites for digital and online transformation, especially in genetic fields: as 
data-gathering began to outgrow the newsletter format in the 1980s, and genetic 
sequencing projects of the 1990s and 2000s generated further data, model organism 
communities established online databases – including FlyBase, Mouse Genome 
Informatics, WormBase, and The Arabidopsis Information Resource (Leonelli and 
Ankeny 2012). Leonelli and Ankeny (ibid.) show that these databases have – through 
curation of standards of terminology and evidence, and co-ordination the sharing of 
physical materials – reinforced and continued to shape a collaborative ethos in these 
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communities15. It is particularly notable that the public, online accessibility of these 
databases alters dynamics of community and identity: membership of the in-group is 
no longer required (ibid., p. 34). This changes what is meant by openness, as 
traditional foundations for sharing in these communities – personal interaction, trust, 
reciprocity, and conditional disclosure of ongoing work – are bypassed by the more 
unconditional qualities of online access. This is an important consideration in relation 
to biological scientists’ encounters with online “open science” in my interview study. 
 
Thirdly, model organism communities shape the well-known collision of public and 
private science that characterised the Human Genome Project (HGP) in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. According to Ankeny and Leonelli 
(2011:317), many key figures in the public HGP effort came from model organism 
communities, likely influencing its ethos. In turn, the public HGP established 
immediate, online data sharing as an internationally agreed norm for large-scale 
sequencing projects – an important origin for more widespread open data movements 
in the 2000s (Maxson Jones et al. 2018; Strasser 2019; Wellcome Trust 2003), that was 
not yet framed as “open data”. 
 
4.10 Free software, open source software, and free culture 
movements 
 
The final thread I will add to the backstory of twenty-first century “open science” 
emerges from software development cultures and communities in the 1980s. 
Prompted by analogous commercial, proprietary trends in computing to those in 
publishing (p. 93) and molecular biology (p. 95), programmer Richard Stallman 
founded the Free Software Foundation in 1983, which promoted the freedom to use, 
copy, modify and redistribute software (Free Software Foundation n.d.). “Free” 
referred to liberty, not price – as is often quoted, “‘free’ as in ‘free speech’ not as in 
‘free beer’” (Free Software Foundation n.d.).  This became an important social, ethical 
                                                     
15 With the possible exception of mouse communities, which have been more entangled with 
commercial and competitive pressures (Leonelli and Ankeny 2012:35). 
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and practical basis for grassroots software practice. In 1998, an offshoot called “open 
source software” emerged, which emphasised the pragmatism and cost-effectiveness 
of free software methodology for commercial purposes (Kelty 2008:99). Open source, 
which was “associated with the dotcom boom and the evangelism of the libertarian 
pro-business hacker Eric Raymond” (ibid.) was framed by Stallman (2016) as a 
corruption of “free” values. To Raymond, however, Stallman and the Free Software 
Foundation represented “a kind of dogmatic, impossible communism” (Kelty 
2008:109). Kelty argues that this ideological division – which includes a determined 
denial of ideology – fuelled the birth in 1998 of free and/or open source software as a 
movement. But, he argues, it was not a typical social movement: “Free Software and 
Open Source share practices first, and ideologies second” (ibid., p. 113). This 
movement emerged out of geek or hacker culture, which was already ideologically 
diverse then (p. 93); it was a movement defined by “the practice, among geeks, of 
arguing about and discussing the structure and meaning of Free Software: what it 
consists of, what it is for, and whether or not it is a movement” (p. 98). 
 
Associated with free software was Stallman’s repurposing of copyright: he wrote the 
GNU Public Licence (GPL) which – instead of restricting re-use – requires that a 
program’s source code be publicly accessible, redistributable, and modifiable (Eve 
2014:17). Moreover, the GPL is “viral”, requiring that modified versions are 
redistributed on the same “free” terms, an arrangement known as CopyLeft (ibid.). 
The licensing dimension of free and open source software then became associated 
with a broader “free culture” movement, in which the Harvard-based lawyer Lawrence 
Lessig was an important figure. He developed licences that could be applied to any 
type of content, and again, built upon copyright law to enshrine re-use rights (ibid., p. 
20). This approach resulted in the now widely used Creative Commons (CC) licences, 
established in the early 2000s (Creative Commons Wiki 2011), of which there are 
several variants specifying different re-use conditions. Free and open source software 
– and subsequently free culture – were also entangled with another dimension of 
1980s and 1990s computing, which was the idea of “open systems” (Kelty 2008:143–78). 
Open systems were seen as the solution to incompatibility between different 
computer components, including software: it meant achieving wide interoperability 
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through standardisation, to provide “seamless integration” in marketing terms (ibid., 
p. 147). Kelty observes that in the 1980s this openness was a “kind of cultural 
imperative” tied to free market ideals, and upheld – at least rhetorically – in many 
industries (ibid., p. 148). However, it was difficult to either define or achieve; amongst 
competing companies it was not clear whose standards should be upheld. Kelty 
describes this openness as “unruly” and “hopelessly plural” (ibid., pp. 143, 145). The 
explicit licensing arrangements of free and open source software, and the free culture 
movement, emerged from the intellectual property “blind spot” of open systems 
(ibid., p. 178).   
 
The connections between free, open source cultures and twenty-first century open 
science are overt, and multiple. The use of the word “open” may be, in part, a direct 
inheritance: David (2014) notes that in October 1999, a conference at the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory was titled “Open Source/Open Science” – the first use of the term 
“Open Science” at a prominent, public scientific occasion, according to David’s 
knowledge and that of conference organisers (p. 34). Wikipedia places the origin of 
the term as at a similar time, and in a computing context. Its sources link to claims by 
the inventor and professor of computer engineering Steve Mann that he coined “open 
science”, and registered the domain openscience.com, in 1998 or 1999 (Mann 2016; 
Mann et al. 2016; Wikipedia contributors n.d.). Although these instances suggest that 
analogies were being drawn between the “open” of software and science from the late 
1990s, open science had not yet gained its current status as a broad “umbrella term” 
(see Section 5.4)16. 
 
Regardless of whether “open” was inherited directly from open source to open science 
– or whether a broader cultural emphasis on openness from the 1980s (Kelty 2008:148) 
shaped today’s terminology – several authors have argued that that cultures and 
ideologies from open source run through today’s “open” movements in science and 
research. In the relatively early days of global open access movements, Willinsky 
                                                     
16 Maxson Jones et al. (2018) assert that “open science” has been a buzzword for scientists and 
policy analysists “since at least the start of the HGP” (pp. 772-773), i.e. since the 1990s, but I 
could not trace this claim in their references. 
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(2005) drew attention to a “convergence” between open source, open access, and open 
science, identifying this as a basis for a popular movement with a common cause. In 
doing so, he linked the meaning of “open” in software movements not only with open 
access to research and scholarship, but with visions of science as historically “open”17. 
Eve (2014), following Willinsky’s observations, proposed that open access emerged 
from the convergence of two histories: those of software-associated free culture, and 
the economics of journal publishing.  
 
Tkacz (2012) takes a broader view of contemporary openness, again identifying its 
roots in software culture. More specifically, he argues that a neoliberal of version 
openness – representing open source over free software values, and traceable back to 
Karl Popper’s The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945) – prevails in contemporary 
movements. Examining open access, Moore (2017) concurs with Tkacz that open 
source software and free culture – with neoliberal overtones – have shaped a distinct 
lineage of open access which, particularly in the sciences, has adopted the Creative 
Commons Attribution Licence (CC BY) as a minimum acceptable standard of 
openness. However, Moore also argues that another distinct lineage of open access is 
concerned more with public access to scholarship than with licensing for re-use: a 
basis outside neoliberalism. These two lineages are similar to those identified by Eve 
(2014), but Moore emphasises an ongoing ideological struggle between different 
lineages of contemporary openness, rather than a convergence. Delfanti (2013) also 
locates a strong influences from open source software cultures in open science, 
specifically in contemporary biology. He argues that there has been a “remix” between 
a hacker ethic and traditional Mertonian values, suggesting that contemporary open 
science inherits a highly diverse18 set of ideologies from hacker culture, as evoked in 
his opening sentence: “crack the code, share your data, have fun, save the world, be 
independent, become famous and make a lot of money” (p. 1).  
 
                                                     
17 Willinsky is among those who draw on the work of David (2008) in constructing the past of 
contemporary open movements, as discussed in Chapter 3. 
18 A diversity also noted by Kelty (2008). 
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It is clear therefore that software cultures, especially those taking shape shortly before 
the turn of the twenty-first century, have had a strong proximal – but not total or 
determining – influence on the shape of today’s open science. That influence is 
traceable through “open” language, ideologies, and specific practices such as the 
application of Creative Commons licences as a standard of openness. It may even have 
led to the conception of contemporary open science as a “movement” (or set of 
movements), analogous to the open source movement. These influences continue to 
become clear in Chapter 5 which unfolds twenty-first century open science itself, as 
well as in my interview findings. But as I have shown in this chapter, software culture 
is one of many antecedents that built up a context for open science: I will now review 
them and bring them together.   
 
4.11 Conclusion: converging on twenty-first century “open 
science” 
 
These multiple, accumulating histories present a nuanced backstory to the emergence 
of “open science” in the twenty-first century. Some depict encroaching closure or 
secrecy, suggesting a relationship between openness and science that is under threat 
or being corrupted. Others depict new or reinforced cultures of scientific openness. 
Since neither “science” or “open” are fixed concepts, it might be more accurate to say 
that the twentieth century profoundly altered – on multiple dimensions – what it 
means to do science, and consequently what it means, and what it looks like, for 
science to be opened or closed. At the start of the century, science was already altered 
from its gentlemanly, seventeenth century form. Significantly, a new boundary was 
being drawn between science as a profession and the public realm (Pandora and 
Rader 2008:355). Then, “big science” changed the organisational structures of some 
fields, notably in physics. There was more reason to communicate science in a rapid, 
ongoing way some of these larger community structures. WWII was central to these 
changes, funding big science (especially physics) and giving cause for centralised, 
rapid communication – but also certain forms of secrecy. All these trends altered the 
relationship of science to its traditional process for openness – journal publication. In 
high energy physics a paper-based preprint culture was born. In other fields, 
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including biology, preprint cultures were suppressed by editors who began to see 
scientific papers as unique products.  
 
The mass commodification of journal publishing after WWII opened it up to a larger 
market, but reduced its accessibility in other ways as prices increased, and scientific 
communities lost financial control over their means of “openness”. Commercial 
publishers co-opted journal metrics – developed to grapple with literature growth – 
and the community tradition of peer review, entrenching and narrowing what it 
meant to publish well. Similar measures were adopted by universities for assessing 
academic merit. By this point, seeds had been sown for both the “serials crisis” – and 
thus eventually for open access movements – and academic cultures that prioritise a 
single means to “openness”: publishing, exclusively and prestigiously. In biology 
journal publishing largely prevailed over a decades-long desire for alternative means 
to “openness” – like preprints – due to these social and economic forces, rather than a 
deficit of technological options. By the 1970s and 1980s, deregulated markets and 
private investment were encouraging a faster, but less fully shared science, prompting 
some to celebrate the dividends of an open market while others saw greater openness 
in publicly owned knowledge, and mourned local losses of Mertonian communalism. 
These changes may have primed both the acceptability of open science in a neoliberal 
political environment, and movements of resistance against commercial closures. 
 
Through all this, the Internet grew, infused with a traditional narrative and a 
technical architecture of openness, and holding a potential for faster, deeper, wider 
sharing. But it could only change existing cultures so far: it helped physicists 
modernise and make public their preprints system – before it was “open science” – 
and helped publishers grow their profits, and further entrench prestige publishing. 
Meanwhile in some enclaves of biology, model organism communities had developed 
their own cultures of openness, based not on universal public access, but community-
based reciprocity and trust. Like physics preprints, these cultures served as blueprints 
for online resource sharing within particular scientific communities, and also 
influenced the adoption of online data sharing as a norm in genomics via the Human 




A final, vital influence at the end of the twentieth century was from resistance to 
commodification in a different domain – free software. Prioritising liberty to access, 
modify, and redistribute software – and creating the legal means to enact this through 
licensing – free software gave rise to open source, which valued the pragmatism of 
these free practices rather than their social, ethical foundations. The resulting 
movement in hacker and geek culture was fuelled by diverse, conflicting ideologies, 
and brought new and specific meaning to “open”, which was already culturally valued 
in the neoliberal 1980s (Kelty 2008:148). There are indications that twenty-first 
century “open science” directly inherited its buzzword from this software movement. 
It certainly inherited other features, including a prioritisation of open licensing for 
reuse, and a conflicted ideological breadth that places free market efficiency under 
the same banner as a pursuit of social equality. This connection also potentially 
establishes software as a metaphor for science, suggesting that science might be 
improved if its source code – all its unpublished inner workings – could be exactly 
recorded and made visible, repeatable, and shareable to others. This is the “extreme” 
vision for open science (Nielsen 2009:32), similar to open notebook science (Bradley 
et al. 2008) that goes beyond openness of papers or data. It chimes with the value 
placed by scientists on objectivity and reproducibility, and is consistent with the 
suggestion by Delfanti (2013) and David (2014) that “open science” results from a 
remix between hacker culture and traditional scientific ideals. 
 
Together, these histories challenge tendencies towards technological determinism, in 
which the Internet is framed as the driving force behind an inevitable emergence of 
open science. Related tendencies frame openness in science primarily as a 
technological problem or accomplishment that can be solved or achieved with the 
correct technological state, practice, or infrastructure. This is perhaps not surprising 
considering that software and Internet cultures were vital influences precipitating the 
emergence of open science. Admittedly, technological framings are often implied, or 
used for rhetorical effect: few if any commentators claim that open science lacks a 
complex, socially entangled past – or present. Framings matter though (see Haraway 
quote, Section 3.4): for instance, Nielsen (2009, 2011) and Bartling and Friesike (2014b) 
110 
 
anchor their expectations of an open science “revolution” in the technological shift 
from paper-based journals to online, networked communication (see Figure 5). At 
the same time, a common emphasis – including by these authors – is the difficulty of 
bringing about cultural change; an acknowledgement of complexity. By presenting 
multiple histories of open science I bring together and thereby broaden the resources 
and vocabularies available for explaining its emergence – and anticipating its future – 
beyond a technological framing, or indeed any single explanatory framing. 
 
Figure 5 | An illustration reproduced from Bartling and Friesike (2014b:8), in which they depict an 
historical succession of scientific communication technologies, highlighting the expected “second 
scientific revolution” in association with the Internet. Technological determinism is evident in this 
framing: it suggests that technologies direct subsequent cultural changes – and that at present, we are in 
a “legacy gap” between the availability of a new technology and its cultural integration. Figure licenced 
under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial Licence. 
 
Together, these histories also show why the contemporary “open science” 
phenomenon is so diverse, connoting multiple meanings and values: it clearly has 
numerous historical roots. Today’s “open” movements – open access, open research 
data, open preprints, open notebook science, and so on – each originate in one or 
several of these individual histories, as well as in overarching trends of growth, 
commodification, resistance to commodification, and socio-technological change. 
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What is remarkable is that in the 2000s, these lineages seem to have converged under 
the heading “open”. It is in this context that I ask my second research sub-question: 
How has “open” in science recently gained such salience and discursive power, despite 
its multiple meanings and lack of specificity? The histories that I have collected begin 
to provide an answer by illuminating a slow and layered build up to today’s 
movements that otherwise seem to appear suddenly. This means a slow ferment of 
ideas, causes, and cultures which have traction prior to their incorporation in an 
“open” movement – including a long-held desire for preprint systems or other 
alternatives to journal publication; dissatisfaction with rising subscription prices; 
pressure to publish with prestige; disintegrating community and ethos in some 
settings, while elsewhere communality is valorised; and excitement about the 
potential of the Internet, and open software, as a way forward. Each one of these ideas 
and causes brings its own constituency of actors to “open”, multiplying salience and 
social power. The attraction of technological openness may be particularly high where 
tension has been building for decades: for biologists embedded in cultures of prestige 
publishing for example, without recourse to preprints, and outside of communally-
minded enclaves like model organism communities. 
 
How it is that “open” brought these constituencies together remains curious. I 
propose that the flexibility and ambiguity of “open” is its strength in this regard. Many 
have commented on this quality, and in Chapter 3 I showed how interpretative 
flexibility eases the reframing of past science as “open”. Fecher and Friesike (2014), for 
example, write that “openness could refer to pretty much anything” (p. 18). In the 
context of computing, Kelty (2008) comments: “Openness is an unruly concept […] 
Everyone claims to be open, everyone has something to share, everyone agrees that 
being open is the obvious thing to do…” (p. 143). My suggestion is that the broad 
appeal of “open” has allowed it to become a rallying point for meaning. It can refer to 
the openness of a free market, which upholds efficiency and progress as markers of 
scientific success; the openness of democracy and equality that shares across social 
boundaries; the openness of information unencumbered by copyright and conditions; 
the openness of transparency and accountability; the openness of being free to act; 
the openness of publishing one’s work; and the open exchanges of a trusting 
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community. Of course, there is nothing inevitable about this acquisition of meaning: 
the potential of “open” seems to have been seeded in the 1980s (see Sections 3.4.6 and 
4.10) when it became a popular term in the context of neoliberalism; its increase in 
cachet may have been gradual with its influential deployment by open source, and 
then open access movements, prior to the “open science” umbrella term. Moore (2017) 
conceives of open access in particular as a “boundary object” – “a concept that has a 
specific understanding in a local community of practice but is rigid enough to 
maintain its definition across communities” (ibid., p. 2; concept proposed by Star and 
Griesemer 1989), a theorisation that could be useful for open movements broadly. 
Crucially, such objects are maintained by their plasticity, and cease to be unifying 
when made specific – for example, in policy (ibid., p. 12). This suggests that 
ideological conflicts within “open” do not diminish its salience and power, and in fact 
do the opposite. Kelty (2008) suggests that open source became a “movement” 
through internal disputes: everyone had something to believe in (p. 113). I propose 
that precisely because it does not commit to any single agenda, but holds positive 
meaning for many, “open” continues to collect causes, holding them together loosely. 
As a result, the term now captures a great deal of all that is considered good – and 
wanting – in contemporary science.  
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Chapter 5 | “An old tradition and a new technology” 




Chapters 3 and 4 showed that openness in science is an idea with great depth and 
breadth: it has resonance through hundreds of years of scientific history, and it has 
also absorbed a wide array of meanings over the twentieth century that continue to 
multiply. A more recent period – coinciding approximately with the twenty-first 
century – is characterised by the rapid rise in salience of explicitly “open” science 
instantiated by growing advocacy and policy movements. These have tended to 
emerge in grassroots communities of researchers and entrepreneurs before uptake 
and wider establishment by institutions that govern research. The aim of this chapter 
is to move from a wide-angle perspective on the historical place and meaning of 
openness in science towards a narrower focus on the contemporary period and the 
way that pertinent aspects of today’s open science movements have unfolded.  
 
In particular, this chapter will unpack the recent emergence of open access and open 
data as two of the most significant advocacy and policy movements defining 
contemporary open science, before turning to open science itself as an overarching 
advocacy and policy movement. This will involve a more detailed characterisation of 
the conceptual and practical meaning of open access, open data and open science as 
constructed in advocacy and policy contexts. This is an empirical engagement with 
the contemporary dimension of my overarching research question: How is the 
meaning of “open” (or “openness”) being constructed in the context of science? The 
advocacy and policy context is also an immediate influence upon the construction of 
openness by scientists. The current chapter thus contextualises the interview-based 
empirical engagements presented in subsequent chapters. I have chosen to focus 
upon open access and open data not only because of their formative influence on 
open science more broadly, but because they emerge as two of the three major 
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categories of meaning discussed by interviewees, and analysed in Chapter 6 (open 
access) and Chapter 7 (data openness). The third category – interpersonal openness 
(Chapter 8) – is significant in its relative absence from the advocacy and policy 
framings of open science presented in this chapter.  
 
This topic presents the challenge of telling recent histories that are still in the making. 
I do not have the benefit of significant hindsight or an established scholarly literature 
with which to make sense of a multiplicity of events, actors and connections with 
varying levels of influence. To be comprehensive would also be beyond the scope of 
this chapter. I aim instead to provide enough breadth, and selective depth, for the 
reader to appreciate key events, trends and themes in the unfolding of open science in 
the UK and Australia over the period 2000-2019.  
 
Document case studies 
To allow for deeper engagement with my research questions alongside broader 
commentary, I include nine short document case studies in which I analyse the 
construction of “open” in key contexts. In each example I consider the context, form, 
and role of the text, and how it relates to the themes of my four research sub-
questions: (a) historical framings; (b) diversity of “open” meanings; (c) epistemic 
virtue, and (d) portrayal of researchers and research culture (full questions in Section 
1.7). The features of these documents are summarised in Table 4, and aspects of my 
analysis are summarised in Table 5. The documents were primarily produced in the 
UK, in or in an international setting that has affected global open science discourse.  
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Table 5 | Summary of analytical points for the nine documents, including engagement with the themes of my research sub-questions. Column (b) summarises values of 
“open” that are salient in the document: Ep=Epistemic benefits, Pr=Productivity/efficiency, Co=Commercial/economic interests, TL=Tech libre values, In= 
Inclusivity/community/interdisciplinarity, Ac=Accountability/transparency/integrity, Pu=Public access & trust. 
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5.2 Open access to research articles 
 
Open access is possibly the earliest and most prominent element of open science 
discourse and practice, made visible by more than 20 years of grassroots and 
entrepreneurial activity followed by increasing top-down endorsement by research 
funders, institutions and publishers. Within these discourses, open access most often 
refers to free, public, online access to scholarly literature – especially in the form of 
peer-reviewed journal articles, but also applying to online books and other content – 
that would otherwise be accessible only via costly institutional subscriptions or 
individual payments (Eve 2014; Suber 2012). Many advocates of open access including 
Eve (ibid.) and Suber (ibid.) emphasise reusability as well as access, so are interested 
in removing legal and technical as well as financial barriers to reuse. For example, the 
Creative Commons Attribution licence (CC BY) – often upheld as a copyright 
standard for open access – requires that original authors are cited, but allows anyone 
to “distribute, remix, tweak, and build upon [the] work” without seeking permission. 
This approach is an influence of open source software and free culture movements 
upon open access, as discussed in Chapter 4 (Section 4.10). 
 
In the early 2000s, consensus and salience were built around this latter, technically 
and legally specified use of “open access” through a series of international discussions 
and declarations: the Budapest Open Access Initiative (BOAI 2002), the Bethesda 
Statement on Open Access Publishing (2003), and the Berlin Declaration on Open 
Access to Knowledge in the Sciences and Humanities (2003). The BOAI is document 
#2, analysed in Section 5.2.4. As the last title indicates, there was participation in 
these discussions from a range of disciplines, not all scientific. However, Moore 
(2019b) argues that this was a key moment at which a scientific framing of open 
access – represented both in the wording of the BOAI and its signatories – became 
dominant, establishing liberal licensing as a tenet of open access (pp. 2, 8). Prior to 
this point, at which the term “open access” was crystallised, another lineage of 
grassroots movements – primarily in the social science and humanities – 
experimented with free online access to scholarship without the libre (licencing for 
reuse) imperative (ibid.). Like open science as a whole therefore, open access is 
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characterised by plurality, but a variety that focuses on “open” reuse is more 
influential, at least in the global north. 
 
5.2.1 Green and gold open access 
 
Practices and infrastructures of open access are usually divided into two main 
categories according to how the material is made accessible: repository-mediated 
open access, sometimes referred to as “green” open access; and journal-mediated, or 
“gold”, open access (Eve 2014:8–12; Suber 2012:6)19. Both of these routes to access are 
proposed by the BOAI, but each has developed a complex history in the politics of 
open access movements, representing a different set of values and compromises. Each 
also involves a different material practice and set of actors.  
 
Green open access involves the deposition of an article into a publicly accessible, 
online repository that is hosted by a research institution, or may be curated in a 
particular subject or disciplinary area. If the article has also been accepted or 
published by a journal, the legal capacity of researchers to distribute it via the green 
route depends on the rules of the publisher in question: traditional publishers tend to 
assert their interests by restricting distribution of the final, typeset “publisher version” 
of the article, which they sell via subscriptions or individual purchases. However, 
many allow an “author version” of the article, which is peer-reviewed and finalised in 
its content, but not typeset and branded, to be distributed via repositories, sometimes 
after an embargo period. As a result, this mode of open access is free of financial cost 
to practise as well as receive, but requires knowledge of repositories and publisher 
rules, a willingness to distribute a pre-typeset version of their article, and a possible 
embargo delay. Online tools exist that allow researchers to navigate individual 
journals’ policies, in particular SHERPA/RoMEO hosted by the University of 
Nottingham (Eve 2014:10). The experience of accessing green open access articles is 
                                                     
19 Other colour-coded categories of open access have also been suggested including bronze 
(Piwowar et al. 2018) and black (Björk 2017a), but these have not gained the salience of the 
green and gold categories. 
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shaped by this infrastructure as they do not appear on official publisher websites 
unless they are also open access via another route. Their discoverability depends on 
the repository’s indexing practices, and potentially on efforts by the researcher and 
their institution to promote and maintain publication records. Many repositories also 
provide the function of digital preservation, which protects access to the article in the 
long term, independent of publisher websites (ibid., p. 11). 
 
Gold open access, in contrast, is a model of journal publishing in which the final, 
typeset “publisher version” of the article is free and accessible online. Contention 
surrounds the financing of this model. Some open access journals are supported by 
the publisher’s internal financial reserves, a sponsor, or another revenue source. Many 
other journals, however, support open access by requiring article processing charges 
(APCs) from authors, who are expected to pay from their own resources, grants, or 
institutional funds (Kozak and Hartley 2013). Some publishers waive these charges in 
cases of economic disadvantage (e.g. PLOS n.d.). Many open access journals – the 
majority, as measured by the Directory of Open Access Journals (DOAJ n.d.)20 – do 
not charge APCs. Fees for open access are, however, particularly prevalent in 
medicine and the sciences. They are favoured by “private and large publishing houses” 
(Kozak and Hartley 2013:2591), and are more common for journals certified by DOAJ 
for meeting best practice openness standards. Additionally, in the global north and 
the life sciences particularly, the founding of open access publishers as start-up 
companies21, funded primarily or entirely by APCs, has been an influential part of the 
open access landscape. Gold open access articles are available free in their final 
typeset and branded form from publishers’ websites as well as any indexing services 
linked with the publisher and the author’s institution. They tend to be “open” in a 
reuse sense, as the publisher controls licensing – although the permissiveness of the 
licence offered may vary – in contrast with green open access articles, which tend to 
be “open” in cost terms only (Björk et al. 2013). 
                                                     
20 On June 1 2020, the DOAJ recorded 4,014 journals that charge APCs and 10,624 journals that 
do not. However, of those certified by the DOAJ as following best practice and a high level of 
openness, most (1,052) charge APCs and a minority (331) do not. 
21 Examples of open access publishers as start-up companies include: BioMed Central (BMC), 




A distinction is made between fully open access journals in which every article is 
openly available, and “hybrid” journals that operate via a traditional subscription 
model, with the option of paid gold open access on an individual article basis. The 
DOAJ as an advocate voice does not include hybrid journals in their certification of 
open access journals, but at the time of my research hybrid was widely accepted as a 
form of open access in funder policies. The number of journals offering a hybrid 
option and its uptake by researchers have grown fast: Björk (2017b) records a five-fold 
increase in hybrid journals and articles from 2009 to 2016. The Wellcome Trust (2020) 
also records higher spending on hybrid than fully open access journals from 2016/17 to 
2018/19 amongst the researchers they fund – both because of a higher number of 
hybrid articles, and a higher average APC cost at hybrid journals. It may be that some 
hybrid journals are able to charge higher APCs in correspondence with their higher 
prestige; there has also been controversy over apparent “double-dipping” as hybrid 
incomes combine subscriptions and APCs, the economics of which are opaque 
(Mittermaier 2015; Pinfield, Salter, and Bath 2015). 
 
APC-based gold open access publishing has also become associated with the 
phenomenon of “predatory publishing” (Beall 2012), which co-opts the norm of 
charging fees for online publication in order to yield profits with little or no attention 
to peer review and other functions traditionally administered by journals, such as 
editorial checking and indexing. It has subsequently been observed that the boundary 
between predatory journals and those viewed as legitimate is not clear-cut, and that 
misleading, indiscriminate, and low quality journal practices abound without 
necessarily being linked to open access (Cobey et al. 2018). However, the association 
arises persistently and was raised once again in my interviews. 
 
5.2.2 The rising salience of open access 
 
The recent history of open access movements in the global north – particularly in 
relation to the life sciences – is marked by several developments in addition to formal 
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definition-making. In 2000, PubMed Central (PMC) – “a free archive of biomedical 
and life sciences journal literature” (NCBI n.d.) – was established by the US National 
Institutes of Health. In the same year, more than 30,000 scientists signed an open 
letter (document #1, analysed in Section 5.2.3) asking that publishers make 
research articles freely available through PMC or a similar resource, or face 
withdrawal of research community support (PLOS 2000). The founding of two 
internationally influential open access publishers, BioMed Central (BMC) and PLOS, 
was closely related to these developments: entrepreneur Vitek Tracz founded BMC in 
1998 and had also been in contact with then NIH Director Harold Varmus about the 
creation of PMC (Poynder 2006); and Varmus together with fellow life scientists 
Patrick Brown and Michael Eisen were the instigators of the open letter. The latter 
group founded PLOS in 2001 as a direct follow up to their letter, having encountered 
resistance from traditional publishers and reasoning that direct entry into the 
publishing industry may be a more effective way to bring about change (PLOS n.d.). 
The creation of these new scholarly publishing avenues, resources and brands among 
others, together with a political consciousness fostered by acts such as the open letter, 
widened visibility for open access initiatives beyond grassroots and entrepreneurial 




5.2.3 Document #1: the PLoS open letter (2000) 
 The Public Library of Science (now PLOS) began in 2000 as an advocacy 
initiative, with the circulation of a short open letter. 
 Aimed at traditional publishers of medical and life sciences, instigated by three 
influential US life scientists. 
 High visibility and traction, including in mass media and prestigious journals 
(Hagerlid 2012:1); “signed by nearly 34,000 scientists from 180 nations”. 
 Shows discourse catalysing “open” movements before they took form. 
 The three-paragraph text: 
o Envisions “online public library” for published biomedical literature; 
o Asserts a right to public ownership and accessibility to this library; 
o Threatens to withdraw community support from publishers who do not 
allow redistribution of work for this purpose. 
“Establishment of this public library would vastly increase the 
accessibility and utility of the scientific literature, enhance 
scientific productivity, and catalyze integration of the disparate 
communities of knowledge and ideas in biomedical sciences.” 
 Epistemic and instrumental goals are prioritised: making science more 
productive and integrated; chiming with both communitarian ideals and 
neoliberal economics. These meanings appear in subsequent “open” discourse.  
 Libre licensing and transparency do not feature. 
 “Public” frequently invoked but value of access beyond scientists not 
articulated: scientists positioned as members of the public with access rights. 
 Establishes negotiating position, accepting compromise with commercial 
publishers: six months of exclusivity, before public access. 
 No historical framing, which appears more in later open discourse. 
 Scientists as instigators of action, not barriers to progress, characterising this 
grassroots phase. Instigators are high-profile, not disempowered, however. 
 Access is framed as epistemically useful and morally correct, but for different 





5.2.4 Document #2: the Budapest Open Access Initiative (2002) 
 First of three international statements in 2002-2003 that catalysed open access 
movements and provided reference definitions. 
 BOAI meeting was called by George Soros’ Open Society Institute (OSI). 
 Brought together “leading proponents” of existing open access initiatives.  
 The 16 original authors were primarily early innovators in online scholarly 
communication – among them representatives of the recently founded open 
access publishers PLoS and BioMed Central (BMC). 
 Concise document, just over 1000 words. 
The text: 
 Begins with a striking line: “An old tradition and a new technology have 
converged to make possible an unprecedented public good”. 
 Establishes historical resonance, but only with the specific tradition of non-
profit publishing before mass commercialisation (Fyfe et al. 2017). 
 “Open access” used frequently, but “open” is not detached as a signifier. 
 Diverse values and goals brought together: efficiency and productivity in 
research – the faster the better; social value of education; equality and the 
upholding of different kinds of knowledge as valuable; epistemic values as 
uniting, human values; cost-efficiency; individual visibility and impact. 
“Removing access barriers to this literature will accelerate 
research, enrich education, share the learning of the rich with the 
poor and the poor with the rich, make this literature as useful as it 
can be, and lay the foundation for uniting humanity in a common 
intellectual conversation and quest for knowledge.” 
 Reflects meanings of “open” from software cultures and the early Internet: libre 
licensing is not specified, but liberal digital re-use rights are mentioned. 
 Technology-centric: language of “users”, emphasis on digital processing. 
 Publisher control is not mentioned: open access as a technological opportunity, 
not an act of resistance. “Access barriers” are naturalised; they exist “for various 
[unarticulated] reasons”. Presents open access as non-threatening to 
commercial actors and achievable through market forces (Moore 2019b).  
 Written in third person, but scientists are portrayed as active, able to adopt 
open access without systemic support – characterising grassroots phase. 
 Moral and epistemic purpose are brought together the single heading “open 
access”, but not blended: no suggestion that open science is better science. 
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5.2.5 Open access in research policy: the UK and Australia 
 
Since the early 2000s the visibility of open access movements has extended further, in 
particular through the influence of major research funders, governments, and 
institutions who have made statements or policies encouraging or requiring that the 
research they support is open access. This has been an international phenomenon, 
but with different geopolitical foci promoting different approaches. My research is 
situated primarily in the UK and Australia, both in the global north, and with parallel, 
yet contrasting, histories of open access governance. The UK context is characterised 
by a relatively early and increasingly stringent pursuit of open access in research 
policy, led by charity and governmental research funders. It has been unusual in 
prioritising and funding a gold, APC-based – and therefore, publisher-centred – 
model of open access. In Australia, timings of major policy developments have tended 
to align with those in the UK, but the policies themselves have been less stringent, 
with fewer consequences for researchers who do not comply. There is also a 
preference for green, repository-mediated open access, with little funding available 
for APCs. Both of these contexts vary significantly in comparison with other regions: 
Latin America for instance is notable for an extensive “non-commercial and publicly-
funded” open access infrastructure (Debat and Babini 2019:3, preprint) that was 
established early, from 1997, with the journal aggregator SciELO (Bulock 2019). 
 
Open access in the UK 
 
Of particular note for the UK context are the statements and policies of the Wellcome 
Trust and Research Councils UK (RCUK22), two of the most significant funders of 
publicly-oriented UK research. The influence of the Wellcome Trust here is notable, 
as a wealthy and influential biomedical charity which has proactively led the open 
access agenda – and subsequently other top-down “open” agendas – in the UK. The 
Wellcome Trust commissioned a report which showed, in 2004, that open access 
                                                     
22 Research Councils UK (RCUK) was replaced by UK Research and Innovation (UKRI) during 
the course of this study, in 2018. 
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scientific publishing, supported by author fees, is economically viable and a preferable 
system to subscription publishing (Wellcome Trust 2004). Both Wellcome and RCUK 
announced and began implementing open access mandates for the researchers they 
fund in 2005-2006 (Suber 2006; Wellcome Trust 2008). The next major developments 
took place from 2012, when a government-commissioned working group chaired by 
Dame Janet Finch and composed of “individuals drawn from academia, research 
funders and publishing” (p. 2) released its report, Accessibility, sustainability, 
excellence: how to expand access to research publications (Finch 2012). This is 
document #3, analysed in Section 5.2.6. It recommended that “the UK should 
embrace the transition to open access” (p. 7), with an emphasis on gold open access 
paid for by APCs. It recommended that funds be put in place to allow researchers to 
cover these costs, an arrangement already pioneered by Wellcome. In the same 
month in 2012, Wellcome “strengthened” its open access policy to include sanctions 
for researchers who do not comply (Wellcome Trust 2012). Not long afterwards, in 
2013 – and following the Finch report’s “broad acceptance” by the Conservative and 
Liberal Democrat government of the day (UK Government 2012) – RCUK introduced a 
more unified open access policy across its research councils, accompanied by a 
provision of block grants to universities to fund APCs (RCUK n.d.). These 
developments established a pattern in the UK of progressively more stringent open 
access policies that increasingly apply to a larger population of researchers.
126 
 
5.2.6 Document #3: the Finch report (2012) 
 Report recommending open access to the UK government, led by Dame Janet 
Finch, composed by a working group representing academics, research funders, 
librarians, learned societies, and publishers. 
 Set the UK’s policy direction towards journal-mediated “gold” open access 
including via hybrid journals, and led to the provision of public funds for APCs.  
 Employs brief historical framing, establishing journal publication as a tradition 
for over 350 years. Does not re-frame past science as open, however. 
 Open access portrayed as a single issue, not part of open science/research. 
 “Open” terminology not emphasised: contrasts with the Royal Society report 
(2012) being produced concurrently. Perhaps a flattening of the disruptive 
connotations of “open” for a multi-stakeholder group. 
 Emphasis on values with appeal for government: transparency; accountability; 
public engagement; stimulation of innovation with public sector benefits; 
economic growth; and increased returns on investment. These are placed 
alongside epistemic values: greater efficiency and innovation within research. 
 Incorporates libre values in which open access also implies liberal re-use rights. 
 Depicts tension, compromise and polarised interests: “Members of the group 
represented different constituencies who have legitimately different interests 
and different priorities” (p. 2). This is no exaggeration: the group includes 
corporate publishers whose businesses are disrupted by open access. 
 Tensions manifest throughout: although “barriers to access…are increasingly 
unacceptable in an online world” (p. 5) there is a need to “sustain what is 
valuable in a complex ecology” (p. 3). Recommends “accelerating” open access, 
but warns that this must not be hasty. Ecological metaphors urge “balance” and 
“sustainability”, arguably naturalising a corporate publishing hegemony. 
 Critics of the report argued that its costly support of “gold” over repository-
mediated “green” reflects publisher influence (e.g. Harnad 2012). Gold and 
hybrid APCs are an income for publishers whereas green challenges their role. 
 Researchers positioned as one of many stakeholder groups involved in a 
systems-level transition. It is anticipated the researchers will lack awareness 
and require reasoned explanations and incentives to adopt open access. 
 Slight, brief blending of the moral and epistemic purpose: “better, faster 





In more recent years, two major open access policy developments have begun – or 
promise – to have an even wider-ranging impact on UK researchers, beyond 
individual grantee-funder relationships. The first of these is exceptional because it 
relates to the 2021 Research Excellence Framework (REF), an assessment exercise 
critical to the distribution of research funds among UK universities. It is a stage upon 
which the value of departments and universities are made measurable through 
reviews of research output. From 1 April 2016, research articles must have been made 
open shortly after editorial acceptance, by means of deposition in a “green” open 
access repository, in order to be eligible for REF2021 (HEFCE 2014). This policy has 
raised the stakes of open access acutely for research institutions, and in turn for 
researchers, during the period of my empirical data-gathering. Secondly, 2018 saw the 
launch of “cOAlition S”, a partnership of national and charitable funding agencies 
centred in Europe and led by Science Europe, which proposes a major re-think to 
open access policy, termed “Plan S” (European Science Foundation n.d.). UK Research 
and Innovation (UKRI) – the new, transformed RCUK – and the Wellcome Trust are 
both members of this coalition, whose ten principles would add a new level of 
stringency to open access policy. Significantly, Plan S commits funder policies to 
aspects of the “open” definition established by the 2003 Berlin Declaration that have 
been treated loosely by existing policies. In particular, it requires that open access 
material is not just freely available online, but also that it has an open license allowing 
liberal reuse. Plan S thus tightens the criteria that journals and repositories must meet 
for their articles to be considered “open access” in policy terms. Notably, “hybrid” 
journals will be disqualified as a route to open access, having previously been major 
beneficiaries of research funder policies and associated block grant provisions in the 
UK. The empirical parts of my research were largely concluded before the 
announcement of Plan S, but it indicates a distinctive trajectory for open access policy 
in the UK that can be discussed in relation to my interview findings (see Section 6.8). 
 
Open access in Australia 
 
In Australia, open access has also grown in salience but to a lesser extent at present, 
and in qualitatively different ways. Australian universities were early to establish a 
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green open access infrastructure: the Australian National University set up an “e-print 
repository” in 2001, and in 2003 the Queensland University of Technology was the first 
institution in the world to mandate open access for its research outputs (QUT n.d.; 
Steele 2013). Government funds were invested in institutional repositories, including 
by the Australian Scheme for Higher Education Repositories (ASHER) from 2007-2011. 
However, these funds were not necessarily used to make these repositories open 
access (Steele 2013) and no such support is ongoing (CAUL and AOASG 2019). The 
two major government-funded research councils began encouraging forms of open 
access from 2006-2008 (ARC n.d.; Suber 2009). Then in 2012 and 2013 respectively, the 
National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) and the Australian 
Research Council (ARC) began to require open access (Steele 2013:284). Although this 
timing approximately aligned with major policy developments in the UK, the 
Australian policies were less stringent with regard to timing of, and exceptions to, 
open access. The policy preference in Australia is for “green” open access, and there is 
no central funding provision for the “gold” path that has been heavily supported in 
the UK. The policy momentum that is apparent in the UK, led by influential 
institutional actors, is not evident in Australia, where promises of an open access 
future are less apparent. At present, there are no sanctions for non-compliance with 
the major policies. Australia is on the periphery of the global north-centred Plan S 
initiative, with little indication that it will embrace landmark changes of that kind 
(Ross 2019). As a result, Australian researchers tend to encounter less demanding 
open access environments, unless their particular institution has developed strict 
policies, with fewer influences from the commercial publishing sector that has shaped 
the UK’s “gold” policy emphasis. However, the global nature of open access discourse 
and scientific communities ensures that these national contexts are not independent. 
 
5.3 Open research data 
 
The use of “open” in relation to scientific research data has also became highly salient 
in research, policy and publishing discourses since the early 2000s. Like open access, 
and the open science label under which both have been incorporated, the open data 
approach is a plural phenomenon – indeed, it is arguably more diverse in its origins 
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and practice than open access, and less conceptually unified. Most obviously in 
relation to the present study, it has foundations in scientific traditions of publishing 
evidence. According to the Royal Society (2012), until the mid-to-late twentieth 
century, it was a norm for published article formats to include all the data resulting 
from a study (p. 26). Since around this time, “the vast majority of scientific data […] 
have only been accessed by small groups of experts” (Leonelli 2013:6). The Royal 
Society attributes this “data-gap” to new ways of collecting data in an increasingly 
digital, online age that produce huge quantities of data, going well beyond the 
capacity of a traditional article. Leonelli (2013) writes that the exclusivity of such data 
was normalised within a traditional view of scientific knowledge production as 
esoteric, technical and specialised, and thus the problem was not entirely a technical 
one. She argues that “the Open Data movement” arose in the twenty-first century as a 
challenge to this traditional view:  
“The movement brings together scientists, policy makers, publishers, 
industry representatives, and members of civil society around the 
globe who believe that data produced by scientific research should be 
made publicly accessible online and freely usable to anyone.” (p. 6) 
As well as being framed as a solution to a problem, an open data approach is seen as a 
technological opportunity to share, store and analyse data in new ways – an opening 
up of scientific evidence to a volume and depth that would have been impossible via 
traditional journal publication. As such it also represents not only a new kind of 
epistemic resource, but a new mode of transparency and accountability. This makes 
open data appealing to public institutions responsible for science, that are under 
pressure to foster public trust – especially in light of incidents that have challenged 
this trust in recent years, such as the University of East Anglia “ClimateGate” email 
scandal (Leonelli 2013:7). This is among the reasons highlighted by the Royal Society 
(2012) for its support of open data movements. Indeed, according to one of my 
interviewees who was closely involved with the Royal Society’s 2012 report, 
ClimateGate was the catalyst for the Society becoming involved in open data. Leonelli 
(2013) also highlights how trends of these kinds – in scientific research and beyond – 
are associated with a re-conceptualisation of data: 
“…data are increasingly conceptualized as inherently valuable 
products of scientific research, rather than as components of the 
research process that have no value in themselves.” (p. 7) 
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This means that research data are being treated in new ways. Open data movements 
encourage the publication of standalone “data papers” that might accrue prestige in 
the same way as research articles (Chavan and Penev 2011). And in a broader political 
economic context, this also means that data – newly mobile and valuable – can 
become commodities in a global market, with value to governments and industries in 
relation to challenges such as in human health (Leonelli 2013:9). 
 
5.3.1 Forerunners to open data: databases and the Human Genome Project 
 
Although the twenty-first century saw the birth of “open data”, there were 
forerunners to this movement that also conceived of data as valuable in themselves – 
a communal resource for science beyond the research article. Strasser (2019) positions 
the first digital sequence databases in biology – EMBL library and GenBank – built 
from the 1980s, as formative examples of open science in action (pp. 227-254). 
Moreover, he argues that these databases follow a long historical tradition of 
collections in biology that that has been overshadowed by experimental traditions 
until recent decades, when collections have become more widely accessible online. 
The communal resources collected by model organism communities in the twentieth 
century, and their transformation into public, online databases, are notable in this 
context (see Section 4.9). Strasser argues that early sequence databases challenged the 
role of journal editors as the authorities on valid scientific data – as journals were no 
longer the only reputable scientific sources. An increased value of scientific data in 
digital form was thus already seeded in the 1980s. 
 
Strasser’s narrative about the development of nucleic acid sequence databases is 
instructive. It began with manual digitisation of sequences published in papers, 
proceeded to accepting electronic submissions, and eventually became a core 
infrastructure as journal policies enforced deposition of sequences associated with 
publications. He documents resistance to such policies by both journal editors and 
scientists that is highly reminiscent of pushback on open data policies today (see 
Section 7.6), and argues that it was an eventual top-down enforcement by journals 
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that led to the success of early databases, and the acceptance of data sharing norms 
by scientists. It is notable that these norms were established specifically in genomic 
sciences, and in crystallography – similar culture change accompanied the 
establishment of the Protein Data Bank (PDB). Influences of disciplinary data sharing 
norms are evident in my interviews (see Section 7.4).  
 
These developments all preceded the Human Genome Project (HGP), which spanned 
the turn of the twenty-first century (Cook-Deegan 1994; Maxson Jones et al. 2018). 
The public HGP drew global attention to the case for publicly available data in service 
of the public interest, through contrast with the proprietary approach to the HGP led 
by J. Craig Venter. The public effort established a norm in genomics of making large-
scale digital datasets publicly available online for reuse by a wider community. 
Consensus around this practice was built through international agreements. The 1996 
Bermuda Principles stated that large human sequence datasets must be “freely 
available and in the public domain in order to encourage research and development 
and to maximise its benefit to society” (HGP Information Archive 1997). The 2003 Fort 
Lauderdale Agreement (Wellcome Trust 2003) extended the same principles to all 
large-scale sequencing efforts. The public HGP effort emphasised speed of access: 
sequences were automatically released into public databases within 24 hours of 
production, and therefore – unusually – were accessible prior to the publication of any 
journal article that might analyse and interpret the data. To reassure data producers, 
the Fort Lauderdale Agreement proposed that users – while making free use of the 
data – should observe a community etiquette of allowing producers to publish their 
analyses first. Sarah23, a senior biomedical journal editor, told me this is known as the 
“gentlemen’s agreement”. 
 
These policies, agreements and infrastructures established data sharing norms and 
laid a path for twenty-first century open data movements – as well as open access 
movements, according to Strasser (2019:249–50). In fact, there are direct institutional 
links: the Wellcome Trust was a significant funder of the public HGP (Maxson Jones 
                                                     
23 Interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
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et al. 2018) and convened the Bermuda and Fort Lauderdale meetings (ibid., pp. 247, 
249), before going on to lead open access and open data policy. However, the earlier 
initiatives were not branded as “open” in the same way as today’s movements and 
thus, I would argue, were part of a discursively distinct phenomenon. While data 
sharing may have helped set the scene for open access movements, open access set 
the scene for open data movements as they spread more widely across disciplines and 
acquired additional meanings associated with “open”.  
 
5.3.2 Crises of reproducibility 
 
The rise of open data has occurred not just in the context of technological means to 
disseminate large datasets as shared resources. There has also been a growing concern 
that published scientific research may not be as reliable as it appears: that due to poor 
research practice, bias, mistakes, or fraud, many published findings may be 
idiosyncratic to the researchers and circumstances that produced them. This set of 
concerns has come to be known as the “reproducibility crisis”, and while it is not 
entirely new – similar ideas can be dated to the 1950s (Bastian 2016; Stam 2018) – it 
has become more visible to research communities at large in the 2000s. John 
Ioannidis’ article Why most published research findings are false (2005) had a 
particular impact, and since then there have been many high profile studies and 
lamentations on the topic. This has included a Nature report in which only 11% of 53 
key preclinical cancer biology findings were confirmed (Begley and Ellis 2012); a 
Science report of a similar problem in psychology, with less than 40% of studies 
successfully replicated (Open Science Collaboration 2015); and a Nature survey in 
which many scientists across disciplines reported being unable to reproduce others’ 
results (Baker 2016). This is in addition to a number of high profile cases of scientific 
fraud that emerge periodically (e.g. the case of psychologist Diederik Stapel; Callaway 
2011). 
 
Multiple causes have been linked with the reproducibility crisis, including failures of 
quality control by journals, an increase in scale and complexity of projects with a 
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diffusion of responsibility, cognitive bias, problematic statistics, and a lack of 
transparency (summarised by Leonelli 2018). There have also been multiple critiques 
arguing that the “crisis” is not all it appears (Fanelli 2018), and that reproducibility is a 
limited lens through which to view research quality (Leonelli 2018; Stam 2018). The 
call for open data is nonetheless strengthened and given new meaning in light of this 
crisis narrative. Where early digital data sharing was framed as a resource to be mined 
for new results, sharing in the “open” era seems to be about integrity as well as utility. 
Errors, imperfections or fraud in the data or its interpretation are exposed, and those 
producing open data know this. Other kinds of scientific openness – of methods, 
code, laboratory notebooks, and so on – also connect with this intention to 
interrogate, and signal, integrity. The potential of these kinds of openness to signal 
trustworthiness to the public, as well as to other scientists (Grand et al. 2012) – and 
thus its appeal to institutions governing science – also connects with this theme. 
 
5.3.3 Defining “open” in relation to data: grassroots movements 
 
Prominent parts of open data movements have been concerned with establishing a 
definition of “open” in relation to data, as was the case for “open” access. Moreover, 
particular lineages of the two movements – access (to articles), and data – appear to 
be extensions of one another in the sense that within similar communities, attention 
appears to turn chronologically from the “opening up” of research literature to the 
data underpinning it. These communities have shared values, particularly the 
importance of libre licensing for any purpose, including commercial. In the UK, 
grassroots networks of researchers and open advocates began defining openness in 
relation to data not long after the landmark Budapest, Bethesda and Berlin statements 
on open access. The Open Knowledge Foundation (OKF), a UK-based global non-
profit organisation, was established in 2004 and circulated and released an “open 
definition” that applies to data in 2005-2006 (OKF n.d.) (document case study #4, 
analysed in Section 5.3.4). In 2009-10 a related group produced the Panton Principles 
(“principles for open data in science”, analysed in the same section), which refer to 
the OKF’s definition and “state clearly what openness is in relation to public science” 
(Murray-Rust et al. 2010), with a focus on licensing data for reuse. These definitions 
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and sets of guidance explicitly refer to free and open source software movements. 
Moreover, OKF’s definition is “initially derived from the Open Source Definition”, and 
is viewed as a continuation of Richard Stallman’s “ideals of software freedom” (OKF 
2015). This indicates that some “open” movements in science – particularly open data 
movements – are significantly influenced or led by grassroots communities with 
technological interests and expertise, and in particular, those versed in principles and 




5.3.4 Documents #4: Open Definition (2006-) and Panton Principles (2010) 
 Key cases of UK-centred grassroots advocacy of openness beyond the article. 
 The not-for-profit Open Knowledge Foundation (OKF) released its first Open 
Knowledge Definition in 2006: an early instance “open” being defined as a 
concept and descriptor in its own right (OKF 2006, n.d.). The latest version, 
simply titled “Open Definition”, was released in 2015 (OKF 2015). 
 Aligns with a discursive establishment of “open data”: the Wikipedia page was 
initiated by Peter Murray-Rust in 2006, who had an authorial role both of the 
documents discussed in this box (Anon n.d.). 
 Some linkage with early open access movements: advocate Peter Suber, a BOAI 
author, was also involved in drafting the Open Knowledge Definition. 
 An indication of influence: the OKF’s definition is cited by UK Government-
funded Open Data Institute on their page What makes data open? (ODI 2013). 
 Explicitly linked with free and open source software. Indicates a lineage of open 
data with foundational ties to software cultures: “The Open Definition was 
initially derived from the Open Source Definition […] Richard Stallman was the 
first to push the ideals of software freedom which we continue” (OKF 2015). 
 A software-derived libre meaning of “open” is in the foreground: unrestricted 
access, reuse, modification, and sharing. Machine readability, open formats, 
and open licensing are required. The document is largely about licensing. 
 Commercial purposes are explicitly included, placing the Definition closer to 
pragmatic, “neutral” open source values than anti-proprietary free values. The 
Panton Principles “STRONGLY discourage” limitations of commercial reuse. 
 Concise, legal style, portraying “open” as precise, bounded, and operational. 
“Open” is portrayed as static, binary quality of an object, rather than a value, 
process, or behaviour. Scientists themselves are thus absent from this portrayal. 
 To maximise decentralised, free sharing and reuse, the OKF acts as a centralised 
gatekeeper of “open”, asserting the Definition as a “gold standard” that 
distinguishes between legitimate openness and “open-washing” (Pollock 2014). 
 The Panton Principles are an extension of the Open Definition for a scientific 
data context, drafted by an OKF-associated group (Murray-Rust et al. 2010). 
 Premised on a traditional openness narrative: “Science is based on building on, 
reusing and openly criticising the published body of scientific knowledge”. 
 Recommends that scientific data be licensed for more liberal reuse: i.e. placed 
in the public domain, with no attribution requirement. This asserts collective 
ownership values over individuals’ attachments to data they produce. 




5.3.5 Open data in research policy: UK and Australia 
 
At the same time as grassroots movements began defining “open” in relation to data, a 
top-down governance of openness in relation to research data was beginning to take 
shape. In 2004, the OECD issued a Declaration on Access to Research Data from 
Public Funding in which 34 countries – including the UK and Australia – committed 
to “the establishment of access regimes for digital research data from public funding” 
in accordance with several principles including an undefined “openness” (OECD 
2004). In the years following, governments, research institutions, and publishers 
increasingly adopted stances that require or encourage openness of data from 
researchers, often as an extension of a stance on open access to research articles. In 
the UK, this tended to take the form of policy statements or mandates from 
institutional actors familiar in open access discourse: the Wellcome Trust and 
government bodies, particularly the research councils (overseen by RCUK/UKRI). In 
Australia, national-level policy is less strict, but there has been considerable 
investment in data sharing infrastructures (Shearer 2015:12). Researchers in both 
countries encounter international trends, such as the increasing adoption of data 
sharing rules by journals. In part due to the diversity of data types and how they are 
situated within any given research project, open data policies have to date been less 
prescriptive and trackable than open access policies. 
 
Open data in the UK 
 
In the UK, moves by major funders towards open data policy began in about 2007, 
when the Wellcome Trust began encouraging researchers to share data “as soon as 
feasible” and “with as few restrictions as possible” (Wellcome Trust 2007). In the same 
year the Medical Research Council (MRC) stated that “MRC research data…must be 
made available for new research purposes in a timely, responsible manner” (MRC 
2007). By 2011, RCUK’s Common Principles on Data Policy had extended this 
recommendation across the research councils (RCUK 2011). The Royal Society brought 
scientific openness into the UK policy spotlight in 2012 with its report Science as an 
open enterprise, which is primarily a manifesto for open data (document #5, 
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analysed in Section 5.3.6). The report coined the term “intelligent openness” as a 
way to define data that are sufficiently open: they must be “accessible, useable, 
assessable and intelligible” (The Royal Society 2012:12). It makes specific 
recommendations for how audiences including scientists, research institutions, 
funders, research assessors, learned societies, scientific journals, industry, and 
governments, should enact openness.
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5.3.6 Document #5: The Royal Society report (2012) 
 Landmark report advocating open research data titled Science as an open 
enterprise. Contemporary with the Finch report on open access (see p. 128). 
Unlike the Finch report it centres “open”, including the use of “open science” as 
an umbrella term, in a limited sense: covers only open access and open data. 
 Blends diverse values into “open”: most salient are epistemic and technological 
advancement; public accountability; economic gain; and civic benefit. 
 Histories in both reports co-locate origins of present science and 17th century 
journal publishing. The Society frames this as a history of openness in science: 
“Much of the remarkable growth of scientific understanding in 
recent centuries is due to open practices; open communication and 
deliberation sit at the heart of scientific practice.” (p. 13) 
 Represents addition of a prestigious establishment voice to open data 
movements. However, it does not cite or align with the OKF grassroots 
definition of open data, and instead develops its own concept of openness. 
 Coins the term “intelligent openness” that goes beyond “mere disclosure of 
data”. Data must be “accessible, intelligible, assessable and usable”24 (pp. 14-15). 
Intelligent openness is specific in different ways to the OKF’s Open Definition; 
the former more contextually nuanced, the latter more technically operational. 
 The Society portrays data openness as somewhat relational and socially 
embedded, rather than “open” being an intrinsic, technical feature of data. For 
example, they suggest that data communication should be audience-specific. 
 Openness with the public realm is a defining feature: a precursor publication 
was titled Science as a public enterprise (my underline) (Boulton et al. 2011). The 
Society’s entry into “open” discourse seems to have resulted from an alignment 
between open and public science, making its motivations distinct25. 
 Exceptions, including withholding of commercial, dual use, and personal data. 
Legitimises industry as non-contributing beneficiary of openness. 
 Acknowledges labour of making data open, and suggests that only data relevant 
to the public needs opening. Comparatively early pragmatic insight, with 
potential to reinforce science-society boundaries that are otherwise challenged. 
 Scientists are the primary audience, expected to need incentives to change. 
 Openness is good for science and will stamp out “bad science”: an epistemic 
virtue. 
                                                     
24 According to a key associated interviewee, FAIR data developed from intelligent openness. 
25 The same interviewee gave reasoning: “open” was seen as a narrower and more achievable 
step on the way to a public science that “blur[s] the divide between professional and amateur 
in new ways” (p. 8). I was told the Climategate email scandal, and associated loss of public 
trust, was the catalyst for this report. 
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Major UK research funders and institutions – RCUK/UKRI, HEFCE, the Wellcome 
Trust and Universities UK – took a decisive and unified stance on the topic in 2016. 
Their Concordat on Open Research Data (HEFCE et al. 2016) (document #6, 
analysed in Section 5.3.7) sets out ten “clear and practical principles for working 
with research data”, introduced by the first principle: “open access to research data is 
an enabler of high quality research, a facilitator of innovation and safeguards good 
research practice” (pp. 2, 7). It sets out expectations for researchers and their 
employers and funders, and is intended to guide data policies of all the signatory 
institutions. The Wellcome Trust, for instance, adopted a more specific, far-reaching 
policy in 2017: researchers “must make any data, original code or materials that 
underpin published research findings accessible to other researchers at the time of 
publication” (Carr 2017). 
 
Open data in Australia 
 
In Australia the two national research councils, the ARC and NHMRC, have taken less 
stringent stances on open data: in 2007 they co-developed the Australian Code for 
Responsible Conduct of Research (NHMRC, ARC, and Universities Australia 2007) 
which emphasises data management but not online sharing (Neylon 2017:10). By 2016, 
both research councils were encouraging data sharing. This became a “strong” 
encouragement on the part of the NHMRC, but not a requirement, in 2018 (Rowhani-
Farid 2018:28). Australia is viewed as a leader, however, on a data infrastructure level: 
the federal government funded an Australian National Data Service (ANDS). In 2007 
the ANDS invested in and hosted centralised data services including for research 
(Shearer 2015:12). In 2018, ANDS was incorporated into the Australian Research Data 
Commons (ARDC), that “pull[s] together industry, universities and the public sector 
to coordinate the sharing and open publication of research data” (Wallace 2019). The 
Australian government also co-founded the Research Data Alliance in 2013 with the 
European Commission and the US Government (RDA 2016). 
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5.3.7 Document #6: Concordat on Open Research Data (2016) 
 Major UK policy development: brings together national institutions with power 
to enforce open data policies: HEFCE, RCUK, UUK, and the Wellcome Trust. 
Concise: does not specify exact rules for open data, but gives ten “Principles”. 
 Reference document guiding data policies. Data is what “underpins the answer 
to the research question, and can be used to validate findings” (p. 3). 
 Open research data framed as a logical “next step” given progress towards open 
access, and positioned as part of “the UK’s open science ambitions” (p. 1). Thus 
open science is portrayed as overarching policy agenda with a moving frontier. 
 Again, diverse meanings are signified by “open”: economic growth; epistemic 
efficiency; and public trust and support as a result of transparency; reputational 
gain. Legitimises closure for confidentiality, security, and commercial reasons. 
 Like the BOAI, Finch report, and Royal Society report, the Concordat imbues 
“open” with libre values that go beyond access, without the technical precision 
of the Open Definition or Panton Principles – which are not referenced. 
 Top-down dynamics are downplayed; the Concordat is positioned as a product 
of the research community itself, despite its institutional origins and working 
group composed of funders and university leaders: “It is not the intention to 
mandate, codify or require specific activities….” (p. 4). 
 A centring of researchers and their communities continues throughout: 
“researchers are a diverse group of people operating in many different cultures 
and contexts […] there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach” (p. 5).  
 Marked departure from open discourses that frame researchers as a 
homogenous group to which universal requirements apply.  
 But a transition towards data openness is still framed as a universal process 
with a single direction: some fields are at an “early stage” on a “journey in which 
the research community will participate over the coming years” (p. 4). 
 Acknowledgement that open data carries a cost: for infrastructure and services, 
specialist support, training, and researchers’ time. Where a financial framing is 
dominant for open access it has tended to be secondary for open data. 
 “The right of the creators of research data to reasonable first use is recognised” 
(p. 12): echoes Fort Lauderdale Agreement (Wellcome Trust 2003) for genomic 
data. Acknowledges competitive pressure and researcher attachment to data. 
 In contrast to Panton Principles’ public domain approach, expects data citation. 
 A moderated, contextual approach that aligns with concurrent discourse at 
European Commission: “as open as possible, as closed as necessary” (EC n.d.). 




5.3.8 Open data in journal policy 
 
In addition to policy stances from funders and institutions, and the provision of open 
data infrastructure, journals have had a key influence on the international open data 
landscape. Some journals have long-standing data availability requirements for 
certain data types, notably, genomic and crystallographic data; the earliest policy of 
this kind was made in 1988 by Nucleic Acids Research in relation to sequence data 
(Strasser 2019:188–89, 233–34). The adoption of data sharing policies by a wider range 
of journals, for a wider range of data types, has been more recent. The open access 
publisher PLOS announced a data access policy in 2014 (Silva 2014), framing it as an 
extension of their open access mission and formalisation data sharing expectations 
between researchers. According to the policy, “authors must make all data publicly 
available, without restriction, immediately upon publication” and must provide a 
“Data Availability Statement” to be published with the article. Other publishers 
announced similar policies afterwards, including larger, traditional, commercial 
publishers Springer Nature, Science, and Elsevier – although these varied in the extent 
to which they mandated unrestricted online access to research data (Federer et al. 
2018:1–2).  
 
5.3.9 A note on “open data”, Research Data Management, and FAIR data 
 
Although the use of “open data” terminology took hold in the context of online data 
sharing in the 2000s and 2010s, it is not used as consistently as is “open access” to 
research literature. Earlier policy interventions – such as those from the OECD, MRC, 
and Wellcome Trust – do not use the phrase “open data”, alluding instead to data 
management, sharing, and access. “Open access to research data” remains a common 
phrase, perhaps indicating an origin of such policies in research literature context. 
However “open data” terminology has been used liberally by grassroots movements 
and, since the 2010s, by prominent UK and international organisations including the 




Part of the reason for this discursive salience is a cross-pollination with movements 
pursuing data openness in a broader range of contexts: for instance, “open data” often 
implies the opening of government-held data, associated with public transparency 
agendas that date back to Freedom of Information Acts (Yu and Robinson 2011). 
Research data can fall into this category especially where they are government-
funded. Thus the rise of “open data” is also associated with the pursuit by the UK 
Government of a broader “open” agenda for several years from 2010, with the creation 
of an Open Government Licence (compatible with CC-BY used for research articles; 
UK Government 2010); the launch of data.gov.uk (BBC 2010); the publication of an 
Open Data White Paper (HM Government Cabinet Office 2012); and the funding of an 
Open Data Institute launched in 2012 (ODI n.d.). The Australian federal government 
has likewise hosted data.gov.au since 2013 (Comprehensive Knowledge Archive 
Network n.d.) and it hosts a “node” of the ODI (ODI n.d.).  With a statement in 2015, 
it  “formalise[d]” its “commitment to open data and data-driven innovation” 
(Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet n.d.). Developments like these reflect 
an intensification the discursive significance of “data” as well as “open”. 
 
There is, however, some evidence that “open data” terminology is no longer, or has 
never been, widely preferred in academic research policy. Policies in the UK and 
Australia – as opposed to position statements – tend to emphasise research data 
management (RDM) and the creation of advance plans for data stewardship within 
which sharing is just one consideration. Neylon (2017) reports that such policies are 
increasingly common, and that they tend to require Data Management Plan (DMPs), 
although this is not necessarily enforced. Some policymakers believe this will raise 
awareness of data issues amongst researchers, where others worry it will create a 
“tick-box” culture (p. 2). Another development in terminology has been the coining of 
“FAIR data” – findable, accessible, interoperable and reusable – by a group drawn 
from academia, industry, funding agencies, and scholarly publishers (Wilkinson et al. 
2016). According to Higman et al. (2019), “little in the research data field has gained 
such traction and universal acceptance as the FAIR data principles” (p. 2). Like RDM, 
FAIR can apply more widely than “open” – for instance, to access-controlled data. 
There are indications that policy emphases on RDM – and possibly in the future, FAIR 
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– may be strategically preferred, for several reasons. Firstly, they can apply to a 
broader range of datasets including access-controlled data. Secondly, FAIR in 
particular is more specific than “open” (Barbour 2016). Thirdly – of particular 
relevance – staff implementing research data policies at universities have adopted 
RDM language tactically. They have found that it represents a foundation and middle 
ground for engagement with researchers who may react negatively to “open data” or 
data sharing terminology. Danny Kingsley26, a leader of open policy at a UK 
university, mentioned this strategic shift. It is also mentioned by LIBER, the 
Association of European Research Libraries (Christensen-Dalsgaard et al. 2012:2) and 
reported by Pinfield et al. (2014:17). The flexible meaning of “open” may therefore, in 
the case of research data, have become a liability for those attempting to implement it 
as policy, resulting in a retreat from “open” terminology. 
 
5.4 Open science 
 
As landmark recommendations in favour of open access and open data have radiated 
and intensified, they have been accompanied by and included in the growth of 
broader “open science” discourses and movements. Like “open access” and “open 
data”, “open science” as a term was intermittently in use prior to the 2000s with links 
to its present meaning: a couple of instances just prior to the turn of the century are 
noted in Section 4.10. However, a concerted rise in its salience appears to have taken 
place from the mid-2000s and especially in the 2010s, led not by the emergence of a 
consensus definition but as a result of numerous movements – again, both bottom-up 
and top-down - pursuing far-reaching, online, digital changes to the way science is 
practised. In 2008, the chemist Jean-Claude Bradley and co-authors wrote of a 
“growing movement promoting more Open Science” as part of a funding proposal to 
support “Open Notebook Science” (Bradley et al. 2008). They described this approach, 
which Bradley had been practising since 2005, as a “logical extension” of open science 
trends that “expos[e] a researcher’s complete record of progress to the public in near 
real time [online]” (p. 1). The Open Knowledge Foundation, which had by this time 
                                                     
26 Head of Scholarly Communication, University of Cambridge; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
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established its Open Definition in relation to data (see above, p. 133), started an “open 
science” mailing list in 2008 (OKF n.d.), bringing together a community under that 
heading. A few years later, Australian physicist and computer programming 
researcher Michael Nielsen (2011) wrote an influential popular book, Reinventing 
Discovery, in which he imagined a future, online networked practice of research that 
he referred to as “open science”.  
 
Reflections on open science as a single multifaceted phenomenon were in evidence a 
few years later (e.g. Delfanti and Pitrelli 2015; Leonelli, Spichtinger, and Prainsack 
2015). For example in 2014, the online book Opening Science was published: a 
scholarly advocacy document advising “researchers, scientists, decision makers, 
politicians, and stakeholders” on the “basics, the tools, and the vision behind current 
changes we see in the field of knowledge creation” (p. v, original emphasis; the 
introductory chapter is document #7, analysed in Section 5.4.1). In a highly-cited 
chapter of this book, Fecher and Friesike (2014) characterise open science as an 
“umbrella term” covering “five schools of thought” (infrastructure, public, 
measurement, democratic, pragmatic). By this time, open science was often 
conceptualised in this way: as a catch-all that refers to a set of distinct but related 
practices, including not only open access and open data, but – for example – open 
methodology, open peer review, open preprints, open code, open citations, citizen 
science, and open notebook science.  
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5.4.1 Document #7: Towards Another Scientific Revolution (2014b) 
 Introductory chapter of an edited book, Opening Science: The Evolving Guide on 
How the Internet is Changing Research, Collaboration and Scholarly Publishing. 
The book is an academic work, grassroots advocacy document, and a guide. 
 The book’s production reflects its “open” values: it was authored using a 
collaborative software tool, published under a Creative Commons licence, and 
invites “everyone” to “contribute to and reuse its content” (Preface, p. vi). The 
content of the book has in practice remained relatively fixed (Github n.d.). 
 The introductory chapter is by the editors, Sönke Bartling and Sascha Friesike, 
researchers with medical and digital innovation/engineering backgrounds. 
 Provides sweeping introduction to the concept of “Open Science”, its historical 
context, and issues involved in transitioning to an open science future. 
“Obstacles” must be overcome to achieve “complex cultural change” (p. 3). 
 Researchers are centred as an audience. They are framed as free agents – “every 
researcher has to decide for themselves which technologies and methods they 
will [use]” (p. 4) – who are also driven by incentives. 
 Moreover, the involvement of researchers is framed as pivotal to the outcome of 
a digital revolution in science, despite an anticipation of reluctance (p. 11): 
“…much will depend upon whether researchers become the leading 
force within this transition, or whether they play a passive role 
driven by other stakeholders of the research process. (p. 12) 
 “Open” in science is thus constructed as a product of meaningful engagement 
by researchers; more than an abstract quality of information, or its processing. 
 A long view of history frames the narrative, beginning in prehistory with a link 
between knowledge and civilization. The 17th century “first scientific revolution” 
is identified as the origin of open science, and the “groundwork” upon which a 
present-day open revolution is built (p. 6)27. Nielsen (2011) is a key reference. 
 The history is strongly presentist: 17th century researchers are viewed as proto-
professionals who were secretive whilst awaiting incentives – a system for 
“assessing the value of a contribution”, i.e. journal publication (p. 6). 
 The text alludes to complexity and contingency, but its narrative tends towards 
technological determinism (see Chapter 4), depicting cultural transformations 
of science as led by shifts from papyrus, to print, and now to the Internet (p. 8). 
 Portrays difficulty in defining open science, Science 2.0, etc.: “All of these 
umbrella terms struggle to find a clear definition” (p. 10). 
 Epistemic virtue is central: openness means immediate, complete, networked 
communication of ongoing science to all, bringing science into an ideal form. 
                                                     




The European Commission played an important top-down role in solidifying this 
usage from 2015, when it adopted “open innovation, open science, and open to the 
world” (EC 2015a) as major policy themes. The term “open science” was adopted after 
a public consultation indicated it was preferred to the related term “Science 2.0”, used 
previously (EC 2015b:6). The EC subsequently launched numerous “open” initiatives: 
the Open Science Policy Platform (OSPP); the European Open Science Cloud (EOSC); 
and the Open Science Monitor which tracks global trends in relation to open access, 
open data, and “outputs such as open code, open hardware, the use of collaborative 
platforms between scientists and the ‘citizen-science’ phenomenon” (EC n.d.). This 
agenda has, with its associated terminology, had an impact in the UK. For instance, 
the League of European Research Universities (LERU) – which includes five of the 
most prestigious universities in the UK – recently published a “roadmap for cultural 
change” towards open science in universities (LERU 2018) (document #8, analysed 
in Section 5.4.2).  
 
The terms “open research” or “open scholarship” are sometimes preferred to “open 
science” in English-speaking contexts, due to their broader disciplinary connotations. 
This also indicates a the growing influence of such movements, which have often 
been shaped in natural science contexts but are now being introduced at a policy level 
as universal. The Wellcome Trust, for instance, now has an “open research” division 
that attends to open access; to data, software and material sharing; and to clinical 
trials data (Wellcome Trust n.d.). The division also runs Wellcome Open Research, a 
publication platform that supports open practices including open peer review; 
administers an Open Science Prize and an Open Research Fund; and studies how 




5.4.2 Document #8: LERU’s Open Science advice paper (2018) 
 Titled Open Science and its role in universities: a roadmap for cultural change. 
Report advising how universities can and should embrace open science. 
 Produced by the League of European Research Universities (LERU), a network 
of 23 “leading” European universities, including five in the UK.  
 Open Science as an overarching term and concept is given institutional weight 
and legitimacy – it appears 295 times. This is a European Commission (EC) 
usage; Open Scholarship is asserted as more correct in English, for its breadth. 
 Recommendations based on eight “pillars of Open Science” identified by the 
EC, including: open access and FAIR data; training, incentives, and new metrics 
for open science; research integrity; and citizen science. 
 For individual researchers, libre open access, open data and open software are 
expected; further, openness during research is encouraged (preprints and data). 
This begins to extend open practice as envisioned at an institutional level. 
 “Open” represents epistemic efficiency, integrity, transparency, reproducibility, 
interdisciplinarity, public engagement, publicity, and professionalism. 
 “Cultural change” is emphasised, bringing to the fore a marginal but persistent 
feature of open policy and advocacy discourse. “Cultural” tends to refer to 
complex, recalcitrant elements of a system being “opened” – often, researchers. 
 Here, again, cultural change implies a shift in researcher behaviour. Change is 
framed as “not a top-down activity” (p. 8), in contrast with suggested strategies: 
e.g. senior leadership, policy interventions, monitoring, training and incentives. 
 Dialogue and consultation are mentioned, but seem directed at persuasion: 
“Leaders should work with the community to explain why change is necessary 
and to support change” (p. 8). However, “trust and confidence” within the 
hierarchy is valued, and the difficulty of cultural change is not underestimated: 
“There are real dangers is trying to introduce new practices 
without carrying the academic community with the leaders […]. It 
would be wrong to think that Open Science is simply a blueprint 
which can be introduced in a mechanistic way…” (p. 9) 
 An epistemic virtue framing is deepened by the assertion that researchers 
themselves are improved by openness, especially transparency, which is “good 
for researchers and good for research” (p. 5). Moreover, the paper begins with 
the phrase, “Open Science is not about dogma…” (p. 3), implying that “open” 
indeed wields an abstract discursive power, with moral overtones. The denial 
further evokes epistemic virtue, as it manifests in the case of objectivity: as the 




Another example of this all-encompassing approach, but from an international 
grassroots perspective, is a document that was drafted online in a publicly accessible 
Google Doc, Foundations for Open Scholarship Strategy Development (Tennant et al. 
2019, preprint) (document #9, analysed in Section 5.4.3). The document details 
short- mid-, and long-term strategies for implementing “open scholarship” at 
individual, laboratory/department, institute, and national levels. A profusion of 
diverse practices appear in the document, from those I have mentioned to: use of 
social media; use of open software and collaborative writing tools; seeking out open 
material for re-use; participation in online forums; making open achievements visible 
on a CV etc.; advocating and educating others about open approaches; adoption of an 
“open mindset”; refusal to engage with restrictive or proprietary platforms or 
publishers; building support networks for open scholarship; and so on. The document 
deliberately eschews a definition for open scholarship, recognising that open 
scholarship “encompasses many disciplines, practices, and principles” (p. 1). As such, 
it portrays open scholarship (or science) as a category actively under construction, 
fuelled by a kind of productive ambiguity. This ambiguity does not, however seem to 
obscure a sense of collective purpose and identity, and perhaps contributes to one. 
Moreover, “open” is constructed as an inward disposition (“mindset”) and outward 
identity (“make individual contributions to openness that are visible in public”, p. 4) 
to be reinforced in the self and created in others through reflection, education, 
training, and community organising. 
 
Collectively, the growth in movements towards open access, open data and now an 
all-encompassing open science has been rapid and extensive over only two decades, 
with a particularly visible rise in policy agendas in the last five to ten years. Notable 
for the purpose of the present research is that the rise of “open” terminology and its 
associated practices and values will have fast become salient to researchers who were 
not previously engaged in this discourse, as the attention of funders, universities and 
publishers has turned towards governing openness. 
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5.4.3 Document #9: Open Scholarship Strategy document (2019) 
 Foundations for Open Scholarship Strategy Development (Tennant et al. 2019) is 
a grassroots community advocacy document; the latest draft from January 2019. 
 Its production reflects “open” values: collaboratively drafted online by 32 
authors, with editable public drafts; available in several languages and digital 
formats; and shared as a preprint under a liberal Creative Commons licence. 
 Extensive scope: characterises “open scholarship” as an international movement 
and strategically analyses its strengths, challenges, opportunities and threats. 
Identifies short-, mid-, and long-term goals from individual to national levels. 
 “Open scholarship” is used as a more inclusive version of “open science” or 
“open research”, reinforcing the idea that “many disciplines, practices, and 
principles” (p. 1) are encompassed by an expanding open movement.  
 The term is not defined, allowing for continued expansion; indeed, the authors 
theorise open scholarship as a boundary object (drawing on Moore 2017). This 
encourages flexible interpretation, with some coherence for integrity (p. 15). 
 The text emphasises plurality but asserts a shared identity and narrative: “…how 
we can more effectively work together as a global community” (p. 1). Attempts 
to build a coordinated focus, with “well-defined objectives” for success (p. 20). 
 The opening up of “entire traditional research workflows” is envisioned (p. 20), 
and the expansion of policy beyond open access and data is encouraged (p. 4). 
 The diversity of “open” values is accepted, theorised, and used to organise 
strategy, based on Fecher and Friesike’s (2014) five schools of open science. A 
“community and inclusion” school is added (in brief), reflecting an expansion of 
open values as centred in the global north. Cognitive justice appears alongside 
e.g. equality, transparency, and collaboration (p. 17), and OCSDNet28 is cited.  
 A tension is acknowledged between community/non-profit and capitalist values 
of “open”. This is a major fault line that elsewhere tends to be obscured. 
 Researchers include advocates, but are mostly portrayed as resistant to change, 
busy, and in need of awareness, training and incentives. Questions why some 
would adopt open practices without a holistic “open scholar” approach (p. 30). 
 Clear epistemic virtue framing: open “will result in a better (i.e. rigorous or 
fairer) research process” (p. 17). Moreover, the belief that open practices are 
“generally a good thing” is identified as the “most widespread commonality 
between Open Scholarship stakeholders” (p. 16): i.e. epistemic virtue anchors a 
collective identity. Also portrayed as practice of the self – a mindset, a pledge – 
and a virtuous identity to be promoted, role-modelled, and taught. 
                                                     
28 The Open and Collaborative Science in Development Network is centred in the global south 





This chapter addresses the moving target of “open” in science through the early 
twenty-first century through its expansion in meaning and impact, especially in the 
UK and Australia. My analyses of UK-relevant advocacy and policy documents, 
although they are a limited selection, illustrate qualitative features and patterns in 
open science discourse that address my research sub-questions.  
 
5.5.1 Historical framings of openness 
 
Some of the documents allude to – or centre – a long history of openness in science 
(theme of research sub-question a); this phenomenon is analysed in Chapter 3. 
However, this was not a universal feature in the documents, and the histories told are 
were always the same, nor were they told for the same reasons. For instance, the PLoS 
letter (2000) does not make an historical case. The BOAI (2002) does evoke an “old 
tradition”, but not to argue that science has long been open, but to draw attention to 
a contingency: that scholarly publishing is not-for-profit, making open access 
possible. The Finch report (2012) evokes a long history of publishing rather than 
openness. But once open science is envisioned holistically, framings of science as 
enduringly or essentially open seem to become more prevalent (Bartling and Friesike 
2014b; The Royal Society 2012), aided by historical accounts that place the origin of 
open science in the seventeenth century (David 2008; Nielsen 2011). Other documents 
lean less on historical detail, some referring to taken-for-granted traditions of 
openness (Murray-Rust et al. 2010; Tennant et al. 2019) or referring piecemeal to 
historical touchpoints for openness (16th century moveable type, LERU 2018). As the 
discourse moves towards “open research” and “open scholarship” to include the 
humanities and social sciences in Anglophone contexts, it seems like an origin story 





5.5.2 Meanings of “open” 
 
The document analyses illustrate an accumulation of meanings and values associated 
with “open” as it gains salience and impact (theme of sub-question b). This begins 
from a broad base. Even before the word “open” is applied (PLOS 2000), online access 
to the scientific literature is framed as an advancement of science with overtones of 
neoliberal productivity; an assertion of public ownership rights; and a protest against 
the power of publishers. The BOAI (2002) again emphasises speed of epistemic 
advancement, and public benefit, and underlines education, equality, cost efficiency, 
and visibility for individual researchers. Openness is also strongly tied to an embrace 
of technology, and libre re-use from software cultures, not yet named as such, makes 
an appearance. From this point forth, “open” tends to be defined according to 
technical and legal re-use permissions as well as access. With the entry of policy 
literature – the Finch (2012) and Royal Society (2012) reports – “open” is valued not 
only as a matter of universal and efficient resourcing, but as a check on science: a 
form of accountability and an opportunity to build public trust. This dimension 
intensifies as data – and subsequently, methods, notebooks, etc. – enter the frame, 
and openness comes to mean not only disseminating results, but showing your 
working: transparency and reproducibility. The public dimension also expands, 
suggesting a blending across science–society boundaries, although e.g. the LERU 
paper (2018) does so within existing institutional and scientific paradigms (“…for 
citizen science to be “science” it needs to adhere to scientific standards”, p. 21). 
 
In the late 2010s, an exceptionally wide and still expanding set of meanings is 
associated with “open”, e.g. including the above as well as interdisciplinarity; data 
stewardship; standardisation for machine readability; reform of metrics and 
incentives; responsible, professional conduct; social inclusion; and cognitive justice. 
These latter critical reckonings with inequality seem to be on the fringes of open 
science in the global north. Earlier framings and many current ones assume that the 
universality of openness signifies equality. Openness as a form of epistemic 
advancement remains at the forefront of this diverse set of values throughout the 
2000s, especially in bottom-up advocacy. Additionally, throughout, openness remains 
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in tension with capitalist values. Its uptake in policy has no doubt been aided by its 
association with efficiency and economic growth (see Section 4.7), and acceptance of 
commercial re-use goes to the core of an “open” lineage established by open source 
software (see Section 5.3.4 above and Moore 2017; Tkacz 2012). However, multiple 
lineages of open science began in protest against corporate power and proprietary 
closures (Moore 2017), a dimension that tends to be obscured in both grassroots and 
policy documents tend towards pro-technology, business-friendly, apolitical framings. 
Sometimes, e.g. in the Open Scholarship Strategy (Tennant et al. 2019), this tension is 
articulated and it becomes clear that open science is increasingly co-opted by large 
corporate powers (as forcefully articulated by Mirowski 2018), a risk of its politically 
ambiguous character. Organisations such as the Radical Open Access Collective 
(ROAC) work to revive an alternative to market-driven visions (Adema and Moore 
2018).  
 
The increasing breadth and salience of “open” in the twenty-first century align with 
my conclusion, in Chapter 4, that the ambiguity of the term – and even the conflicts it 
encapsulates – allows it to accrue power and to hold together causes and 
constituencies with different histories and motives. Moore (2017) suggests that open 
access can be theorised as a boundary object (Star and Griesemer 1989) due to these 
sorts of qualities, and Tennant et al. (2019) suggest that the same applies to all of open 
scholarship. I concur, but also postulate that “open” is a different kind of boundary 
object or something else altogether: operating at higher level of abstraction, with 
almost no common ground internally except, as the latter authors observe, an 
agreement that openness is “generally a good thing” (ibid., p. 16, original emphasis).  
 
5.5.3 “Open” as an epistemic virtue 
 
The documents portray a gradual shift towards the construction of openness as an 
epistemic virtue (the theme of sub-question c, defined in Section 2.2.1). The earliest 
documents, portraying the rise of open access, depict openness as the right thing to 
do (e.g. good for society) because it makes science more accessible, integrated, and 
faster. Ethics and epistemology are arguably not combined here: the dissemination of 
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science is transforming, but not necessarily science itself29. The Finch report refers 
obliquely to “better research” resulting from open access, hinting at epistemic virtue 
but not specifying how this research is “better”. Something more significant happens 
when open data enters the picture: openness is portrayed as an improvement at the 
core of science. For example, the Royal Society (2012) portrays openness as an 
essential feature of good science: the very quality that “permits others to identify 
errors, to support, reject or refine theories and to reuse data for further understanding 
and knowledge” (p. 7). Open access, and particularly open data, are framed as 
extensions of that principle. Where openness connotes transparency, it can “deter, 
detect and stamp out bad science” (ibid., p. 8), improving epistemic integrity.  
 
The LERU advice paper (2018) states that openness – transparency in particular – is 
“good for researchers and good for research” (p. 5), bringing together knower and 
knowledge, and evoking an integrity that is both epistemic and moral. An epistemic 
virtue framing is brought to full fruition by the Open Scholarship Strategy (Tennant et 
al. 2019), which not only depicts open knowledge as good knowledge, but depicts 
openness as a blended moral-epistemic practice of the self that is internalised by 
“open scholars” (p. 30). The document suggests scholars take on an “open mindset” 
(p. 4), adopt “an implicit or explicit (shared) open science pledge or code of conduct” 
(p. 7) and share and educate others on this principle. Moreover, a belief that open 
scholarship is “generally a good thing” (p. 16) is identified as the most widespread 
commonality in the movement, suggesting that – despite its almost complete 
flexibility and ambiguity – “open” may be anchored by its epistemically virtuous 
qualities, at least from a bottom-up perspective. 
 
5.5.4 The role of scientists 
 
Finally, the documents depict distinctive changes in the role of the scientist (or 
researcher, or scholar; theme of sub-question d) in relation to open science over the 
                                                     
29 Open access could be seen as a qualitative transformation of science at a 
systems/community level. For a discussion of this idea in relation to epistemic virtue, see 
Section 9.3.1. However, these early documents do not emphasise such an interpretation. 
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course of the 2000s. The earliest of the documents (PLOS 2000) is written by 
scientists – in powerful positions – on behalf of scientists, and primarily casts free 
access to research literature as an epistemic project, with great benefits for science 
and scientific communities. Here, scientists have agency, political ambition, and 
make little distinction between themselves and the lay public – the democratic right 
to knowledge applies to all. The BOAI (2002) depicts scientists/scholars as active 
agents once more, but from the distance of the third person: nonetheless, any 
individual scientist is depicted as capable of practising open access without a need to 
wait for systemic change. These depictions change when open access, data, and 
science are framed in policy. In the policy documents I examined, researchers become 
one of many categories of stakeholder to be coordinated in a process of systemic 
change. They tend to be portrayed as passive – at most, motivated by their immediate 
research aims and competitive pressure – and are expected to require explanations, 
education, and incentives in order to embrace openness.  
 
In this context, culture change becomes a policy interest in relation to openness. It 
develops from a passing mention in the Finch report (2012) to an overarching focus in 
LERU’s advice paper (2018). Culture change evokes systemic change, but in 
documents often refers to research culture – and more specifically still, to behaviour 
change expected of researchers. This “culture” change is seen as slow, complex, and 
beset by passive resistance. The discursive shift from an active to a passive researcher 
has an obvious origin: earlier grassroots framings are made by, and in relation to, 
researchers who are on the leading edge of open movements; policy is instead 
concerned with shifting an entire population of researchers. Nonetheless, this shift 
may have profoundly shaped on how researchers are conceptualised within open 
science movements. The Open Scholarship Strategy is partly written by advocate-
researchers, and portrays a struggle to be patient with the “apathy” of researchers who 
do not practise or commit to openness, and are “generally resistant to change” 
(Tennant et al. 2019:30, 34). This connects with a prevalent portrayal of researchers as 
under the control of incentives in a “publish or perish” culture30. Cultural change in 
                                                     
30 Freese and Peterson (2018) similarly observe, in in the context of the reproducibility crisis, 
that an “economic view of the self” predominates, which “emphasizes responsiveness to 
incentives provided by institutions rather than […] morals or socialization to scientific norms”. 
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this context is liable to be reduced the top-down alteration of incentives, in order to 
reward “open” behaviour. Many policies and discourses currently tend in this 
direction (e.g. Leonelli et al. 2015; “develop individual HR criteria for recognising and 
rewarding Open Science”, LERU 2018:18; "the EC [European Commission] should 
encourage the development of new indictors […] to measure and support the 
development of open science”, Wilsdon et al. 2017:16). This is accompanied by 
discourse acknowledging that metrics-based incentives must be used carefully to 
avoid counterproductive effects (Hicks and Wouters 2015). 
 
This portrait of open access, open data, and open science as they have developed and 
manifested in advocacy and policy contexts is intended as a contribution in itself that 
addresses my research questions. It also establishes the context in which my interview 
study was conducted. Interviewees’ experiences have been shaped by the discourse 
and policy environment characterised here, and some advocate/policymaker 
interviewees have been involved in shaping this environment. The majority of 
interviewees are biological scientists, whose accounts align and contrast in instructive 
ways with the framings presented in this chapter. My findings from the interview 






Chapter 6 | “We are obliged” 
Open access to research articles 
 
 
Molly was working towards the later stages of her PhD in behavioural 
ecology and evolutionary biology when we spoke. She had several 
papers written, lined up to submit to journals. They had long been 
awaiting sign-off by a group who gathered the data at an exclusive, 
remote field site. She had just received her first permission. 
 
She had chosen a prestigious multidisciplinary journal, and prepared 
her article to meet its requirements. She only realised later that it 
charged a standard fee to publish, plus a fee for open access if she 
chose that option. “I have to find this money that I don’t know where 
I’m going to find it from […] for the first paper finding money to get it 
published in the first place is enough of a hurdle.” 
 
Molly equivocated about open access. 
 
“I know there are a lot of publications starting up that are entirely 
open access, which is wonderful. But also at this stage a lot of them 
have, are mostly very low impact factors. And I can’t afford to publish 
my stuff in something that’s a really low impact factor if I only have 
three papers and then I’m looking for a job. Then I need to come with 
these papers that are from quite high end journals potentially. So, as 
much as I love the idea of open access, I personally am not willing to 
put my career on the line for it sadly, which is probably a bit 
hypocritical, but yeah.” 




I set out to ask the overarching question: how is the meaning of “open” (or “openness”) 
being constructed in the context of science? This chapter presents and discusses the 
first of three significant answers to this question as expressed by the biological 
scientists in my interview study: open access to research articles. This finding was not 
unexpected: open, online access to research articles, or other scholarly outputs, is one 
of the most salient categories of “open science” that can be found in policy and 
advocacy discourse; it has played a pivotal, pioneering role in the historical and 
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continuing development of open science movements. Moreover, by 2017-2019 when 
these interviews were conducted, even scientists without connections to open 
movements might have become familiar with open access via multiple routes: the 
policy requirements of major funders in the UK and Australia; the visibility of open 
access publishers in the life sciences including PLOS, BioMed Central, PeerJ and eLife; 
and coverage in the popular and scientific press for a decade or more. However, I 
could not have been sure that open access would feature as a salient and 
distinguishable category of openness for scientists, and I could not predict how it 
would be understood, framed, and prioritised by scientists in relation to their 
practices and principles. Although open access is defined in specific ways in advocacy 
and policy literature, scientists may not encounter such definitions directly, and thus 
could be expected to form their own. This chapter unpacks a set of salient framings 
and patterns that characterised open access in scientists’ – and sometimes advocates’ 
and policymakers’ – interview responses. These framings were: financial; journal-
based (“gold”, as opposed to “green”, see Section 5.2.1); concerned with “impact”, 
reputation, and sometimes quality; and centred around compliance.  
 
6.2 The salience of open access in interview 
 
Of the 40 scientists I interviewed, half mentioned open access, open publishing, or 
the accessibility of research articles, in their response to my initial, broad question 
about openness: “What first comes to mind when you think about openness in 
science?”. More than three-quarters of interviewees [31] mentioned it spontaneously 
at other points in the interview, and all showed familiarity with the concept when I 
asked directly. At surface level, this indicates that open access is a common 
association with “openness in science” in many scientists’ day-to-day professional 
lives. The converse should also be noted, however: half of the interviewees did not 
mention it in their initial response, and many [9] never brought it up of their own 
accord. This observation is noteworthy for a topic that is highly salient in policy and 
advocacy terms, particularly given that it was difficult to avoid priming interviewees 
on the topic. My past employment by an open access publisher was known to some 
interviewees, and sometimes a reference to this or to open access became necessary, 
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for clarity, in an otherwise broad, non-directive interview introduction. Thus open 
access was salient, but was mentioned less than could have been expected.  
 
6.3 Open access as a forerunner: earliest memories 
 
Most of the scientists who I asked recalled a time before the term “open” was part of 
the language around science. Open access, more than any other category or concept, 
was associated with the emergence of such terminology: over half of those who were 
asked [17/30] mentioned open access among their earliest recollections of “open”, and 
for a significant subgroup [10/17] it was the only topic of such recollections. This latter 
subgroup were mainly established scientists who had completed their PhDs in the 
2000s or before. Most would thus have encountered the rise to prominence of open 
access (see Section 5.2) as already-established scientists. Roger31, who completed 
doctoral training in the 1980s, recalled how “open” terminology “…somehow diffused 
into the language I guess maybe five or six years ago, more than that probably. When 
those first [open access] journals started to come out.” Similarly Greg32, who is of a 
similar academic generation – and went on to become Editor-in-Chief of a PLOS open 
access journal – reflected: “If I had to hazard a guess, I would say that the first time 
that I heard about it [open/openness in science] was open access. Yeah, so I'm gonna 
guess that it's a relatively new term. As apart from just a generic adjective.” These 
interviews depict the transformation of “open” into a buzzword representing a 
movement and a practice.  
 
Several interviewees specifically linked their memories with open access publishers 
PLOS and BioMed Central (see Section 5.2.2). My own association with PLOS – for 
those who knew about it – may be entangled with the emergence of such 
recollections, but they are notable nonetheless, and come from multiple national 
contexts. Jude33 commented that use of “open” “…[is] a long-held thing in terms of 
                                                     
31 PhD 1980s; interview: UK, Jan 2017. 
32 PhD 1990s; interview: US, Feb 2018. 
33 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
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open access journals, I mean I remember the start of the PLOS journals…”. Adam’s34 
earliest memories of “open” included a “young hotshot” and his students, who would 
go around wearing t-shirts supporting PLOS, having been trained in California where 
the publisher originated. Ernie35 also remembered open access movements in 
California as the origin of “open”. He recalled a crisis over Elsevier’s bundled 
subscription charges to the University of California, around which: 
“…lot of [people] became real activists for saying, ‘Well we think this 
should be open, publishing should be open", but I think it was this 
community of people, primarily in the Bay area, who started pushing 
that. And because they were very influential, very powerful, very good 
scientists, they got noticed, and then other people joined in with the 
idea…” 
Amongst these interviewees there was a consistent understanding of “open” as a 
phenomenon that arose in a particular form (open access biomedical journals), at a 
particular time and place (California is prominent), and involved particular forms of 
activism (by influential scientists).  
  
More recently trained scientists tended not to recount specific publisher- and activist-
associated histories in their earliest memories of “open”. Instead, there was an 
association in the UK context with top-down open access policies from the Wellcome 
Trust, the European Research Council, and REF (HEFCE 2014). Interviewees trained 
from the 2000s onwards often recalled encountering “open” at the start of their PhDs. 
Other “open”-related ideas tended to accompany open access in these more recent 
recollections. Julia36 said of “open” terminology: 
“I feel like it’s more commonly used now than it was maybe 10 years 
ago, because I feel like there’s a link with more recent developments. 
So obviously things like open access publishing, and all of the furore 
surrounding public money funding science that is then not open 
access, and things like DORA37, this comes more in the community 
consciousness I think. And also there’s various platforms where these 
                                                     
34 PhD 1980s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
35 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
36 PhD 2000s, interview: UK, Jun 2018. 
37 DORA is the 2013 San Francisco Declaration on Research Assessment 
(https://sfdora.org/read), that recommends the assessment of research based on its own 
merits rather than journal reputations or metrics, and frames online research publication as an 
opportunity for better assessment. 
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things are promoted or highlighted as an issue, like ResearchGate, 
kind of social science platforms I guess. So I feel like it’s more in the 
vernacular in the last…but definitely related to internet-based sharing 
of science, yeah, and the preprint revolution and this kind of thing.” 
These responses suggested that from approximately the 2000s, scientists began 
encountering “open” through a wider variety of channels including policy 
requirements and newer online initiatives and platforms (e.g. DORA, ResearchGate, 
preprints) that increasingly encompass a wider range of “open” objectives. Lara38, a 
PhD student, spoke of her encounter with “open” using the more recent, integrated 
term “open science”. She recalled learning about it in 2017 by listening to the podcast 
Everything Hertz (Quintana and Heathers 2020), which features discussion of meta-
science – the science of science – by two scientists who themselves trained in the 
2010s. Encounters with open science movements via the social, platform-based web – 
especially Twitter – were mentioned more by scientists trained since the 2000s. 
Overall, scientists’ memories of “open” tended to follow a pattern in which open 
access was constructed as a forerunner, but its history as a grassroots movement – 
and forerunner status – were increasingly obscured by the passage of time, as open 
science movements have broadened and acquired a top-down dynamic. 
 
Not all interviewees linked their earliest memories of “open” with primarily open 
access or subsequent open science movements, however. For several – both scientists 
and advocates, across career generations – open source software was the forerunner. 
Elliot39, who trained in the 2010s, spoke of being influenced by his older brother: 
“…he was really into this kind of open source software movement [in 
the] very, very early days. I remember him getting copies of Linux on 
loads of floppy disks and stuff when I was really young. So he kind of 
indoctrinated me quite early into it.” 
Elliot then described witnessing a movement of computer scientists with “open” 
principles into biology in the “mid to late 2000s” in association with a new generation 
of genome sequencing technology: “…that kind of seeped over into the science you 
were doing as well”. This reflects a linguistic association between open software and 
open science (see Section 4.10) and evidences an early and ongoing flow of open 
                                                     
38 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Dec 2018. 
39 PhD 2010s; interview: UK, Jan 2019. 
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software enthusiasts and experts into scientific communities, shaping cultures of 
scientific openness. Mat40 spoke explicitly of the analogy between open source and 
open science as the foundation for his laboratory’s drug discovery approach (see 
Section 7.8.1, 7.9). 
 
Some scientist interviewees distinguished the appearance of explicitly “open” 
language from an implicit (cultural or behavioural) openness in science. This latter 
openness was depicted as long-held presence or absence. Olivia41, for example, 
commented that “the implication [of open/openness] has always been there. But I 
think the term, as openness in science, is quite a new thing”, and Cedric42 described 
the “jargon” as new, but the “notion” of openness as “part of what scientists do, the 
ethics of science […] we took it with our mother’s milk, as it were”. Nicole43 and 
Andrea44, in contrast, implied an absence of openness in their communities. Many of 
these answers were part of an emerging category that I have identified as 
“interpersonal openness” and analysed in Chapter 8. Framings of openness as an 
enduring or essential to science also indicate an empirical relevance to the 
“traditional” narrative identified in Chapter 3. 
 
6.4 Money, money, money: a financial framing of open access 
 
Dominant among framings of open access by scientist interviewees was an 
understanding that it costs money, and is expensive: a financial framing. Interviewees 
in both Australia and the UK both commonly expressed this understanding, as did 
interviewees of all career generations. This is notable as from a policy perspective, as 
there are recommended routes to open access that are cost-free to researchers – the 
next section discusses the implication for “gold” and “green” routes. Molly45, the PhD 
                                                     
40 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Apr 2019. 
41 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Jul 2018. 
42 PhD 1960s; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
43 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
44 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Oct 2018. 
45 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Nov 2018. 
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student featured in the opening vignette, portrayed open access as desirable but 
prohibitively expensive. Cedric46, an emeritus professor who remains active in 
research, offered a similar view: “I know about the issue [open access], but I'm 
not...I'm only affected by it insofar as, because I'm self-funded, I cannot pay the huge 
fees that publishers demand, so everything I produce, by and large, is not open 
access”. Both Molly and Cedric positioned open access as out of their reach, and 
therefore of only theoretical relevance to them, owing to a lack of funding in these 
earlier and later stages, respectively, of their careers. Jason47 described open access in 
association with publishing business models: “either I’m paying [open access] or 
you’re paying [subscription access]”. This financial framing was prevalent, and 
separated interviewees’ responses according to their means and relationship with 
money. 
 
Some interviewees portrayed open access as an expense they could habitually afford, 
either because of the financial privilege of their research group, or because of the 
block grants funded by UK research councils and charities including the Wellcome 
Trust (see Section 5.2.5). Kate48 had an approach defined by the block grants system, 
as did many other UK interviewees: 
“…at the moment that's [open access is] the easy part. The research 
councils require it. So at the moment we've published in whatever 
journal we've wanted to and then we've turned to the university and 
asked them to pay so that the article is open access and we've 
managed to achieve that so far.” 
This idea that open access can almost always be bought, if one is able and willing to 
pay the price, suggested a widespread awareness that many normally “closed” 
subscription journals can be paid to arrange open access on a per-article basis – the 
so-called “hybrid” model of open access (see Section 5.2.1). Mark49, who runs what he 
described as a wealthy laboratory, portrayed the ease with which he can now publish 
open access in a prestigious subscription journal. He contrasted the radical politics of 
                                                     
46 PhD 1960s; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
47 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Nov 2018. 
48 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Jun 2018. 
49 PhD 1980s; interview: UK, Feb 2017. 
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the open access movement represented by PLOS – an entirely open access publisher – 
to the practice of open access he is able to adopt through a hybrid model: 
 “Especially now - when PLOS was getting started it was radical and 
fantastic and very exciting, and everything's sort of moved on a long 
way, since then. So...yes, because, you know, we can publish in 
Nature and you pay extra five thousand dollars or whatever and it 
becomes open access, and that's great [laughs].” 
The “open” versus “closed” politics of journals and publishers could thus become 
insignificant in moneyed settings – including the UK’s block grant system – which 
preserve the ability to publish in one’s journal of choice, and reduce open access to a 
single – more or less expensive – transaction.  
 
Alongside the question of affordability, a financial framing of open access added a 
framing of conditionality or precarity. For instance, in Kate’s response above, there is 
tentativeness: she uses the language “at the moment” and “so far”, implying that 
funding that may not always be available. This implication was also present on the 
administration side of block grants for open access in the UK. Danny Kingsley50, who 
leads open advocacy at a different UK university to Kate’s, described the complicated 
and precarious accounting required to administer open access block grants from 
different funders, under different and sometimes continually uncertain conditions: 
“So we now have three different sets of policies that are all slightly 
different to each other, happen at different amounts of time, affect 
different people...may or may not have funding associated with them 
[…] last year, the RCUK said: transition period is going to finish, 31st 
of March, full-stop, that's it, you cannot pay anything after that. That 
caused a major problem for us […] So, they then...said okay, well we'll 
continue the transition, that we're not now calling a transition 
period, for two more years…”  
She described how, towards the end of a budgetary period, it was sometimes 
necessary to change the conditions of funding availability: restricting funds available 
for open access in hybrid journals in particular. Scientists in the UK therefore – 
depending on their funder, institution, and publishing practices – sometimes 
experience inconsistent funding of open access. 
                                                     




The financial framing of open access was associated with conditionality. Lena51 spoke 
of “always” making her work open access, but made it clear that it was the provision 
of specific funding that enabled this, despite her lab’s fortunate financial position. 
This was due to the degree of expense involved: 
“…even for a lab that is well-funded, the amount that you need to pay 
for publications is not small. So it's a whole like, US or Japan type of 
conference that is cheaper than what you need to pay for open access. 
Yeah, so it's...this is big, right.” 
Her financial framing placed open access in a cost versus benefit competition with a 
long-haul flight to a conference and challenged the value of the former. She also 
described the cost of four or five open access papers – “twenty-five thousand pounds” 
– as an amount that would otherwise keep a laboratory in her field running for a year: 
a major rather than incidental expense. Steve52 , similarly, was “very pleased to publish 
our work open access”, but disclaimed responsibility for the cost: “I don't think I have 
ever paid to have open access when it wasn't free to me. Because it is quite 
expensive…”. Like Lena, Steve imagined the weighing up of open access costs in his 
laboratory budget: “If I've got that thousand pounds in a grant, I'd much rather spend 
it on laboratory consumables...or indeed on the salary of the person doing the work, 
than on open access.” Melanie53 made enthusiastic remarks about open access, but 
again, her commitment was conditional on financial provision: 
 “…the only time I would ever say it [open access] would not be 
something I would do, is if it was money limited right? So now - it 
used to be that…they [funders] would give you publishing charges as 
part of a grant, and now they want that out of the grant, and they 
give the university a chunk of money [the block grant]. And so, if we 
didn't have money for it, it would be the only time I wouldn't do it.” 
The conditionality of open access through a financial lens demonstrates its tenuous 
position in current scientific practice in the UK. Moreover, it shows that when 
scientists are asked to place a financial value on open access and weigh it against 
other research expenses, it is often considered less than essential.  
                                                     
51 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Apr 2018. 
52 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Nov 2017. 




In the Australian context of this study, where specific funding for open access tended 
not to be available, Jude54 spoke of a non-hypothetical case of budget compromise: 
 “Okay, this [journal name] paper […] I didn't pay for open access, 
because I figure, most of the people who are interested in that field 
will have a good university library, so what's the point? You know, 
[collaborator] shelling out a couple of thousand dollars to make it 
open access, because I figure most people that want it can get it.” 
Jude’s financial reckoning on a per-article basis shows that a lack of dedicated funding 
makes open access publishing a weightier decision. For those with research budgets – 
but not block grants for open access – paying for the latter is not necessarily out of 
reach, but requires compromise, and is only “easy” at the highest level of laboratory 
wealth. This scenario also makes cost of open access publishing more visible and 
transparent. It is perhaps remarkable that some interviewees in Australia did claim to 
publish open access habitually; however, they were a very small minority. 
 
Finally, a financial lens on open access conditioned particular emotional and 
attitudinal reactions, including scepticism, bemusement, suspicion, and resentment 
about the way money is used. Jason55 expressed indignation at the idea of being 
required to pay a publisher for open access: 
“You have to pay the publisher that money, and that could be 
thousands of pounds, which I find offensive […] I do feel that all of 
this material should be open and unrestricted of course. But now I 
have to pay for it and I don’t have a lot of money. But I have to pay for 
it, because I have to have a job. I want to get a job after this in 
academia and research, and I need to have publications to do that. 
And that’s that whole publish or perish model.” 
His anger is connected to a broader sense of injustice and vulnerability about his 
dependence on publications for career security; along with scepticism about academic 
publishing as whole: “I think the whole publication thing is a bit of a scam”.  
 
                                                     
54 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
55 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Nov 2018. 
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Scientists in more secure positions in their careers also had objections to the 
movement of money around open access: there was a sense that unjust power 
dynamics were playing out behind the scenes, and that science and scientists were 
losing out to publishers and bureaucrats. David56 positioned open access and the 
ability to “do the science” as a zero-sum game in budgetary terms, perhaps reflecting a 
wider sense of grievance and scarcity in relation to top-down governance: 
“…it's extremely annoying in this country, open access drive when 
they basically force us to do it but don't give us the money to do it. 
[laughs] So it basically just reduces the amount of money available to 
do the science […] So basically it's just another way that they took 
money away from the science budget without appearing to cut the 
science budget.” 
Ernie57 stated that he always publishes open access using the “pot of money” [block 
grant] available through his UK funder. He nonetheless remarked, “I don’t see 
necessarily why anybody should have to pay”, and was suspicious that PLOS might 
“make a tonne of money” from “big publication fees”. This suggests the construction 
of resentment about the cost of open access alongside broader resentments towards 
academic publishing. Julia58 expressed a broader concern about academic publishing 
with amused exasperation:  
“…ethically, [there is] something a bit tricky about people making 
even more money out of something being made open access, like 
demanding a large fee for that, when they’re already… People outside 
of science think it’s hilarious that you publish your work and you pay 
to do it [laughs] rather than the other way around…” 
Lena commented drily that “science publishing is just amazing” for similar reasons: 
charging fees to publish and to read; asking researchers to review for free; acquiring 
copyright. Ironically, objections like these have long been motivators for open access 
and other open science movements, but through a financial lens open access can 
stoke the same kind of resentment it was intended to dismantle. And through this 
lens, hybrid and subscription publishers with exceptionally high profit margins may 
not be distinguished by some scientists from non-profit open access publishers.  
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6.5 Going for “gold”: journal-centred views of open access 
 
Open access is conceptually and practically differentiated into categories in open 
advocacy and policy settings: journal-mediated access (“gold”) and repository-
mediated access (“green”) are two of the most commonly recognised such categories 
(see Section 5.2.1). “Gold” and “green” each have a complex history and politics within 
open access movements; feature differently in institutional policies; are enabled by 
different economic models; and in practice require different sets of practices and 
interactions. The framing of open access by many scientists through a financial lens – 
it costs money, and is expensive – aligns with another framing, which is of open 
access as a “gold”, journal-mediated practice.  This is because the “gold” route often, 
but not always, requires payment by the scientist, their funder, or institution; whereas 
“green” is cost-free to researchers. The “green” route was invisible or marginalised in 
most interviewees’ accounts, which is significant given that the UK’s rigorous REF2021 
open access policy centres a repository-mediated “green” route (HEFCE 2014), despite 
an early and continuing emphasis on “gold” by funders including the Wellcome Trust 
(see Section 5.2.5). “Green” is also the policy approach favoured by the major research 
councils in Australia. There is therefore a noticeable disjunction between many 
scientists’ constructions of open access, and the modes of open access that are 
available, and perhaps required, in their research context.  
 
The main indication that scientist interviewees held “gold”-centred views was the 
dominant financial framing of open access, including familiarity with the hybrid 
journal concept. Secondarily, language associated with journal publication rather than 
repositories was used to frame the topic. Jude, for example, raised the topic with this 
comment: “Okay, probably open access journals would be one [kind of openness]”, 
and Lena saw open access as being “all about the journals”. Talk of publications and 
journals does not indicate an exclusive focus on “gold”: “green” provides repository 
access to published articles. However, combined with a financial framing, this way of 
talking does indicate that journals and the academic publishing industry – not 
institutional or disciplinary article repositories – are at the forefront of scientists’ 




The Australian context was noteworthy, as – despite national funder policies 
requiring “green”, a similar policy at university level, and a lack of specific funds to 
support “gold” – interviewees still primarily spoke of open access as a practice 
associated with journal choice and payment. None of the interviewees in Australia 
mentioned, by name or implication, having followed a “green” repository route. 
Adam59 did mention the terminology, however: 
“…green is when there is a version of the paper that is almost the 
same as, but maybe the non-typeset version or whatever of the paper 
in a, typically an institutional repository and [university] has such a 
thing, but it's not the culture here to put papers on that, I don't know 
anyone who's put papers on the [university] one, so I don't think...I 
like the green idea but I don't think it actually works.” 
This explicitly confirms a journal-centred view of open access which seemed 
implicitly widespread amongst interviewees in Australia, and suggested a lack of 
engagement with national funders’ recommended route to open access. This 
emphasis on “gold” in a “green”-centred policy environment is striking and perhaps 
indicates an influence of global open access discourses and influences over national 
and local governance and infrastructures. 
 
Repository-mediated open access was mentioned more by UK interviewees, perhaps 
because this was a larger group. However, it tended to be a secondary framing, for 
example emerging through follow-up questions, suggesting that scientists may indeed 
be familiar with “green” without considering it a meaningful mode of open access. 
Yvonne60, who said that open access “usually means paying the open access charges, 
for the journal”, commented as follows when asked about deposition in the university 
repository: 
“So we do that - we're obliged to do that […] For the next REF […] You 
have to have put your publication in a public repository within three 
months of acceptance. And so what we're told now is that we have to 
put that final accepted version in the repository. Some of the journals 
won't let it be open access. So some of the journals will not let you 
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actually make that accessible to the public, but it has to be there in 
the repository. So yeah, we do do that.” 
Yvonne’s response showed that she was knowledgeable about the university and REF 
arrangements for arranging “green” repository access, whilst simultaneously 
constructing open access as a “gold” journal-centred practice. Her comment 
suggested that this may partially be due to the mixed levels of access – not always 
“open” – that repositories allow.  
 
Other UK interviewees constructed “green” as a form of open access, but assigned it a 
lower or less desirable status than “gold”. For instance, Erin61 told me that the two top 
journals in her discipline are not open access unless you pay expensive fees, so she 
“…will publish it there [in a top journal] and make it green open access. But not pay 
the fee to make it gold”. She then commented:  
“But when I can, you know, intersperse that with things that are 
actually gold open access. And moving more towards that. So I think 
we’re trying to publish more in PeerJ so that people in our discipline 
will know that you can find stuff in PeerJ for example.” 
Her use of “actually” in this statement suggested that “green” repository-mediated 
open access is a less realised or valuable form of open access. Luke62 similarly 
constructed “green” as a second-class option: he described it as a “baseline” in 
comparison to “the highest open access you can…gold”. In his account, “green” is a 
work-around: 
“…I think [current university] wants you to make it as open access as 
possible, but they have ways that they get around it. So like, I give 
them the copy of my work before it’s copyedited, and that gets around 
some of the open access issues. They can release our version - it’s just 
not the published version of your work.” 
This account suggests that repository-mediated access may be viewed by some as a 
compromised version of open access – or not open access at all, but an imitation that 
satisfies certain technical requirements. 
 
                                                     
61 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Aug 2018. 
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There are many possible reasons for the secondary placement or backgrounding of 
“green” open access. In some cases there may be a lack of awareness, as suggested by 
the contention that a lack of funding unequivocally places open access out of reach. 
However, even in these cases it may be that “green” is not considered an adequate 
form of “open access”, implicitly or consciously. As Luke identifies above, a “green” 
open access article is not the final, polished, typeset (“final published form” in some 
policy language: Wellcome Trust n.d.) unless the publisher allows use of their final 
version – it is in that sense a “way to get around” certain publishers’ rules. It may be 
that this peer-reviewed but slightly less finalised article is considered less of an article, 
or less open. Given the importance that interviewees attributed to the reputation and 
audience of their chosen journal, it may make a critical difference not to have the 
article openly accessible from the journal website, and for it not to be visibly 
authorised by the journal’s branding. And given the importance of publishing as a 
threshold to authorised and attributed knowledge – constructed as such throughout 
the interviews – an article that appears slightly less than published, even though it is 
published in almost identical form, may be felt to lack crucial value. It also emerged 
in a subsequent section (6.7) the centring of “gold” could relate to scientists’ agential 
connection with the practice of journal publication; repository deposition may feel 
like more work, and less under scientists’ control. Thus there may be multiple 
overlapping explanations for the backgrounding of “green”, but many relate to the 
cultural importance of publication in academic science. 
 
Alternatively, scientists may not consider “green” sufficiently open. Erin’s support of 
the open access journal PeerJ, above, and the surrounding context, suggests that for 
her, “actual” open access means publishing in a fully open access journal, rather than 
choosing a subscription journal with open access via hybrid or “green” routes. Her 
valuing of “gold” implies a relationship with the politics of open access movements in 
addition to open access as a technical state. A few other interviewees voiced similar 
considerations, but it remained rare for the open access status of a journal to be 
considered above its audience, reputation, or impact factor in publication decision-
making (see next section). Immediacy of access via the “gold” route did seem to be 
part of its appeal: Steve thought that his work would not get “such an airing” without 
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open access via journals, and Melanie commented, “…I love that [open access] 
because everyone has access the day it comes online”. The value of licensing for re-
use, which “gold” open access can more easily allow and is strongly upheld in 
dominant open science movements (see Section 5.2), was not raised by interviewees 
except those involved in open advocacy, and seemed not to be influential to the 
backgrounding of “green”. This was a clear point of disjunction between pro-“open” 
and broader scientific communities. 
 
There was a notable exception to the centring of “gold”. Lara63 was being trained in a 
lab with a strong commitment to many kinds of “open” practice, and she had become 
committed to such practices herself. When it came to open access, however, she 
expressed some of the scepticism and resentment that was characteristic of financial 
framings: 
“Gold open access is where you pay a lot of money to the journal to 
publish your manuscript. So, I don't know. I think I have a lot of 
opinions on the publishing industry. I don't know. I think these 
journals are making a lot of money out of something that should be 
just available for free. So that’s why I'm obviously a really big fan of 
green open access. So just like making your manuscripts available 
online.” 
Unlike other interviewees who expressed such resentment however, she distinguished 
this as a problem of “gold”, and framed “green” as a cost-free and open solution. Her 
mechanism of choice was preprints: making articles openly accessible online in a 
preprint repository. Other interviewees too, mostly of a more recently trained 
generation, and were adopting preprints as a means to make their work visible and 
attributable prior to publication. This suggested a trend towards the co-option of 
preprints as a form of open access that combines the cost-free element of “green” with 
the immediate visibility, accessibility, sometimes open licensing, and even journal-
platform brand recognition of “gold” (the preprint server bioRxiv was commonly 
mentioned by interviewees).  Preprints might be considered indistinguishable from 
“green” open access, especially if an editorially accepted version is made available: this 
is the implication of Lara’s account. However, preprints are not necessarily considered 
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to be open access in policy terms. For example, the REF2021 open access policy in the 
UK only counts preprints if they are both “accepted for publication” and uploaded 
prior to publication; and, bioRxiv discourages posting of accepted manuscripts 
(ASAPbio 2019). Thus, a generational trend towards preprints arguably represents an 
embrace of open access – much desired, theoretically, by policymakers – but in a form 
not recognised within policy and compliance framings (see also Section 6.7). 
 
6.6 Quality, reputational, and “impact” framings of open access 
 
A further significant facet of open access in scientists’ constructions is related to 
quality, reputation, and “impact”. Some interviewees portrayed a systematic link 
between one or more of these characteristics and open access; others did not. An 
understanding of open access as costly and journal-mediated – shown above – shaped 
these portrayals. One type of response, from a minority of interviewees, associated 
open access with concerns about quality in the production of science. For some, this 
was a concern about the editorial practices of open access journals. Jude commented 
that “one of the big dangers” of open access was that “a lot of the editors don't have 
intimate knowledge of the field”: he associated this sense of unease with receiving 
invitations from open access journals to review papers from outside his field, and 
conversely seeing papers in his field of expertise “being reviewed [at an open access 
journal] by, you know, associate handling editor…someone I've never heard of”. His 
contrast case is with society journals whose editors: 
“…are normally in their fifties or sixties so they've got a lot of 
experience and they know who hates who, who might be…best able to 
give a fair review. I mean obviously by their choice of referees they 
can bias the outcome, but…” 
Jude’s view is thus shaped by a journal-centred view in which the reputation and 
trustworthiness of open access is tarnished by particular observations of editorial 
practice. These stem from a lack of community-embedded leadership, seen as 
important to quality refereeing, and in turn the quality of published knowledge. 
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Similarly, when I raised the topic of open access with Jacqueline64, she told me that 
she was most concerned about: 
 “…making that sure that there has been appropriate peer review. And 
so if you're talking about journals that are just going to 
publish...anything, I'm not in favour of that.” 
Like Jude, she was preoccupied with an associated loss of “human judgement” and the 
use of “computer-generated list[s] of reviewers”. These are not direct, inevitable or 
systematic consequences of open access; nor was concern about them widespread in 
the interviews. But Jacqueline and Jude – trained in the 1970s and 80s – expressed a 
poignant worry about loss of community that had become, for them, a connotation of 
open access. “I find it really scary if we're going to move to a situation where we don't 
trust our colleagues”, Jacqueline told me. 
 
Although Jude and Jacqueline’s social-epistemic quality concerns were not held by the 
majority, they did have echoes in other responses, including of more recently trained 
interviewees. Jason, a PhD student, keenly advocated open access whilst adding: 
“… if you are making free and open access to publications, it needs to 
be quality publications. It can’t just be anything that someone put 
out. I still believe in peer review.” 
Jason depicted an association between open access and poor quality – the idea of 
publishing “anything” – as a tendency to guard against. When I asked him about 
repository-mediated open access, he again defended quality:  
“I’m for that as long as it goes through quality peer review […] There 
are journals out there that you can submit to without peer review and 
that stuff gets published. And that is a huge problem.”  
This concern as well as those from Jude and Jacqueline is likely influenced by the 
phenomenon of “predatory publishing”, originally characterised by Beall (2012) as a 
corruption of author-pays models of open access, in which researchers are spammed 
and “duped” into paying for publication with poor quality or non-existent editorial 
quality control. The phenomenon was later acknowledged to be broader, 
incorporating misleading, indiscriminate, and low quality journal practices that are 
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not necessarily linked with open access, and do not necessarily distinguish predatory 
journals from those deemed “legitimate” (Cobey et al. 2018:3, 15).  
 
While most interviewees did not voice open access quality concerns, the spectre of 
predatory publishing continued to haunt open access, even where the two were 
distinguished. Mark65 phrased it as follows: 
“…there are some very unfortunate, pernicious, secondary - 
unintended, secondary consequences from open access publishing. 
Which has led to this spawning of a whole series of low quality 
predatory journals. Which I think has, yeah, it's not the open access 
movement's fault at all […] but it's terrible thing that's happened in 
scientific publishing, a really, really bad thing.” 
Ben66 expressed a similar sentiment, and observed that although “high-end academic 
institutions” tend not to suffer from the confidence tricks of predatory publishers, 
researchers in less privileged environments can be systematically affected. Notable in 
Mark’s and Ben’s accounts was a sense of profound damage to scientific and 
publishing systems. It is important to acknowledge this as a meaningful loss or 
concern for researchers that shapes understandings of open access, including for 
those who express support of open access practices and movements. 
 
Quality framings were entwined with reputational framings of open access that 
concerned the prestige or “impact” of published research (where “impact” tends to 
refer to the journal impact factor, see Section 4.6). Where only a few interviewees 
expressed explicit quality concerns about open access, many more associated it with 
lower “impact” work – again, a journal-centred framing. Open science movements 
have long made the argument that reputational shortcuts to research assessment – 
and in particular, the journal impact factor – are problematic as they do not 
meaningfully reflect the value of individual research articles: “We conclude that 
science is currently rated by a process that is itself unscientific, subjective, and 
secretive” (The PLoS Medicine Editors 2006:0707).  
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However – unsurprisingly – my interviews showed that journal reputations and 
impact factors were still commonly used to make publication decisions, whether in 
the pursuit of prestige, quality, or a mixture of the two. Steve expressed a common 
stance, which to priority a journal’s reputation over its openness: “…the open access 
option has not been the decider […] - it's the good old impact factor!” Steve otherwise 
expressed wholehearted support for and adherence to open access practices, as did 
most interviewees who nonetheless considered journal reputation – including 
community factors like audience – before the possibility of open access. Reputational 
orientations were not necessarily the preserve of senior scientists: Molly, a PhD 
student, associated open access journals with low impact – and poor career prospects 
– at the start of this chapter. The conclusion that high-impact publication is mutually 
exclusive with open access again reflected a journal-centred view, and one in which 
hybrid open access was either unaffordable or not considered a true form of open 
access. Julia valued publication at fully open access – as opposed to hybrid – journals, 
but observed a structure to the availability of such options in relation to prestige: 
“So there’s a kind of mid-range level where there’s several really good 
options for open access publishing. So for example one of the last 
papers I published was in eLife, and that is a kind of mid-range 
impact factor. […] The issue is if you go a bit higher up, then you start 
to lose such good options for open access I think, which is when I 
would consider to go to paywall journal and make it open access with 
the funder.” 
Thus, even as a keen supporter of open access, Julia associated open access with 
compromises when it came to the most prestigious forms of publication. An 
alignment between prestige and open access did sometimes occur, in disciplinary 
context. Gavin67 told me that “a lot of the open access journals are some of the top 
journals in our discipline [computational biology]”. Even in this case it appeared that 
the reputations of such journals drove loyalty, with open access constituting a 
secondary part of that reputation. As Michelle68 put it: “I have published in open 
access journals, but it wasn't because they were open access journals.” 
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Some interviewees did not question the legitimacy of impact factors and other 
reputational shortcuts; others took care to distance themselves from such approaches, 
whilst complying with them nonetheless in practical terms. Ian69 commented: 
“I would like to publish everything in PLOS ONE, or F1000 Research 
or something [fully open access journals] […] But, it's not fair on 
young people [his trainees/co-authors] to do that, because they need 
to get the kudos from publishing in good journals.” 
Adam expressed almost exactly the same desire and justification, describing this 
approach as “operat[ing] knowing how the system works whilst railing against the 
system at the same time”, with associated with feelings of tension and hypocrisy. 
Accounts like these suggested that reputational factors often influenced publishing 
behaviours not because they were intrinsically valued, but due to a conviction that 
such factors are systematically upheld by others in professional assessment contexts. 
This observation aligns with a with the findings of a survey by Niles and colleagues 
(2020) in a North American context, who found a disconnect between what 
academics most value when choosing a journal – readership – and what they expected 
their peers and evaluation committees to value – prestige-related metrics.  
 
The pursuit of high-impact publication by senior scientists on behalf of junior 
colleagues – which often came at the expense of open access, in journal-centred and 
financially constricted contexts – seemed to be a pattern. Adam also observed it as 
such: he felt sure that some senior scientists used such reasoning as a pretext to 
advance their own reputations, whilst others genuinely sought to assist their juniors. 
However, it was not clear that junior scientists were allowed agency to form or pursue 
their own dissemination preferences. When I asked Rory70, a postdoc, whether he was 
in the driving seat when it came to publication decisions, he said: “No. I’m normally 
sitting in the back. Someone tells me, I think we should go here, go there.” Thus I 
observed a potential for reputational systems – often negatively associated with open 
access – to be maintained by a cycle of expectations, including by senior scientists 
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notionally or actually protecting their juniors. Meanwhile, junior scientists may not 
be given the authority to instigate alternative systems – or may already have 
internalised the same expectations as their seniors. 
 
These generational dynamics are notable because of evidence that some scientists –
those more recently trained– configure open access differently in relation to 
reputation. Several interviewees did not make any association between open access 
and quality, reputation, or “impact”. This tended to occur where multiple routes to 
open access were viewed as possible and legitimate: for instance if hybrid, “green”, or 
preprint-mediated open access were felt to be salient, accepted, and affordable forms 
of open access. In other cases, “open” principles themselves actively drove journal 
choice, and the presence of a “paywall” or expensive hybrid fees was considered 
harmful to a journal’s reputation. For instance, Olivia was determined to publish the 
first paper from her PhD in an open access journal: “…I’m really pushing to get it in 
PLOS ONE because it’s a journal that’s known for its open values”. She framed open 
access publication as aspirational in the way that other scientists frame high-impact 
publication – strikingly so, in comparison with accounts above from senior scientists 
eschewing publication in PLOS ONE for the sake of their students. Erin also actively 
pursued open access (see Section 6.5 above) and, moreover, consciously sought to 
raise the reputation of the open access journal PeerJ in her disciplinary community, by 
publishing there to increase its visibility and relevance to her colleagues. It was not 
clear how widely valued openness was as a reputational feature of journals or 
platforms: it seemed to be emerging rather than entrenched like “impact”. However, 
the demographics of the group upholding this feature suggest its reputational pull 
may increase over time. Thus, the adoption of open access was only partially driven by 
the abandonment of journal reputations as markers of quality publication; the growth 





6.7 Compliance framings: open access as distanced and 
bureaucratic 
 
A final salient construction of open access arose from its position in top-down 
institutional policy regimes. Most notably, UK interviewees tended to practise open 
access via administrative mediation that prioritises policy compliance. This featured 
particularly in the accounts of research group leaders, and was likely connected with 
their employment at UK universities that have significant open access budgets and 
teams of professional services staff. In Australia, where funding for open access was 
not routine, interviewees did not speak of administrative mediation for open access, 
but they did report bureaucratic monitoring from funders. Nonetheless, it was a 
prevailing experience of interviewees in this study – especially in the UK – that in 
everyday life, open access took on the form of an administrative task or interaction; a 
responsibility displaced to others that still requires passing attention; a tick-box task 
that is also a black box, its contents relatively opaque to researchers.  
 
When interviewees in the UK felt that the administrative process worked smoothly, 
they spoke in positive terms about their experience of open access. Ernie, for example, 
commented: 
“So sometimes it's quite - sometimes it is a drag [the open access 
process]. But in general, it - actually, we're blessed, it goes pretty 
smoothly, and the guy [library staffer name] who's in charge of doing 
it, he's great. I hope he retires after I do [laughs].” 
Ernie’s experience of open access was strongly influenced, perhaps even defined by his 
interactions with a particular staff member who performed the involved tasks of open 
access, which could include: knowing precise definitions of “open access” in licensing 
terms; ensuring access is achieved in a way that meets specific funder policy 
requirements; and managing any financial transaction required. Ernie described an 
occasion on which “it took poor [staffer name] about 20 or 30 emails back and forth” 
to negotiate payment for open access at his chosen journal, which had only recently 
introduced an “open” option. Scientists in Ernie’s position thus experienced open 
access as relatively effortless – “all I have to do is…make sure that that option gets 
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ticked” – with moments of friction from which they are partially shielded. 
Simultaneously, they are shielded from practical knowledge of open access, and an 
associated agential connection: a sense of responsibility and control. Steve, for 
instance, stated that open access is “quite expensive”, but added: “I’m not 100% sure 
[what it costs], because I never see the bill…”. Scientists in this UK context are strictly 
required to practise open access – this is at least part of the reason for administrative 
mediation – which compounds a lack of agency, as the decision is not theirs, nor are 
they required to carry it out proactively. In many cases, this disconnection was 
experienced as a convenience, allowing open access to become assumed and 
unremarkable: according to Henry71, “…we just have to publish open access so it's not 
really […] a topic to discuss” and similarly Andrea said “there’s no discussion about it”. 
 
The Australian context was markedly different because open access requirements 
were less stringent, specific funding was generally not available, and administrative 
mediation systems were not mentioned. Amongst the small interviewee sample – 
mostly at one university – a pressure to practise open access was not in evidence: only 
two of eight interviewees (Gavin and Jenny72) spoke of habitually pursuing open 
access, and both described exceptions to this practice. Moreover, both seemed to 
pursue open access for reasons unrelated to policy rules: Gavin mentioned the “top” 
quality of open journals in his field, and Jenny mentioned the benefits of immediate, 
wide accessibility – particularly for her contacts in India and Thailand. Australian 
interviewees thus seemed to feel greater agency in relation to open access, through 
which a minority became personally attached to the practice. They did not, however, 
have financial freedom to pursue the “gold” route, which was most salient in their 
accounts, and their overall prioritisation of open access was low.  
 
Curiously, there was at least some awareness that the national research councils in 
Australia required open access – and recommended a repository route – but the 
associated compliance procedures were viewed as ineffectual. Adam told me: 
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“…we're asked to keep it [database] up to date, put papers in there 
and one of the questions...so what's the title of your paper, date of 
publication, page numbers etc., which grant did you use to fund this 
work, and is it logged on a...open access thing. And for most of them 
the answer is no, and as best I know there's no pushback on that, they 
don't - I've never, I've not heard of anyone being pinged for not having 
their stuff on an open access site. Even though I'm quite sure most 
don't.” 
Ian portrayed a similar meaninglessness to bureaucratic monitoring of open access, 
especially in the context of time pressure: 
“…so [funder], for example, requires you to deposit your publications 
in a, in an open place, I went - last grant I put in, I was up against a 
deadline, and I came to that question, I just ticked all the boxes. I 
have no idea whether they're openly accessible or not - nobody looks 
at that…” 
This suggested that both extensive, effective policies and bureaucracies – as well as 
those perceived as minimal and ineffectual – struggle to connect scientists 
meaningfully with open access. Whether through a sense of unaccountability and 
futility, or a convenient displacement of personal labour and responsibility, scientists 
were at an arm’s length from open access – at least, as defined by policy compliance. 
Through a compliance lens, open access was part of an administrative workload. This 
may have led scientists to associate it with their feelings about administrative work 
and research bureaucracies generally.  
 
Scientists were not inevitably disconnected from open access as a policy compliance 
activity. Where they did actively seek to comply, the bureaucratic context shaped 
levels and experiences of engagement. In the UK, Yvonne had a conscientious 
knowledge of open access options and routes to compliance (see Section 6.5), but this 
appeared to reflect resigned rather than enthusiastic engagement: “We're obliged to 
do it, so we do it”. Miriam73, meanwhile, had actively brought members of her 
research community together to petition a top journal in her field to comply with the 
REF2021 standard for open access. However, her construction of open access 
remained dominated by a sense of distance and exasperation, created not only by the 
administrative load of such engagements – which she described as a “pain in the bum” 
                                                     
73 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
181 
 
– but also by a sense that compliance requirements were obscure, inflexible, and 
punitive, even for those like herself who were proactively committed to open access.  
 
In particular, she referred to an occasion on which she “got into trouble” for failing to 
submit an open access article she had co-authored to a university repository. The 
article was openly accessible through a journal but not registered through the “green” 
mechanism by which the university monitored open access. She found this experience 
to be intensely frustrating: 
“…you're just thinking...ugh, lads...just go out there, see, can you 
access it, you don't need to have to have it documented in that exact 
format […] people can search it on the website and find it there, it's 
this open access paper that's been written by [Miriam], and look she's 
one of 30 authors, and she's right in the middle, so it's really not an 
important part of her work! But isn't she awful, because we can't 
count that in our [laughs]...” 
Erin, who was also committed to practising open access, described an administrative 
struggle to arrange payment at her chosen open access journal, PeerJ, because it 
operates on a membership fee rather than fee-per-article basis: 
“…the university or the granting agency would rather you pay single 
fees that cost way more money than to actually just say, can I buy a 
membership that – yes – will last longer than a duration of my grant, 
but will be way more economically feasible and a better use of grant 
money. And that seems to be – even though it’s totally logical it 
seems to be a real difficulty.” 
Experiences like these suggested that bureaucratic procedures associated with policy 
compliance and financial management can create distance from a wholehearted 
embrace of open access – associating it emotionally with limited agency and 
frustration – even, and perhaps especially, where scientists have proactively sought to 
practise it. Even Ernie, who described a positive experience of open access made easy 
by delegation, initially labelled it as a “drag”, alluded to the “pain” of arranging open 
access for papers co-authored across institutions, and lamented his funder’s approval 
of “certain types of open access license” and not others due to a “technicality”. The 
particular qualities of systems and individuals managing open access thus have a 




The experience of agency may be one reason for salience of “gold” over “green” routes 
to open access for interviewees: the former is a publication practice with which they 
have already traditionally engaged, and the latter may feel like new administrative 
work primarily associated with compliance. The appeal of preprints may also be 
associated with agency and an escape from bureaucracy. Julia, for instance, happened 
to be submitting to bioRxiv for the first time on the day of our interview, and told me: 
“I’m quite excited actually [laughs]. It almost feels like you get a 
paper for free, right, without the pain of like - it’s going to have to go 
to an editor sooner or later. But you almost feel like I’m going to 
publish a paper today [laughs] without having to wait painfully for 
the review process, and the editorial process.” 
Scientists are accustomed to the bureaucracy of publishing, so the removal of these 
layers combined with the separation of preprints from compliance framings of open 
access imbue the practice with a sense of freedom. 
 
In the UK context, scientists’ experiences with bureaucracy around open access – both 
of convenience and frustration – are given context by interviews with UK university 
staff working to advocate, implement, and facilitate open access policies. Individuals 
in these roles portrayed a complicated policy landscape: Paul74, Pro-Vice-Provost at 
UCL and advocate of open science at university leadership level, told me that there 
were “over 400” open access policies across Europe (see also Danny Kingsley’s account 
in Section 6.4 of administering multiple funder policies). Laura75, who was working in 
administrative facilitation of open access, described compliance with open access 
policies as a complicated and confusing process which she would not expect 
researchers to navigate themselves. The procedural intricacy of compliance was 
evident in Laura’s need to refer to specialised digital tools and databases – 
synonymous with the UK organisation SHERPA (Jisc n.d.) that produces them – in 
order to navigate, for example, the exact forms of open access required by each funder 
or offered by each journal. These tools are publicly available but the only scientist 
interviewee to mention them was Thomas76, who had existing expertise and 
                                                     
74 Interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
75 Interview: UK, Jul 2018. 
76 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
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motivation having turned his career towards research and advocacy of open practices. 
Compliance with open access policy thus manifested as a practice of such esoteric 
complexity that it required mediation by both human and machine specialists.  
 
The development of bureaucracies to implement open access compliance reflects not 
only its complexity but a sense that scientists will not engage proactively. Laura 
described mediation as necessary partly because open access is “the second stage, or 
not the priority” for researchers. In advocates’ accounts, there was tension between 
two reactions to scientists’ disengagement. On one hand, disengagement was viewed 
as increasingly irrelevant given that systems of compliance successfully implement 
open access without necessitating scientists’ engagement. On the other hand, it was 
viewed as part of a cultural problem in which scientists are complicit, and which calls 
for fundamental culture change. Danny Kingsley77 described her own struggle with 
this tension. She portrayed with regret her view that open access was failing to “win 
hearts and minds”78 in the research community: 
“…some people get it [open access]...some people do it because they 
think, oh well, it's easy enough, I don't really care. There are others 
who do it really reluctantly, and there are others again who have 
actually refused to, completely refused to engage. Full stop, they just 
go: this doesn't apply to me […] my feeling is if all of this stuff 
[policies] went away tomorrow… we probably would have actually 
sort of only incrementally increased engagement. So, the voluntary 
engagement before this was around the 10 to 15% of material was 
being made open access voluntarily. I would say if we took it all away, 
we'd be lucky to be hitting 25%. Really lucky. So I think that the 
researcher attitude to openness is reluctance...” 
Her account was striking in its portrayal of widespread open access as reliant on 
policy compliance systems rather than scientists who value the practice. She critiqued 
the “compliance line” as a narrow framing that prioritises quantitative reporting of 
open access over any qualitative purpose: 
 “The original goals of the policy were not that we'd have 81% 
compliance, presumably it was […] that we wanted to share our 
                                                     
77 Head of Scholarly Communication, University of Cambridge; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
78 The phrase “winning hearts and minds” is notable for its use in military strategy, where it 
refers to the winning over of a local population, although the consent of that population is a 
matter of interpretation (Dixon 2009). It seems telling in this context, where it implicitly 
frames the introduction of open access as a battle or conflict. 
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research with the world, or we want to improve mankind, or we want 
to...whatever it is. Whatever that is - is that being measured? Have 
we achieved that? ‘Oh, well that'd be quite hard to measure.’ It's like, 
yeah, well maybe [laughs] you should have thought about that five 
years ago!” 
Danny’s account suggested that compliance framings of open access are set at the 
very top of research governance structures – the UK research councils, in the case 
above – and subsequently manifest in university approaches encountered by 
scientists. 
 
Despite evidence of critical reflection on a compliance framing, university staff 
implementing open access policies seemed caught in an ongoing bind between 
attempts to engage “hearts and minds”, and strategies that compel open practices 
regardless of researcher engagement. Danny described how, “ironically” and out of a 
feeling of necessity, her team was reverting from a values-based framing of open 
access (“this is a great idea and this is a positive thing to do”) to a compliance framing 
“if you do not do this, you will not get any money. Do it.”). This position was reflected 
by an open policymaker at a different UK university, who implied that he now cares 
more about researchers’ actions than their attitudes and values: “I don’t want them 
[researchers] to want to do it [open practices] any more, I just want them to do it.” 
These views seem to stem from a persistent difficulty in engaging researchers, 
accompanied by growing fatigue and frustration over a period of years. Many open 
advocates in different roles had stories about their struggle to be heard by 
researchers, and including instances of outright hostility. Stephanie Dawson79, who 
leads the platform ScienceOpen, told me that a professor invited her into his office 
just to deliver “a ten-minute tirade about how terrible he found open access”. 
Accounting for the lack of engagement, Danny said that “[researchers’] eyes are on 
the novel results in high impact journals - don't care about anything else”. A 
policymaker different UK university expressed frustration that researchers are 
“sleepwalking”, complicit in maintaining – rather than challenging and taking 
ownership of – a system where publishers have a high level of control.  
                                                     




This is an illuminating counterpoint to scientists’ constructions of open access, and 
suggests a cycle: policy compliance approaches breed bureaucratic distancing of 
researchers, with associated loss of agency and frustration; in turn, disengaged 
researchers frustrate the efforts of advocates; and the advocates feel compelled to 
reinforce compliance framings. In this way compliance framings of open access may 
both create, and result from, disengagement amongst researchers. Similarly, 
scientists, policymakers at research organisations, and open advocates all make 
observations of a research culture seemingly driven by the pursuit of high “impact”, at 
the cost of various forms of openness, including open access. However, they tend to 
feel that others are in control. Danny portrayed researchers as stubbornly impact-
driven, while Jenny, a scientist in Australia, felt the same about institutions: “…the 
only interest most institutions have in publication is that they want more. […] I mean 
it's all become very much scores, and impact factors and stuff like that…”. And while 
some scientists that I interviewed expressed a personal valuing of high impact 
publication, many who followed this approach were motivated by the expectations of 
others – particularly assessors of research. Thus, my findings suggest a collectively felt 
loss of agency, in which cycles of frustration and distancing drive a compliance 
framing of open access – fuelled by cycles of expectation which have been 
constraining research publication and dissemination practices for a longer time.  This 
may be a version of the “cultural problem” that is taken to be a barrier to openness in 
science, and which “culture change” policies in open science increasingly seek to 
address. Compliance approaches (“I just want them to do it”) sit awkwardly with the 
goal of culture change, as they may aggravate the “cultural problem”. Moreover, they 
involve top-down governance, whilst culture change implies the movement of a whole 
system or community, presumably including the hearts and minds of researchers.  
 
6.8 Generational change and future orientations 
 
In much of this chapter I have attended to the distance, ambivalence, scepticism, and 
even resentment that often features in scientists’ relationships with open access. 
186 
 
However, this should not be mistaken for a report of widespread disapproval: the vast 
majority of scientist interviewees were positive about open access at least in principle, 
along with a range of more complex reactions. It is also important to note that 
scientists trained from approximately the 2000s onwards had a slightly shifted profile 
of reactions to open access, as noted throughout, which tended to be more positive 
and engaged. Financial, journal-centred framings of open access were prominent in 
all career generations, but open journals and preprint repositories were often actively 
embraced by recently trained interviewees. These generational dynamics suggest the 
potential for an acceptance of open access actively led bottom-up by scientists rather 
than top-down by compliance measures. However, this is uncertain, as for any 
prediction of generational change outside of a longitudinal study.  
 
There is also major policy change on the horizon in relation to open access: Plan S, 
centred in Europe, is due to be implemented by many research funders worldwide, 
including in the UK from 2021. Plan S (European Science Foundation n.d.) makes a 
number of policy changes with relevance to the themes in this chapter: including 
limits to open access charges, a removal of support for the “hybrid” route, and stricter 
open licensing expectations. My interview observations suggest that scientists may 
welcome – in theory – a number of these changes: especially cost reductions and 
checks on the power of “hybrid” publishers who claim income from both 
subscriptions and open access. In practice, where scientists are already distanced from 
open access procedures, cost reductions may not be felt; and any cost of open access 
can arouse suspicions of injustice. Emphasis on licensing arrangements and on cost 
controls, may reinforce financial, journal-centred framings. Compliance framings may 
be reinforced as the definition of open access becomes more stringent, and as funders 
promise to “monitor compliance and sanction non-complian[ce]” (European Science 
Foundation n.d.). However, any policy unification arising from Plan S may ease 
bureaucratic friction.  
 
Many of the anxieties in interviewees’ accounts are associated with a lineage of open 
access that has become dominant in advocacy and policy, especially in the sciences: 
one which prioritises reusability and friction-free movement of knowledge (libre) 
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alongside free access (gratis), has neoliberal resonances, and become big business for 
commercial publishers (Moore 2017, 2019b). This is not the only type of open access, 
and Moore (2019b) argues that scholar-led, not-for-profit, open online publishing – 
owned and run by research communities, and providing a space for experimentation, 
collaboration, and self-sufficiency away from market forces – is an important 
alternative. Moreover, such operations have been present but on the fringes since the 
advent of online scholarly communication, and are currently re-emerging, for 
example in the form of the Radical Open Access Collective (ibid.; Adema & Moore, 
2018). This form of scholarly communication has a stronger tradition in the 
humanities and social sciences than the natural sciences, and was absent from 
interviewee accounts – except in the form preprint archiving. However, it has the 
potential to address deep preoccupations expressed by scientists: financial strain and 
injustice of steep publication fees; a loss of community feeling and possibly quality in 
publication; a tense allegiance with “impact” as configured in commercial publication; 




In this chapter I have presented the first of three significant categories of openness as 
constructed by scientists in interview: open access to research articles. This category 
is also highly salient in policy and advocacy discourse. The task of the chapter was to 
make sense of continuities and contrasts in scientists’ portrayals of open access, 
identifying themes and patterns that together illuminate the relationship between 
scientists and open access in the context of this study. 
 
In alignment with policy and advocacy histories, scientists with careers spanning 
decades tend to remember open access as the earliest explicitly “open” practice and 
movement in science – a forerunner to other forms of open science. More recently 
trained scientists linked their early “open” memories with open access policies and 
expanding “open” visions and technologies, suggesting a generational shift in 
scientists’ understandings as the phenomenon itself evolves. Several scientists across 
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generations positioned open source software as their earliest memory of “open” – 
reflecting an early and ongoing cultural influence from software communities.  
 
The clearest framing of open access was financial. Across contexts and generations, 
scientists associated a cost with open access, and portrayed it as expensive. For 
scientists without access to funds, open access was felt to be out of reach. Many UK 
scientists had access to block grant funding for open access at the time of this study: 
in those cases, or when funding was otherwise in generous supply, open access was 
experienced as easy and reduced to a transaction – enabled by the hybrid publishing 
model. However this framing primed conditionality: scientists suggested that their 
practice of open access was dependent on the – sometimes precarious – availability of 
funding. A financial framing also primed negative and ambivalent emotional and 
attitudinal reactions to open access associated with feelings of scarcity and injustice. 
 
Linked to a financial framing was the construction of open access as a “gold” journal-
mediated practice, which tended to be associated with publication fees. The cost-free 
“green” repository route, where it was mentioned at all, was framed as a less valuable 
or actualised form of open access – despite its policy relevance. Although this 
indicated an awareness of the “green” route on the part of some interviewees, others 
seemed to construct repository-based open access as a lesser form of scholarly 
communication. There was evidence that more recently trained scientists may – 
outside policy framings – see preprints as a form of open access that combines the 
benefits of “gold” and “green”. 
 
A minority of scientists associated open access with concerns about quality and rigour 
in scientific systems: this was linked with the rise of predatory publishing, and 
perhaps a deeper sense of loss – for established generations - of order and community, 
coincident with the rise of open science. Many more scientists associated open access 
with a compromise in journal “impact” despite attempts of open movements to 
challenge this thinking. However, impact was often pursued for its apparent value to 
others who make career-defining judgements, in opposition to internal values. Some – 
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especially those more recently trained – did not link open access with reputational 
concerns, and some framed open access as a reputational asset. However, junior 
scientists had less agency over publishing decisions, and were influenced by others’ 
reputational concerns. 
 
Scientists’ experiences of open access were shaped by a policy compliance framing 
through which open access was distanced and bureaucratic. This was especially the 
case in the study’s UK context where professional services staff mediated the practice 
of open access, managing compliance at a university level by shielding scientists from 
the labour and procedural expertise involved in matching practice with policy. As a 
result UK scientists sometimes experienced open access as easy, but lacked an 
agential connection with the practice. In other cases, bureaucratic friction arising 
from the compliance framing led to frustrating experiences of open access. Advocates 
of open science within universities gave responses that matched these patterns of 
behaviour, one describing a struggle to “win hearts and minds” on open access. The 
frustration caused by this struggle seemed, ironically, to reinforce compliance 
approaches – creating a cycle of frustration and distancing. 
 
Generational differences in the construction of open access suggested the potential 
for a gradual scientist-led embrace of the practice, as more junior scientists upheld 
the reputations of open access journals and supported preprints. However, any such 
prediction is fraught with uncertainty, and does not apply across all scientific 
communities. The policy changes soon to be expected with Plan S may result in an 
open access landscape quite different from the one encountered by scientists in this 
study. On the other hand, some of the patterns I have identified may be reinforced.
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Chapter 7 | “You feel quite vulnerable” 
Opening up research data 
 
 
Luke was a few months into his first post-doctoral position when we 
spoke. His manner was cheerful and laid back, but he was also feeling 
the pressure of his new career stage: it was in the same lab as his 
PhD, but “a big change” – with a renewed focus on producing papers. 
 
When I asked him about openness in science, he began diffidently – 
perhaps due to modesty, or a real sense that his views may be atypical 
– before making his position clear:  
 
“So I might be a bit warped in my views here but I think openness in 
science should be that everything is available. So if I publish a paper, I 
put all my datasets, all my R scripts, I put everything I can into it so 
that it’s completely open. Which makes you feel quite vulnerable…” 
 
Luke was not to be alone in holding these commitments, especially 
amongst interviewees of his generation. He was more unusual in 
articulating the vulnerability of data openness. His account helped 
me to understand the emotional range that characterised this topic.  
 




This chapter is about openness of research data, the second of three significant 
categories emerging from my interviews with biological scientists, and thus a second 
interview-based answer to my overarching research question: how is the meaning of 
“open” (or “openness”) being constructed in the context of science? The prominence of 
data openness, like that of open access, was unsurprising due to the salience of open 
data in policy and advocacy discourse (see Chapter 5). Norms and policies that expect 
digital research data sharing have been in place since the 1980s and 1990s in some 
disciplinary niches relevant to the life sciences: genetics, genomics and x-ray 
crystallography in particular (Strasser 2019). In the 2000s, and especially in the 2010s – 
following shortly in the wake of open access – “open” research data was increasingly 
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advocated across disciplinary contexts. Advocacy has come from both grassroots (e.g. 
Murray-Rust et al. 2010) and top-down (e.g. HEFCE et al. 2016; The Royal Society 
2012) sources. By the time of my interviews in 2017-2019, biological scientists in the 
UK and Australia may have become familiar via multiple routes with the concept of 
open research data, including major funder and journal policies that increasingly 
require or encourage data sharing upon publication. Once more, however, I could not 
be sure that open research data would be a distinguishable, salient category of 
openness for scientists; nor could I predict how they would understand, frame, and 
prioritise the concept. Open research data is less bounded than open access, as it may 
refer to many different types and hierarchies of data with varied epistemic and 
temporal relationships to a research project. Nonetheless, as conceived in advocacy 
and policy terms, open data has certain consistent features: digital, online, publicly 
accessible, licensed for reuse, machine-readable, curated with relevant metadata, 
readily discoverable, and securely archived. Not all of these features may be reflected 
in scientists’ accounts as they form their own concepts of data openness with varying 
degrees of closeness to advocacy and policy discourse. I use the broad term “data 
openness” in this chapter to reflect an awareness that scientists’ constructions of 
scientific openness in a data context may be varied, and formed at some distance from 
“open data” movements. In this chapter I present salient themes and patterns that 
emerged in relation to data openness during a grounded analysis of interview 
responses. 
 
7.2 The salience of data openness in interview 
 
Of the 40 scientists I interviewed, approximately half [19] mentioned data openness – 
or related concepts such as data sharing, data access, or data transparency – in their 
response to my initial, broad question about openness: “What first comes to mind 
when you think about openness in science?”. Nearly three-quarters [28] mentioned it 
spontaneously at other points in the interview, and nearly all [37] showed familiarity 
with open data practices when I asked directly. This indicated a similar, or marginally 
lower, salience and familiarity than with open access [respective figures: 19, 31, and 
40] in the interviewee group. Despite this quantitative similarity, it was not 
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necessarily the same individuals who raised the two categories: 7 individuals 
mentioned data openness but not open access in their first response [6 vice versa], 
and over the course of the interview, 4 raised data openness whilst never raising open 
access [4 vice versa]. For the purposes of these indicative figures, I was looking for 
contextual indications that interviewees were referring to online sharing of digital 
datasets with a wide audience rather than more abstract interpretations such as 
communicating one’s “data” via a talk or conversation (this is examined in Chapter 8). 
Superficially, this indicates that data openness is commonly associated with 
“openness in science” in biologists’ day-to-day professional lives. Again, it is also 
notable – given its prominence in advocacy and policy – that a high proportion of 
interviewees did not mention data openness in their first response, and a significant 
number [12] never brought it up. Several [5] raised neither of the two categories most 
primed by policy – data openness and open access – and had constructed different 
meanings of openness, discussed in Chapter 8. Data openness thus emerged as a 
significant category of scientific openness in the context of my study, but again less 
significant than some may predict. 
  
The ways in which interviewees constructed openness in relation to data, and the 
range of associated attitudes and emotions that they expressed, differed from the case 
of open access. Open access was widely approved of in principle; in practice it was 
associated with a degree of frustration towards costs, bureaucratic processes and 
power imbalances, but it was also often accepted, impassively or with a degree of 
enthusiasm. Data openness was associated with a wider and distinctive range of 
reactions. Those who approved often expressed principled attachment and passion, 
focusing on the topic for large portions of the interview. Negative or unsettled 
emotional reactions also featured more strongly: fear, defensiveness, and vulnerability 
arose alongside frustration and scepticism. Together, these reactions suggested a 
deeper connection to scientific practice and professional or scientific identity in the 
case of data openness. Openness in the context of data was also clearly constructed as 
an epistemic virtue in several cases. It became evident that understandings and 
attitudes were highly contextual, entangled with factors such as data formats and 




In the following sections I explore interviewees’ constructions of data openness 
through four characteristic reactions that I observed: familiarity and acceptance; 
scepticism and unease; passion and principle; and vulnerability. I will consider each in 
relation to the material, social, and temporal data contexts that seem to mediate 
attitudinal disposition, as I gradually build a conceptual understanding of how such 
diverse dispositions arise. I begin with some groundwork on the language of data 
openness used by interviewees, and the variety of practices to which it referred. 
 
7.3 Terminology: do scientists talk about “open data”? 
 
Given the breadth of data-associated terminology used in open advocacy and policy 
discourse – including open data; open research data; open access to research data; 
data sharing; data access or availability; research data management; and FAIR data 
(see Section 5.3.9) – I paid attention to language used by interviewees as an indication 
of how settled or wide-ranging biologists’ discourse on these concepts may be. I 
occasionally introduced the term “open data”, but this was rarely before the 
interviewee had framed the topic themselves. Overwhelmingly, I found that 
interviewees used descriptive terms rather than any settled jargon to refer to online 
sharing of research data. For example: 
 Jude80 raised the issue of “data deposition in large databases”;  
 Gavin81 talked of an instance in which “all our data had to be open”;  
 Jaqueline82 spoke of “obligations now to archive data”;  
 Michelle83 raised “the sharing of knowledge and data”, including “…the issues 
of big data, and you know, all the ‘omics stuff, and...when people generate 
such a huge amount of data like that, and then making it available to other 
people”; 
                                                     
80 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
81 PhD 1990s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
82 PhD 1980s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
83 PhD 1980s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
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 Ben84 spoke of “complete transparency in sharing of data”; 
 Arthur85 mentioned requirements “that you publish the data, the raw data”; 
 Jason86 referred to “free to access to data”; 
 and Madison87 talked about “a really big trend towards sharing the data”. 
Only scientists substantially involved in advocating openness appeared to use of the 
phrase “open data” routinely. This included Thomas88, a biologist who works in 
research data management, and Greg89, who leads an open access journal. Similarly, 
only Thomas referred to FAIR data or “research data management”. The 
heterogeneous, descriptive language of data openness used by biologist interviewees 
suggests that associated data concepts and practices are diverse, lively, and under 
negotiation. Where open access has become familiar jargon in research communities, 
data openness has not been reduced to an equivalently recognisable label. The data 
practices represented by this diverse language were often implicit. Where further 
context was given, or emerged upon questioning, it became clear that multiple 
practices of varying significance were invoked: for example, data sharing was assumed 
to occur at different times in relation to publication, and the constitution of “data” 
differed according to context. I have taken this into account, and provided contextual 
information where available, in my interpretations.  
 
7.4 Familiarity and acceptance: disciplinary data sharing norms 
 
A significant proportion of scientist interviewees [about one-third90] discussed online 
data sharing with familiarity and acceptance, indicating that it is uncontroversial in 
their fields. These interviewees’ disciplinary associations – genetics, genomics, and x-
ray crystallography – indicated the continued salience of particular digital data 
sharing norms for sequence and crystallography data that pre-date the rise of “open 
                                                     
84 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
85 PhD 2010s; interview: UK, Jul 2018. 
86 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Nov 2018. 
87 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Jan 2019. 
88 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
89 PhD 1990s; interview: US, Feb 2018. 
90 The boundaries of this category are subjective; my count is conservative and does not 
include those categorised as principled or passionate in their approach to data openness. 
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data”. These norms were established as far back as the 1980s and 1990s (Strasser 2019), 
both by journal policies and – in the case of large-scale genetic sequence data – by the 
international Bermuda Principles and Fort Lauderdale Agreement (HGP Information 
Archive 1997; Wellcome Trust 2003) in the context of the Human Genome Project. 
For instance, Gavin91, who was involved in a publicly shared large-scale HIV 
sequencing project, commented that “…the enforcement by journals to publicly 
deposit all your sequences in GenBank etc.” was “a great leveller” in terms of the 
resources available to a community for reanalysis. GenBank was one of the earliest 
online databases involved in the establishment of data sharing norms (Strasser 2019). 
Other interviewees working in genetics and genomics also described certain kinds of 
data sharing as routine: “Yes, so with microarray data or RNA sequencing data…we do 
try and do it routinely” (Yvonne92); “all of our sequence data goes into the sequence 
data archive, ENA, European Nucleotide Archive” (David93); “Oh yeah like when you 
upload to NCBI, yeah - I do that, I mean you have to anyway” (Henry94); and “so for 
sequence data - yes, everything goes online. It always has done” (Ben95). This familiar 
relationship with data openness tended not to be highly salient in interview: 
interviewees in this category tended to highlight other dimensions of openness before 
data, indicating that this practice was not central to their construction of openness. 
 
Jenny96, who was working in animal genetics and genomics, described sequence 
sharing that was not only routine but immediate: 
“In genomics of course, it happens pretty much automatically, any 
sequence we get goes immediately open on the website, so - you 
know, we can't publish any sequence without it being accessible. And 
that's been policy in genomics for a long time, and of course it has 
enormously advanced the field, I don't think anybody would tell you 
otherwise. So we appreciate that and of course all the genome data is 
immediately published. Everything that we've got on the [specific 
animal] is already online. So people are already, even though we 
haven't published the data yet, people are already accessing it…” 
                                                     
91 PhD 1990s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
92 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Nov 2017. 
93 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Dec 2017. 
94 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Dec 2017. 
95 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
96 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Nov 2017. 
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This mode of data sharing is in line with the agreements made around the turn of the 
century for genome and other large-scale sequencing projects. Outside this 
disciplinary context, pre-publication data sharing was very rarely reported by 
interviewees, and never reported as a disciplinary norm. The Fort Lauderdale 
Agreement (Wellcome Trust 2003) asserts that in this context, data producers should 
be allowed to publish about their data first, even though others can freely make use of 
it. Sarah97, a senior journal editor, told me that in her experience, this “gentlemen’s 
agreement” is mostly observed. This offers a level of reassurance, in the form of 
community etiquette, that data sharing will not be competitively risky.  
 
7.5 Contextualising familiarity and acceptance 
 
These examples firstly suggest a persistence of specific data sharing norms established 
twenty to thirty years ago via journal policies and international agreements. It may be 
that this persistence partly arises from the first-hand experiences of interviewees in 
this group, who were largely trained prior to the 2000s, making them the generation 
in which such norms were established – or their immediate scientific descendants. A 
relative absence of younger interviewees from this group does not necessarily suggest 
an abandonment of these norms; it potentially suggests a reconfiguration of such 
norms as part of a broader openness concept amongst recently generations (see 
Section 7.8). This finding may also be shaped by the disciplinary backgrounds of 
senior interviewees in my study, a high proportion of whom were trained in genetics.  
 
I found that these routinely accepted forms of data sharing were conceptualised by 
interviewees as specific, both in relation to timing and data type. Each culture of data 
sharing in this category seemed to have its own locally developed expectations, 
whether these were of immediate data release, release upon publication, or release 
after an acceptable embargo period. What was viewed as open behaviour in one 
context would likely be viewed as closed in another, but within each context 
                                                     
97 Senior biomedical journal editor, prior career in biological science; interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
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acceptability had developed. Moreover, each expectation applied to a specific 
standardised data type, e.g. DNA or RNA sequence data, microarray data, or Protein 
Data Bank files. Interviewees in this category only brought up these kinds of 
standardised data types in relation to data openness, but upon questioning it emerged 
that some of them produced other data types that they did not expect to share. For 
instance, alongside their open genome data, Jenny’s lab produced “tonnes and tonnes 
of mapping data” – physical mapping of sequences to chromosomes, in the form of 
photographs. Jenny was positive about the idea of publicly archiving this data, partly 
due to its “voluminous” nature which made it difficult for her to store; indeed, a 
collaborator had investigated archiving it in processed form. However, she did not 
view release of the original mapping data as feasible due to the absence of a 
specialised repository. Moreover, she described feeling no top-down pressure to do so 
– “quite the reverse, nobody seems to care at all”. Likewise, Henry routinely uploaded 
sequence data, but also – it emerged – produced image data: histology results. Henry 
reflected that “it would be really cool if that kind of thing could be shared”, and had 
briefly looked into it, but had become too busy to go further.  
 
Jenny and Henry’s accounts illustrate the specificity of their disciplines’ data sharing 
norms; non-standard data were invisible in the interview discussion until I asked. This 
in turn illustrates the constitutive role of digital infrastructure in data openness: the 
norm of sequence data sharing was built upon the availability of sequence databases 
(Strasser 2019). Although generalised data repositories now exist, they clearly do not 
play an equivalent role, especially for scientists habituated for many years to format-
specific data-sharing. Jenny and Henry were in part positive about sharing other data 
types because they envisioned practical and epistemic benefits, such as being able to 
offload storage of huge files, and visualise their data in new ways through sharing 
platforms. This suggested an attachment to data sharing grounded in contextual 
functions and conveniences – like those that arose from sequence databases – rather 
than a generalised embrace of open principles. 
 
Additionally, scientists who accepted sharing norms for certain data types were not 
necessarily comfortable with sharing a layer of more “raw” underlying data. This 
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emerged in an interview with Ben98, who described the reaction in his genetics-
associated field when journals began requiring greater depth in data sharing: 
“So in genetics now a lot of the larger journals are requiring you to 
not only deposit your DNA sequences on GenBank and public-access 
databases, but also all of your raw data, your genotype data, so every 
measurement from every individual at every DNA marker, to be put 
online […].  And that was a bit of shock to a lot of people - it was like, 
you want my data as well?! That's my data.” 
Ben indicated that this detailed form of data sharing was now routine in his field, 
albeit avoidable in certain journals. However, his account highlights the 
conditionality with which data sharing was accepted in his field; extension of the 
principle across context was uncomfortable. Neil99 alluded to a similar transition in 
crystallography: “once upon a time people would perhaps make the PDB [‘just a list of 
coordinates’] available but wouldn't bother uploading their diffraction data [‘the 
raw…the experimental data’]”. It is possible that data sharing norms established in the 
1980s and 1990s to some extent eased the acceptance of extensive data openness in 
certain fields in the 2000s, but Ben shows that such transitions may not be easy. This 
may be linked with a rise in the interrogative function of sharing increasingly “raw” 
data that unveils more of one’s scientific process, and imperfections. This reflects 
shifting connotations of data openness in the 2000s, as transparency, reproducibility, 
and trustworthiness come to be seen as functions of openness, alongside resource-
building (see Section 5.5.2). 
 
Moreover, a routineness of data sharing did not eliminate friction or competitive 
tension. Interviewees reported deviations and ambiguity in relation to apparently 
long-accepted norms. For instance, Ben indicated that for genome sequencing 
projects, epistemic ownership and the readiness of data for release were negotiated 
boundaries. An example of this is what he called a “typical land-grab”: 
“If you say you're sequencing the genome of a species, a wildlife 
species. And everyone will benefit from having access to that genome 
once it's published, and everyone's thinking: for my research it would 
be really helpful to get a genome. If someone says, "well I'm 
sequencing the genome of this", that's basically saying - I'm doing it, 
                                                     
98 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
99 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Nov 2017. 
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so don't bother [laughs]. You're stamping your...you know, you're 
claiming some territory.” 
He went on to describe how a genome project, once announced, may be delayed for 
years for reasons that are opaque from the outside. The promise of openness acts as 
an ownership bid, granting a period of closure during which the data producers make 
private judgements about the readiness of sequences for sharing. According to Ben, 
an extended approach of this sort risks frustrating the community and may lead to 
duplicate attempts. It is, however, “open” compared with an unannounced approach: 
“some people are very quiet about what they do, and you don’t know anything about 
it until they’ve published a paper.” This negotiation of openness as a social as well as a 
material act has echoes through centuries of the history of science (see Section 3.4.2.1, 
Historical example of openness and closure in practice). Today’s data sharing norms 
are not, therefore, free from the social context and tensions that operated in science 
even prior to contemporary competitive pressures.  
 
Additionally, some large-scale genetic projects involve more explicit forms of closure: 
David100 spoke of consortium projects that “have no choice but to share data” but 
nonetheless insist on “complete secrecy” prior to this point due to competitive and 
commercial interests (“we actually had to sign documents […] undertaking not to 
disclose information to any outside group”). On a smaller scale, Roger101 was involved 
with the sequencing of a genome that was embargoed by a collaborator, who “felt 
strongly that we would lose out” due to competitors “siphon[ing] off the low-hanging 
fruit”. This suggests that data-sharing norms established around the turn of the 
century are applied flexibly across communities producing genomic and related data 
types – and in some cases they have broken down, or never been established. 
 
 
                                                     
100 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Dec 2017. 
101 PhD 1980s; interview: UK, Jan 2017. 
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7.6 Scepticism and unease: defensive reactions to data 
openness 
 
In contrast – upon first impression – with the familiarity and acceptance shown by 
interviewees in genetic and crystallographic fields, there was a smaller group of 
scientist interviewees [4, or 10%] who reacted defensively to the idea of data 
openness, showing frustration, scepticism, and unease. This did not mean avoidance 
of the topic: most of this group highlighted it early on, indicating salience. For 
instance, as part of his initial response to my openness prompt, Ernie102 commented:  
“There's this new thing coming along where - wanting people to make 
all their data open. But that's, in my opinion, particularly groups of 
people who sort of have an axe to grind and don't think about - really 
about how what they're arguing for will impact many other people…” 
Ernie’s reaction was strong, immediate, and strikingly defined in relation to an 
opposition group. Jude103 similarly raised the issue early, expressing disquiet: 
“Okay, so the general public's paid for these data, but I have real 
problems with, you know, so a lot of grants and so on say okay you've 
got to dump your data in a central database...immediately you get 
them. And I think that does no one any good because you need to 
know a lot more about acquisition of the data, the care with which it 
was acquired, and the way the systems works…” 
Jude followed with other concerns about data openness: that a “big lab” will mine the 
data faster than his “two-man operation in Australia”; and that online data may not be 
provided in good faith – he knows researchers who hold back selected sequences to 
maintain a competitive advantage. He occupied an embattled position on the topic, 
defending on both epistemic and personal fronts: his concerns about the online data’s 
completeness, integrity and validity – what use is it anyway? [paraphrased]– come 
alongside a threat to his own scientific enterprise – this feels unjust and risky.  
 
 
                                                     
102 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
103 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
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Jacqueline104 reacted with a more quizzical tone, but similar concerns: 
“It's very hard work, getting your data and whatnot, and I find it 
curious on some of the things they've…obligations now to archive 
data, for example. And I find that really fascinating. Because most of 
the time, you're doing an experiment, you're going to have very 
particular conditions that you impose or that you use, so the data are 
not necessarily going to be all that useful in a direct sense, to 
somebody else, unless they're doing the exact same measurements 
[…] So I don't have a problem with publishing it [the data], however, 
here's the rub: we spent the last three years getting these data 
together, working very hard, we now see that this set of data can be 
used in several ways to address these questions and we want to get it 
out there. Once we've published it, we've lost control of it.” 
Once again, personal and epistemic objections were combined: the injustice of 
working hard only to lose control was expressed together with doubts over the 
scientific purpose and validity of data sharing. Conceptually, Jude and Jacqueline’s 
accounts imply that open online data may lack integrity and usefulness to others, and 
also pose a competitive threat to themselves105. A conceptual interpretation, however, 
may miss the point. Ernie, Jude, and Jacqueline’s accounts show how some scientists 
perceive the idea of data openness not as an opportunity or solution, but as a 
nuisance and a threat. Competitive, even ruthless behaviour is expected from others; 
protection of data is normalised; and trust in a wider community is low – sharing is 
“losing control”. Epistemic objections are perhaps rationalised secondarily to these 
existential concerns (which is not to invalidate them). In particular, Jude and 
Jacqueline indicate that their data are difficult to separate from their context of 
creation, a circumstance that is likely to occur when research settings and data types 
are less standardised. Together with Ernie’s objection that advocates of data openness 
do not think about impacts on “other people”, there is a hint that scientists who react 
defensively feel that “open” expectations are being imported, without empathy, from 
data contexts in which sharing is easier. 
 
                                                     
104 PhD 1980s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
105 This seemed like a conflict to me, at face value: if the data are not useful to others, how can 
they be provide a competitive advantage? I then realised this was not a binary: interviewees 




The observations in this section, although they apply to a small number of 
interviewees, are consistent with other evidence that a significant proportion of 
researchers react negatively to the prospect of data openness. Some advocacy 
documents suggest these ideas should be approached cautiously, perhaps with 
language that de-emphasises openness and sharing (see Section 5.3.9). Moreover, 
Danny Kingsley106 spoke vividly on the topic: 
“We do not use the term "open data" anymore. Because it's very, very 
poorly received by the research community. When we first started 
talking to the research community about open data, my colleague 
who has a wonderful turn of phrase […] she said: we were speaking to 
them, and they were throwing the rotten vegetables at us! [laughs] It 
was true! I mean, not literally. But they were yelling, a lot of them. 
Like, very emotional.” 
She goes on to explain that researchers were troubled by the organisational state of 
their data, having not expected it to be widely visible. To address this, her team 
adopted a “research data management” framing, reasoning that data well managed 
from the outset is not embarrassing to share: opening up is just one small, extra step. 
However, the interviewee accounts above suggest that this could be just one of several 
uneasy aspects of data openness.  
 
7.7 Contextualising uneasy reactions 
 
Further dimensions emerged as interviewees expanded on their uneasy reactions to 
data openness. As Ernie’s account continued, it became clear that the practice he 
objected to took a particular, relatively radical, form: 
“…people who are arguing that all - basically lab books, all lab books 
should be electronic. At one extreme there are people who are arguing 
that the content of those electronic lab books should be made 
accessible to anybody at any time - to everybody, basically. Right 
from the moment they're created.” 
Ernie’s concern was thus not necessarily about mainstream, commonly mandated 
data openness practices, but as he put it, the “extreme” end: what is sometimes 
labelled open notebook science (see Sections 1.2 and 5.4). He envisioned requests for 
                                                     
106 Head of Scholarly Communication, University of Cambridge; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
203 
 
all his data – and upstream ideas, notes, and other lab book contents – to be public; 
and for it to be released in real time, before publication. It became clear that more 
conservative and regularly practised forms of data openness – release upon 
publication of associated datasets – might be perfectly acceptable to him. Indeed, he 
talked about having uploaded his raw data into a journal’s data viewing tool, after 
publication, and his comfort with sharing data underlying a specific published result: 
“I don't have any problem with giving people access to the raw data, 
but I think that people should have access to the raw data that's in 
the publication, and that's backing up what's in the publication.” 
With statements like these, Ernie’s discomfort with data openness was contextualised, 
and his attitude could be viewed as one of conditional acceptance. 
 
However, it remains notable that Ernie began with the extreme case, and his strongest 
possible objections to data openness. Viewed cynically, this could be interpreted as 
hyperbole that avoids engagement with more limited forms of sharing. Notably, 
however, the extensive openness which Ernie opposes is in line with the techno-
utopian visions of some advocates (e.g. Bartling and Friesike 2014b; Nielsen 2009). 
Ernie, and other interviewees, seemed to conceive of and experience open science as a 
rolling frontier in the same way as it has been framed, and has developed, as an 
overarching movement (see Chapter 5). Although open access and open data are the 
only practices currently widely mandated in UK and to an extent, Australian contexts, 
recent policy and advocacy documents suggest that interest in extending open 
requirements further, including to unpublished articles and data, and methods (LERU 
2018; SSAC 2019; Tennant et al. 2019). It may be that the expansiveness of “open” – 
both conceptually, and in policy – has a role to play in the oppositional stances of 
some scientists, who expect to be asked for more and more (data) openness, and 
perhaps eventually for unlimited access to ongoing scientific processes and ideas. 
Ernie likened extreme openness to the conditions of a “totalitarian society”. 
 
Similarly, Jude’s concern that a large laboratory could take advantage of his data was 
associated with the idea of immediate data release. When I asked him about data 
sharing with, or after, publication, his attitude changed: “I think with publication, yes, 
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there's very few things I would say shouldn't be shared […] as long as the lab that did 
it has first access to the data.” Jude was even happy to consider data release prior to 
publication, upon acceptance, if publishing priority for the data producers could be 
arranged. This latter condition shaped his views strongly. Receiving this credit in “the 
system” was seen as crucial in a competitive environment where data, and the funding 
to produce it, is hard won. Like Ernie, Jude placed himself in opposition to those who 
ask for data openness not because he objects outright to making data available on 
publication, but because this request may presage demands for immediate openness – 
and the need to defend his “little lab that has worked its butt off for a year”. Jude’s 
expectation of immediate data sharing might have been derived either from utopian 
visions constructed by open movements, or more established expectations of 
immediate sharing for large-scale sequencing projects – his field overlaps with 
genomics, so he may have directly encountered the latter. However, he did not 
mention the community etiquette – asserted through the Fort Lauderdale Agreement 
– that was intended to address concerns about priority in a genomic context of 
immediate data sharing (Wellcome Trust 2003). It may be that, inside or outside 
genomics, Jude’s community does not uphold any such norm. His views underline the 
importance of publication as a boundary before which data openness is seen as a 
particular threat, especially in the absence of a community consensus protecting a 
sense of fair play for data producers. It is notable that the UK Concordat on Open 
Research Data (HEFCE et al. 2016) suggests that such a consensus should apply across 
disciplinary contexts, but how it can build the trust required in communities is 
unclear. 
 
Jacqueline’s position is also interesting to examine in context. It emerged that one of 
her research projects already required data sharing. She was therefore expecting, after 
completing data collection, to upload a “massive dataset” to a project-associated 
archive that allows gradual, publication-associated data release:  
“…it's a simple matter of putting an embargo on it, as we're working 
through papers in various areas and then as we submit those, as 
those papers become published then we just open up the portal.” 
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Jacqueline framed this practice as appropriate and non-threatening. Although she 
remained sceptical that her data would be useful to others working in different 
contexts, she gives consideration to the possibility: 
“You'd probably get more out of reading the paper than you would of 
looking at these numbers in an archive […] But, I don't know, maybe 
someone will find that useful. I don't have a problem with it.” 
Again it was striking that Jacqueline expressed unease about data openness before her 
conditional acceptance – and actual practice – of data openness emerged. As for Ernie 
and Jude, her conditional acceptance hinges on the post-publication timing of data 
release, and the practice she adheres to seems designed to ensure that researchers 
that they will not “lose control” – that they will be able to gain credit for their hard 
work. Despite the emergence of conditional acceptance, initial negative reactions 
signal a lack of trust in advocates’ and policymakers’ visions for open science. For 
these scientists, data openness is constructed as a promise of something more radical: 
that science will change in ways that transgress familiar boundaries, threaten 
epistemic integrity, and remove a sense of control. 
 
Ernie, Jude, Jacqueline and Steve107 (whose account also fits this category) have in 
common that their disciplinary identities – cell biology, zoology, ecophysiology, and 
plant biochemistry – are outside, or only partially overlapping with, domains in which 
online data sharing traditions have been established. It seemed that in these fields, 
data sharing is not supported by a community consensus that might make it easier for 
individuals. Moreover, these interviewees seemed to deal with different modes of 
knowledge production, and different data types: data that may be more laborious, 
proportionally, to produce; larger in size (thousands of microscope pictures, in Ernie’s 
case); non-digital; and more difficult to interpret outside its context of production. 
Ernie expected that sharing his data “in a comprehensible way” would take months of 
extra work that he could not imagine his funder supporting. Jude and Jacqueline 
portrayed their data production circumstances as so specific and entangled that data 
lose integrity and meaning as they travel. Although open and FAIR data discourses 
emphasise the need for rich metadata (Wilkinson et al. 2016:4), they also emphasise 
                                                     
107 PhD 1980s; interview: UK, Nov 2017. 
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standardisation, and not all contexts can be communicated in this way: subtleties 
such as “the care with which [data] was acquired” (Jude), for instance. As a result 
“open data” is likely imbued with assumptions from settings in which both research 
conditions (e.g. laboratories) and data types (e.g. nucleic acid sequences) are more 
standardised and digitised, with commonly assumed context, lower costs of curation, 
and more digital infrastructure support. Scientists working in less standardised 
settings not only encounter greater barriers to data openness, but face the implicit 
suggestion that their way of working is suboptimal – even less scientific – because it is 
more difficult to “open”. Advocacy, policy, and academic literature has reckoned to an 
extent with this diversity: there are repeated warnings that a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach to open data must be avoided (HEFCE et al. 2016; Levin and Leonelli 2016; 
The Royal Society 2012). My interviews underline the importance of these warnings, 
and show that scientists anticipate one-size-fits-all before its enforcement. Ernie, Jude 
and Jacqueline anticipated norms from other fields being applied to them, and 
expressed resistance.  
 
The four interviewees in this category were all senior and well-established in their 
fields, having received their PhDs in the 1970s and 1980s. The unease in their 
reactions might partially be about a dislike of disruptive change, but it cannot be 
reduced to this. These scientists’ views were based on experience accumulated over 
decades in particular community contexts and interwoven with knowledge of how 
data interact with local competitive and collaborative dynamics. The following 
sections show how their reactions differ from those of many other interviewees, but 
also how they are not alone in experiencing data openness as unsettling. 
 
7.8 Passion and principle: embracing data openness 
 
A third category of reaction to data openness is best characterised neither as 
familiar/conditional acceptance, nor as unease: a significant group of interviewees 
[about one-third] expressed actively principled or passionate attachments to data 
openness. These interviewees tended to bring the topic up early on, and to construct 
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openness in science largely in relation to data practices and related methods. They 
tended to discuss the topic extensively: for several, it shaped the whole interview. The 
meaning of data openness as constructed by these interviewees reflected the breadth 
of post-2000 open science movements (see Chapter 5), rather than the more specific 
ambitions of data sharing as developed in genomic or crystallography contexts. 
Although passion or principle united these “open” attitudes, they seemed to emerge 
from diverse sets of values, both within and between individuals. Unlike acceptance of 
data sharing in genetic fields, which was context-specific, the interviewees in this 
group tended towards a holistically positive attitude, not only towards different forms 
and contexts of data sharing, but towards a wide range of additional “open” practices. 
This did not mean an absence of sensitivity to timing and extent of data sharing in 
relation to publication. Some of these interviewees were speaking more of 
hypothetical than actual practice, due to limitations in circumstance, or an early 
career stage. And, strikingly, most of these interviewees were early in their careers: 
they tended to have been trained since the 2000s, and many were PhD students. The 
few more established scientists in this category were also established as open science 
advocates. 
 
7.8.1 Software principles 
 
One route by which an attachment to data openness seemed to develop was software 
culture. Elliot108 spoke about being “indoctrinated” into the ideals of open source 
software by his brother, and then seeing its benefits in his field of molecular and 
computational biology. A new generation of sequencing technology was introduced in 
his area that required computational expertise for data analysis; computer scientists 
were recruited and brought open source software and methodologies with them. 
According to Elliot, the analogy between software and data then became compelling: 
“So then people were like well if all the software's open, why shouldn’t 
the data be completely open as well? Why shouldn't everyone be able 
to use all of the data that’s being produced in all these papers?” 
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He was far from alone in making this connection. Mat109, an organic chemist and 
advocate of open science, had built his laboratory’s entire approach around the 
analogy: “we’re trying to mimic the way people make open source software and we’re 
trying to apply that to the discovery and development of new medicines”. Mat’s 
approach includes, but goes far beyond, open data: it is open notebook science, in 
which ongoing details of experiments, and collaborative discussions, are online and 
public-facing. The historical and ideological influence of software cultures upon 
developing open science movements is discussed in Sections 4.10 and 5.3.3, and seems 
particularly significant in the data context. 
 
7.8.2 Transparency and reproducibility principles 
 
 A software-influenced framing of data openness is in turn associated with a valuing of 
transparency and reproducibility. As open source software inherently reveals its inner 
workings and allows them to be reproduced and modified, it resonates strongly with 
certain scientific ideals: that good science should be reproducible, in part because its 
processes are transparent. These ideals have received particular attention since the 
2000s, as high-profile concerns have been raised that swathes of scientific results may 
not be reproducible – the “reproducibility crisis” (see Section 5.3.2). This discourse 
shapes visions of open data and open science, which are seen as remedies. The value 
of transparency and reproducibility was also upheld by interviewees strongly attached 
to data openness. Elliot’s focus on software and data, for example, was introduced 
through the frame of transparency: 
“What first comes to mind [re: openness in science] is the 
transparency of everything that you do. So that’s transparency in all 
the methods that you carry out, and transparency in the results that 
you publish, about what you show to other people.” 
Madison110 also spoke predominantly about data openness, introducing it in relation 
to transparency and reproducibility, with connections to code and method sharing: 
“… what comes to mind for me [re: openness in science] is that it's 
very transparent, that scientists are quite upfront about sharing what 
                                                     
109 PhD 1990s; interview: UK, Apr 2019. 
110 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Jan 2019. 
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they did and more and more like their actual data. So I think that’s 
how I've thought about it a lot recently because there's a really big 
trend toward sharing the data and sharing code and sharing methods 
and that kind of thing, rather than – and also reproducibility as well, I 
think probably, or with an aim toward reproducibility.” 
For Arthur111, reproducibility shaped his earliest encounters with “open” in science, 
which also occurred as he moved from a chemistry background towards biology:  
“…the other thing that came across when I first got into life sciences 
was reproducibility, like the reproducibility process, so it’s openness 
in the context of that. I have a friend who's actually at [an open 
science institute] […] And they write a lot about openness in science 
and how you make science more transparent and how to make it 
more reproducible. So yeah that's where I really first encountered it.” 
This mode of attachment to open data, which extends into broader “open” visions, 
was framed as a principled pursuit of good, rigorous science. This finding has clear 
implications for my sensitising concept of epistemic virtue (see Section 2.2.1), and I 
discuss it further in the final chapter (see Sections 9.3.2 and 9.4.2). 
 
7.8.3 Public duty principles 
 
Another factor motivating strong attachment to data openness was a principle of 
equal, democratic access for all, including the lay public. This perspective 
overwhelmingly shaped Jason’s112 self-declared passion for openness in science: 
“So when I think of openness in science I’m thinking of free access to 
data. So data generated from a project. I’m thinking, and by free I 
should say free of cost and free of restriction113. You don’t have to be a 
member of a university research group to access it. You’re a member 
of the public and you can access this material.” 
For Jason, open data and open access blended together as an information domain that 
should be public-facing due to taxpayer investment. This also connected with what he 
                                                     
111 PhD 2010s; interview: UK, Jul 2018. 
112 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Nov 2018. 
113 Notably, where “unrestricted” in an open advocacy context usually refers to libre licensing, 
Jason defined it as access across institutional boundaries. This was consistent with near-
absence of licensing for re-use as a feature of openness in scientists’ accounts: Mat and Elliot’s 
accounts, which explicitly discuss software–science analogies, were telling exceptions. This is 
striking given the prominence of licensing in advocacy and policy literature as well as in 
interviews with advocates. 
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describes as his “naïve” and “idealist” perspective, developed from childhood, that 
science should be accessible to the public e.g. through museums. These values blend 
with Jason’s conviction that scientists produce better knowledge when their access to 
resources is improved: 
“I believe that the more scientists especially that have access to 
research data, resources, publications, the better your science will be, 
the more efficient it’ll be and the more innovative it will be.” 
This, again, brings epistemic virtue to the fore, but based on ideals of cumulative, 
progressive science rather than reproducibility (see discussion in Sections 9.3.1 and 
9.4.1). Jason brings reproducibility into his view as well: he runs a website that hosts 
publicly, freely accessible datasets for researchers in his field, and he only includes 
datasets he thinks meet standards for reproducibility.  
 
Publicly oriented attachments to data openness were less common than those focused 
on scientific integrity. However, another notable case was Greg’s114: as Editor-in-Chief 
of an open access journal, he had witnessed an extension of “open” from publications 
to data, and highlighted both reproducibility and the public interest as reasons to 
pursue data openness: 
“…since then [early days of open access] it's also grown into this idea 
about data accessibility, and open data. And I think that that's 
enormously important as well, I think that that's helping combat the 
problem in rigour and reproducibility that we're facing in science. 
And I think that it lets people who aren't necessarily part of this big, 
expensive machine that we have at universities and companies, 
participate, by looking at data, and analysing it post-hoc, […] it 
includes more insight by broadening the community of people who 
use it.” 
His response also hints at “opening” of science–society boundaries, in which scientific 
data is not only accessible, but begins to be shaped and diversified by interests 
outside of institutional science. Openness as an orientation to publics framed Greg’s 
entire response, which was rare in the interviews. Significantly, a public orientation – 
in both accounts – led to the categorisation of data openness as an obligation only for 
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publicly-funded science. Private science was viewed separately, a distinction that did 
not feature in other modes of attachment to data openness (see also Section 8.5.5). 
 
7.8.4 Collaborative and personal principles 
 
Attachments to data openness also emerged in connection with collaboration and 
personal scientific integrity. These aspects seemed not to drive attachment to data 
openness in themselves, but to be important secondary aspects for some interviewees. 
In this case, data openness was valued not only as an act of opening or sharing, but as 
an ongoing practice, integrated into scientific life, that anticipates openness. Data was 
imagined through others’ eyes – the eyes of the public, collaborators, and even one’s 
future self. For example, Madison115 told me that whenever she thinks about her 
datasets, she tries to think about “how would I feel about just making them public”. 
She goes on to describe how this kind of mind-set shapes her data practices: 
“…[data openness] makes me be much more stringent and 
reproducible of my own data and my own code and everything […] I 
try and design the datasets themselves so that they're not very 
specialist just in my eyes, that someone else would understand them 
[…] as transparent as possible and as transferrable as possible […] 
Like, even for myself, if I needed to do another type of analysis on the 
data, it's much more helpful if they're […] very easily formattable and 
very clean data […] I think that’s been the biggest thing is thinking 
about well what would it take for me to just put this in a publicly 
digestible format, and try and work backward from there. And also 
generally just make sure that I'm setting up my workflows so that my 
data is both for me and potential collaborations…” 
This practice of reflective self-discipline is reminiscent of a Foucauldian “technology 
of the self”, a concept that Daston and Galison (2007) invoke to explain how an 
epistemic virtue – objectivity – operates at the level of the scientific self, integrating 
into habits of the body and mind. Thus, a clue is offered as to how openness as an 
epistemic virtue might operate on this level, connected with the pursuit of 
transparency and reproducibility, as well as accessibility. Madison portrayed openness 
with collaborators as on a spectrum with public openness, and had become familiar 
with collaborative data sharing via her lab’s regular practices. Her data practices 
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occurred in the context of feeling ownership over her data, which gave her confidence 
to initiate and negotiate collaborations.  
 
Olivia116, another PhD student, described going to extra lengths to prepare her data 
for sharing. She wanted to publish in an open access journal with an open data policy, 
and her data required anonymization. Like Madison, Olivia framed this not as an 
imposition but as an opportunity for professional self-improvement: 
“…I think on a personal level it’s good for people to be able to 
reproduce your work easily and see the work that you’ve done and be 
able to criticise you. If people can get access to your code they can get 
your data and they can say: oh well you could have done this better, 
and you can learn from it and definitely improve as a scientist.” 
Again, this framed openness as an epistemic virtue, operating at the level of the 
scientific self: simultaneously an improvement of knowledge, and knower. Olivia also 
described, during an undergraduate project, voluntarily keeping an extensive lab book 
because of a sense that if her work was not recorded properly, she would not be able 
to share discoveries. She described having an “engrained feeling about it” [her 
emphasis], driven by “really wanting to become a scientist”. Olivia thus constructed 
scientific identity according to a sense, both rationalised and subjectively felt, about 
good knowledge-making, which was expressed and reinforced it through disciplined 
data practices, with a view to making knowledge shareable. This is vividly reminiscent 
of Daston and Galison’s (2007) portrayal of epistemic virtue in the context of 
objectivity, which also attends to scientists’ note-keeping practices (pp. 244-245); in 
Olivia’s portrayal, objectivity and openness are related (see discussion in Sections 
9.3.2 and 9.4.2). 
 
7.9 Contextualising principled and passionate reactions 
 
Principled and passionate attachments to data openness, operating via diverse sets of 
values, were often expansive in scope, sometimes connecting with overarching visions 
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of openness in science, including of open software, methods, and laboratory 
notebooks. However, these attachments were not independent of context. Most 
notably, immediate data release was only rarely considered definitive of openness: 
openness in the final stages of a project, following publication, or even several years 
later, was more typically assumed. For instance, the data openness that Jason117 
passionately advocated would occur, his view, well after a project is finalised:  
“…I won’t release any of my data until after a year, until after one 
year from my analysis. So I give myself a year to do the work on my 
own stuff, then I release it, which I think is reasonable.” 
He went on to reason that an embargo of about five years would be appropriate for a 
five-year project. This would be viewed as an extended delay in many fields, but in 
Jason’s field of palaeoanthropology, embargoes applied by senior scientists sometimes 
extend for decades. Molly118, who was also in favour of data openness, distinguished 
between data directly supporting a publication and a wider dataset. The former she 
expected to be open with or soon after publication; the latter could be released a 
couple of years later, “to make sure you’ve published all of the things that you were 
aiming to publish from it”. The latter was a necessary compromise, in her view, 
between furthering her career, and furthering science via data openness. All of this 
was hypothetical to Molly, however: her PhD data were generated by others in remote 
field contexts; her access was conditional, achieved through long-term negotiation, 
and did not allow re-sharing. It was from this context that Molly envisaged any form 
of data release – even after a couple of years – as opening up.  
 
Elliot119 also strongly endorsed open data, code, and methods. He saw these as means 
to “good science” – an epistemic virtue framing – on two counts. Firstly, having 
himself learned from others’ openness, he saw holding back as “stopping some 
actually other good work being done”. Secondly, he saw holding back as “like saying 
you’re never going to do any good work again” – a reliance on exclusivity of past work 
for one’s scientific reputation, rather than ongoing work. Again, this embrace of 
openness was anchored by an assumption that any data released were already 
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relatively finalised and readily attributed to their producer, thus not at significant risk 
of “scooping” by competitors: “you're already kind of finished the project once you're 
required to be quite open about what you're doing”. In contrast with Jason and 
Molly’s accounts, however, this did not mean to Elliot a delay of years or even waiting 
for publication. It meant online dissemination, e.g. posting a preprint, or putting up 
software on Github. However, he considered the effect to be similar: “…your name is 
already attached to them. So you can already claim that it was your work if that’s 
important to you.” His confidence contrasted with the worries about scooping that he 
saw as prevalent amongst more established colleagues, for whom openness about 
process could mean “throwing away” work. An acute generational–disciplinary shift 
may be at play here. Elliot describes the arrival of computational expertise and culture 
into his field as recent; his established colleagues may value data, code, and methods 
differently, having trained in a different epistemic culture. Elliot’s confidence that he 
will receive recognition for online and pre-publication modes of dissemination may 
be shaped by his immersion in a computational field with high digital literacy and 
open source values.  
 
In contrast to these cases, Mat120 took a fully “open source” approach: his lab’s data, 
and the process and discussions surrounding it, were made publicly available “in real 
time”, prior to publication. Many other interviewees viewed such an approach as 
prone to scooping, and Mat acknowledged that others “don’t want to reveal their 
competitive advantage […] I get that”. However, he seemed unconcerned himself 
about this type of professional threat as he described to me his open principles, and 
their epistemic and societal benefits. As the interview went on, it became clear that 
Mat had, as a side effect of his unusually open and innovative approach, changed the 
competitive dynamics of the field in which was operating:  
“…if you’re working on a problem and you manage to attract in a few 
people who are able to contribute to that project, that you generate a 
momentum which is quite tough to beat.” 
Instead of competing, Mat gained a secure position by collaborating so extensively – 
his project was open to any interested party – that the traditional element of 
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competition was virtually eliminated, or made ineffective. Through his approach, Mat 
had established networks, including in industry, and a professional and public 
reputation that was invulnerable to the competitive dynamics negotiated by the 
majority of scientists. This demonstrates not only how certain contexts make open 
principles and practice more comfortable; but also how open principles can 
participate in creating such contexts. 
 
The cases above show how principled, passionate attachments to data openness are 
closely intertwined with contexts that tend not to be initially apparent in interview. 
Just as defensive responses could become conditionally accepting as context changed, 
principled attachments seemed to be eased by the contexts in which they were held. 
Timing was clearly critical: those who were defensive were reacting to expectations 
that data openness would be required before publication; those were principled and 
passionate tended to assume that post-publication release – even years later in some 
cases – was acceptably open. Underlying this dynamic seemed to be an issue of 
control and security: defensive accounts anticipated a loss of control as data openness 
was imposed; but positive accounts implied a sense of control and choice. Although 
all responses were rationalised, the affective qualities of both positive and negative 
reactions suggested to me that a sense of control manifested at an emotional level and 
could be a primary influence on the embrace or rejection of data openness. I 
conceptualise this observation further in the following section, and in Table 6 and 
Figure 6. 
 
A final set of interviewee responses made a connection between the poles of defensive 
unease and principled attachment: some interviewees described fear and vulnerability 





7.10 Vulnerability: feeling the fear and doing it anyway121 
 
Melanie122, a principal investigator who trained in the 2000s, recalled being “super 
worried” about releasing data on long-term ecological projects she had worked on. 
This was especially the case for her PhD data: 
“…I mean I think at the beginning, you're just like...[laughs] so the 
first dataset I collected was a big one, as a PhD student – and I 
worked so hard on those, like multiple years, out every weekend, and 
then like...when I published the first paper on that series, they were 
like "okay well we'd like you to publish all the data". And I thought w-
...I had like three or four other papers on that dataset, and so...it was 
just something that we hadn't talked about openly as a part of our 
lab. Like... I wasn't ready for it, right? I didn't know, and so I 
completely freaked out and I thought like well...I didn't want someone 
else to take the data and analyse it in these ways.” 
The emotion depicted in this response is acute: feelings of shock, not being ready, 
“completely freak[ing] out”, and a need to be protective. This is comparable to the 
uneasy, defensive category of interview reaction, but is Melanie’s reflection upon 
experiences and feelings in her scientific past. She described having “evolved” to a 
position of principled acceptance of data openness: “…there's such a big push to make 
things open and accessible, and I think the downsides are really like, small compared 
to the positives.” She also described data openness as “better for the field and for 
science”, and a duty in the context of public funding. She pointed to embargoes of a 
year or two, or the release of limited datasets for individual articles, as acceptable 
ways of managing openness for large, long-term datasets.  
 
Melanie’s account is notable not only because she portrayed a transition from a highly 
defensive position to an accepting one. Her initial and later experiences reveal 
contextual factors that may have primed her defensive feelings initially, and those 
which later eased her embrace of data openness. Firstly, her fear about releasing her 
PhD data was linked to her personal and scientific relationship with the data. From an 
instrumental perspective, her data resulted from an extensive investment of time and 
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effort and was highly valuable professionally – the basis for a whole series of papers. 
And at that particular moment in time, during her PhD, its value was heightened by 
her reliance on it for establishing an academic career. Because of the way data are 
gathered in her discipline, over long periods of time in the field, a new dataset would 
not be just around the corner. This is very different from Elliot’s scenario, in which he 
could suggest that reliance on past “locked up” work was like “saying that you’re never 
going to do any good work again”. Moreover, more was at stake than instrumental 
value. Melanie had invested herself personally in the data with years of embodied 
labour, her leisure time, her care and attention, and even her love; she described her 
relationship with her discipline as a “match made in heaven” and her “scientific love”. 
Especially at a formative time in her scientific life, this investment – that closely 
blends the personal with the scientific – imbued her data with exceptional value. The 
loss of these data to a competitor would not just be a professional blow, but a 
personal wound. Finally, Melanie encountered the requirement for data openness – 
via a journal policy – unexpectedly, without supportive communication from her 
seniors: “it was just something that hadn't talked about openly…”. This might have 
contributed to her panic, as she could not draw on time or social resources to gain a 
sense of control.  
 
Melanie’s eventual acceptance of data openness seems to have been aided by key 
contextual changes. Firstly, she became established in her career: this alone would 
make her less reliant on any one dataset, and more resilient to professional risks. 
Secondly, she began to collect data in different ways: not only from the field, but from 
laboratory experiments that yield smaller and shorter-term – less personally 
entangled – datasets. Thirdly, she described having supportive discussions with other 
scientists in her current institution, including those who collect long-term ecological 
data. There was some indication that these conversations allowed risks of data 
openness to be articulated, put into perspective, practically managed, and emotionally 
processed. She had somewhat detached from her former worried self: the concern 




Luke123, an evolutionary biologist in his first postdoctoral position, also spoke of 
overcoming fear in relation to data openness (see the opening vignette, p. 190). 
However, he articulated a different category of data-related risk, and one that was 
ongoing rather than in the past. From the first time I asked about openness, Luke 
underlined his dedication to open practices, following immediately with: 
“Which makes you feel quite vulnerable: like whenever I publish a 
paper [accompanied by open data/code] I’m terrified I’m going to get 
an email within like a month with someone saying you’ve done this 
all wrong and you need to retract the paper…” 
His identification of this experience as vulnerability is illuminating, because it frames 
openness as a state of emotional and professional exposure – as well as an exposure of 
scientific information – that leaves one susceptible to emotional and professional 
harm as well as growth. This again depicts an entanglement of data with the person 
producing it, evoked in Melanie’s account. 
 
The harm the Luke feared – as well as the benefit he pursued – was not scooping, but 
the exposure of his scientific process, and the unveiling of potential errors: 
 “…it is scary and it is, like sometimes when I’m falling asleep I’m like 
oh shit, what if someone finds a huge mistake? Because I’m talking 
2000 lines of code and if I’ve got one letter wrong it could completely 
change the result […] Like that paper came out last week and I think 
as long as I’m doing something I don’t worry but there is always this 
fear. And then it always flashes up, so if I’ve had people email me 
about my work to ask a question and sometimes about the analysis 
and that’s when the fear comes again. You’re like oh crap, are they 
emailing me to say this all wrong?” 
His recollections were viscerally frank: vulnerable, terrified, anxiety, interrupting sleep, 
huge mistake, fear flashing up, is this all wrong? Luke’s disclosure of these emotions 
could be a window into the experiences of many scientists as they consider opening 
their data to the world. Feelings like these may well contribute to rationalised 
objections and defensiveness, which could also be understood as attempts to avoid 
vulnerability. Luke’s account was remarkable as a case of conscious reckoning with 
vulnerability: he knew how he would feel; he sometimes wanted to retreat; yet he 
engaged with it repeatedly – and had done so in the week prior to the interview. He 
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saw openness as a route to the improvement of science and scientists: better for a 
mistake to be corrected than for his anxiety to prevent that. He was also motivated by 
having conducted a meta-analysis through which he encountered refusals to share 
data by scientists who seemed to have everything to gain – “they would have got full 
acknowledgement, they would have been cited, and it would have furthered the field 
that they work in, yet they still wouldn’t help”. This experience prompted Luke to 
embrace a whole spectrum of open practices, suggesting that his commitment to 
openness had become identity-defining: a distinction between himself and those 
whose closure had been epistemically and socially uncaring. He also described 
rewarding consequences of openness: forming new professional connections, being 
able help other researchers, and understanding his own work better. 
 
Luke’s attachment to data openness was clearly deep and principled, as indicated by 
his willingness to endure intense episodes of vulnerability. But again, contextual 
factors add another layer to the story. Firstly, Luke was not fearful about scooping: in 
fact, he viewed preoccupations with scooping as “ridiculous”. He described with 
frustration attempts to coordinate research plans with a former supervisor – “to stop 
us doing the same thing” – that were blocked due to the latter’s fear of being scooped 
(including by Luke himself). However, Luke described his own experiments as “so 
massive that no one could reproduce them”: they take a year or more, even with 
several scientists working together. Additionally, they involve some resources that are 
“only available” in the local area. Thus, Luke’s principles took form in a research 
context that was protected from some competitive pressures. In contrast, he 
described his former supervisor as having been “scooped in the past”, trained in a 
competitive environment, and “really unlucky with grant proposals”. Although such 
differences in attitude and behaviour cannot be reduced to contextual factors, the 
context is illuminating. It suggests that career experiences – particularly early, 
formative experiences or adverse events – as well as career security, shape whether 
scooping comes to be seen as genuinely threatening, or as a preoccupation of the 
paranoid. Impressions like these became detached from context in scientists’ 
accounts, and seemed to be part of a long-term, internalised feeling of security or 




A second context influencing Luke’s account – in common with Melanie’s case – is 
social support. Luke described feeling strongly supported by the principal investigator 
(PI) of his group and his local academic community. Moreover, openness was 
modelled and actively pursued in these social relationships. Luke’s PI was a close and 
established support base; he also supervised Luke’s PhD, in a research group that 
began with just two of them. Luke described the group atmosphere as laid back and 
social: a place where everyone can “just chat”, but also a place where his career 
ambitions are actively recognised and facilitated. Luke described his PI as the 
opposite of his previous (Master’s) supervisor: open (interpersonally rather than 
online; see Chapter 8) and unworried about scooping, having established his career 
studying long-term data from a remote field site. Luke also described his local 
academic community as exceptionally social and supportive: 
“Every day at [time] we go for coffee, and there’s a communal coffee 
pot. So anyone who’s salaried buys bags of coffee and we make 
cafetières and share it and you just sit for half an hour and chat 
science […] And then […] everyone goes for lunch as well. And it’s 
really social. Yet [nearby institute] […] they don’t come to coffee and 
stuff. So it’s a real community within [building].” 
Help and collaborative opportunities were offered cross-hierarchically in his building; 
it was the opposite of feeling “on your own”, which Luke had experienced in a 
previous (Master’s) research environment. Luke also observed an influence of this 
“community spirit” on his behaviour in other contexts, such as conferences. 
Additionally, he was close to his PhD cohort – they would discuss issues including 
data openness on WhatsApp – and was part of a journal club that reviewed preprints. 
This exceptionally strong web of community support could be expected to anchor 
Luke’s openness in myriad ways. Firstly, the collaborative, interpersonal openness 
practised by his PI and community seemed to provide a foundation for, or at least to 
align with Luke’s online openness practices. Secondly, Luke himself identified early-
stage interpersonal openness as a way to avoid scooping, by allowing competing 
research plans to diverge, or even to become collaborative. Finally, even if openness 
caused him harm, Luke would know he is not “on his own”: his PI and community are 
likely to build his confidence, allowing him to embrace vulnerabilities that may feel 
dangerous to the isolated. And should anything go wrong – a mistake is exposed, or 
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he is scooped – he knows that he has a personal and professional safety net, a 
community that is likely to affirm his scientific integrity rather than shame him for 
being open to critique and competition. 
 
7.10.1 Caring for data with closure and openness 
 
There is an interesting difference between Luke and Melanie’s accounts that relates to 
affective and caring dimensions of scientific knowledge-making: these themes have 
been studied in various settings (e.g. Kerr and Garforth 2016) and theorised in STS as 
“matters of care” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2011). While both Luke and Melanie spent 
formative years of their careers gathering large datasets, Luke did not portray the 
scientific labour and data itself in affective terms, where Melanie strongly evoked her 
labour of care. The narrative differences are of course influenced by the particular 
vulnerabilities that Melanie faced and Luke did not, and their personal – perhaps 
gendered – modes of expression in interview. Luke did, however, portray the affective 
labour of openness vividly. An intriguing interpretation would be that Luke cared for 
his data through his practice of openness, where Melanie cared for her data by 
protecting it – an extension of her care in creating it. Conceivably, Luke’s 
internalisation of openness as an epistemic virtue meant that the best way to care for 
his data was by opening it to the world for feedback and correction, despite the 
anxiety this could cause, rather than caring for it alone. This lens might be applied to 
other accounts as well, both from my interviews and elsewhere, wherever affective or 
other forms of labour are undertaken in order to uphold openness as an epistemic 
virtue; and conversely, where data are cared for through an avoidance or delay of 
openness. The latter case may not only arise from a need to control risk, or due to 
practical barriers: other epistemic considerations might conceivably be cared for by 
delaying openness, such as a cautionary rigour (e.g. Madison: “I worry about 





7.11 Conceptualising scientists’ relationships with data openness 
 
Identifying vulnerability in scientists’ accounts helped me to understand relationships 
with data openness as complex and entangled with the self: not simply a matter of a 
positive or negative attitude. Unease and fear were experienced by those who 
embraced data openness as well as those who resisted it. I have also shown that 
context is key in these differential responses, which are not just a matter of emotional 
processing. Circumstances differ widely: some projects are especially vulnerable to 
competition, where others come with unique materials, resources and networks. 
Some scientists occupy secure positions, where others are fighting to build or 
maintain their careers. Data openness can not only create vulnerability to scooping, 
but introduces the vulnerability of exposed scientific processes. Exactly which 
vulnerabilities apply in any circumstance is variable, and multiple dimensions of 
vulnerability interact: e.g. those who feel competitively secure may be better placed to 
accept other forms of vulnerability. A feeling of security and control can be gained in 
the short term – e.g. by protecting data until publication – but can also be a deep-
seated disposition shaped influentially by e.g. experiences of community, or formative 
events, in early training periods. Interviewees tended to dissociate their sense of 
security or insecurity from the contexts that shaped them, leading to the surface 
impression that attitudes to data openness are individual preferences, or at most, 
alignments to disciplinary culture – rather than complex, specific responses to past 
experience, present circumstance, and future expectation. 
 
To make sense of these interacting influences, I present in Table 6 a summary of the 
contextual factors that seemed to promote or lower a sense of control or vulnerability, 
based on the interviews. I made these observations not only in association with data 
openness, but with the topic of Chapter 8, interpersonal openness, since the two 
categories evoked related forms of vulnerability. In the table I distinguish short-term 
factors (controllable by actions, e.g. waiting until after publication to open data); 
medium-term factors (often relating to current research, e.g. resourcing); and long-
term factors (often relating to community and the shaping of the self, e.g. social 
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support). Medium- and long-term factors were not clearly separable and played 
different roles according to circumstance.  
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Table 6 | Based on interviews, factors that seemed to be linked with higher and lower feelings of control 
or security, influencing whether data openness was experienced and/or tolerated as a vulnerability.  
Higher control  
(lower vulnerability) 
Lower control  
(higher vulnerability) 
Short-term factors – often actions/behaviours 
Openness after credit for work is 
secured, usually via publication  
Openness before credit for work is 
secured, typically pre-publication 
Only sharing data that underlie a specific 
published work 
Sharing extensive datasets that could 
underlie several publications 
Only sharing specific data types, e.g. 
sequence data, that are routinely shared 
according to community norms 
Sharing every type of data produced in a 
research project, including those to 
which community norms do not apply 
Sharing processed or summary data 
Sharing “raw” data that reveal more 
process and potential imperfections 
Medium-term factors – often related to current research project 
Highly-resourced data production and 
analysis that are difficult for others in the 
same field to achieve 
Low resourcing, e.g. smaller team size, 
less access to equipment or facilities, 
lower research budget 
Privileged or exclusive access to a 
research setting, contextual knowledge, 
primary data, or methods 
The research setting, contextual 
knowledge, primary data, or methods 
can be easily accessed or replicated 
Low reliance on any one dataset; low level 
of labour per dataset; ease of obtaining 
new data 
High reliance on each dataset for 
recognition; high level of labour per 
dataset; difficulty obtaining new data 
Limited affective tie with data, or 
minimal caring labour required 
Strong affective tie with data, or 
extensive caring labour required 
Long-term factors  - often related to community, and shaping the self 
Trust in fair recognition by community, 
especially if openness is pre-publication 
(related to community norms, e.g. Fort 
Lauderdale Agreement) 
Lack of trust in fair treatment by 
community, expectation that others take 
advantage of data access to gain 
competitive advantage 
Low competitive pressures, possibly due 
to extensive or exclusive collaborative 
networks 
High competitive pressures and/or 
limited collaborative networks 
Social support by supervisors, PIs, peers, 
and/or local and extended communities, 
especially where openness is discussed 
and practised in these relationships 
Lack of social support by supervisors, 
PIs, peers, and/or local and extended 
community, or relationships in which 
openness is not discussed or practised 
Secure, established career or reputational 
position 
Insecure career or reputational position, 




I propose that issues of control and vulnerability are fundamental, and predispose 
scientists to highly variable reactions to data openness. Two other dimensions also 
seem to have a key influence. The first (i) relates to the contextual ease or labour-
intensiveness of making data open (see Section 7.7). The second dimension (ii) is the 
extent to which data openness is constructed as an epistemic virtue (see Sections 7.8 
and 7.10). In Figure 6, I visualise possible interactions of these influences that 
condition scientists’ likelihood of accepting or resisting a practice of data openness: 
this could serve as a starting point for further sense-making beyond this research. 
 
I suggest that combined medium- and long factors shape a scientist’s overall sense of 
control and vulnerability: a feeling of control predisposes acceptance of data openness 
practices, and vulnerability predisposes resistance. Certain data-specific factors (i) 
seem to modify these predispositions, but not radically: e.g. acceptance may be 
lowered, or resistance strengthened, by labour-intensiveness or lack infrastructural 
support. Reducing labour and adding technical support, however, cannot be expected 
to overcome vulnerabilities deeply ingrained in individuals or research settings. 
Individuals can gain control in vulnerable situations through short-term actions that 
limit their openness in specific ways (e.g. later timing of sharing). If they lose agency 
over short-term factors – e.g. due to policy requirements – these factors become 
vulnerabilities, and combine with other vulnerability factors. Scientists may also work 
around policy requirements in these situations to maintain control, e.g. by complying 
to a minimum required extent, or withholding contextual detail (see Section 9.3.2) 
 
Finally, I suggest that when data openness is pursued as an improvement to 
knowledge and knower (i.e. [ii] as an epistemic virtue), the interactions above are 
altered. Control/vulnerability remains important and may shape an individual’s 
likelihood of relating to data openness in this way to begin with. However, once such 
a disposition is internalised, it may change or even reverse the significance of other 
factors: a higher degree of vulnerability in the service of openness may be tolerated, 
and both vulnerability and technical labour may be re-cast as acts of care that 




Figure 6 | Visualisation of how the conceptual elements identified in the observations made in this chapter may interact. See previous page for commentary.
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7.12  Conclusions 
 
In this chapter I have analysed the second of three significant openness categories 
constructed by scientists in interview: data openness. This category and open access 
were comparably salient in interviewees’ accounts, and both were linked with a high 
salience in policy and advocacy discourse. The aim of this chapter was to make sense 
of the great diversity of practices, attitudes and emotions associated with data 
openness in scientists’ accounts, and to identify common patterns. 
 
One sizeable group of interviewees was familiar and accepting in their attitudes: they 
portrayed data sharing as routine and uncontroversial. The topic tended not to be a 
highly salient one for this group: although many brought it up, it was not usually their 
first openness-related interest. They tended to work with genetic or crystallographic 
data, and to be trained in the 1990s or before. I concluded that the concept of data 
openness, for this group, was probably shaped by digital data sharing discourses and 
norms dating to the 1980s and 1990s and applying specifically to sequence and 
crystallographic data (HGP Information Archive 1997; Strasser 2019). This was not a 
holistic orientation towards data openness, as is encouraged in more recent 
discourses.  
 
A second group of interviewees reacted with a distinctive unease and defensiveness to 
data openness. The topic was salient for this group, and raised early on. They 
presented a wide range of objections that brought together the epistemic and the 
personal. Data openness was variously seen as lacking in integrity due to its 
abstraction from context; not useful for recipients; excessively laborious; and/or 
competitively risky. However, beyond first impressions, it emerged that all of the 
interviewees in this category would be happy to share data under particular 
circumstances: when the data was associated with a particular publication, and – 
crucially – when that publication credit, was secured. Despite the potential 
acceptability of data openness to these scientists, they expected to have to defend 
themselves, and their scientific interests, against expansive or one-size-fits-all “open” 
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requirements. They did not expect to be shown empathy or given contextual 
accommodations to ease data openness in practice. Their research contexts likely 
shaped their objections: these interviewees tended to produce data that were less 
standardised and digitised, without links to decades-old data sharing norms. 
 
A third, sizeable group of interviewees showed a principled or passionate attachment 
to data openness that could be distinguished from familiar acceptance. Data openness 
was highly salient for these interviewees. The principles or passion driving their 
attachment were varied and included connections with open source software culture; 
transparency and reproducibility, and public duty. Many of these accounts framed 
data openness as an epistemic virtue. Interviewees in this category tended to view 
openness as expansive in a positive way: applicable to multiple data types as well as 
articles, methods, code, and more. In this way, the principled and passionate group of 
interviewees clearly reflected the influence of twenty-first century open science 
movements: their motivations were as diverse, their visions as expansive, and their 
attitudes as enthusiastic, as these movements. Moreover, nearly all of these 
interviewees had trained since the 2000s. This suggests that open movements are 
gaining deep traction with more recently trained generations of biologists, even 
though this trend has not yet stood the test of time. Moreover, data openness seemed 
to inspire this generation more profoundly than did open access to articles. However, 
the embrace of data openness was not context-free. Where those who reacted 
uneasily to data openness assumed the “worst” in terms of the difficulty and risk, 
principled and passionate interviewees assumed the “best”: commonly, that data 
release would occur after securing credit for work – sometimes after a significant 
embargo period. I identified a feeling of control and security (or lack thereof) as an 
underlying influence on ease or unease with data openness, and linked it with 
contextual factors such as trust in one’s community; resourcing; and career security.  
 
A final set of examples revealed a common thread between uneasy and enthusiastic 
relationships with data openness. Several interviewees reported worry or fear about 
data openness, but subsequently or simultaneously embraced it. Luke’s account 
helped me to make sense of data openness as a form of vulnerability: a state of 
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personal exposure, as well as an exposure of data, that entail susceptibility to 
emotional and professional harm as well as growth. The two main vulnerabilities 
scientists faced were competitive threats – the risk of scooping – and exposure of the 
details of scientific process. Both also carried opportunities for growth: e.g. through 
collaborative rather than competitive interactions; feedback; and corrected mistakes. 
In both cases, the scientist and their data were closely entangled in a relationship of 
care. This could mean – as in the case of Melanie’s PhD – that as data came to 
represent a labour of love, the prospect of its use by a competitor was felt to be both 
emotionally and professionally threatening. But when openness was embraced as an 
epistemic virtue, as in Luke’s case, it seemed to become part of a labour of love: a way 
to care for data – and to cultivate one’s scientific self – that may be difficult, but is 
ultimately worthwhile. Context – particularly a sense of security – made a crucial 
difference between these two scenarios. I identified a range of influencing contexts in 
Table 6 and conceptualised their interactions in Figure 6. 
 
An overarching finding from this chapter is the extent to which context matters in 
scientists’ relationships with data openness – and not only in the obvious ways such as 
ethical or commercial sensitivity, anonymity, or even generalised “disciplinary norms” 
(HEFCE et al. 2016). It also matters in ways that are unseen even by scientists 
themselves: complex interactions between the epistemic and competitive positioning 
of a research project; the networks and resources of a research group; characteristics 
of social relationships on individual and community scales; and the career-long 
experiences of each scientist that have helped them feel secure about opening their 
data, or have warned them to be protective.  It does, however, appear that more 
recently trained scientists are profoundly influenced by twenty-first century open 
science agendas, an influence distinct from earlier discipline-specific data sharing 
norms. Some are internalising data openness into their scientific identities, suggesting 
a potential for deep and lasting bottom-up culture change. However, scientists who 
are not supported through the vulnerabilities of data openness may remain isolated 
and disadvantaged in cultures that increasingly value data openness, both bottom-up 




It remains an “open” question whether polarised reactions to contemporary data 
openness will settle into a familiar acceptance, as have early data sharing norms. 
Strasser (2019) suggests that this is likely: he argues based on historical precedent that 
a general acceptance of data openness only develops when top-down rules are 
enforced and eventually become norms. Only time will tell, but my study suggests 
that contemporary data openness could be different. Its expansive character within 
open science lacks the boundaries which may have made earlier data sharing 
acceptable; and norms that support openness – e.g. etiquette about use of 
unpublished data – would need to be developed in many, varied epistemic cultures. 
Moreover, contemporary data openness is aimed not only at resource-building, but 
also at checking integrity: a far more vulnerable form of openness. However, an 
increasing embrace of data openness as an epistemic virtue may provide grassroots 
momentum, and a tolerance of “open” labour and vulnerability, that is difficult to 
create through top-down intervention: a changing of “hearts and minds” with which 
open access, by comparison, has struggled. The topic of the next chapter, 
interpersonal openness, adds understanding about the support or privilege that might 
be necessary in scientific communities for vulnerable forms of openness to flourish.
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Adam was the first person I interviewed for this research. When I 
asked him about “openness in science”, his responses were confident 
and relayed to me at speed, but reflective. Perhaps it was the time 
pressure of his executive-level academic diary; there also seemed to be 
a focused concern and care about the meaning carried by those 
words. My question seemed to fit into a narrative he understood 
implicitly. Perhaps because the conversation flowed smoothly, I didn’t 
immediately realise that he was saying something unexpected to me. 
Something that is not typically articulated in policy and advocacy 
visions of “open science”. I heard it more clearly once I had listened to 
several other scientists talk this way.  
 
“…when you ask me: what do I think of when you say openness? 
I think about the many scientists I have known 
and the way they approach how they communicate their work 
and when they communicate it 
and how communicative they are 
and what sort of discussions you can have with them. 
That's what I think about.” 




This third interview-based chapter is distinctive because it features a category of 
openness without foundation in advocacy and policy discourses. Nonetheless it was 
raised by scientists with a prominence and consistency comparable to open access or 
data openness. Interviewees had no shared, concise name for it. I have called it 
“interpersonal openness” to capture its clearest feature: it occurs in personal 
interactions between scientists. Typically these interactions are face-to-face rather 
than online, although they include socially bounded online settings such as email. 
They range in intimacy, interactivity, and formality from one-to-one conversations, to 
conference presentations, although they tend towards the intimate, informal and 
interactive. They occur in any space in which scientists mingle and communicate 
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about science with those beyond their immediate research group: meetings, 
conferences, cafeterias, visits to other laboratories, and social events. Interpersonal 
openness was distinctive partly because of its mundane, micro-scale qualities: it was 
integrated with everyday professional–personal conduct, and governed not by top-
down policies but by the instincts or intentions of individuals, and the norms of small 
groups. It emerged as a mode of openness entirely owned and operated by scientists.  
 
Interpersonal openness had characteristic features that emerged repeatedly in 
scientists’ accounts. Firstly, it meant communicating about science-in-the-making 
that had not yet been published, or perhaps even funded: current work, recent data, 
and especially ideas. This made it an acutely vulnerable, but also valuable, form of 
openness. Secondly it ideally meant talking freely or feeling free to talk: a feeling of 
honesty, freedom, flow, and excitement. Thirdly, interpersonal openness was 
associated with reciprocity: ideas were shared generously, but in the long term there 
was an expectation of epistemic, social, and professional rewards. Finally, trust was 
key: it both enabled and resulted from interpersonal openness, and structured the 
social networks through which privileged scientific information flowed. I explore and 
evidence these features of interpersonal openness in the first part of the chapter. The 
middle sections of the chapter explore interpersonal open-ness as a spectrum of 
intertwined attitudes and practices that is never entirely open or closed. A significant 
group of interviewees upheld interpersonal openness nearly unconditionally, arguably 
as an epistemic virtue with a close connection to their sense of scientific self. Because 
of the vulnerability it entailed, however, the majority of interviewees described 
making contextual judgements about how much to share – and especially, with 
whom. And for some, protecting ideas was the norm. 
 
The final chapter sections explore factors that enable and constrain interpersonal 
openness, many of which have also featured in relation to data openness. These 
factors include both circumstantial and systematic forms of security and insecurity. In 
the conclusion I reflect on the insights that interpersonal openness offers for open 
science movements and for my research questions. To begin, I describe the salience of 




8.2 The salience of interpersonal openness in interview 
 
Of the 40 scientists I interviewed, just under half [17] referred to interpersonal 
openness in response to my initial prompt: “What first comes to mind when you think 
about openness in science?”. Just over half [21] brought it up spontaneously at some 
point in the interview, and most [36] showed recognition of this mode of openness, 
whether they saw it as something to promote, negotiate, or avoid. These figures were 
somewhat lower than those for open access and data openness [respectively: 19 and 19 
raising at the initial prompt; 31 and 28 raising spontaneously at any time; and 40 and 
37 showing familiarity]. However, this was partly because those raising the topic 
tended to embrace interpersonal openness; those who recognised its dynamics while 
viewing it with ambivalence or caution were less likely to nominate it as a form of 
“openness”. Figure 7 shows how spontaneous mentions of the three main categories 
of openness overlap in interviewees’ accounts. It shows that interpersonal openness is 
somewhat set apart: a significant group [8] mention interpersonal openness but not 
open access or data openness in their first response, whereas there is a tendency for 
the latter two categories to be mentioned together. 
 
Figure 7 | Venn diagrams showing how the three main categories of openness overlap in interviewees’ 
accounts. The counts are of interviewees, according to whether they mention a given category of 
openness either (a) in their initial response, or (b) at any time prior being directly asked. Those who did 
not mention any of these three categories spontaneously are not shown, but are: for (a) 5, for (b) 1. Other 
categories also arose, but were less salient than these three. Made with a tool by Heberle et al. (2015). 
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8.3 “Openness in science” versus “open science” 
 
An important context to this chapter is that my choice of words in interview seemed 
shape the emergence of interpersonal openness as a salient category. I asked 
interviewees about “openness in science” because I reasoned that it would be less 
prescriptive than “open science”, a common phase in policy and advocacy discourses. 
This proved to be the case: there were a broad range of responses from inside and 
outside such discourses. But as the interviews progressed, I observed ways in which 
“openness in science” was not a neutral prompt. As well inviting many interviewees to 
talk about topics like open access, “openness in science” seemed for many to actively 
resonate with the phenomenon I now call interpersonal openness. I initially hesitated 
to make a feature of this, worrying the category might somehow be too loose, obvious 
or generalised. I was convinced otherwise by its quantitative salience, almost uncanny 
qualitative consistency, and captivating quality in many accounts. Those who raised it 
often spoke as if encountering a rare opportunity to articulate a deeply-held principle 
or hope.  Several took pains to distinguish it from open access or data openness as a 
more profound form of openness. Lest I conclude otherwise, Richard124 closed his 
interview with this reflection on “openness”, which he had defined interpersonally:  
“My feedback to you is that […] I think that the general concept of 
openness is much broader, and much more important, than the 
concept of open access itself. I think open access is a little thing. 
Openness is much more important.” 
Thus although interpersonal is at face value a broad, common-sense category, I began 
to take seriously its value to interviewees, and to explore its meaning. 
 
I also began asking interviewees about their impressions of the difference between 
“openness in science” and “open science”. The outcome was illuminating, and 
confirmed that the former tended to connote interpersonal or behavioural openness; 
and the latter, “open science” movements, practices, and policies. There were several 
other enlightening thematic distinctions. For example, “open science” tended to be 
associated with an extreme, ideal, or complete state of openness, whereas “openness 
                                                     
124 PhD 1980s; interview: US, Mar 2018. 
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in science” was more associated with a process of becoming open, a spectrum, or 
openness possible within current realities. Kate125 captured this: she described open 
science as “when you're there, when you've managed, when you're achieving science 
that's more open than what I'm currently achieving”. Openness in science she 
characterised as “when you're trying your best”.  
 
“Open science” was also associated with narrow or specific concepts or technologies, 
where openness was linked to an expansive set of values and behaviours. Greg126 put it 
as follows: 
“I think that "open science" sounds like a specific set of rules or, a 
specific...maybe for lack of a better word, movement. Right? I mean it 
almost sounds like CC BY127, or something like that, right? […] 
“Whereas "openness" is a perspective. It's an attitude. It's a set of 
behaviours.” 
Some interviewees connected open science with information outputs such as articles 
or data, where openness was associated with embodied behaviour and internal 
experience or identity. This meant a difference between performing open practices, 
and being open in an intentional, principled way. Erin128 commented:  
“…open science to me is: here’s the data […] it’s like something that 
you have to do. […] Openness suggests a process in which people are 
actively engaged and willing to be open […] you can still be someone 
who’s not an open researcher but that still puts their data online and 
still publishes their papers in an open access way but doesn’t ever 
engage in that openness.” 
These findings have implications for the construction of “open” or “openness” as an 
epistemic virtue, and for scientists’ engagement with these concepts: I discuss this 
further in Chapter 9. In sum, my choice of words was a fortunate methodological 
contingency because it gave interviewees space to talk about interpersonal openness: 
a less prescribed, more embodied form of openness that happens “when you’re trying 
your best”. In the following sections I characterise interpersonal openness as 
constructed by those who spoke passionately about it. 
                                                     
125 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Jun 2018. 
126 PhD 1990s; interview: USA, Feb 2018. 
127 CC BY is a licence widely asserted as a standard in open movements (see Section 5.2). 




8.4 Characterising interpersonal openness 
 
Interpersonal openness emerged from the very beginning of my interview process. 
Adam’s129 first thought about openness was not of articles or data, but of scientists 
and how they behave differently to one another: “how open scientists are at 
discussing their own work”, as shown in the quotation that starts this chapter. Adam 
was well aware of open access, and even of open notebook science, but highlighted 
interpersonal openness first – and tended to return to it after discussing other modes 
of openness. He portrayed interpersonal openness as a spectrum: 
“…you see a huge variation in that, you see schools of thought where 
you don't tell anybody anything until you've published it, you don't 
give talks about it in public, you don't discuss it with other scientists, 
you go as far as instructing your students and people not to discuss it 
elsewhere, because it is really important to you to be first […] and get 
maximum credit for it […] and there are those at the opposite extreme 
who will talk about everything.” 
Here Adam drew attention to features that would emerge repeatedly: pre-publication 
timing; settings such as public talks and private conversations; and group dynamics in 
which research leaders set norms for their students. He embedded qualitative, 
relational features in his characterisation: scientists’ approach to communicating; 
when they communicate; how communicative they are; what sorts of discussions you 
can have with them. Adam saw himself as open (“I’m someone who does 
communicate very freely”), and framed this as a virtue with both moral and epistemic 
overtones, closely tied to his sense of professional self and identity. He was motivated 
by a Mertonian-like “collegial, collaborative” view in which “we are working side by 
side, shoulder to shoulder with our fellow scientists, pushing back the barriers of 
science”. Adam described open interactions as enriching for both science and 
scientists, yielding “input and insights”.  
 
                                                     
129 PhD 1980s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
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Jenny’s130 prioritisation of interpersonal openness was evident from the outset, when 
she made a distinction between “openness in publication or openness in science”. 
This implicitly placed open access outside of “science”, and centred an interpersonal 
“openness in science”. This meant talking to other scientists in situations like 
meetings, and being completely frank – “no holds barred” – about current research 
and ideas. In an illuminating narrative, she described how she had developed this 
approach almost as a matter of necessity, but maintained it as a matter of principle. 
She characterised her formative career environment, in marsupial genetics, as 
relatively free from competition, making openness less risky: 
“I've been on the edge, most of my life, I haven't been sort of in the 
mainstream human genetics community or the mainstream mouse 
genetics community, and I'm generally not at risk. So I'm probably 
much more likely to be open about what I'm doing, what I'm thinking, 
because I don't have the same sort of competition as human 
geneticists and mouse geneticists.” 
In this setting, Jenny developed a habit of interpersonal openness that not only felt 
“easy”, but was advantageous for her career as it raised awareness of her non-
mainstream research organisms and contributions: 
“…I told my students and post-docs, you know, talk to anybody and 
everybody you possibly can because we need input and we also want 
them to know that what we're doing is actually relevant to what 
they're doing.” 
In this way, what may have begun as a personal intuition became a strategy for 
enriching her science, into which Jenny initiated her research group. She decided to 
continue this approach as an explicit “policy” under more competitive circumstances: 
 “I actually have made a policy that generosity pays. And for me and I 
think for our whole group, that has generally been the case, that we 
get much more by soliciting other peoples' opinion on what we 
actually care about and what we're actually doing, than we lose […] 
It only became a spoken policy much later when I think we observed 
that the world around us wasn't necessarily as generous with their 
sharing of ideas and data than, than we were.” 
                                                     
130 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Nov 2017. 
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Jenny did not underestimate competitive risk – her group had “been burnt, two or 
three times”, but she had learned from formative experience that openness was 
rewarding, productive, and led to reciprocity: “discussions that are very real”. 
 
Ernie131 also began by distinguishing “openness in publishing” from “openness in how 
you interact with others”. He delighted in the latter: 
“…one of the things I enjoy most about science is going to meetings 
and visiting other places and talking to people about my work and 
having them talk to me about their work. And people who are 
constantly playing a game, that you know - you show me yours and 
I'll show you mine, and I'm only going to show you - I'm going to 
figure out how much what you told me is worth and I'll show you that 
much - I mean that's a drag. So I cultivate relationships with people 
who I trust and then we just talk freely about ideas…” 
Once again, it was the exchange of ideas in face-to-face settings, around which 
interpersonal openness was evoked. Ernie placed emphasis on trust: it was the 
foundation for a “free” exchange, a condition upon which Adam and Jenny appeared 
less reliant. This may be linked with the “very competitive and not always particularly 
friendly” communities in which Ernie was embedded; Adam in contrast occupied a 
“supportive” community, and Jenny had experience with both “extremely nasty” and 
“incredibly friendly” communities. In a competitive environment, Ernie’s 
interpersonal openness involved the creation of trusting spaces and relationships in 
which the risk of sharing was mitigated. His openness was with selected people in 
order that the interaction itself could be unconditionally open and free: a reciprocity 
that was, like Jenny’s, generous rather than calculated. Palpable in Ernie’s account was 
joy: interpersonal openness was both personally and epistemically fulfilling, 
underpinning his attachment to science and his identity as a scientist. 
 
Accounts like these were as common as they were compelling. Interpersonal openness 
was portrayed in positive terms as the most obvious, important, or relevant form of 
openness in science by an additional nine interviewees, as follows: 
                                                     
131 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
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 Andrea’s132 first thought on openness was “talk, talking to people, sharing.” 
 For David133, “openness is sharing information before the story is complete” 
when “meeting people and just talking about what we're doing”. 
 For Mark134, “openness is the generous sharing of ideas”. 
 For Julia135, openness meant “talk[ing] about your work as it develops”. 
 For Lena136, the “most prevalent” form of openness in science was “openness 
about what I'm doing, to others, at conferences”. 
 For Miriam137, “openness is more right at the beginning and the 
conceptualisation of the work […] So open, in terms of collaborating”. 
 For Nicole138, openness was about collaboration, and “the ability to freely talk 
about what you're doing, and idea share…”. 
 For Richard139, openness meant “the extent to which individuals within a 
community, research groups within a community, share their results 
informally, with each other”. 
 And for Steve140, “what first comes to mind would be feeling free to talk at 
meetings about work that hasn't been published yet”. 
In addition to Adam, Jenny, Ernie, and the group above, were interviewees who raised 
interpersonal openness spontaneously but with less emphasis or in negative terms, 
and interviewees who did not raise the topic but spoke about it with familiarity and 
sometimes enthusiasm. The following sections are an exploration of the features of 




                                                     
132 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Oct 2018. 
133 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Dec 2017. 
134 PhD 1980s; interview: UK, Feb 2017. 
135 PhD 2000s, interview: UK, Jun 2018. 
136 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Apr 2018. 
137 PhD 2000s; interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
138 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
139 PhD 1980s; interview: US, Mar 2018. 
140 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Nov 2017. 
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8.4.1 Pre-publication ideas: valuable and vulnerable 
 
Publication was a highly salient temporal boundary in relation to interpersonal 
openness, as it was for data openness. Being open interpersonally meant sharing 
before publication: “before the story is complete” (David); as work “develops” (Julia); 
“right at the beginning” (Miriam); and “work that hasn't been published yet” (Steve). 
For interviewees embracing this practice, sharing new, unpublished work was seen as 
the purpose of a conference presentation. This view was so strongly held by some that 
they viewed presentations of published work – or work holding back unpublished 
details – as professionally unacceptable, disrespectful to the gathered audience, and 
epistemically obstructive. Both Adam and Richard characterised their response as 
deep “irritation”, and Mark also expressed frustration. Richard commented:  
“I just think that is not good behaviour […] it serves nobody's interest 
other than the person who is talking about it to try and advance their 
own personal ends […] it sucks up time in a public setting. And fails 
to actually serve the purpose of communication. No real valuable 
information about biology is communicated. […] I don't like it, I avoid 
it, I never do it myself - and I call it out whenever I see it - and I try 
and encourage all of my students and colleagues to not do that.” 
Conference presentations were thus key settings in which interpersonal openness was 
established as a pre-publication behaviour, as well as moralised as an epistemic virtue.  
 
Beyond this, interviewees tended to associate interpersonal sharing with informal, 
interactive settings, and the exposure of information that might not be ready to 
present at a conference. In short, much of interpersonal openness was about sharing 
science-in-the-making: “what I'm doing, what I'm thinking” (Jenny). This included 
not only new data, but ideas: abstract, malleable epistemic elements that may be a 
long way from manifesting as a research process or paper. Miriam distinguished these 
stages of research and made it clear that early, interpersonal openness was 
particularly meaningful for her in comparison with open publishing: 
“…I think publishing is the end of the work […] I'd like to think that 
openness is more right at the beginning and the conceptualisation of 
the work […] So open, in terms of collaborating […] I would consider 




Interviewees who embraced interpersonal openness often seemed to do so because 
they found it valuable and enlivening to discuss science that is not yet settled: to 
expose their conceptual processes to feedback in in a rewarding, interactive, creative, 
collaborative, social setting. Some even directly characterised this as a definitive part 
of doing good science and being a good scientist. As Adam put it:  
“…to be open and to communicate and to have a free flowing 
exchange of ideas and criticism is much more healthy, and 
environments of how science – the best science – is done.” 
Here once again, interpersonal openness – of an interactive, intimate kind – is 
characterised as an epistemic virtue. 
 
Ideas were portrayed as extremely valuable in two interlinked senses that lay at the 
crux of their role in interpersonal openness. They were materially, professionally 
valuable because they were foundations for future grants, data, and publications: the 
currencies of academic science. Ernie told me: “The fact that I can convince people 
that my ideas are better than other people's ideas, is how I get grant funding.” For this 
reason, Ernie saw it as important to be careful with his ideas: to share them with 
trusted parties, but not publicly or online. Mark portrayed his wealth of ideas as so 
materially advantageous to his laboratory that he need not worry about being 
scooped. He embraced a “generous sharing of ideas” in interpersonal settings: 
“It's partly because I have the resources, but also a couple of my ideas 
are sort of, big, in terms of their number, and types of experiments 
that they open up, and so I can have my ideas, share them, and people 
will be able to pick up and run with them and it doesn't matter, 
because my students are doing experiments that nobody else can do, 
because we're so many, we're quite a few years ahead […] in some 
ways ideas are easy, but they're also still valuable.” 
In this way, ideas not only held promise of future career security, but could amplify 
and reinforce existing professional advantage.  
 
As well as their material value, ideas were portrayed as acutely valuable personally. 
There was an implication in multiple interviews of a deep link between ideas and 
scientific identity: ideas were expressions of an intimate, imaginative epistemic self, 
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and the generation of ideas gave meaning and purpose to doing science. Ernie spoke 
directly and eloquently of their personal value: 
“What I own, and nobody else can have, are my ideas. They come 
from inside my head, I generate them through the happiness and 
misery of my life, that's where the ideas come from. When I 
graduated university, I was going to be an artist I wasn't going to be a 
scientist. But I found that the process of designing beautiful 
experiments actually satisfied the same creative urge in me, but I do 
have sort of an artist's view of ideas - that ideas are really critical, and 
they're unique, and they come from your soul. And other people don't 
own them. So even in a totalitarian society - you just can't make 
people share ideas. I'll share my output. I'm happy to share my 
output, but my ideas are mine.” 
Ernie’s impassioned language underlined the value of ideas: he placed them at the 
core of his internal life, his “soul”, as expressions and nourishments of a self that is 
both artistic and scientific. His “output”, in comparison, was far less personally 
entangled. Ernie also portrayed idea generation as essential to his scientific existence: 
“If I can't have my own ideas, then I should retire. 'Cause what 
science for me is about is the creative process of having ideas, and 
then seeing if you can figure out a way […] to see if they're true or not. 
That’s what the fun is.” 
Thus for Ernie, sharing ideas was not only materially risky, but existentially 
vulnerable: a baring of his soul. This aligned with the trust-based selectivity of his 
interpersonal openness, and the strength of his aversion to online, open notebooks. 
The suggestion that he might be forced to reveal an interior domain of ideas was felt 
as a violation of his most basic freedoms. Ernie recalled devastation when one of his 
“best friends” and closest scientific confidantes took advantage of his trust by writing 
a grant to compete with him: “I felt that I was stabbed in the back”. This vulnerability 
also aligned with his joy in interpersonal openness in a trusting context. 
 
Cedric141 also aligned his identity and success as a scientist with the production of 
ideas: “I have a very poor memory, which I argue is why I've been, to some extent, 
successful in science - because I don't get bogged down by the facts…I can have ideas”. 
                                                     
141 PhD 1960s; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
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He drew on an essay by the philosopher Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox 
(1953), to evoke two intellectual personae defined by their approach to ideas:  
“…the hedgehog has one big idea, and pursues it relentlessly. And the 
fox has many ideas, and pursues them as and when, and follows his 
or her nose, and finds the whole world exciting.” 
Cedric identified both himself and influential mentors and colleagues as foxes, and 
placed great value on prolific idea generation, despite an assertion that hedgehogs are 
more traditionally successful in science (“I think of my friends who focused more and 
more on one topic, and have won bigger and bigger prizes”). He linked these personae 
directly with interpersonal openness and closure, suggesting that hedgehogs, with a 
limited set of highly developed ideas, “keep it all to themselves”, whereas foxes, with 
their profusion ideas, “want to share the stuff they're doing because they find it all so 
exciting and interesting”. Nonetheless Cedric, like Ernie, portrayed ideas as part of an 
intimate interior domain that cannot be shared involuntarily: 
 “…in the end, we all keep our ideas to ourselves. Until you can 
download what I'm thinking, you have no idea what's gone on in my 
head, what's going on in my head, and what I'm storing there.” 
Here the generation of ideas again emerged as an experience and aptitude anchoring 
a sense of scientific self, and connected with an embrace of interpersonal openness. 
 
Other interviewees also alluded to the generation and sharing of ideas as deeply 
constitutive of scientific identity. For Melanie142, sharing ideas interpersonally was so 
enlivening and essential to a sense of scientific purpose that she accepted a concrete 
risk of her ideas being used by others: 
“I mean I tend to be super open. 'Cos, I just feel like […] not 
expressing what I do, and ideas and sharing - that's my favourite part 
of science, so if I didn't do it I don't think I would stay in science. But I 
mean I've been burnt on that several times, where you know, you talk 
about ideas so freely then someone else does them. But whatever, I'll 
come up with more ideas. I'm not too worried about that. I always 
think if I get to the point where I can't share them, then I would leave 
- just leave science. So I tend to be an over-sharer, probably. But I just 
get so overexcited, it's so fun to talk about the process, and new 
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results, and interesting ideas and stuff. So I tend to be very open with 
colleagues. And I encourage my students to be as well.” 
Again, ideas – and particularly the ability to share them – sustained Melanie’s 
scientific identity. She inhabited the fox persona described by Cedric, and echoed 
Mark’s notion that ideas can be both valuable and easy. Lena143 similarly felt able to be 
open because “we have plenty of ideas”. She also spoke of ideas as outcomes of 
interpersonal openness – not just conversational inputs that that are critiqued, but 
conceptions that emerge “non-linearly” from interaction: 
“…if you don't talk to people, you don't get as many ideas […] I get 
ideas from very, very different kind of people and conversations. I 
start a conversation with someone, about a scientific project, and end 
up getting something useful for a completely different project. So it's 
non-linear, how you get useful information.” 
This generative quality of interpersonal openness was implied in other accounts. Julia 
suggested that it could occur partly within the self, through the act of interpersonal 
sharing: “I’m quite extroverted, and I realise that I develop a lot of my ideas by 
talking”. The notion of “bouncing ideas off” others in conversation was also part of the 
generative quality of interpersonal openness. 
 
Collectively, these accounts show that the value and vulnerability of idea-sharing are 
closely interlinked. As abstract, malleable concepts, they are often far upstream from 
being realised as academic currency in the form of a grant or publication. As a result 
their authorship is not established and they are vulnerable to seamless acquisition by 
others. In this sense ideas were more vulnerable than unpublished data: they are 
further from being realised, and less traceable to an origin. For the same reason, 
sharing ideas was seen by some as especially valuable: an opportunity for imaginative, 
critical input at a formative stage. Ideas – and the process of generating them – were 
also closely linked to scientific identity, as expressions of a creative interior self. This 
meant idea-sharing could be akin to baring one’s scientific soul – but its rewards 
could be great for the same reason: an opportunity to share an exciting, purpose-
affirming process of idea generation with others. This observation connects with 
Parker and Hackett’s (2012) notion of “hot spots and hot moments”: “places and times 
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of high emotion, creativity and performance where transformative science is done” (p. 
39). 
 
8.4.2 “Talking freely” and “freedom to talk” 
 
Interviewees used similar language in descriptions of interpersonal openness, the 
clearest example being repeated use of “talk” and “free”: “feeling free to talk at 
meetings about work that hasn't been published yet” (Steve); “freely talk about what 




“Talk” perhaps coincidentally described both of the main contexts of interpersonal 
openness: conference presentations and face-to-face conversations. It was also 
employed by some as a shorthand for open sharing, as if to suggest that there is 
something honest or revealing about talking in comparison to less embodied or more 
formalised modes of scientific communication. For instance, Andrea spoke first of 
“talk, talking to people, sharing” when I asked about openness: she saw “talk” was a 
means to compensate for the omissions or obfuscations of published science, for 
example in methods sections. Jenny emphasised the value of meetings at which 
“…people will talk about what they're doing and what they're thinking, that there'll be 
discussions that are very real”. “Very real” suggests talk without artifice or inhibition: 
talk that cuts through noise, and perhaps has the intimate, creative, interactive 
qualities evoked in the previous section. Jenny described an admired colleague’s 
response to competitive environments as “talking more, not less”. The implication 
that talk should be open and honest was also present in the moral conviction that 







The use of “free” to characterise interpersonal openness was also recurrent. It implied 
expansiveness, spontaneity and sincerity in disclosures and interactions, as well as 
communicating a feeling of agency and unshackling. Jenny used the wrestling 
metaphor “no holds barred”, implying a rule-free and perhaps intensely interactive 
and exposing approach. “Free” was also associated with “flowing”: Adam advocated 
openness as a “free flowing exchange of ideas and criticism” and Mark spoke of a “free 
flow of ideas at conferences” as essential. “Flow” again suggests a quality of 
communication that is unrestricted: not held back, partial or polished, but lively and 
spontaneous. It also evokes the psychological concept of a “flow state” or being “in the 
zone” (Csikszentmihalyi 1990) which could describe the enjoyable, absorbing process 
of idea generation. When ideas are shared and this process becomes a meeting of 
minds, “flow” suggests not only an inhibited conversation, but one in which social and 
epistemic boundaries become less distinct, and ideas can mix and re-emerge anew in 
unpredictable ways, free from preoccupations about ownership or calculations about 
a degree of openness or closure. In some accounts, “free” was used to emphasise an 
unshackling from competitive pressures: not just freedom within talk, but freedom to 
talk. Ben144 commented that at early stages of research, “…you’re a bit careful about 
who you share your ideas with. In a free way”. The openness that Steve145 evoked was a 
liberty to talk about unpublished work, with an implication this is not always the 
case; Nicole’s146 aspiration to “freely talk” about what she was doing was a response 
the competitive culture of her field, in which she did not feel that freedom.  
 
8.4.3 Reciprocity: “generosity pays” 
 
Embedded in idea-sharing, free-talking openness is a dynamic of reciprocity. 
Interviewees spoke about an “exchange” of ideas, and some described this further. A 
common feature was that reciprocal openness was not expected to be transactional, 
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i.e. repaid in an exact and proportional way, in a single interaction or relationship. For 
example, Ernie disliked “playing a game” in which you “figure out how much what you 
told me is worth and I'll show you that much”, preferring instead to establish trusting 
relationships so that he could share freely, without calculation. Interviewees 
characterised this reciprocity as “generous”. Taking an open approach was expected, 
on average, to prompt openness from others, making it more than worthwhile in the 
long term. Occasional exploitation of openness was seen as possible or even probable, 
but tolerable in light of overall benefits. Jenny’s “generosity pays” policy was based on 
this premise: “we get much more by soliciting other peoples' opinion on what we 
actually care about and what we're actually doing, than we lose”. Cedric’s equivalent 
of ‘generosity pays’ was “enlightened self-interest”:  
“The more open you are with other people, then hopefully the more 
open they will be with you. And the more you will both be able to 
move forward, in a meaningful and interesting and exciting and 
innovative - which is what science is all about in the end - way.” 
Both of these concepts mix virtue – “generosity” and “enlightenment” – with ego-
centred interests: blending of what is good for others, and for science, with what is 
good for oneself. This view was not only asserted by established scientists. Olivia147, a 
PhD student, told me: 
“…people have this sort of element of: oh, if you’re not going to give 
me anything then I shouldn’t give you anything and keeps this very 
closed off mentality within science. But actually if you go out there 
and say: oh you can have this, then quite often you get something 
back. Even in ways that you don’t expect I think. Other doors open to 
you. That’s a big part of openness.” 
David148 asserted these principles with particular directness: “if you give, you get”. He 
saw it as important to “give away” ideas without an expectation of reward, as this 
upheld collegiality and a “common good” – and because it was personally rewarding 
in the long term. If you are “somebody who shares ideas”, you can expect to receive 
them: the reciprocity of openness was connected with personal character. 
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Cedric’s choice of words echoed Kohler’s (1999) characterisation of the open, co-
operative moral economy of early twentieth century Drosophila research: “The 
custom of exchange mixed altruism with enlightened self-interest, bringing 
substantial benefits…” (p. 254). Although “enlightened self-interest” is an established 
phrase, Cedric’s use of it carries the suggestion that interpersonal openness operates 
as a moral economy (a trade in “symbolic more than economic values”, ibid., p. 249). 
Interpersonal openness as characterised by interviewees certainly shares more with 
model organism moral economies (see Section 4.9) than with twenty-first century 
“open science”. Twentieth century model organism communality typically operated 
within bounded social settings, depended on reciprocity and trust, and eased the 
sharing of ongoing work (Kelty 2012). “Open science” foregrounds no-strings-
attached, universal sharing. It is possible that the prominence of interpersonal 
openness in my interviews is promoted by the cultural influence of model organism 
communities in biological science, as generations of biologists have moved through 
such cultures. But for interviewees, interpersonal openness tended to operate as a 
diffuse moral economy through networks of like-minded individuals and or small 
communities; it did not seem to characterise large communities or epistemic cultures. 
 
8.4.4 Trust, collaboration, “circles of trust”, and trust technologies 
 
8.4.4.1 Trust as a foundation for interpersonal openness 
 
Trust was a major theme intersecting with interpersonal openness. For many 
interviewees, trust was a necessary foundation for interpersonal sharing, because of 
the vulnerability of sharing ideas. This seemed to be why, in a “very competitive and 
not always particularly friendly” field, Ernie cultivated trusting relationships in which 
to talk freely. Whilst Ernie implied that he would actively establish trust in order to 
share, many others portrayed their openness as a response to existing levels of trust 
that differed across relationships. Michelle149 told me: “…people who you trust and 
know well, you might be open to […] if you're just chatting someone at a conference, 
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you might give vague outlines but not specific details. And completely open with 
collaborators…”. Many interviewees spoke of adjusting their interpersonal openness 
contextually in this way (see also Section 8.5). Ben150 summarised this approach: 
“…I think you make judgement calls on a case-by-case basis, whether 
that be to do with the state of the development of the work you're on, 
the actual project you're working on […] but usually actually the 
person. If you trust the person, and you see them as someone that 
you'd quite like to collaborate with, then you talk to them about what 
you're doing […] But there are people out there who I wouldn't tell 
stuff to, because I don't trust them.” 
Likewise, Miriam151 emphasised a person-by-person, trust-based approach: 
“...it's about the people, actually […] within the people who are good, 
there are going to be people who you want to work with or people you 
don't want to work with, and talk to things about […] with experience 
you figure that out […] people you trust, you can be open with…” 
Navigating trustworthiness within communities was portrayed as an important skill 
by many interviewees, and included circumspection around individuals known – 
through experience or by reputation – to be untrustworthy.   
 
8.4.4.2 Interpersonal openness as a foundation for trust 
 
Those who most strongly embraced interpersonal openness seemed to practise it 
without a foundation of trust. In these cases it was clear that openness could establish 
trust where it did not already exist, through free talk about exciting, valuable, 
vulnerable ideas. Generosity and vulnerability in sharing ideas seemed to be a social 
signal that prompted reciprocity, as Cedric noted: “The more open you are with other 
people, then hopefully the more open they will be with you”. Thus openness indicated 
trustworthiness, and performed trust before it is established. Vulnerability, in 
particular, could be expected to establish a social bond, especially if it is shared, and 
each party depends on the other to treat their ideas with care. Perhaps for this reason, 
interviewees often depicted interpersonal openness in close association with 
collaboration. Ben and Miriam, above, both showed how interpersonal openness can 
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pave the way to collaboration. Such openness provided a means to test for, and 
establish, the trust required for a close, ongoing working relationship. For 
interviewees like Jude who depended on trust for openness, collaboration was the 
main setting for interpersonal sharing: “a lot of real openness is only when you're 
involved in collaboration”. Interviewees mostly spoke of informal collaborations: 
professional relationships sustained over long periods, perhaps associated with 
collaborative grant or paper co-authorship. These collaborations were in some cases 
blended with friendship. Andrea commented that her supervisor’s close collaborators 
were his “professional friends”. This underlines the degree to which interpersonal 
openness intertwines the epistemic with the social. 
 
8.4.4.3 Circles of trust 
 
The theme of trust exposed the unevenness with which interpersonal openness 
operated in scientific communities: it flourished in trusting relationships and 
networks, but often not outside them. This was one way in which interpersonal 
openness manifested the complex, relational dynamics described in Chapter 3 
(Section 3.4.2.2): it could be both open and closed at the same time. Miriam, for 
instance, spoke about selecting collaborative partners for big projects based on trust 
and their past openness with her: “…we'll talk to them, them and them, because 
they're really open”. Reflecting on this, she commented that this “blocks the people 
who don’t want to [be open]”, so “I suppose actually it’s the opposite of being open”. 
Similarly, Ben described it as prudent to only share unfunded ideas within a “circle of 
trust”. Andrea observed these dynamics amongst senior scientists: 
“So obviously there is sharing and there is collaboration going, but 
with selected people. So you find networks of collaboration in topics 
but they’re normally based on people that know each other through 
PhDs or postdocs, people that have worked together in the past….” 
Michelle observed this dynamic somewhat from the outside, as someone less 
“embedded” in such networks: 
“…I think overall there is a tendency to share less except with those 
trusted colleagues, and I think that leads to quite a cliquey-ness, that 
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if you're in the in group, you get stuff shared with you, and if you're 
not, you know nothing.” 
Her account showed that it was possible to be systematically excluded from moral 
economies of interpersonal openness by being outside cliques, circles of trust, and 
long-established professional friendships. Michelle had changed fields a couple of 
times in order to stay in the same location as her scientist husband: as she became 
less connected, he was “very much embedded within a network of close collaborators 
and colleagues, where they all know each other and talk to each other”. Mutual 
reinforcement of trust and interpersonal openness promotes this uneven flow of 
privileged information, ensuring that only some people are aware of the newest ideas 
and data in a field. Due to its social embeddedness, interpersonal openness could be 
expected to flow along contours established by existing social inequalities – not only 
gender, as was evident in Michelle’s case, but race, class, socioeconomic status, 
(dis)ability, sexual orientation, etc., and their intersections – and to reinforce these 
inequalities. This was not inevitable: where interpersonal openness was practised 
independently of trust – or most people were assumed to be trustworthy – it had the 
potential to expand circles of trust or dissolve their boundaries. 
 
8.4.4.4 Trust technologies and “trust-no-one-technologies” 
 
The theme of trust had another key interaction with interpersonal and other 
categories of openness. Openness was viewed by some as a signal that a scientist’s 
work could be trusted, and closure as a sign of untrustworthy work. This seemed to be 
true both of interpersonal openness, and other modes of openness that revealed 
process, such as data openness. Mark commented: 
“…if somebody's not open, you start to wonder about what other 
things they might be hiding […] if they're not open, and you're not 
able to actually really examine, drill into that data in more detail, you 
start to worry about the integrity of their science.” 
This suggests that interpersonal openness may operate as a “trust technology” that 
“offers a powerful reassurance that things really were done in the way it is claimed 
that they were” as argued by Grand et al. (2012:1–2) in relation to online forms of open 
science. These authors were drawing on concepts established by Shapin and Schaffer 
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(1985:60–69), who showed how seventeenth century experimentalist Robert Boyle 
established trust through “virtual witnessing”: literary techniques involving “the 
production in a reader’s mind of such an image of an experimental scene as obviates 
the necessity for either direct witness or replication” [original emphasis] (p. 60). 
These techniques included text and images rich in circumstantial detail, and inclusion 
of failed experiments; and a plain, functional style. Such techniques provided 
testament to the integrity not only of experiments, but also of Boyle himself a modest, 
objective, and therefore trustworthy observer. Interpersonal openness – not as a form 
of virtual witnessing, but as a willingness to “talk freely” and be generous with ideas – 
is a social technique that similarly establishes the sharer as honest and trustworthy.  
 
My observation of a bidirectional connection between interpersonal openness with 
trust, and Grand et al.’s proposal that open science is a trust technology, both contrast 
with an implication prevalent in open science discourse: that openness can and 
should replace trust. This implication is evident in efforts to make the processes of 
science progressively more open, and especially in the removal of reliance on human 
actions or testimony. This is exemplified in the words of Jean-Claude Bradley, who 
coined the term open notebook science and pioneered its practice: “…In the past, 
trusting people might have been a necessary evil […] Today, it is a choice. Optimally, 
trust should have no place in science” (Drexel University 2014). In analysing open 
science discourse Gabrielsen (2020) makes the opposite observation to Grand et al. 
(2012): “In the Open Science-scenario, there is no real need to trust anyone as 
everything will be available for checking and validation […] Open Science is therefore 
rather a ‘trust-no-one-technology’” (p. 499).  
 
As Gabrielsen (2020) concludes, drawing on Leonelli (2016), openness and data-
intensiveness of science do not diminish a need for trust, but reconfigure it, placing 
emphasis on e.g. trust in data curation. Interviewees tended to uphold a role for trust, 
and several vehemently defended it. Mark said: “…in science, trust is absolutely 
essential...we rely absolutely, utterly, on trust”; Jacqueline: “I find it really scary if 
we're going to move to a situation where we don't trust our colleagues”. Some found 
trust a sufficient alternative to openness. Gavin said: “…if I trust the researchers to do 
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a good job then I really don't mind if they want to keep mining their data, and they're 
not releasing it”. And Michelle found openness an insufficient alternative to trust: “…I 
can't think of a lot of situations where you would think, well these people are so 
untrustworthy that I want to see the data, because if they were so untrustworthy you 
might mistrust the raw data as well.” This underlined the limited capacity of online 
openness to prove trustworthiness, and its impotence where trust or distrust was 
established by other means, perhaps interpersonally. 
 
The chapter thus far has characterised interpersonal openness according to its 
distinctive features that arose repeatedly: the sharing of valuable, vulnerable ideas; 
talking freely; generous reciprocity; and trust. The theme of trust begins to show why 
not all interviewees felt free to talk. The next sections show how interpersonal open-
ness is not a single approach, but a spectrum of intertwined attitudes and practices. 
 
8.5 Context and ambivalence: a spectrum of interpersonal 
openness 
 
8.5.1 Open approaches: from unconditional to selective 
 
Given the many nuances of social context and the bounded nature of interpersonal 
settings, a universally open or closed interpersonal approach is inconceivable. 
However, some interviewees portrayed something close to unconditional 
interpersonal openness: Jenny’s “policy of generosity” did not seem to discriminate, 
even in environments where others were less generous. Several others reported a 
comparable approach: Elliot152, for example, said: “I can't think of anything that I've 
tried to hold back on. Yeah, even to people who are working pretty much on the exact 
same stuff as us, I've pretty much said what I'm doing.” Similarly, Luke153 told me that 
he “would just say everything” when networking at a conference. Mat, meanwhile, 
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portrayed his lab’s interpersonal approach as completely open, in keeping with his 
open source methodology, in which ongoing results were made public, online. For 
Mat, even unconditional interpersonal openness was limiting: he made it a rule to 
avoid email, due to its exclusive audience: discussions were moved into an online, 
public forum. 
 
Other interviewees showed almost unconditional openness. Adam, for instance, 
mentioned “one or two occasions” on which he recommended to a student that they 
hold back in interaction with a scientist who does not “have a good track record”. 
Withholding from particular individuals was common, and likely was implicit in 
accounts that appeared unconditional. This suggested that even the most open 
approaches were based in trust that could be selectively withdrawn. Lena154 
exemplified an approach at the open end of a trust-based spectrum: 
“So my approach is […] I just talk about everything […] and if I'm ever 
scooped, well that's the nature of science, and you prepare your lab 
for that, and then you lick your wounds, and you get up, and you go.”  
Lena assumed trustworthiness, and withdrew her trust and openness if she had 
adverse experiences with a particular individual: “if there is a problem, then I no 
longer trust […] It might change the interaction with that particular person in the 
future, but that's it, right.” She portrayed interpersonal openness as “the right thing to 
do” and something she would continue on principle regardless of specific negative 
experiences. In a spectrum of trust-based openness, approaches became gradually less 
open the more trust was withheld, rather than offered, as a default. 
 
8.5.2 Mid-spectrum: contextual approaches that aspire to openness 
 
Many interviewees’ approaches were contingent on multiple overlapping factors and 
involved nuanced judgements; thus they could be placed somewhere in the middle of 
a spectrum of interpersonal openness. Typical considerations for these interviewees 
included not only the trustworthiness of the individuals involved, but also the 
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competitiveness of their field and project; the developmental stage of their ideas; the 
security of their own or colleagues’ careers; resourcing advantage compared to 
competitors; and the proximity of an interlocutor’s research aims to their own. 
Interviewees with mid-spectrum approaches often embraced interpersonal openness 
attitudinally, or depicted themselves as characteristically open: it was a feature of 
their identity or sense of scientific self. Gavin155, for instance, upheld a Mertonian-like 
ideal of scientific openness and said of his own interpersonal practices: “I think by and 
large, the default is to be open”. In context, this meant “calibrating” against factors 
like the maturity of his research, and to whom he was speaking – where “some people 
are more competitive than others”. As a result he spoke about his ideas before 
publication, at conferences – knowing this carried some risk – but only did so after 
the ideas were fairly secure, having been written up and submitted to a journal. He 
also described sharing ideas openly if he was unable to pursue them himself owing to 
a lack of personnel – but holding back on ideas that he planned to develop: “I might 
give some clues […] I would not open it up completely”. Gavin thus showed how 
openness could be an important and identity-shaping scientific principle with 
connections to a messier, nuanced, context-based practice.  
 
Likewise, Oscar156 told me that he talked about work in progress at conferences, which 
could be a risky but also beneficial form of exposure. He hesitated if the work was “at 
a very early stage” though, and shared it only with close collaborators. Greg157 also 
characterised his behaviour as tending towards interpersonal openness: “I tend to not 
be very protective, I tend to talk about our stuff early before we publish it. But at the 
same time, we live in a practical world…”. He told me he might occasionally hold back 
where a trainee of his was dependent on the work for their next job. Erin158 too was 
comfortable being open, partly because she was “far enough along in my career and 
far enough along in my research database […] that no one else can do what I’m going 
to do in […] any near future time”. When emailing potential collaborators with ideas 
that could be scooped, she was relatively unworried as she knew who was a “good 
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person” within her small field. She was cautious, however – choosing her words 
carefully and withholding detail – when the contact was about a new project, or 
outside her sub-discipline. Similarly, Ben159 considered himself someone who shared 
more than others, but identified two “pinch points” before which he considered it 
normal to withhold: before securing funding he would only share freely within a 
“circle of trust”; and before getting data he would be careful not to say too much, as it 
would be possible for others to refocus their work to compete. He portrayed 
scientists, especially students, as apt to be “bad businessmen” – naïve and trusting – 
where instead they needed to be socially aware. Arthur160 told me he “tried to be 
open”, but would hold back if someone was working on a topic close to his. All of 
these cases show that an open attitude was often more a guide than a rule: brought 
into practice through negotiations of social and epistemic context that sought to limit 
vulnerability whilst seeking some of the rewards of openness.  
 
8.5.3 Mid-spectrum: entirely contextual approaches 
 
Some interviewees did not claim a particular attitude or identity in relation to 
interpersonal openness, instead portraying their actions as entirely context-
dependent. Yvonne161 told me that “it depends on the project”. One of her projects at 
the time was confidential: “I have a postdoc who worked on the project, and so I need 
to not be open about it until we have the publication secured - because it's her 
future”. In other cases she was happy to be open – when there was less competition, 
when the discovery was not “big”, and when she had relatively unique resources. 
Michelle162 similarly refrained from generalisations about her approach, instead 
characterising open ideals as out of reach, and in tension with practice: 
“…I still have an idealistic tendency to think that people should be 
open and scientists should talk to each other, and share data, but 
realistically people are competitive and that doesn't happen all the 
time, and of course there's valid reasons…” 
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Her view was influenced by sensitivity to risk in her research environment: “…there's 
this constant fear all the time that I see in my colleagues […] that they're going to be 
scooped”. She described being open with collaborators and trusted individuals, but 
otherwise protective:  
“…if I'm doing a project then for most of it, it's completely open to 
some people, but not terribly broadly open […] if you're just chatting 
to someone at a conference, you might give vague outlines but not 
specific details”.  
She also advised her students to be cautious, “warning them not to give everything 
away […] just in case”, unless they were close to publication. This prioritisation of 
caution edged towards an interpersonal closure approach. Yvonne and Michelle may 
in practice have behaved similarly to the interviewees in the previous section, but 
their hesitation to characterise themselves or their practice as open is notable: they 
emphasised prevailing conditions, rather than internalised principles, as determinants 
of openness.  
 
8.5.4 Interpersonal closure: prioritising caution and protectiveness 
 
The accounts above showed that many interviewees were willing to talk about 
behaviours and attitudes of closure, despite framing openness as good for science. 
This was to some degree because of the contextual and graduated nature of the 
interpersonal category: it did not compel scientists to declare themselves open or 
closed. It was possible to be open and closed at the same time, depending on the 
exact nature of the information divulged, when, to whom, and with what intention 
(see Section 3.4.2 for analysis of the same idea in historical context). Some 
interviewees viewed protection of early-stage scientific information as not only a 
consideration, but a norm and a priority, due to competitive risks.  
 
It was particularly illuminating to speak with Jacqueline163 in this regard: she was the 
only interviewee who questioned the idea of openness at the outset. Her initial 
                                                     
163 PhD 1980s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
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response was: “Openness. Actually I don't really know what you mean by ‘openness’ in 
science, to be honest.” As the interview proceeded, she raised concepts that had more 
meaning to her, including honesty, trust of colleagues, and humility. However, her 
follow-up to the quotation above showed that the topic did have meaning for her. It 
brought to mind protection, rather than openness, of pre-publication ideas:   
“I guess having worked in the traditional circumstances of 
competitive labs, where you are...I guess it's not really secretive, but 
protective of your ideas at least until you get them published 
[laughs]. To me that's normal. So I don't see that as not being open.” 
It thus became clear that Jacqueline’s initial reaction was in part a critique of the 
interview premise, which did not resonate with her. She recognised the same category 
of experience as those embracing interpersonal openness, but approached it in a 
different way, seeing herself as neither open nor secretive, but normal; and normal 
meant holding back from sharing unpublished ideas. 
 
Jacqueline’s protective approach did not mean an abandonment of open practices, 
just as open attitudes did not preclude closures. She described how she might 
cautiously establish openness from a default position of closure:  
 “I mean there are certain things you're willing to share, and also 
when you meet certain colleagues or you meet new colleagues, and 
maybe you strike up a…you realise that you've got common ground, 
and you may start to share a little bit just to let someone know that 
you have data that's relevant to what they're thinking about and you 
may develop a collaboration. Or you might not.” 
Her negotiation of trust and potential collaboration through incremental sharing was 
comparable with Ernie’s cultivation of trusting relationships. The difference was 
Jacqueline’s emphasis: she gave weight to protectiveness, and did not associate pre-
publication openness with joy, freedom or generosity. Instead, she placed weight on 
communicating fully and honestly at the end of the process. She saw it as a duty to be 
protective until the science was ready to be seen and used by others: “if you present 
your data, and your ideas, and put them out there and somebody runs off with it, 
that's...you put it out there! You have responsibility for that”. In this view 
interpersonal openness was a risk to be taken individually: shared information was 
fair game, and scooping a natural product of competition. This contrasted with the 
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expectation of many who embraced interpersonal openness: that idea-sharing 
promotes a reciprocal, trusting social contract. Jacqueline’s expectation, which 
conditioned her cautious response, was likely influenced by the norms of her field, 
which she described as “highly competitive” – in part due to the relevance of her work 
to climate change. The high stakes of this research topic also contextualised her 
emphasis on cautious, but full and honest, communication. When the competitive 
element of her work was put aside – for example when teaching undergraduates, or 
talking to the public – a joy in interpersonal communication emerged: “many of us 
biologists like myself love telling stories…we love talking about it, it's hard to stop us!” 
 
Jude164 had a similar approach that was contextualised by early career experiences: 
“…my experience is […] okay, that the best scientists don't talk about 
their research until it's usually at least submitted, very few of the best 
scientists I know...well, especially if you're in a competitive field […] 
the one I'm more familiar with probably is Drosophila genetics165. 
And, you know, nobody was letting on what they were working on 
until it was at least submitted.” 
This observation was from the 1980s, in the US: “that really opened my eyes to big 
time science, big time grants, and that there is this whole level of science that I didn't 
know existed”. Interpersonal closure was thus portrayed not as a compromise, but as 
an integral part of performing top-level science, and being a top scientist, that was 
impressed on Jude as a young scientist. Like others, Jude made decisions based on 
trustworthiness and competitiveness. He saw his current field as “relatively non-
cooperative […] fractured, and fairly fractious”: possibly not a safe setting in which to 
share ideas. In line with this, he observed that “a lot of real openness is only when 
you’re involved in collaboration”, and even then, there was a possibility of “feeling 
ripped off at the end”. As someone leading a smaller lab, Jude described how he offset 
competitive disadvantage by finding a niche in which he could be a “relatively big fish 
                                                     
164 PhD 1970s; interview: Australia, Jan 2017. 
165 Jude’s characterisation of Drosophila genetics as interpersonally closed is intriguing given 
its well-studied association with communality (Kohler 1999). There could be many 
explanations for this, including changes that occurred in Drosophila research between the 
1920s and 1980s, differences between the communality described by Kohler and interpersonal 
openness, and the particular communities and experiences that Jude encountered. 
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in a small pond”. He nonetheless portrayed his position as one that required 
defending, making a degree of interpersonal closure both necessary and wise. 
 
Jacqueline’s and Jude’s accounts were distinctive in viewing interpersonal closure as a 
priority and a settled norm; perhaps part of a scientific self that upholds values in 
conflict with interpersonal openness. However, several other accounts, from more 
recently trained scientists, show that practices and attitudes of interpersonal closure 
are sometimes less settled, or held in tension with open aspirations. Rory’s166 response 
to the interview topic was influenced by experiences of secrecy and competition:  
“...one of the things that interests me about science is that you’re 
building on someone else’s work, so you need to be open. But I know 
there’s people who are hiding stuff that they don’t want other people 
to build on because they want to get there first. So I don’t know if 
that’s all right.” 
The group he worked in had, multiple times, had papers rejected because another 
group – who were both collaborators and competitors in the same field – had 
published just before them. As a result, he felt uncomfortable about consulting and 
sharing with this group, in case they used his results to gain advantage. This had 
begun to stoke a generalised disillusionment and distrust: “…more recently people 
aren’t sharing. Or maybe that’s just because I’ve gone higher up in science that I’ve 
realised that people don’t really share their results. And aren’t telling everybody the 
truth”. During his PhD he had also been concerned about scooping, and had 
experienced unsupportive supervision. He felt little control over his own 
interpersonal openness – “I’m told what I can present and what I can’t present” – and 
reported conflicting ideas of how he would behave if he had agency. When he thought 
about his present situation, he envisioned holding information back from 
collaborators – staying “a few steps ahead”. When he took a more abstracted view, he 
“would want to be open”. Strikingly, his view was influenced by whether he intended 
to “stay in this career” or not: pursuing a scientific career would mean a more closed 
approach. Rory’s account shows how acutely competitive environments, encountered 
                                                     
166 PhD 2010s; interview: UK, Jan 2019. 
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with a lack of support, begin to build attitudes of distrust and closure; or potentially, 
drive early career scientists out of the profession.  
 
PhD researchers Nicole167 and Andrea168 also focused almost entirely on interpersonal 
openness in interview, and its curtailing by competitiveness in their fields. Nicole was 
researching dementia, “one of the big problems in the world that just hasn’t been 
solved yet”. Competition was inspired by the academic and societal rewards of success 
in this field, and efforts were focused on a small set of well-defined goals. The stakes 
were also high due to job insecurity: “a lot of people […] are on one-year contracts”. 
Nicole was accustomed to being discreet, as modelled and advised by colleagues, 
“until you're really, really ready to publish, so no one has time to catch up and push it 
out quicker”. She was dissatisfied with this interpersonal closure, and interested in an 
open, collaborative alternative – especially as the research context was also “emotive” 
and “caring”. However, she described an individually open approach as naïve in the 
absence of a systematic cultural shift.  
 
Comparably, Andrea worked in an area of veterinary immunology and infection that 
was both academically and commercially competitive. She spoke about senior 
colleagues’ strategic pursuit of funding (“science is driven by money”), the need for 
novelty, the danger of scooping (“the worst thing that can happen when you’re doing 
science”), and secrecy around industrial collaborations research. She observed senior 
scientists limiting their openness to networks and behaving secretively at conferences 
whilst attempting to expose sensitive information: 
“For example: I have discovered A, and I haven’t told anyone. And I’ve 
been told that you have discovered A as well, but we haven’t talked 
directly. So you’re doing a talk about things related to A in a 
conference, and I’m going just to ask you, to push you to see how 
much you know. And you see that all the time. They challenge each 
other in questions to see how much they tell, to try to like scoop each 
other. Instead of just going up and openly talk[ing], like: oh, really 
interesting talk, we’re doing something similar. Shall we sit down 
                                                     
167 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Oct 2017. 
168 Mid-PhD; interview: UK, Oct 2018. 
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with a coffee and discuss about it? No no no, they prefer the 
bitchiness strategy [laughs], which is horrible. But that happens.” 
Like Nicole, Andrea disapproved of these closures but saw them as inevitable, due to 
the competitive nature of science funding. She did not picture herself becoming a 
primary investigator: she associated this career path with an off-putting “politics of 
making money” to which her personal and scientific motivations were opposed. Thus 
like Rory, Andrea had an ambivalent relationship with her profession in which issues 
of competition and interpersonal closure were important factors.  
 
One interviewee faced a more extreme case of interpersonal closure in their training. 
They left academic science after experiencing “complete shutdown of 
communication” in their PhD lab, to the extent that they never had the opportunity 
to experience competitive behaviour personally. Their supervisor seemed to have 
been affected by an earlier incident of scooping that led to “paranoia”: “…we weren’t 
allowed to go to conferences. We weren’t allowed to talk to people about what we 
were going to do with our work. He [supervisor] managed all communications even 
with direct collaborators.” This interviewee remarked in particular on an inability to 
develop networks and collaborations in this setting. Partially in response to what they 
had experienced, this interviewee subsequently developed a career as an advocate of 
open science. It was in that capacity that I interviewed them. These instances suggest 
that an inability to align oneself with a desired scientific self – one that upholds 
interpersonal openness as an epistemic virtue – can result in disengagement from this 
notion of scientific self, and associated professional identity, altogether. 
 
8.5.5 Interpersonal closure in a commercial context 
 
Andrea was conflicted about interpersonal closure for both academic and commercial 
reasons, which was somewhat unusual. There was a tendency for interviewees - who 
worked in academic settings, with varying degrees of industrial involvement – to view 
commercial projects and collaborations as uncomplicated exceptions to their usual 
practices, principles, and negotiations of interpersonal openness. The commercial 
became a separate domain, in which different rules legitimately applied, and tensions 
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between collaborative and competitive instincts could be dissolved. For example, 
Mark169 portrayed himself as “pretty open” and collaborative – and strongly, morally in 
favour of interpersonal idea-sharing. At the same time, he was pursuing a side-line to 
his main research in secret, having had “quite a powerful idea”, likely to be lucrative, 
that he hoped to patent. Mark emphasised how unusual this secrecy was for him, and 
the detachment of this work from moral obligation, unlike his main research which 
related to agriculture and was driven by a commitment to “society and planet”.  
 
This dimension of interpersonal openness was an intriguing one. In the light of the 
wealth of scholarship on academic–industrial integrations (Croissant and Smith-
Doerr 2007; e.g. Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff 2000; Gibbons et al. 1994), it would be 
beyond the scope of my thesis to analyse it fully. However, it was notable that 
interviewees tended to characterise and treat these domains as separate – and 
commercial domains as straightforwardly and legitimately secretive – despite the 
emphasis of STS scholarship on blending between domains.  
 
8.5.6 Making sense of a spectrum of interpersonal openness 
 
The accounts above depict a full range of intertwined attitudes and practices from 
near-unconditional interpersonal openness, upheld as a personal or group policy; to 
openness-as-default approaches that are variably sensitive to context; to entirely 
context-dependent approaches; to caution-first, protective approaches. This 
underlines Adam’s initial observation that “you see a huge variation”, from holding 
back completely until publication, to “talk[ing] about everything”. Interpersonal 
openness was unequivocally framed as an epistemic virtue by those at the open end of 
this spectrum, who had internalised it in their scientific identities as a means to better 
science and being a good scientist. These interviewees actively pursued interpersonal 
openness, initiated their trainees into it, and articulated it with particular care and 
emphasis: they saw it as a key distinguishing quality between scientists, and one on 
which they prided themselves. Further along the spectrum were many interviewees 
                                                     
169 PhD 1980s; interview: UK, Feb 2017. 
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who framed interpersonal openness as an epistemic virtue, but more of a guide than a 
rule: they aspired to it and tended to shape their identities around it, but calibrated 
their practice to context. Nonetheless, they often took pride in working around their 
circumstances to create openness. Also in the middle of the spectrum were 
interviewees who saw their approaches as entirely context-dependent: they did not 
uphold interpersonal openness as a principle, perhaps due to a greater sense of 
tension with closures in practice. Finally, towards the closed end of the spectrum, 
were interviewees who saw caution and interpersonal closure as a norm. Some of 
these individuals had settled in this position, and asserted epistemic principles 
distinct from interpersonal openness. Others, who were earlier in their careers, 
upheld interpersonal openness as an epistemic virtue but felt unable to enact it: this 
state of tension was associated with ambivalence about pursuing a scientific career. 
Interpersonal secrecy associated with commercial science was treated as an exception 









Figure 8 visualises this spectrum of intertwined attitudes and practices of 
interpersonal openness. Different approaches are shown as overlapping to indicate 
that they are not absolute or clear-cut, but overall they fall on a spectrum. Interview 
quotes illustrate different positions on the spectrum. Categories are larger on the 
openness side to indicate that more interviewees saw themselves as embracing or 
aspiring towards openness than those who tended towards closure. A box with a grey 
gradient shows where interpersonal openness was constructed as an epistemic virtue. 
Because interpersonal openness is subjectively defined and experienced, the spectrum 
does not aim to present an objective view of interpersonal practice. It is possible that 
to an observing party, the behaviours of interviewees towards the middle of the 
spectrum may seem more similar than their accounts suggest.  
 
8.6 Enabling interpersonal openness: security, resources, 
support 
 
As is evident from interviewees’ testimony thus far, their approaches to interpersonal 
openness were not simply a matter of personal preference. Attitudes and practices of 
interpersonal openness were enabled and constrained by a complex array of 
intersecting factors, both circumstantial and systemic. Here I refer the reader to the 
previous chapter on data openness, and in particular Table 6, where I compiled a list 
of factors that either build or diminish a sense of control and security, and 
respectively enable or constrain openness. Most of the medium- and long-term 
factors in this list also apply to interpersonal openness, because both forms of 
openness – especially when they reveal unpublished information – create 
vulnerability. Interpersonal openness exposes science at an earlier stage, but in a 
more limited and controlled setting. However, both are primarily focused on the risk 
of scooping, and are generalised enough that insights can be shared across the data 
and interpersonal categories: Table 6 was informed by both contexts. In this chapter I 
will limit my exploration of enabling and constraining factors to those most saliently 
and explicitly connected with interpersonal openness by interviewees. Factors like 





8.6.1 Career security 
 
Several interviewees made comments linking their capacity to be open with their 
senior position and established career. Steve articulated this as follows:  
“…well I'm [age in sixties], and my career has gone pretty well so far, 
and I'm not so much, not at this stage in my career, likely to miss out 
on promotion or anything like that by being second to publish 
anything. So it doesn't stop me from talking openly about things…” 
Adam was similarly conscious that his position afforded certain freedoms: 
“…I'm aware that I'm in a luxurious position now […] you can say well 
Adam, you can afford to be totally open […] if you get scooped lots of 
times now and you never publish much again that doesn't really 
matter to you, you've had most of your career and you've got jobs 
now where it doesn't matter so much.” 
Career security meant that Steve and Adam could enjoy benefits of interpersonal 
openness – such as feedback, intellectual stimulation, and networking – whilst being 
able to weather any negative consequences. In contrast Rory, an early-career 
researcher, felt that interpersonal closure would be necessary if he continued to 




The ability to be open was also connected with medium-term factors like the 
resourcing of a research group or project. This included team size, budget, and access 
to equipment and facilities: factors that allow work to be done faster or in unique or 
sophisticated ways. It also included access to privileged social and epistemic 
resources: collaborative links, contextual knowledge, materials, research settings, or 
data. Jude described both of these resourcing issues: 
 “…if you have the only material in the world, well you can be much 
freer about sharing ideas than if...a guy with a big lab over there 
could do what you're talking, what you're thinking about in two days 
when it's going to take you two months.” 
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Jude described unique access to material as “holding all the cards”, a contextual 
advantage that could allow smaller and less wealthy research groups to thrive and 
share their ideas openly, where they might otherwise struggle. Nicole similarly had “a 
particular element that we got from one of our collaborators that’s particularly 
valuable”: this was a source of reassurance when her conference poster was 
photographed by a competitor.  
 
8.6.3 Competitiveness, collegiality, and social support 
 
Interviewees’ characterisations of their research communities differed widely, from 
competitive, even nasty, to friendly and supportive. Competitiveness tended to be 
linked with cultures of interpersonal closure, whereas friendly communities seemed 
to support openness. Nicole’s account was an example of a highly competitive, high-
stakes field being linked with interpersonal closure. Jacqueline, too, connected the 
high stakes of her field – related to climate change – with its competitiveness, whilst 
upholding interpersonal closure as a norm. Ernie, who showed a strong commitment 
to interpersonal openness, nonetheless limited this to certain trusting circumstances, 
in his very competitive field. In contrast, Adam’s interpersonal openness was set 
within a “lively, supportive” field, a character he helped to promote: “we, the senior 
people know each other and like each other, and try to be supportive of each other 
and the people coming through the labs as well”. David170 also strongly upheld 
interpersonal openness, and did so partially in a collegial context of his own creation. 
As an institute director, he had sought to promote interpersonal openness at a 
community level through architecture: 
“This building is actually designed deliberately to encourage 
openness. So you can't get to the laboratory floors without going 
through the cafeteria. That's deliberate. There's only one block of loos 
in the building, and they're in the middle of the building. Which 
means you've got to get up, and walk the length of the building, and 
walk past people. Open-plan, shared laboratories...is all intended 
avoid any kind of territorialism.” 
                                                     
170 PhD 1970s; interview: UK, Dec 2017. 
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These accounts showed that interpersonal openness or closure sometimes 
characterised a community or field. This made it easier or more difficult to trust one’s 
colleagues, and practise openness as an individual or research group. Adam and David 
had reached points of security and influence in their own careers from which they 
could shape openness culture at a community level. Of course, each interviewee 
characterised their community through a partial lens. It would be possible to see and 
experience one’s colleagues as untrustworthy in a field perceived by others as 
supportive, and vice versa, depending on factors like social embeddedness. Types of 
social support described in Chapter 7 are also relevant (see Section 7.10). 
 
8.6.4 Early experiences, role-modelling, and generational dynamics 
 
Interviewees commonly mentioned interpersonal openness of their supervisors or 
mentors, and those in supervisory positions readily spoke of advising their students 
and post-docs about interpersonal openness. Adam linked his open identity with the 
influence of a mentor who “talked about everything to everyone” and espoused this as 
a philosophy, reckoning that the risk of scooping was worth it. “That has stayed with 
me”, Adam told me – and he passed it on to his students. This connected with a 
depiction, throughout the interview, of his enjoyment and care in training students. 
Interviewees pursuing interpersonal openness as an epistemic virtue were particularly 
inclined to speak of cultivating this approach in their students: encouraging them to 
share liberally, and not to feel constrained. Adam actively introduced his students to 
“big names” in the field and left them together to converse “as equals” without “any 
sort of barrier”.  
 
Others also highlighted the people and experiences that had encouraged them, early 
in their careers – and often decades ago – to be open. This suggested that role-
modelling, advice, and supervisory care practices were influential in passing 
interpersonal open approaches down through generations of researchers. There was 
also an indication that these approaches might persist via a virtuous cycle, as those 
who practise interpersonal openness from early in their careers benefit from 
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reciprocal rewards. Jenny demonstrated this possibility: although she did not have a 
mentor, a non-competitive early environment and a need for visibility and feedback 
encouraged her to adopt an open approach. By the time she encountered riskier 
environments, she had already established her practice and seen its benefits. Thus, it 
seemed that freedoms or constraints of training environments, including but not 
limited to supervisory influence, were formative, and could develop a degree of 
resilience to vulnerability in subsequent environments.  
 
It is harder to say whether more cautious approaches travelled in the same way, but it 
is likely, as interpersonal openness largely operated at a research group level. When 
asked, senior scientists with more contextual or protective approaches readily 
reported passing this circumspection on to their students as a matter of common 
sense (e.g. Michelle warned “not to give everything away […] just in case”). This 
influence also seemed to have the capacity to last: Jude’s cautious approach was 
contextualised by his early observations that “the best scientists don't talk about their 
research until it's usually at least submitted”. Importantly, both open and protective 
role-modelling and mentorship were practised as acts of care for students.  
 
Generational influences were not always strong, determining, or unidirectional. 
Olivia, a PhD student, displayed a commitment to interpersonal openness that was 
actively discouraged by her primary supervisor: 
“I was at a conference and I was speaking to one of, well, probably 
our biggest competitor […] we just ended up having quite a lot of 
interesting scientific conversations together, and by the end of the 
conference he offered to collaborate with me […] So I went quite 
excitedly back to my supervisors and said: oh well this has happened 
and it all sounds great. And then, he sort of had quite a negative 
reaction to it.” 
Luke similarly reported defying advice from his Master’s supervisor not to talk to a 
rival group. These cases showed that some scientists, even early in their careers, have 
acquired sufficient agency, confidence and security to pursue their own approach, and 




Complexities of generational influence also arise from the fact that early career 
researchers, if they stay in academia beyond their PhD, typically experience more 
than one training environment and approach to openness. Julia171 described her open 
approach as influentially shaped by her PhD supervisor, “one of the most open people 
in terms of his science that I’ve ever come across”. She only realised later on that 
“many people don’t work like that”, including the PI of a lab she subsequently worked 
in: “that was a time when I had to contain myself”. At the time of interview, Julia had 
recently become a PI herself, and planned an open approach both interpersonally and 
online. Her cautious former PI had recently supported eight trainees in starting their 
own labs, and these new labs “are now networking and sharing information with each 
other in a way that she [cautious PI] probably wouldn’t have done”. Julia implied that 
role-modelling may begin to work in reverse, as her former PI seemed happy with the 
new sharing behaviour of her scientific offspring. Olivia also reported reversing the 
direction of influence: “I think I generally try and push for him [supervisor] to be 
more open all the time. And he’s responded well.” These cases are probably 
exceptional, but they show that interpersonal openness is not embraced or 




In this chapter I explored the third and final category of openness that was highly 
salient in scientist interviewees’ responses. Interpersonal openness was distinct in 
that it did not have formal links with openness as constructed by twenty-first century 
open science movements. Accounts of interpersonal openness often had a captivating 
quality, and several interviewees underlined its value to them in contrast with online 
openness, in particular open access. It emerged as a category of openness that gave 
meaning to scientific lives, and to which many had a moralised attachment, or even 
an explicit “policy” commitment. Interpersonal openness could thus readily be 
conceptualised as an epistemic virtue with an important place in many scientists’ 
sense of self or professional identity. The emergence of this category was partly 
                                                     
171 PhD 2000s, interview: UK, Jun 2018. 
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contingent on my specific choice of words: “openness in science”, not “open science”. 
“Openness in science” allowed interviewees to articulate something outside normative 
discourses: outside open–closed binaries; outside outputs; and outside policy 
prescriptions.  
 
It might be argued that interpersonal openness is not comparable with other 
categories under the expanding open science umbrella. Open science advocates and 
policymakers tended not to bring it up as a form of openness172. It was not 
revolutionary, but mundane and low-tech: simply a mode of human interaction. 
Moreover, it was constitutive of a science that open movements sought to transform: 
conditionally, relationally open; messy, ephemeral, replete with human influence; 
unaccountable to outsiders; and coextensive with networks of privilege. However, 
because of its separation from contemporary “open science” – and its high level of 
recognition by scientists – interpersonal openness offers novel insights on the 
meaning and practice of openness in science. Here, I bring it into conversation with 
the themes of my research sub-questions. 
 
In historical context (sub-question a), interpersonal openness offers a perspective 
different from both traditional, Mertonian narratives of essential openness (see 
Chapter 3), and contemporary “open science” narratives. In contrast with the former, 
interpersonal openness is defined by unpublished, not published work. A history of 
interpersonal openness – as a history of unpublished communication – may even 
mirror a history of scientific publishing in interesting ways: perhaps interpersonal 
domains have gained new value as published communications have, over time, 
become more formal, commodified, and competitive (see Section 4.6).  
                                                     
172 Open science advocates/policymakers sometimes identified the similar kinds of distinctions 
between “open science” and “openness in science” as scientist interviewees, discussed in 
Section 8.3, e.g. the latter as more process-, behaviour-, or person-oriented. Peter Murray-Rust 
described open-ness as a “philosophy […] a way you feel”, and Mark Patterson associated it 
with scientists who embody open practices. However, advocate/policymaker interviewees 
tended not to describe or recognise interpersonal openness as part of open science. Jon talked 
about variable disclosure levels at conferences, but commented, “I don't think it is open 




The emergence of interpersonal openness in interview again underlined the expansive 
potential of “open” terminology (the theme of sub-question b). It also demonstrated 
how contemporary open science movements, despite their breadth are mainly 
expanding in particular directions defined by technology and visions of universality. 
Interpersonal openness was most salient category outside this direction of movement, 
but interviewees also raised the following as forms of openness: support of junior 
colleagues; openness with research participants; openness about animal work; 
receptivity to new ideas and questions; inclusion of diverse individuals and 
perspectives; and freedom to be open about identity in science (in this case, LGBT 
identity). These dimensions of openness, which are more about social challenges and 
contextual opening, illuminate the partial focus of movements that appear all-
encompassing. 
 
The dynamics of interpersonal openness offer particular insight on questions of 
epistemic virtue (c) and scientists’ apparent disengagement from open science (d). I 
explore these connections more fully in Chapter 9, where I also bring themes from 
Chapters 6 (open access) and 7 (data openness) into conversation with interpersonal 
openness. While interpersonal openness was constructed by many interviewees as an 
epistemic virtue with a relationship to the self, it differs in interesting ways to the 
main epistemic virtue characterised by Daston and Galison (2007), mechanical 
objectivity (see Section 2.2.1). The relationship of interpersonal openness with the self 
seems to be one of trust, enrichment, and excitement rather than denial or restraint 
as in the case of mechanical objectivity. I also note that understandings from this 
chapter can expand ways of thinking about scientists’ relationships with openness 
beyond current policy and advocacy discourses. In interpersonal contexts, openness is 
not new: scientists have career-long experience of negotiating it around situated 
vulnerabilities and opportunities. Calls to be publicly open, online – particularly when 
they apply to unpublished science – therefore meet and contrast with established 
landscapes of openness that are nuanced and relational. An understanding of where, 
why, and how scientists and their communities come to embrace interpersonal 
openness – or interpersonal closure – is valuable its own right, to promote security 
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and wellbeing in scientific lives and careers. It is also valuable as a rich, layered, 
empathetic way to understand (dis)engagement with online openness practices, many 
of which prompt similar vulnerabilities, but in a setting of altered or diminished trust, 
talk, and reciprocity: features that make interpersonal openness feel safe and 
worthwhile.  
 
I have now identified, characterised and analysed the three most salient categories of 
openness raised in interviews with scientists. The final chapter is a discussion that 
brings these categories, and the different ways of being open that they represent, into 
conversation with one another and with a broader context. 
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Chapter 9 | “Actively engaged and willing to be open” 
Discussion and conclusions  
 
Lena spoke to me with candour and directness. The group leader of 
an interdisciplinary lab who had completed her PhD in the 2000s, she 
was in search of nothing less than the “equations that describe life” – 
or a reason why they do not exist. She responded to my questions 
with precision and feeling, extending her attention as a critical 
researcher to the topic at hand. She mentioned “scientific integrity 
rules” which guided her towards interpersonal openness. When I 
asked about the origin of these rules, she gave a striking account of 
identity, ethics, and epistemology – bringing epistemic virtue to life: 
 
“…I do science because it's how I am, right. I wake up in the morning, 
and the first thing I want to do is go to my lab, right, and that's since 
I started […] That is the motivation to do good science. Of course we 
want to be acknowledged […] of course we want to publish the best 
papers that we can – but with that good science, right. If that's gone, 
then there is no point in everything else […] It's just a very important 
thing to preserve and I'm just not sure where it comes from […] 
 
So it's hard to define. Let me try. So, if you are motivated by the wish 
to find the answers to certain questions, right - the real answers – not 
what seems to be a real answer if I present it to a reviewer […] But if 
you really want - you, yourself - want to know what is the real 
answer. Then I think this science integrity comes naturally. Because 
it's kind of like there, to enable those real answers to be found.” 
Lena, biophysicist 
 
9.1 Introduction: the story so far 
 
I began this thesis by observing six curious aspects of open science that made it a 
timely and rich topic for study: its rapid rise to salience; future promise; historical 
resonance; elusive expansiveness; moral overtones; and apparent distance from the 
lives of (many) scientists. In this chapter, I look back upon these overarching themes 
– guided by my research questions – and consider what I have learned. First, I will 
briefly revisit each empirical chapter to summarise its discrete findings. Research sub-
questions (a) and (b) – set out in Section 1.7 – are primarily addressed in the earlier 
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chapters. I will then bring these findings into conversation with one another, focusing 
on the interview study, to consider the differences and similarities between different 
categories of openness from scientists’ perspectives. This allows me to address 
research sub-question (d) directly and holistically: why does it appear that many 
academic scientists are disengaged from “open” discourses and practices?  
 
I then introduce epistemic virtue, to consider whether it adds depth this explanation, 
and to address sub-question (c): to what extent is “open” (or “openness”) being 
constructed as an epistemic virtue? I then suggest another layer of interpretation: that 
the breadth of openness might contain several distinct epistemic virtues – which I 
identify – and that these play different roles in the present open science “revolution”. I 
then contextualise open epistemic virtue(s), re-asserting their contingent place and 
enabling and constraining factors that make them unequally available to scientists. I 
consider, in this context, one of my early curiosities: in what sense we might be 
experiencing a shift in the agreed meaning of “good science”, defined according to 
openness. 
 
9.1.1 Chapter 3: Historical framings of openness in science 
 
My overarching interest, through this research, has been in how meanings of “open” 
in science are being constructed. This first literature chapter resulted from a curiosity 
about historical framings: both contemporary open science texts, and older accounts 
of the workings of science, implied that scientific openness had a long history. 
Moreover, the narratives in these texts built up a picture of science as essentially, 
inevitably, enduringly open. This was an intriguing juxtaposition with contemporary 
narratives, which are of crisis and opportunity: today’s science falls short in its 
openness, but can be restored and elevated through Internet technology. Because of 
this, I asked (a): How do contemporary “open science” discourses relate to older, 




The answer was more complex than I expected. I began by reading histories of 
scientific openness, and learned about its contingent origins. These are commonly 
traced to seventeenth-century Western Europe and co-located with the first scholarly 
journals and the birth of modern science (David 2008; e.g. Eamon 1985). However, an 
examination of openness and secrecy as social practices (in historical works, e.g. 
Balmer 2012; Iliffe 1992; Vermeir and Margócsy 2012) showed that the two tend to be 
closely intermingled in cultures, individuals, and even actions. I also observed that 
flexible semantic qualities of both “open” and “science” enable a circular kind of 
boundary work, through which it is possible to find openness in almost anything 
considered scientific. I therefore sought to describe the openness of seventeenth-
century Western science in specific and situated ways: public, communal, and 
cumulative; defined by journal publishing; and within elite, gendered, not-yet-
professionalised community structures of the time. It was more difficult to say – 
owing to its subjective, relational qualities – whether a distinctive cultural idealisation 
of openness arose at that time. I was able to conclude, however, that historical and 
contemporary narratives of scientific openness are closely entangled. Such historical 
narratives are part of a contemporary phenomenon that re-imagines past science as 
“open” in contemporary terms, and adds depth and authenticity to today’s open 
science narratives. Even historians have subtly participated in boundary work – 
seemingly from the 1980s – that attaches “openness” to Western science (e.g. Eamon 
1985; McMullin 1985). In the 2000s, this became “open science” (David 2008). 
 
9.1.2 Chapter 4: Twentieth century preludes to “open science” 
 
In this second literature chapter, I viewed the history of “open science” differently: 
instead of looking for a long-ago origin for scientific openness, I thought about 
salience and breadth of contemporary “open science”, and its apparently sudden 
appearance in the twenty-first century. The Internet is often framed as the driving 
force behind open science, and there is a tendency towards technological 
determinism. I sought a more holistic, nuanced backstory that would help my 
understanding of how open science came about. Many parts of this story have been 
told, but my aim was capture breadth, and explain salience. In doing so, I sought to 
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address (b): How has “open” in science recently gained such salience and discursive 
power, despite its multiple meanings and lack of specificity? 
 
In seeking the roots of open science, I brought together diverse twentieth century 
histories and trends, including: 
 an increase in scale, and archetypal “big science”;  
 the birth of preprints in physics;  
 the influence of World Wars;  
 a growth in commercial publishing;  
 an intensification of academic–industry relations in fields including biology;  
 the rise of the early Internet;  
 the development of sharing cultures in model organism communities;  
 and the emergence of free and open source software movements.  
This showed that in the century before the appearance of “open science”, science itself 
shifted in profound ways: its openness was not simply present or corrupted; instead 
the relationship between science and openness changed qualitatively in multiple 
dimensions. Some of these historical developments suggested an encroaching secrecy, 
and others depict new or reinforced cultures of scientific openness. Distinct elements 
of today’s “open science” – e.g. open access – can be traced in one or several of these 
histories. They seem to have converged under the heading “open” in the early 2000s. 
Addressing (b), I proposed that the salience and discursive power arises because of its 
ambiguity. “Open” has become a rallying point for meaning, standing for diverse 
values that bringing together many constituencies, with myriad histories – magnifying 
the salience of “open”. In this way, “open” comes to represent great deal of all that is 
considered good – and wanting – in contemporary science.   
 
9.1.3 Chapter 5: Advocacy and policy framings of open science 
 
This final empirical literature chapter moved from a wide-angle perspective history 
and meaning of scientific openness towards a narrower focus on the contemporary 
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period. My goal was to concretely situate the interview study by providing detail on 
two “open” movements – open access and open data – as well as the holistic 
movement of open science. I also analysed the construction of openness in these 
advocacy and policy contexts through nine document case studies from the period 
2000-2019. This was an engagement with my overarching research question – How is 
the meaning of “open” (or “openness”) being constructed in the context of science? – 
that addressed the themes of all four sub-questions. 
 
Through this document analysis, I confirmed a tendency for advocacy and policy 
narratives to draw on a long history of openness in science. However, this framing 
was not universal, and seemed to gain momentum only after “open science” was 
envisioned holistically. It also seems to lose relevance as “open research” and “open 
scholarship” become preferred framings in Anglophone contexts. I also illustrated an 
accumulation of meanings associated with “open”, from a broad base. Values 
associated with advancing knowledge and public benefit were present early on; 
accountability and transparency/reproducibility framings appear later; and critical 
reckonings with inequality are recent. Both grassroots and policy documents tended 
towards technological, business-friendly framings, obscuring a complex relationship 
between openness and capitalist values. The documents depicted a gradual shift 
towards the construction of openness as an epistemic virtue, and towards the 
portrayal of researchers and their cultures as by-products of incentive systems. 
 
9.1.4 Chapter 6: Open access to research articles 
 
Open access was the first of three main categories of openness constructed by 
scientists in interview, consistent with its salience in advocacy and policy. Most 
interviewees supported open access, at least in principle, but it was characterised by 
prominent problem framings. The clearest of these was financial: open access seen as 
an expense. This made it seem impracticable to some, easy to others, and associated it 
with conditionality, scarcity, and injustice. This financial framing was linked with the 
construction of open access as a “gold” journal-mediated, and fee-paying, practice. 
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The cost-free repository route (“green”) was mentioned less often and framed as a less 
valuable or actualised form of open access, despite its prominent role in local policy 
mandates. There was a hint that more recently trained scientists see the benefits of 
both “gold” and “green” in preprints. A minority of interviewees associated open 
access with a loss of quality, rigour, and community in scientific publishing. Many 
more associated it with lower “impact”, which they expected would be judged 
negatively by others, even though they tended to profess disagreement with that 
judgment. Some more recently trained interviewees framed open access separately 
from quality and impact, or saw open access as a reputational asset.  
 
Experiences of open access were shaped by a policy compliance framing through 
which open access was distanced and bureaucratic. This was particularly the case in 
the UK context, where the open access was often administrated by professional 
services staff. This shaped framings of open access as easy, on one hand – but lacking 
in personal meaning – or frustrating on the other, where bureaucratic friction arose. 
Open advocates at UK universities gave congruent responses, and seemed caught in a 
bind between a desire to win “hearts and minds”, and need to compel compliance. 
 
9.1.5 Chapter 7: Opening up research data 
 
Data openness was the second, comparably salient category raised by interviewees, 
and again was associated with advocacy and policy discourses. Reactions to this 
category were highly varied, so I grouped them by attitudinal and emotional qualities. 
For a sizeable group, data openness was familiar and accepted, but not highly salient 
or emotive. I concluded that for this group, who tended to work in genetic or 
crystallographic fields, data openness was probably shaped by digital data sharing 
norms established 1980s and 1990s for specific data types.  
 
A second, smaller group found the topic salient, and reacted with unease and 
defensiveness. Here, data openness carried a blended epistemic and personal threat: 
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worries about competition, and losing the context attached to data, were prominent. 
However, these interviewees were happy to share data post-publication. The 
assumption that pre-publication data sharing would be required seemed to emerge 
from the expansive qualities of open science, and distrust in those implementing it.  
 
A third, large group also found data openness salient, and were passionate about it. 
They were driven by a variety of principles that reflected the breadth of contemporary 
open science movements: including links with software culture, reproducibility, 
public duty, and epistemic self-improvement. Nearly all these interviewees had 
trained since the 2000s, suggesting a profound influence of open science movements. 
Principled attachments to data openness could still be marked by vulnerability. I 
proposed that a feeling of control – arising from a combination factors – is a pivotal in 
enabling scientists to embrace data openness. I suggested that the vulnerability of 
data openness may be more tolerable to scientists who internalise it as an epistemic 
virtue, because openness can become an act of care. 
 
9.1.6 Chapter 8: Interpersonal openness 
 
The final category I described as “interpersonal openness”. Its salience alone was 
remarkable, since it had no foundation in established open science discourses: but 
interviewees raised it consistently and with conviction. They spoke of face-to-face 
interactions with other scientists in which unpublished information – especially ideas 
– were exchanged. They spoke of talking freely, sharing generously, with indirect 
reciprocal benefits; and a dependence on, or a creation of, trust. Where interpersonal 
openness was dependent on trust, it was associated with cliques through which 
information flowed selectively. The emergence interpersonal openness was likely 
contingent on my phrase “openness in science” (not “open science”). This contingency 
allowed interviewees to express something important to them outside normative 
discourses. Attitudes and practices of interpersonal openness fell on a spectrum from 
near-unconditional openness, through to principled protectiveness. Those who 
embraced it tended to construct it as an epistemic virtue, core to their professional 
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identity and an approach to instil in trainees. Mid-spectrum, interpersonal openness 
was constructed as context-dependent: an aspiration that seemed achievable or naïve 
to varying extents. For some, interpersonal closure was the norm: either as a settled 
position, or – often for junior researchers – an uncomfortable compromise.  
 
Interpersonal openness was both epistemically and personally vulnerable, so was 
enabled by a sense of control, like data openness. Role modelling and social support 
at training stages seemed to be an important basis for long-term interpersonal 
openness, further underlining its connection to development of the (scientific) self. 
As a category of openness defined by scientists, it offered particular insight into 
scientists’ apparent disengagement from “open” discourses and practices. I will 
elaborate these insights in the following discussion. 
 
9.2 Synthesis: comparing interview-based openness categories  
 
The three most salient categories of openness that emerged in interview were 
contrasting: conceptually, in practice, and in their relationship with scientists. This 
led to an opportunity for comparison and direct reflection on sub-question (d): why 
does it appear that many academic scientists are disengaged from “open” discourses and 
practices? Here, I present a comparison broken down into thematic sections, and 
summarised in Table 7 (Section 9.2.5). 
 
9.2.1 Stage and interactivity of openness 
 
One of the clearest differences between these categories in scientists’ accounts was 
the stage or state of knowledge-making that is “opened”. Open access applies to the 
publication stage: a relatively settled knowledge claim in a bounded, permanent 
physical or virtual form. Data openness exposes science-in-process through bounded 
information objects that contain multiple interpretative possibilities, and may 
structurally enable re-use. Interpersonal openness reveals ideas upstream, non-linear 
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components of knowledge-making in ephemeral, fluid, and appropriable form. In this 
way, the three main categories identified by interviewees happen to fall along a 
spectrum.  
 
Another lens through which to view this spectrum is interactivity. Open access 
publications are primarily one-way communications. Online data openness also takes 
the form of one-way dissemination, but may prompt more interaction than open 
access, e.g. if users ask for contextual information or contact the producer as a matter 
of etiquette. Moreover, the re-use of data creates a form of epistemic intimacy 
between producer and user, as the latter becomes familiar with minute details. At a 
pre-publication stage this may reshape findings. Interpersonal openness is inherently 
interactive: ideas are produced and altered through interaction. These categories of 
openness thus differ profoundly in their receptivity to outside perspectives, and thus 
their capacity to shape knowledge. An inverse relationship emerges here between 
access and receptivity as connotations of openness: public online access (open access 
and data) seems to entail a lower potential for interactive, creative, upstream re-
shaping of knowledge; and interpersonal openness creates the latter through the 
exclusivity of intimacy and trust. This raises the question of whether online, public 
openness necessarily limits other types of openness. 
 
9.2.2 Scale, infrastructure and standardisation of openness 
 
Interviewees’ three categories of openness are also standardised to different degrees, 
in association with the scales at which they are organised and governed. Open access, 
especially in the UK, encompasses a limited range of practices that are definable, 
administrable, and measurable by the top-down policies of funders and universities 
(limited but not simple: as advocate/policymaker interviewees noted, there are several 
main funder policies in the UK, leading to administrative complexity). This large-scale 
standardisation and governance seems to occur partly because “opening” a journal 
article means the same thing across epistemic contexts: its openness is not entangled 
with the specific form of knowledge it conveys. Open publishing and repository 
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infrastructures can therefore operate in the same way in different academic fields, and 
researchers across fields encounter open access in similar ways – with the notable 
exception of humanities and social sciences fields in which monographs hold 
particular value. In short, there are a limited number of ways to be “open” in the 
current context of open access. 
 
Data openness features a complex layering of scales, infrastructures and standards. 
There are now funder and government-level open data requirements and generic 
infrastructures for data sharing (e.g. Zenodo n.d., “a catch-all repository”). Before this, 
some disciplinary communities had created infrastructures for specific data types, 
associated with local norms and journal-governed mandates (Strasser 2019). Any one 
scientist may now encounter multiple standards and norms from different sources 
and scales; or none at all. Data openness is less amenable to top-down governance, 
because of variety in what constitutes “data” and sufficient openness173. In other 
words, there are a large number of ways to be “open” with data. This relates to the 
entanglement of data – compared to articles – with science-in-the-making. 
 
Standardisation does not apply in the case of interpersonal openness, which falls 
outside a policy framing, and would be difficult – and deeply problematic – to 
measure and control. Through this social, relational lens there are myriad qualitative 
shades of openness, though none are public. Some uniformity seems to occur at the 
research group level. These comparisons again depict an inverse relationship, which 
may hold more widely: the more amenable a form of openness is to large-scale 
standardisation and governance, the more constrained it is, and the less contextual 
depth it reveals about processes and relations of knowledge-making.  
 
 
                                                     
173 Graeme, an open science policymaker/advocate at a major UK research funder, commented: 
“With data, we don't say: you have to put your data in [specific repositories], we recognise that 
[…] there's so many different types of it, and there are so many different norms about how 
people share…”. Interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
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9.2.3 Enforcement and agency of openness 
 
Differing scales of standardisation are thus associated with different approaches to 
enforcement, and different experiences of agency for scientists. The relative 
standardisation, infrastructuring and measurability of open access render it amenable 
to enforcement, which is strongly pursued in the UK context. This shapes its 
construction through the binary lens of compliance, and reduces the need for any in-
depth form of engagement by scientists to a minimum. 
 
Some open data policies are similarly top-down, but with less extensive enforcement, 
partly because data openness is less amenable to standardisation and measurement 
(although Data Management Plans are a top-down mechanism for accountability, 
Neylon 2017). Not many interviewees framed data openness as a matter of 
compliance, perhaps because open data policies had not made a wide impact at the 
time. Alternatively, the more contextually sensitive range of openness practices 
encompassed by such policies may allow a greater sense of agency. A substantial 
group of interviewees had a principled attachment to data openness that seemed 
independent from policy requirements, but shaped by a wider advocacy and policy 
landscape. This may be because of the epistemic entanglement of data openness. 
 
Interpersonal openness is not governed or governable by formal structures, and was 
characterised in interviewees’ accounts by freedom and agency: a free quality of 
interaction; a freedom to be open; and agency to control precise levels of closure. For 
many it seemed to represent an escape from structure and pressure and a space for 
nurturing one’s scientific identity.  
 
9.2.4 Attitudes and emotions of openness 
 
The dimensions above were connected with patterns in attitude and emotion. Positive 
responses to open access were approving, acquiescent, and occasionally enthusiastic. 
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Many positions were neutral or passive, perhaps connected with a compliance 
framing or the perception that open access is a “done deal” (Thomas) that no longer 
needs to be discussed (Henry and Kate). On the negative side, scepticism and 
frustration were characteristic orientations, linked with the financial framing of open 
access, and distrust towards publishing and institutional systems. 
 
Data openness was associated with a wider and qualitatively distinct attitudinal range. 
On the positive side, it was embraced with passion by a significant group – often more 
recently trained scientists – who seemed to have internalised openness as an 
epistemic virtue across a range of context and practices. Another significant group 
were approving and acquiescent, having adjusted to discipline-specific data sharing 
norms. A third group of reactions were defensive and vulnerable, and linked with the 
contextual and competitive sensitivity of opening up data. 
 
Interpersonal openness was associated with strong positive emotional reactions as 
well as ambivalence. Distinctive to this form of openness were expressions of joy and 
excitement linked with the experience of freely exchanging ideas in a social context. 
Principled and passionate expressions of commitment were also characteristic. 
Neutral or negative reactions seemed less demonstrative, perhaps because of the 
agency of interpersonal openness: risky or vulnerable elements of the practice could 
be avoided through contextual forms of closure.  
 
9.2.5 Bringing it together: a multi-layered spectrum of openness experiences 
 
These comparisons build up a picture of the distinctive ways that open access, data 
openness, and interpersonal openness are experienced by scientists. Many of these 
experiences are specific to the present context: biological science, at relatively 
privileged institutions, in the UK and Australia in 2017-2019. However, there is 
potential to make more general observations about the reasons for scientists’ 
relationships with these forms of openness, and the factors that promote engagement 
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or disengagement. This addresses research sub-question (d): why does it appear that 
many academic scientists are disengaged from “open” discourses and practices?  
 
First, I propose that forms of openness that are more epistemically involved – that is, 
entangled with knowledge-making processes – have a greater capacity to engage 
scientists. Being open can feel like part of doing science in these cases. This happens, 
for example, when interpersonal openness leads to new ideas or collaborations, or 
critiques. It also happens when an embrace of data openness causes a scientist to 
organise and examine their data in new ways, or when data sharing leads to critical 
input that catches a mistake or shapes an interpretation. This may partially explain 
why it is difficult to engage scientists in open access. 
 
Secondly, I propose that it is easier to engage scientists in forms of openness in which 
social enrichment – and feelings of joy and excitement – are part of epistemic 
enrichment; and in which trust mitigates vulnerability. This is a lesson drawn from 
interpersonal openness, which blends knowledge-making with social interaction, 
trust-building, and collaborative friendship. This presents a challenge to open science 
practices, which in part rely upon a dissolution of necessary social ties between 
creators and recipients of information in order to enable universal online access, 
independent of social networks. Data-sharing as a technical, decontextualized, 
human–machine interaction may feel both less rewarding and more vulnerable than 
an equivalent interpersonal exchange. 
 
This ties in with a third proposal: that top-down, standardised, enforceable forms of 
openness present a problem for engagement, and for nurturing openness in research 
communities. This is for a variety of interlinked reasons. Forms of openness that are 
amenable – or have been made amenable – to top-down administration are, firstly, 
likely to connect less closely with local epistemic processes and contexts, and thus to 
lack personal meaning for scientists. As a result, large-scale governance of open 
science may both disproportionately measure, and incentivise, forms of openness 
from which scientists are disengaged. This underlines the importance of local, 
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contextual approaches; and the potential harm of both metrics-based and other 
standardised approaches to incentivising openness in research communities. 
  
Moreover, top-down governance associates openness with structures and institutions 
that scientists may distrust. There were signs in interview that disengagement from 
open access and other centrally regulated forms of openness are due to suspicion of 
financial arrangements and a sense of injustice rather than objections to openness 
practices themselves. This is analogous to findings by STS scholars that distrust in 
scientific institutions is a prominent reason for publics to lack trust or acceptance of 
scientific knowledge (Irwin and Wynne 1996).  
 
Finally, enforcement of openness reduces agency, resulting in unease and 
defensiveness when openness requires labour or vulnerability. Moreover, 
bureaucracies for large-scale management of openness reinforce framings of open 
practices as administrative rather than scientific. In Table 7 I present a summary of 
comparisons between openness categories, and these observations about engagement. 
However, the factors above are not the only ones that mediate engagement. One 
crucial factor can be understood through the lens of epistemic virtue.  
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Table 7 | Comparison of the three main openness categories from scientist interviews, leading to the identification of factors influencing engagement. 
 Open access Data openness Interpersonal openness 
Stage and interactivity 
Downstream: “opens”  





Upstream: “opens” ideas and 
process; high interactivity 
Scale, infrastructure and 
standardisation 
Large-scale, standardised 
governance and infrastructure 
Mixture of large- and mid-scale 
standards and infrastructure: 
interaction of top-down and 
community governance 
Research group and individual-
scale governance without 
standardisation or infrastructure 
Enforcement and agency 
Enforced top-down; bureaucratic; 
limited agential involvement  
(especially UK) 
Expected/encouraged top-down 
and in some communities; some 
bureaucracy; agential 
involvement required 
Unenforced (bottom-up); some 
lab-level expectations; agential 
and anti-bureaucratic 





Passion, principle, approval, 
acquiescence, scepticism, unease, 
defensiveness, vulnerability 





(+) factors that may promote 
engagement; (-) factors that 
may discourage engagement 
Tends towards passive 
acceptance; (+) visibility of work;  
(-) low epistemic/social 
entanglement, low contextual 
relevance, institutional/structural 
distrust, compliance framings 
Full spectrum; (+) local, trusted 
governance & infrastructure, high 
epistemic/social entanglement, 
high agency; (-) standardised 




discourse, but experience is more 






9.3 Sensitising to epistemic virtue 
 
The comparisons above show that interviewees’ levels of engagement with scientific 
openness was highly varied, and that disengagement might be productively reframed 
through varied lenses such as lack of epistemic/social interactivity; lack of contextual 
relevance; distrust of institutions or systems; and lack of agency. In this section, I will 
explore whether my sensitising concept, epistemic virtue, can bring any extra depth 
and explanatory power. This involves directly addressing sub-question (c): to what 
extent is “open” (or “openness”) being constructed as an epistemic virtue? 
 
9.3.1 Finding virtue in open access? 
 
Open access was a distinctive case. It was widely recognised, accepted and practised 
by scientists in the study context, especially in the UK. Thus in many ways it 
represented a runaway success story all those who wish to see a wider dissemination 
and reuse of research. Cameron174, a high profile open science advocate and 
researcher, noted this achievement with nuance: 
“…there's been various criticisms […] But honestly I think, massive 
increase in accessibility of content fundamentally in a decade, 15 
years, is actually not a bad achievement […] Access was always an 
important part of open access [laughs]. I'm pretty comfortable with 
the notion that that's on the way to being delivered.” 
The analyses above, however, emphasise strain and conditionality in scientists’ 
relationships with open access. This was underlined by Danny Kingsley’s175 reckoning 
that “voluntary engagement” with open access would drop dramatically if policies 
were removed. This conditionality can be viewed through the lens of epistemic virtue 
– or rather, its absence. For many interviewees, open access was not good science 
because it was not science at all: it had value, but it was separate; it was publishing; it 
was money and paperwork; it was “a little thing” (Richard) compared to the science. 
                                                     
174 Interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
175 Head of Scholarly Communication, University of Cambridge; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
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Moreover, open access was not typically a concern of the scientific self. Indeed, the 
process could be largely handled without scientists. Erin was one of several 
interviewees who made it clear that one can practise open access without being an 
“open researcher” who is “active engaged and willing to be open” (see Section 8.3). 
This disconnection from epistemic virtue is another way to understand the 
conditionality in scientists’ relationships with open access: why acquiescence was 
more common than passionate commitment; and why sacrifices of cost or journal 
choice were not easily made for this practice. 
 
However, an absence of epistemic virtue was not the whole story. For some scientists 
open access is closely entangled with knowledge-making, because articles take on the 
role of primary data. Accessing and computationally processing articles – at scale – is 
pivotal for this kind of research. Peter Murray-Rust176, a veteran open science advocate 
and computer scientist, described making knowledge in this way: “content mining, 
which is the use of the whole scientific literature - the whole scholarly literature - but 
particularly science, to create new knowledge artefacts”. Additionally, Sarah177 - a 
journal editor who was involved in early open access movements – indicated that the 
biomedical scientists who founded PLOS were initially motivated by these kinds of 
epistemic goals rather than accessibility for the public: 
“…they were doing genome-scale experiments, and doing microarrays: 
they've got hundreds of thousands of things they want to find the 
references for, and doing a sort of pay-per-view option is just not 
reasonable - or even working out how you get round the paywall in 
each case is not reasonable.” 
Open access is entangled with many other values and causes including, vitally, 
resistance to big publishers. In terms of engagement, however, it is illuminating to 
consider that some differences in scientists’ orientations to open access may depend 
on project- or field-specific differences in how “good science” is made. 
 
                                                     
176 Interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
177 Interview: UK, Jan 2018. 
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This specific epistemic virtue framing is not end of the story, either. Some 
interviewees were proactively committed to open access without it being a direct and 
intimate part of their knowledge-making process. There were moral and epistemic 
elements to these commitments: open access was sometimes framed as the right 
thing to do for scientists with less access, or for publics, or because it aligns with 
other “open” values and principles. This is an interesting challenge to Daston and 
Galison’s (2007) concept, which engages at the level of the scientific self. When a 
virtue is internalised not for its truth-telling value in one’s own scientific endeavours, 
but for its assumed benefit at a systemic level, is it an epistemic virtue? Or a moral or 
social virtue, without epistemic entanglement? This question speaks not only to 
contemporary open science, but to the much longer-held idea that communal 
visibility of findings is essential to science (see Chapter 3).  
 
Elsewhere – but absent in Objectivity (2007) – Daston (1998) identifies 
“communitarian objectivity” that “urges scientists to standardize their instruments, 
clarify their concepts, and depersonalise their writing styles to achieve 
communicability and commensurability across continents and centuries…” (p. 88). 
This certainly resonates with aspects of contemporary open science, but it does not 
capture commitment to open access on equality grounds, which might be considered 
more moral than epistemic: the right thing to do, whether or not it is good for 
science. This is different from the idea of better science through inclusion of diversity 
of voices and perspectives, which interviewees rarely alluded to (but see Section 
9.4.4), and which open access, in current forms centred in the global north, may not 
be well placed to accomplish (Chan et al. 2020; Nabyonga-Orem et al. 2020). 
 
Whether open access is considered a moral, social or epistemic virtue in these cases – 
and perhaps the distinction begins to break down at systemic level – the virtue- and 
identity-associated framing introduced by epistemic virtue is useful, as it captures an 
emerging, generationally-specific internalisation of “open” values that extends to open 




9.3.2 Finding virtue in data openness? 
 
Because data openness takes so many forms, theorising its relationship with scientists 
is not a single task. However, it was clear – as noted in Chapter 7 (see Section 7.8) – 
that some scientists internalise and pursue openness of data as an epistemic virtue. I 
could see this most clearly when opening data was constructed not only as a route to 
good science, but an act of reflective self-improvement for the scientist. It was also 
instructive to see data openness experienced as a form of vulnerability that was worth 
enduring for the improvement of both the scientist and their work. This level of 
“engagement” was distinct from the case of open access. In other cases, linked to pre-
2000s genomic data-sharing norms, interviewees seemed “engaged”, but in limited 
and specific ways. They seemed to experience openness as a managed process of 
exposure that limited vulnerability through standardised formats, infrastructures, and 
community expectations. Defensive rejection of data openness suggested a conflict 
that went beyond frustration: vulnerability of the (scientific) self, and perhaps a 
challenge to the epistemic virtues anchoring that sense of self, which may be in 
tension with openness. For example, some expressed a view that pre-publication data 
sharing threatens the integrity of knowledge-making: Cedric178 drew on the Scottish 
saying, “fools and bairns should never see a job half-done”. 
 
The internalisation of data openness as an epistemic virtue had a particularly strong 
tie to rationales of transparency and reproducibility, and seemed to incorporate 
methodological openness including open code, preregistration, and occasionally open 
notebook science, as well as extending to assume open publication, and often an open 
interpersonal approach. As I have argued, this indicates that contemporary open 
science is gaining traction amongst more recently trained scientists. I suggest that an 
epistemic virtue framing helps to articulate what this “traction” might consist of: a 
strong, moralised, identity-associated conviction likely to be long-lasting in 
individuals, and instilled in their trainees and other close colleagues. This depth of 
engagement may be necessary for data openness to be practised with a purposeful 
                                                     
178 PhD 1960s; interview: UK, Feb 2018. 
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integrity that makes it worthwhile. Enrico179 articulated the practical difference this 
can make:  
“I can supply a code of what I did, it’s open, it’s accessible. I can 
supply a code that’s a lot of comments for the support document to 
help documentation, that’s also open. But clearly the latter is helping 
out […] And that really generally has to come from the researcher 
thinking this can help and not because I’m forced to put my data 
because the reviewer, or the publisher, or the grant body have asked.” 
As Enrico and others point out, there is potential for openness of this kind to be 
enacted instrumentally. In some cases interviewees were aware of strategies employed 
to limit the openness of “open data”, such as deliberate withholding of parts of a 
dataset, or a lack of annotation make the data understandable to others. Even without 
such strategies, some scientists approached data sharing as a tick-box task, without 
expectation that the opening of data would improve their own work or others’; or they 
did not share data at all for the same reasons. This is important to understand from a 
policy perspective, since top-down governance is limited in its ability to motivate – or 
perhaps even distinguish – the kinds of openness that are most epistemically caring 
and enriching. Moreover, the depth and specificity of engagement required cannot be 
displaced from data creators. This certainly makes open data an ambitious policy goal, 
and one that is distinct from open access. It is helped, however, by the fact that data 
openness is a task close to the epistemic self. 
 
9.3.3 Finding virtue in interpersonal openness? 
 
Because interpersonal openness is so different from the categories above, it is an 
illuminating point of comparison. Many interviewees’ relationships with interpersonal 
openness suggested its internalisation as an epistemic virtue: they connected it to 
formative elements of knowledge-making and the nourishment of their scientific 
identity and purpose (see Sections 8.4.1 and 8.5.6). These experiences were 
characterised by excitement, joy, moral conviction, and a desire to pass this approach 
on. Adherents to this approach often saw it as a fundamental quality distinguishing 
scientists. Some interviewees who felt unable to practise interpersonal openness still 
                                                     
179 PhD 2010s; interview: UK, Nov 2018. 
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framed it as an epistemic virtue. This tension was tied, in younger scientists, to 
ambivalence about continuing in a scientific career, which emphasises a link to 
identity and purpose. However, others expressed no systematic commitment to the 
practice. Interpersonal openness seemed to operate as an epistemic virtue, and a 
moral economy, in certain research groups, communities and networks.  
 
Distinctive to this epistemic virtue was its embodied quality: it was an opening – a 
vulnerability, receptivity, exposure – of the self. This gave it with a particularly close 
tie to identity: scientists who internalised this virtue were not just practising openness 
– they were being open. This is significant in contrast with online open science, which 
is characterised by the opening of information objects, and their abstraction and 
separation from their human creators: in Nielsen’s (2009) terms, moving information 
“out of people’s heads and labs, onto the network” (p. 32), and in Bartling and 
Friesike’s (2014b) terms, enabling knowledge to “flow quickly, regardless of 
institutional and personal networks” (p. 8). These narratives imply that there is a 
technological solution to making science open; and that scientists’ connections with 
their knowledge hamper rather than enable openness.  
 
Interpersonal openness presents an illuminating counterpoint because it is a 
thoroughly human practice of scientific openness, in which social entanglement is 
both problematic and a source of profound epistemic enrichment. It is also an 
example of an openness practice that many scientists pursue energetically in the 
absence of external incentives, and despite the risk it entails. Moreover, accounts of 
interpersonal openness show that many scientists care deeply about sharing ideas and 
data well upstream of publication, but may only do so when they feel secure. 
Interviewees’ accounts also show how a sense of security might come about in 
scientific careers and communities, and thus how cultures of openness might be 
nurtured. None of this makes interpersonal openness a model “open” epistemic 
virtue. In many ways, it represents the opposite of what open science movements 
seek: universally accessible, transparent, permanently recorded knowledge. However, 
in the context of difficulty “engaging” scientists with online open science I suggest 
that lessons might be learned from interpersonal openness. Communities in which it 
296 
 
has been widely internalised as an epistemic virtue may even have laid the cultural 
groundwork required for online forms of openness to thrive (see examples in Section 
7.10). 
 
9.4 What “openness” hides: distinct virtues within? 
 
Through the discussion above, I have considered the question of scientists’ 
(dis)engagement with open science (d); the construction of scientific openness as an 
epistemic virtue (c); and an illuminating connection between the two. Here, I extend 
my focus on epistemic virtue in one further direction. I consider what happens if the 
“openness” label is removed from epistemic virtues (above) to which scientists are 
committed, allowing these to be understood in different ways. I have analysed the 
breadth of meaning encompassed by scientific openness throughout this thesis, and 
others have proposed categorisations of the breadth of open science (e.g. Fecher and 
Friesike 2014). Here I propose four categories specifically grounded in scientist 
interviewees’ constructions of openness as an epistemic virtue, and informed by 
historical and policy/advocacy analyses. In other words, these are epistemic virtues 
that an “openness” framing hides, which cut across practice-based categories like 




One distinct purpose and value of scientific openness is to make knowledge resources 
communally available, for use in future knowledge-making. This purpose 
characterises centuries-old scientific openness in Western Europe associated with the 
tradition of journal publication (see Chapter 3). It is also associated with the idea of 
“standing on the shoulders of giants” (Newton 1675); and Merton’s norm of 
communism (1973 [1942]). In the twentieth century, this type of openness is also 
manifest in the moral economies of model organism communities (Kohler 1999), their 
newsletters (Kelty 2012) and later online databases (Leonelli and Ankeny 2012); and in 
the public Human Genome Project (see Chapter 4). It is also, of course, a purpose that 
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drives contemporary open access and data movements. I have called it “commoning” 
in reference to prevalent discourses that characterise open online resources as 
knowledge or information commons (Lawson 2019; Moore 2018). “Commoning” places 
critical emphasis on “the practice of cultivating and caring for the relationships that 
exist around the production of shared resources” (Moore 2018:17), as distinct from the 
treatment of commons as decontextualised, free, universally appropriable resources, 
as they are often configured in open movements (ibid). Interview accounts showed 
that the latter arrangement – which does not entail community ownership, 
reciprocity, and trust – tends not to engage scientists. More epistemically, socially 
involved forms of resource sharing governed at smaller scales engage scientists more 
(see Section 9.2.5), and are more likely to be constructed as epistemically virtuous. 
Thus, “commoning” captures one distinct way in which openness is pursued by 
scientists for the improvement of knowledge-making their communities. Daston and 
Galison (2007) define epistemic virtues in relation to problematic tendencies of the 
self that they counteract, in order to seek truth. I propose that commoning is a virtue 




Distinct from commoning is transparency: exposing processes of knowledge-making 
so that their validity can be examined and improved. This purpose is salient in open 
data movements, alongside commoning (or at least, the creation of “commons”), and 
is a sensibility distinguishing today’s pursuit of open data180 from pre-2000s digital 
data sharing traditions in genomics. Of the four categories I propose, transparency is 
most identifiable as an epistemic virtue in Daston and Galison’s terms, perhaps 
because it could be considered a type, or extension of, objectivity. The transparency 
component of open data, for example, is focused towards detecting and kerbing error, 
bias, fraud and other problematic entanglements of the scientist with their work. 
Where mechanical objectivity (Daston and Galison 2007:20) encourages the scientist 
to self-examine and suppress biasing tendencies, transparency no longer trusts the 
                                                     
180 See Section 5.5.2: I documented rise transparency/accountability connotations of openness 
as open data joins open access as a policy issue).   
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scientist alone with this task: the eyes of a community (perhaps including online “data 
thugs”, see Section 7.10), and the panoptical eye of public visibility, are turned in this 
direction.  
 
Transparency is closely linked to reproducibility in scientists’ accounts (Section 7.8.2), 
and the need to prove the integrity of knowledge-making in response to 
“reproducibility crises” (Section 5.3.2). There is an implication here that good 
knowledge-making must be amenable to exposure and extraction from context. An 
extreme manifestation of transparency as an open epistemic virtue is the automation 
of data sharing to eliminate human imperfection from this process (Kekecs et al. 
2019), and the removal of a need for trust (observed by Gabrielsen 2020), although 
these are not inevitable directions. Transparency and reproducibility were strongly 
tied to scientist interviewees’ epistemic virtue framings, and seemed to drive 
principled and passionate orientations towards open science in general (see Section 
7.8). After my analysis, I found that Freese and Peterson (2018) also link 
reproducibility concerns with the emergence of a new epistemic virtue in Daston and 
Galison’s sense, which they describe “statistical objectivity”. This is a “meta 
objectivity” focused upon populations of studies, rather than individual studies, that 
configures scientists as “economic actors led into bed practices by a poorly aligned 
system of incentives” (Freese and Peterson 2018:293). This is an interesting synthesis 
overlapping with the “transparency” category I propose as well as my observation that 
researchers are portrayed as incentive-driven in open discourses (see Section 5.5.4). 
However, my analysis of epistemic virtue focuses more on openness than 
reproducibility, and is based on scientists’ interview accounts, where Freese and 
Peterson draw primarily on literature and academic activism associated with the 




A further distinct open epistemic virtue is collegiality, which involves offering oneself 
and one’s embodied knowledge generously to a scientific community. It is a defining 
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feature of interpersonal openness, but incorporates other community-oriented 
practices identified by interviewees. It involves building and nourishing communities 
by fostering trust and collective identity; establishing networks; supporting colleagues 
and particularly students; and even designing physical environments to promote 
interaction (as one interviewee, David, had done: I borrowed his use of “collegiality”). 
Collegiality improves knowledge through free-flowing idea-generation; creativity; 
excitement; and the creation of settings in which this can occur. As an epistemic 
virtue it is dissimilar to objectivity as identified by Daston and Galison: although it is 
identity-defining and tied to truth-seeking, it builds upon rather than suppressing 
human influence. It exposes knowledge-making not through surveillance, but 
through relational vulnerability, and is strongly trust-mediated. Where objectivity, 
and its “open” extension – transparency – seek to counteract error-prone tendencies 
of the self, collegial openness is trusting of the self and its insight, and of other 
community members. It thus has self-possessed qualities that contrast with some 
stereotypic characterisations of science. If it guards against any tendencies of the self, 
they might be distrust, competitiveness, narrowness, isolation or stagnation. 
 
9.4.4 Cognitive justice 
 
This fourth open epistemic virtue is only thinly represented in my interview data, but 
signposts an important, newer direction in open science discourse that has been 
centred in the global north (see Chan et al. 2020; and Section 5.5.2). It has important 
distinguishing features that variously challenge or complement the categories above. 
Cognitive justice is “open to all knowledge and all epistemologies, and not an abstract 
universalism based on Western standards that exclude what is different from 
themselves” (Piron, 2018, cited in translated form in Chan et al. 2020). This virtue 
acknowledges the inequalities that are embedded in knowledge-making systems, and 
has feminist, decolonial sensibilities. It might be embodied by a reflexive, situated, 
empathetic self that seeks truth(s) by counteracting tendencies towards narrowness, 
assumed omniscience, supremacy, and perhaps – objectivity. It is self-examining but 
not self-denying, and with parallels to Haraway’s (1988) feminist objectivity . This 
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virtue is in conflict with some others, especially transparency as outlined above: an 
uncomfortable implication for some open science movements.
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Table 8 | Proposed categories of epistemic virtue that underlie or cut across “openness” categories identified by scientists in interview. Cognitive justice framings were 
uncommon in interview, but represent an important emerging, contrasting direction in open science.  
Types of virtue Commoning Transparency Collegiality Cognitive justice 
Description 
Communal resource 




Making detail and 
processes of knowledge 
production transparent 
for inspection and 
reproduction 
Making oneself and one’s 
knowledge available as a 
colleague; cultivating 
trust and community; 
supporting colleagues 
Acknowledging contextual 
embeddedness of oneself 
and one’s knowledge; 
addressing effects of 
systemic inequality 
Linked practices 
Open access; open 
preprints; open data; 
data stewardship; open 
materials (some of these 
are more “commons” 
than “commoning) 









Representing and including 
diversity; reflexivity; 
receptivity to other views 
and epistemologies 
Tendency of 




Bias, imperfection, error, 











“…the more scientists 
especially that have 
access to research data, 
resources, publications, 
the better your science 
will be…” (Jason) 
“...if they're not open, 
and you're not able to 
actually really examine, 
drill into that data in 
more detail, you start to 
worry about the...yeah, 
the integrity of their 
science.” (Mark) 
“I think if people were 
less worried about 
somebody, I don't know, 
maybe...using their ideas, 
or wanting to come on 
board, I think maybe 
there'd be a lot more idea 
sharing.” (Nicole) 
“…it’s way better at the end 
of the day because you have 
multiple people with 
multiple perspectives and 
expertise. And that’s going 
to produce better science 





9.5 Contextualising virtue: insecurity, inequality, and culture 
 
There is a vital counterpoint to the construction of openness as one or several 
epistemic virtues: virtuous orientations are not equally accessible. I have explored this 
topic in depth in Chapters 7 and 8 in relation to data and interpersonal openness. The 
scientists I spoke to – even those in positions of significant power – tended to feel 
beholden to a “system” through which jobs, promotions, grants and prestige are 
distributed. This system was associated with feelings of anxiety, scarcity, precarity, 
and pressure. An environment of this kind in academia is increasingly well-
documented, and related to trends such as the rise of the “entrepreneurial university”; 
short term job contracts and the projectification of research; metrics and rankings 
including the journal impact factor and its use in performance assessments; and a 
large population of PhD graduates compared with available academic jobs (Felt 2017; 
Müller and De Rijcke 2017; Schönbauer 2019, 2020; Slaughter and Leslie 1997). 
 
Interview accounts showed how such an environment impacts on openness. Opening 
up some stages and types of knowledge-making was associated with acute risks and 
anxieties about scooping and transparent exposure. As I have discussed, made 
openness easier for scientists who are more secure than others in a pressured system. 
In Chapter 7 I identified short- to long-term factors that seemed to shape this feeling 
or experience of security (see Table 6). Importantly, some forms of security not only 
made openness feel easier, but buffered its risks. Scientists in insecure positions may 
not be able to afford such risk-taking. Unequal access to openness is likely to be 
reinforced by the fact that openness is often rewarding – both personally and 
professionally – as well as risky. Open access was easier for scientists in wealthy labs 
or with access to wealthy institutional systems: thus, the benefit of greater visibility 
through openness also accrues to those scientists. The effect was more notable in 
relation to data and interpersonal openness, which were epistemically and socially 
enriching. Scientists who embraced interpersonal openness in particular spoke of its 
reciprocal rewards and long-term benefits. Current proposals to promote open 
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scientific cultures top-down by creating rewards for open practices (e.g. LERU 2018; 
Wilsdon et al. 2017) risk feeding into this feedback loop that reinforces the security of 
scientists who already had the privilege to be open. Inevitably, woven through these 
privilege dynamics are systematic societal inequalities, which likely make openness 
more accessible to scientists at intersections of power in gender, race, ethnicity, 
disability, sexual orientation, class, and so on. 
 
One final form of privilege is worthy of particular mention because it may be a means 
to rebalance – although not overcome – others. There was evidence that supportive 
role modelling, mentoring, and community dynamics had a formative effect on 
scientists’ feelings of security in their early careers. It may be the case that risks 
associated with openness can be buffered in a community that builds confidence and 
generosity in individuals, and provides a secure foundation from which to experiment 
with the risks and rewards of openness. Conversely, experiences of scarcity, 
competition, and isolation seemed to promote long-term protective approaches. 
 
9.6 Comparison with similar studies 
 
The findings of my interview study in Chapters 6-8, and their synthesis in this 
chapter, can be productively compared with the findings of similar studies mentioned 
in the Introduction (see Section 1.9.1). The most relevant comparison is to Levin et al. 
(2016), because their interview study with 22 UK biomedical researchers employed a 
similar broad framing and in-depth qualitative methodology in which interviewees 
were asked about their understanding “openness” in science (p. 3). The thematic 
analysis conducted by these authors yielded seven themes characterising 
understandings of openness, and nine factors shaping openness practices. These 
themes and factors were broadly consistent with my observations: for example, 
interviewees across both studies highlighted the importance of “timely donation of 
and access to research components” and “access to research components in non-
Western and/or Nonacademic contexts” (themes identified by Levin et al.). 
Interviewees from my study also concurred that factors such as “the existence of 
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repositories and databases for data, materials, software, and models”, “the 
competitiveness of academic fields”, and “credit systems in academic research” shape 
experiences and practices of openness. My study also aligned with overall conclusions 
of Levin et al., including that researchers’ decisions about openness are highly 
contextual, especially for data, and that open policies which are too stringent or 
standardised may be counterproductive. 
 
There are also key differences and complementarities between my findings and those 
of Levin et al. (2016), which highlight the contribution of my research. These seem to 
arise from differences in analytical approach, theoretical lens and sampling strategy. 
Most obviously, my analysis took a different form to that of Levin and co-authors. My 
use of multiple analytical techniques, including but going beyond NVivo coding, 
resulted in a decision to focus on three highly salient themes (open access, data 
openness and interpersonal openness) that incorporate many sub-themes and capture 
a cross-section of experience. This focus enabled me to study scientists’ relationships 
with each of these categories in depth, sensitised by epistemic virtue and experiences 
of scientific self. This in turn enabled the synthesis in the current chapter, which goes 
beyond these three categories to identify underlying virtues of “openness” that 
scientists uphold in their practices and identities. The analytical process described by 
Levin et al. seemed instead to rely more directly upon thematic coding (“…the authors 
coded the interviews with the software program NVivo. The selected themes were 
included in the study if they were referred to by at least three different interviewees”, 
p. 3). As a result their findings are best summarised as a collection of themes and 
factors associated with openness that are difficult to cluster due to their variety. In 
contrast, my study features more thick description evoking openness as constructed 
by scientists; continuities and contrasts in their relationships with openness, 
including affective dimensions; and systematic conceptualisation of why experiences 
and identities in relation to openness are diverse, including consideration of factors 
that may be implicit (such as vulnerability). 
 
The different process and form of my analysis compared to that of Levin et al. (2016) 
is also associated with at least one clear novel finding in my study: the identification 
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of interpersonal openness as a category that is highly salient and meaningful for 
scientists. There is a hint that interviewees in Levin et al.’s study raised similar ideas, 
as those authors identify “collaboration and cooperation with peers and communities” 
as a theme. This theme touches on a link between openness, informal sharing, and 
collaboration, but does not capture the distinctiveness and salience of the category in 
my research, which includes its relative absence from established “open science” 
discourse, and its coherent links to the sharing of unpublished ideas, trust, 
reciprocity, generosity, creativity, vulnerability, and a fulfilment of scientific self.  
 
There are likely several reasons why this category did not arise with the same 
distinctive salience in the study by Levin et al. (2016), despite the similar breadth and 
framing of their study. Firstly, my analytical focus on scientists’ relationships with 
openness promoted a focus on personally meaningful and identity-defining categories 
such as interpersonal openness. Secondly, like other similar exploratory, qualitative 
studies on this topic – such as Scheliga and Friesike (2014) and Ali-Khan et al. (2017) – 
Levin et al.’s analytical lens may focus their attention on established categories of 
“open science” over alternative interpretations by scientists that do not fit coherently 
with current advocacy and policy discourses. Despite this, Levin et al. were more 
likely than others to encounter interpersonal openness due their use of “openness” 
rather than “open science” as an interview prompt (I reflect on this in Section 8.3). 
Finally, my inclusion of interviewees without pre-existing links to open science 
movements may have been a pivotal difference: both Levin et al. and Scheliga and 
Friesike (2014) recruited interviewees through their connections with open science. 
This would have made it less likely that interviewees would raise alternative 
categories of openness, even within a broad, exploratory study. This difference in 
sampling may also have shaped a greater focus by Levin et al. on themes reflecting 
“expert” knowledge of open policy and advocacy, such as metadata, standard formats, 
and open-source approaches to intellectual property. In sum, breadth in both 
participant input to my study and my analytical gaze, with a particular emphasis on 
how “openness” is constructed outside advocacy and policy perspectives, likely 
contributed to my identification of interpersonal openness. This approach and finding 
proved valuable in making sense of many scientists’ lack of “engagement” with open 
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science – partly by showing that openness is of deep interest to most scientists, but 
perhaps not in the ways that are expected. 
 
Levin and Leonelli (2016) analysed selected aspects of the interviews by Levin et al. 
(2016) in more depth and concluded that openness is a mode of valuing research, 
rather than a value or virtue in its own right. This conclusion is complementary with 
aspects of my own findings: throughout the thesis I have observed that openness 
connotes a diverse, expanding and internally contradictory range of values and 
practices; it is not coherent or self-explanatory as a value, but rather plays a social and 
sematic role as a rallying point for meaning, through its flexibility and the history of 
its use in contexts connected to science. Levin and Leonelli (2016) also make nuanced 
observations of scientists’ negotiations of openness and closure; how different aspects 
of the research process are valued; and the risk that open science policies will disrupt 
the “close and ever-changing relationships” between scientists and the aspects of 
research they value and have laboured over (p. 18). These observations strike a chord 
with my own, especially those in Chapters 7 and 8, which touch on partial and finely 
calibrated forms of openness, and the value that is gained and lost through opening 
up or holding back personally meaningful data or ideas.  
 
Levin and Leonelli (2016)’s conclusion about value in relation to openness is thus 
productive in light of my own research as well as theirs. My conceptualisation of 
openness in relation to epistemic virtue does not challenge Levin and Leonelli’s 
conclusion. Instead, it offers a new layer or depth of understanding of scientists’ 
relationships with openness. While openness itself may not have essential qualities as 
a value or virtue in science, my conclusion is that many scientists assign significance 
to the idea and/or terminology of openness; that it plays a role in their understanding 
of “good science” and being a “good scientist”; and that these understandings can be 
collective, albeit situated, shaping consensus views of epistemic virtue in scientific 
communities. This is not to say that “openness” has one meaning when it is upheld or 
internalised as a virtue in these settings. It means many things, but is loosely bounded 
by recurring features in scientists’ experiences, such as an experience of epistemic 
exposure that is both vulnerable and potentially rewarding. It also connects and 
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perhaps unites several distinct principles that scientists may already consider 
important to their practice and identity (such as commoning, transparency, 
collegiality, and cognitive justice; see Section 9.4). All of the nuances of openness and 
its situated value, as identified by Levin and Leonelli, remain relevant. But in this 
study, I showed that – alongside processes and outputs of research – scientists’ 
identities and notions of what is “right” when making knowledge are also subject to 
openness as a “mode of valuation” (ibid., p. 17). Thus, these identities and moralities 
are shifting in complex ways with the rising salience of open science movements.  
 
9.7 Conclusion: an open science “revolution”? 
 
This study is set within the context of the so-called open science “revolution” 
(Bartling and Friesike 2014b; Nielsen 2009; The Royal Society 2012) in which scientific 
practice is expected, by some advocates and policymakers, to transform on a scale not 
seen for centuries. I have critiqued and contextualised this narrative, but it remains 
the case that some kind of transformation is happening as open science becomes a 
priority in research governance, and advocate voices embrace more and more 
varieties of openness. My research enables me to comment on the “cultural” aspect of 
this transformation. The internalisation – or otherwise – of openness as an epistemic 
virtue suggests the extent to which open science is transforming ways of being as a 
scientist, and deeply-held conceptions of good science. In sum, based on the analyses 
above, there is at present no consensus on the virtue of contemporary open science, at 
least amongst a disciplinarily broad population of biologists in the study context. 
Open access movements by themselves appear not to have had a widely, deeply felt 
impact on internalised notions of “good science”. However, the idea of an “open” 
epistemology seems to have gained traction as open data movements rise to join open 
access, with accompanying movements seeking transparency and reproducibility. The 
main indication of this change - a particular principled, passionate stance of a group 
of more recently trained interviewees – suggests the beginning of a transition marked 
by a re-making of epistemic subjects: a generation of “open” scientists. This does not 
suggest a natural ascendency, but an ongoing, multi-sited, cross-generational, value-
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based negotiation or contest in which prevailing conceptions of good science are 
challenged and may be displaced. 
 
The shaping of epistemic subjects is a robust indicator of deep cultural change. 
However, this cultural shift – if it is indeed taking place – is fragile, and in its early 
stages. It depends on the trajectory that younger scientists take through their careers, 
the effects of these journeys on their relationship with “open”, and the nature of the 
ongoing influence from open science advocacy and policy movements. Moreover, 
several implications of this shift require ongoing attention and critique. Firstly, as I 
have argued, current pressures, diverse epistemic contexts, and systematic 
inequalities in academic research make openness unequally available, and may 
amplify privilege. Top-down incentives to be open may magnify this effect. Scientists 
who are less secure in their careers; who are isolated from support; who feel unable to 
trust their communities; or who work with less standardisable data and methods, are 
at risk of being disadvantaged in a shift towards “open”. This, in turn, may entrench a 
need for self-protective closure. This applies to all career generations: not all recently 
trained scientists were in a position to internalise open values, and some continued to 
receive formative training in highly competitive, unsupportive, or precarious settings.  
 
Secondly, the nature of the “open” epistemology rising to prominence requires 
ongoing attention. My analysis suggests that it is predominantly influenced by a 
vision of transparency and reproducibility that extends a traditional, objective “view 
from nowhere” (Daston and Galison 2007; Haraway 1988). This view may narrow or 
lock out alternative ways of knowing. Leonelli (2018) argues that a focus on 
reproducibility reduces researchers’ attention to local, idiosyncratic, and variable 
aspects of their research, as well as “devaluing the role of expertise and embodied 
knowledge in data production, processes and assessment” (p. 13). This type of 
openness is thus in conflict with a decolonising view of open science framed by 
cognitive justice (see Chan et al. 2020 and Section 9.4.4). Moreover, the mechanism 
by which this type openness governs integrity – and produces “good science” – is 
analogous to panoptical surveillance (Foucault 1991): the creation of a system in which 
scientists avoid imperfections, errors and malpractice because they face the ongoing 
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potential of exposure. This mechanism may build trust in outputs of science, but it 
operates by institutionalising distrust amongst scientists, and contains a logic by 
which the elimination of trust – and of human influence – is ideal. This conflicts with 
a collegial, generous, trusting view openness that nurtures community. There is also 
an emphasis in open science discourse and policy on the creation of universal 
information “commons” rather than on “commoning” practices that acknowledge the 
social entanglements of knowledge production and sharing (Moore 2018).  
 
These are not inevitable directions of “open” epistemologies. My interview study 
indicated that scientists deeply inspired by “open” sometimes had broad and 
imaginative views that went beyond transparency and reproducibility, and sometimes 
included a deep sense of moral responsibility towards publics; a receptivity to 
collaboration and outside ideas; and a community-oriented, supportive mind-set. 
These scientists also tended to combine an open approach to interpersonal 
interactions with their online openness. Interpersonal openness is imperfect, but its 
partial diffusion as an epistemic virtue through scientific communities suggests – 
almost maps – how current scientific cultures are locally enabling or constraining 
collegiality and generosity. A healthy, equitable embrace of online open science surely 
depends on the capacity for scientific communities – and the individuals that make 
them up – to be collegial, generous, and supportive of diversity. For an open science 
revolution that raises up – and arises from – a diverse community of scientists in all 
their humanity, we must think deeply about the kinds of openness we hope future 
generations of scientists will embody as they practice “good science”. 
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Appendix A: Recommendations for open science 
advocates and policymakers 
 
I acknowledge that individuals and organisations advocating and making policy to 
promote open science are diverse, and face complex challenges with which I am not 
practically familiar. Individuals in these roles likely have contextual knowledge that 
aligns with or challenges my findings. I present these recommendations with the hope 
that they may become conversations, and enable mutual learning.  
 
 Where scientists seem to lack awareness, understanding, engagement, or 
incentives to engage with open practices, consider alternative framings. For 
example, their position may arise from a combination of: 
o distrust of institutions that represent or mediate open practices, including 
commercial publishing systems; 
o vulnerability, especially if they are experiencing other forms of insecurity 
(or have been influenced by such experiences in the past); 
o implementations of “open” that lack sensitivity or relevance to particular 
local contexts of knowledge-making; 
 Open practices that reveal processes of knowledge-making (e.g. open data) have a 
greater capacity to engage scientists deeply than practices that make finalised 
science open (e.g. open access).  
o But for similar reasons, opening up unpublished and/or process-related 
information can be vulnerable and risky experience, especially for 
scientists with existing vulnerabilities. 
 Avoiding one-size-fits-all approaches is important. Also important: scientists’ 
relationships with openness vary not just according to face-value factors like 
discipline and ethical or commercial considerations, but layered and nuanced 
factors like the uniqueness of project resources; trust dynamics in their 
community; and long-term career security (see Table 6).  
 It may be easier to engage scientists in open practices that allow trust-building 
and social, collaborative interaction between sharer and recipient. 
II 
 
 Top-down, enforceable forms of openness present a problem for engagement for 
interlinked reasons related to trust, agency, and sensitivity to local context. 
o There may be an inverse relationship between the measurability and 
enforceability of an open practice, and its value and meaning in context. 
 Open practices tend to be easier for scientists who are systemically advantaged. 
Consider that reward systems incentivising openness may reinforce existing forms 
of advantage and disadvantage. 
 Supportive supervision and mentoring is an important factor promoting a long-
term sense of security in early career scientists, which in turn is a foundation for 
openness. 
 Most importantly: consider nurturing a sense of wellbeing, security and trust in 
research communities as a first step to supporting openness, especially if 
openness requires vulnerability. This may require imaginative, empathy-based 
policymaking. I include a thought experiment below. 
 
Thought experiment: empathy-based policymaking for openness 
The kinds of openness that scientists and advocates of open science may value the 
most entail in-depth knowledge work, caring labour, and vulnerability. Such 
practices cannot be straightforwardly measured, incentivised, and implemented. 
They connect to questions like: what makes people secure pursuing this 
profession? What makes them care about it, deeply? Are they at liberty to pursue 
that? If they are generous with their community and with society, will they be 
valued or punished? If they are unable to be generous, will they be supported – 
not isolated, not punished? Making sense of research culture is hard. It’s even 
harder to admit that we probably know some of the ways to improve it already, 
but they are not convenient, politically, financially, or procedurally. They are not 
amenable to standard policy measures.  
 
Think about the best contexts for openness that you have witnessed. Not the most 
open individuals. Think about the student who feels safe, inspired, and ambitious 
because their department holds a coffee morning every day (see Section 7.10). 
III 
 
They don’t just hold it, people attend. People don’t just attend, they talk. They 
don’t just talk, they talk openly. They don’t just talk to people they know. They 
don’t just talk to people of their own rank. Senior scientists go out of their way. 
Senior scientists are at liberty to go out of their way to help. Because they don’t 
feel precarious themselves. And because they didn’t feel precarious when they 
were students. Think about why these things might come about. How they are 





Appendix B: Interview schedule 
 
Sample interview schedule for scientists 
 
Thank you. 
Introduce - sci training in bio, work in sci publishing, interest in social/cultural 
aspects. 
Topic - deliberately broad, you can frame the discussion, no right or wrong answers. 
Biographical component at the beginning for context. 






Could you tell me briefly about the research you’re currently involved in? 
 
How would you define the discipline/disciplines that you are part of? 
Your primary identity as a scientist? What is comfortable? 
When in your career did you start thinking of yourself as this? 
Previous identities in career? 
 
Which scientific community or communities would you say you were part of? 
 




Could you tell me what first comes to mind when you think about openness in 
science? Most salient issues/thoughts 
 
Does [that kind of] openness feel like something relevant to you? 
Does it make you feel any particular way - interested, passionate, bored, worried? 
 
Do you recall when you first came across the term “open” or “openness” 
used in relation to science - or has it always been used, in your experience? 
 
How would you describe science that is open? What does it look like for you, 
in practice? 




Is there a difference between “openness in science” and “open science” as 
far as you are concerned? Open source? 
 
 
In your everyday work (e.g. talking to colleagues, in the lab/field, at 
conferences, writing publications…) is openness something you have tended 
to think about? 
Are you making decisions about what to say or not say to others? 
When advising students? 
 
Has this changed over your career? 
 
Have you ever faced a situation in which you wanted to share more scientific 
information than you did in the end? Or when you kept information back but 
regretted doing so? 
 
Have you ever regretted sharing as much information as you did? 
 
Did (or do) you tend to: 
- Publish open access? 
- Share raw/primary data? 
- Share information about a study before publication? (preprints) 
- Open peer review 
- Open notebook science 
Has this changed? 
 
Have you been aware of any expectations or rules from your university of 




Did/do you feel that there was a consensus in your discipline about how 
“open” science should be? 
Should there have been? What? Why? 
 
Think about a scientist who you know and really admire - someone who you 
think is a really good scientist. Could you describe their qualities as a scientist - 
what makes them a good scientist? Is this anything to do with openness, or is 
openness unrelated? 




Is there such a thing as an “open scientist” for you? If so, what are they like? 





Anything else we haven’t covered? 
 
Sample interview schedule for advocate/policymaker 
 
 Tailored to the individual 
 
To start off with - for context -  
I’m wondering if you could talk a bit about your background in science and how 
you’ve got to where you are now. 
 
Could you tell me a bit about your background in research, as [e.g. a 
biologist]? 
What type of research did you do in your PhD? How did you find the experience? 
Did you continuing to work as a biologist? 
 
Which scientific community or communities would you say you were/are part 
of in biology? 
 




Could you describe how you have got involved in advocating for openness in 
science?  
What were your reasons for becoming an advocate? 
 
Do you recall when you first came across the term “open” or “openness” 
used in relation to science - or has it always been used, in your experience? 
 
Could you tell me what first comes to mind when you think about openness in 
science now? What does it mean to you? 
 
Is there a difference between “openness in science” and “open science” as 
far as you are concerned? Open source? 
 
How would you describe science that is open? What does it look like for you? 
Do you have a vision for what open science should look like? 
Open access, open data, open peer review, open notebooks, preprints… 
 
Is there such a thing as an “open scientist” for you? If so, what are they like? 
VII 
 
Are they defined by what they do? Their attitudes? Their communities? Their 
character? 
 
Have your views on openness in science changed or developed while during 
your years of advocacy? If so, how? 
 




How do you think openness in science is understood by academic scientists? 
How would you describe their attitudes? What types of openness are they keen (or 
not) to engage with? Why do you think some scientists are ambivalent or negative 
about openness? What are their priorities?  
 
What is your opinion on the current state of openness in science (broader / 
UK policy)?  
Are things heading in the right direction or not?  
What, if anything, still needs to change?  
What do you think the priorities should be? 
 
How do you understand the policy landscape in the UK and Europe currently?  




From your point of view, is there anything particular that you hope my 
research could shed light on? 
 
Are there any particular articles, reports or projects which you think I should 
pay attention to, that I might not be aware of? 
VIII 
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Appendix E: Interview transcripts 
 
Some interviewees opted for their transcripts to be made publicly available (or 
archived online in a controlled access way), and/or to be named. I have not yet 
uploaded the relevant interviews to data archiving services (I will complete this after 
submission). However, I include two interview transcripts here as samples of method 
and data. These interviewees opted for their transcripts to be made publicly available. 
Ernie is anonymous, and Jenny (Professor Jenny Graves) is named. 
Interview transcript: Ernie 
 
- Opted for the transcript to be publicly available with pseudonym 
- Made some edits to the transcript, for flow and confidentiality of third parties 
- Recruited by “cold” emailing; interview took place in-person, October 2017 
- UK university context 
 
So to start out with could you tell me briefly about the kind of research you're currently 
involved in? 
 
Yeah, we're currently involved in studying what happens to the chromosomes when cells 
divide. So we're interested in how the DNA - the chromatin transforms its structure from 
the interphase nucleus to make the mitotic chromosomes. We're interested in how the 
mitotic chromosomes attach to the mitotic spindle - which is what guides them in their 
movements during mitosis - and we're interested in how that process is regulated, in 
particular by one complicated protein kinase.  
 
Okay, right. And is that... As part of that, how would you define the discipline or disciplines 
that you're working within? 
 
I'm a cell biologist. And considered to be an expert on chromosome structure and mitosis.  
 
Right, okay. Is that how - Is that the most comfortable identity you would give yourself, cell 
biologist? 
 
Sure, sure.  
 
Has that been stable throughout the years, or is it something you've changed over your 
career? 
 
I started as a molecular biologist, but I started a long time ago when molecular biology 
encompassed lots of things that included cell biology. But I've considered myself a cell 




Okay. So your initial training was...molecular biology. Is that how it was talked about at the 
time, or was it...? 
 
It was just called biology [laughs]. 
 
Just biology, yeah. 
 
Yeah. But I did my - my undergraduate I didn't particularly train very much in biology, I 
did that only when I went into postgraduate work, and I did that at [institution], and the 
department there was very molecularly oriented. Molecular genetic orientation to that 
department at that time.  
 
Is there something distinct about that time of being a molecular biologist that's different 
from being a cell biologist? In terms of... 
 
[Pause]. Not really, a lot of what I did could also be lumped under microbiology. I studied 
viruses. I studied bacteriophages, viruses that infect bacteria. But I was doing structural 
studies of them by x-ray diffraction analysis and also doing genetic studies. It was kind of a 
complicated mixed PhD with many different aspects to it. And today all of those things are 
covered in our textbook in cell biology that we have published.  
 
Okay, right. And so - sort of, being in all these different disciplines, I'm guessing that that 
means you're a member of maybe one main scientific community or several scientific 
communities where you do your work - where you sort of review other people's work. What 
would you say those are? The scientific communities you're in. 
 
Mostly things having to do with chromatin and chromosomes and cell division.  
 
And is there any particular word or words you would use to describe those communities - 
some people say the community is big or small or competitive or friendly, or has some kind 
of character... 
 
I'd say that those communities tend to be very competitive and not always particularly 
friendly.  
 
Hm, right okay. Well I'll ask you about openness now, and - just to start off with, I'm 
wondering what first comes to mind when you think about openness in science, or whatever 
you thought this interview...would or should be about? 
 
Well it's your interview so I didn't [laughs]...I didn't have any particular ideas for what it 
should be about. I mean, there's the whole issue of openness in publishing, there's the issue 
of openness in how you interact with others - I mean those are the two major things that I 
think of when I think of openness. There's this new thing coming along where - wanting 
people to make all their data open. But that's, in my opinion, particularly groups of people 
who sort of have an axe to grind and don't think about - really about how what they're 
arguing for will impact many other people who work in different ways from them. 
 




Well, so a lot of the people...there are people who are arguing that all - basically lab books, 
all lab books should be electronic. At one extreme there are people who are arguing that the, 
the content of those electronic lab books should be made accessible to anybody at any time 
- to everybody, basically. Right from the moment they're created. This is...completely 
unrealistic for a number of reasons. It's - the first reason why it's unrealistic is, I have my 
own ideas and my own methods that I want to use to answer questions. The fact that I can 
convince people that my ideas are better than other people's ideas, is how I get grant 
funding. If everything I do is immediately made open to all of my competitors, then where's 
the advantage in me having ideas, I may as well not have ideas, I may as well just get good 
at...surfing the web and finding what other people have done and not yet even published 
and then jumping on top of it. And so I, I think that that's really...the people who do that 
don't think about the fact that competition is extremely important in getting funding. If I 
can't convince people - if I can't convince the [funder], that I am the right - so whenever you 
write a grant, you have to have a really important problem, you have to have a really 
powerful way to study that problem, and you have to be able to convince a committee of 
people that you are the best person to study that problem. Better than anybody else. Time 
after time, people will not get funded, even though they've identified a good problem, they 
have a good method, and then the committee sit there and say, "Oh yeah but that, that group 
off in America's already doing this. They were always going to do this better, and this 
applicant can't compete." So you have to have that edge, and if you make everything open, 




Alright so that's one thing. The other thing is... People want, they want to have all the data 
out there, well if I'm doing genomic sequencing - and so what I do is I isolate some DNA, 
and then I do whatever I do to it, and then I send it off to a facility and I get back a few 
terabytes of sequence data which I'm then going to work with. That comes back as a big 
huge file, and it represents a lot of - you know, maybe months' worth of work or whatever. 
Sure, I can make that available to everybody when I decide I want to make that available. 
But what if what I'm doing instead involves taking thousands of individual pictures of 
things with a microscope. Am I then supposed to put these - you know - figure out a way of 
formatting in which to store these thousands of pictures and then make them all available to 
everybody? That's going to take as much time or more than it takes get the data in the first 
place. Where - where's the allocation of time for doing that? I'm - you know, I'm supposed 
to answer a question within a certain amount of time, and the [funder] – they don’t give me 
any money for a secretary, and they wouldn't give me - they wouldn't say, "Oh yeah well 
six months out of each year can be spent in the process of archiving your data so that you 
can make it open." But if that's what it took then it simply means that I'm losing six months 
of research time, so for people whose data involves collecting many scraps and different 
pieces from all over, and all different types of data, to then have to assemble all of that and 
make it available to everybody in a comprehensible way, is a huge, huge time burden. And 
people arguing for open data often don't think about that. So the people who are in favour of 
this open data tend to be people who produce huge datasets, which is like one big lump, and 
you can release the one big lump. But when you produce thousands of little datasets, now 




Mm, okay, so these people who you - you think have a sort of particular axe to grind with 
open data issues, is that how you imagine that arises, that they have a different kind of data 
to deal with? Their sort of workflow is completely different? Is that where you think this 
comes from? 
 
A lot of the people, their workflow is quite different, yeah, yeah. Uh... Yes, yeah. 
 
Okay. So does the whole - when I talk about the issue of openness in science, does it feel 




Is it something that you...like you feel a particular way about, like sort of interested, or 
passionate, or worried, or annoyed, or... 
 
Well, one of the things I enjoy most about science is going to meetings and visiting other 
places and talking to people about my work and having them talk to me about their work. 
And people who are constantly playing a game, that you know - you show me yours and I'll 
show you mine, and I'm only going to show you - I'm going to figure out how much what 
you told me is worth and I'll show you that much - I mean that's just...that's a drag. So I 
cultivate relationships with people who I trust and then we just talk freely about ideas, and I 
do that with people who I compete with as well as people who I'm collaborating with. 
And... But the competitors that I do that with are competitors who I know and trust.  
 
Okay. How do you know if you can trust someone, in the context, is it...? 
 
You just... Lifelong experience gives you some hints for how you, you know, who you can 
trust and who you can't, but sometimes you make mistakes, and there are people you can't 
trust. Others, you can. I mean I... Years ago, I felt that I was stabbed in the back 
scientifically by one of my best friends. Many years ago. We used to go out every Friday 
and have dinner together, and have a drink, and just socialise and have a good time. And 
then... And we were collaborating a project, and then without - on a project - and without 




At the same time as he was doing all of this, and so that really hurt. But...that didn't stop me 
from having other very close friendships and collaborations with people, and thankfully 
that's never happened again.  
 
Did find that experience formative in any way, did you... 
 
Well... It certainly influenced my future interactions with him, I mean I still interact with 
him years later and we are still friends and enjoy each other’s company socially. But even 
though he has come a long way in his career and is now super-successful and would be 
extremely unlikely to need my ideas ...  Because of that residual memory, I don't go out of 





Mm, okay. And what about with other people, do you...are you more...? 
 
Well with most of the people I interact with, there are just some people who you...just the 
word is out there. You know, we were talking about - I went out to dinner with a seminar 
speaker last night and the name of another person - not the person I was just talking about - 
came up, and two different people round the table said "Oh," you know, "he's a terrible 
shark, I wouldn't - nobody has anything - nobody wants anything to do with him", so there 
are people who just have this reputation. I mean one person once told my students that the 
only good reason to go to a scientific meeting was to steal ideas. I think he thought he was 




You know, I - personally, that doesn't interest me. If I can't have my own ideas, then I 
should retire. 'Cause what science for me is about is the creative process of having ideas, 
and then seeing if you can figure a way - first of all, they have to be good ideas, and then 
you have to see if you can figure out a way to see if they're true or not. That's what the fun 
is.  
 
Mm, okay. Did you have any - thinking about this way of learning who you can trust and 
deciding what ideas to share, and how to be open with other people, do you - did you have 
any - Yeah, is there any aspect of your training in this, did you have any influential mentors 
or people who showed you how this kind of thing is done? 
 
Not really. I mean my PhD training was in the bacteriophage, in the virus assembly 
community, and there was a - there was a specific meeting for those people at 
[location/institution] lab that we used to go to, and we used to socialise with other people. 
But I don't - but there wasn't a big history of the group leaders collaborating with one 
another. Uh... I think they, I think they talked about - at that meeting you would talk about 
unpublished work, and it would - and people wouldn't steal your work. So maybe to that 
extent there was, but... No, that just came...it's just obvious that if you can collaborate and 
become friends with people who have complementary expertise to you, then your life is 
going to be richer. Now I collaborate a lot with people in [country], and that... that involves 
a very particular type of process. Because most of the [nationality] people who I have 
worked with and know, do not place a high priority on respecting boundaries on things. If 
they see something, they believe that everyone has a right to work on it, and they'll work on 
it. So the way I collaborate with those people is we talk in general about what we're 
working on, and then basically we just end up both doing what we were going to do 
anyway. The important key is that when we have finished up an overlapping project, we get 
together and we talk about it and we put together what we all have and we always publish 
together. But we don't say - I'm going to work on this and you're not going to work on that, 
because that just doesn't work. They work on it anyway. But they don't do it maliciously, 
it's just the way they, it's just the way that the people I've interacted with are. And I've had 
very long term friendships and interactions with a number of people in [country]. And 




So, and when you're collaborating with other people, are there - those boundaries are sort 
of...sort of exist, and they are unspoken or...? 
 
Well... Not necessarily, I mean at the moment we're working on a big - we're collaborating 
on a, we have - I mean, I have a number of collaborations going at the moment - there's a 
big one where we have a paper which is, we're revising in [prominent journal], and there 
my lab is doing all the wet cell biology and biochemical work, another lab is doing the 
molecular biology analysis, and a third lab is doing very high level mathematical modelling 
of the data. None of the labs would really be competent to do what the other labs are doing, 
so it's a perfect collaboration in a sense, because everybody knows what their niche is. And 
then, the paper's going to have three - the paper has three first authors, and three 
corresponding authors. 
 
Mm, okay. I'm wondering - going a bit back to the issue of openness in general, is there a 
time when you started hearing the word "openness" or "open" in relation to science - is it 
something that you've always...thought and heard about, or is...? 
 
Well, yeah, no. No, I - I think that started, I mean if I would think about openness, I would 
think, well primarily - the first big conversation about this was about open access in 
publishing I think. And in my understanding, this was basically because the University of 
California couldn't pay Elsevier's bill. Elsevier - because Elsevier bundled all of their 
journals together and they charged, and they were charging the University of California all 
this money, and California had a budget crunch, and people couldn't really afford to pay it, 
so a lot of them became real activists for saying, "Well we think this should be open, 
publishing should be open", but I think it was this community of people, primarily in the 
Bay area, who started pushing that. And because they were very influential, very powerful, 
very good scientists, they got noticed, and then other people joined in with the idea, and of 
course now that's - it's pretty much - except that I mean if you publish with the Wellcome 
Trust or Max Planck or other big societies you're expected to publish things open access. 
Which is - that's fine with me, I don't see necessarily why anybody should have to pay. Just 




I mean I don’t know, but I think PLOS makes a tonne of money, actually. Because they just 
charge these big publication fees to the authors. So they don't, they don't do it by selling 
subscriptions, they do it by making the authors pay - and as I'm sure you know, there's this 
world of predatory publishers out there now who are just trying to get money out of people 
that publish papers.  
 
Mm, yeah, indeed. Is that... Yeah, there were a few things that came up there - but, so 
you're aware of the, the sort of expectations or policies of the university or funders - do 
those sort of impact on you directly? 
 
Well, so - I'm a [funder name] fellow, so I have a kind of a slightly odd attitude about the 
[home university name]. I mean they host me, and they administer the payment of my 
salary, but actually it's the [funder] who pay my salary. And, so I've alwa- ... Actually, 
there's a great book which you probably never could find, because it's, I think it's long out 
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of print, but it's an amazing book called "Academic Gamesmanship" - it's a really very 
sarcastic view of how to be successful in an academic career. And one of the points that the 
guy made in that book is, the most important thing is to figure out what you're going to be 
assessed for, and then do that first. And - you'd just be amazed at the number of people who 
don't do that. You know, people get hired, people come here as [funder name] research 
fellows, and there's all this buzz buzz buzz around the university - all these people saying, 
"Well you know, some day it's going to be really important if you know how to teach, you 
really need to teach", and so they convince a lot of these people to get involved in teaching 
courses. Then, four years down the line they have to renew their fellowship. In that renewal, 
the *only* thing they're judged on is their research output and ideas. So *all* the time that 
they spent teaching, wasn't doing anything that was going to help them to get their 
fellowship renewed. And if they don't get their fellowship renewed, the university can say, 
you know, bye-bye - you're gone. Well, you know how to teach, maybe you can find a job 
at a teaching university [laughs], I mean it's - people - you have to pay attention. So if the 
[funder] say "we want everything published open" - I do what the [funder] says [laughs].  
 
So that's - that's something - do you have to put much effort into that, thinking... Do you, 
like, always - sometimes - publish open access? Or... 
 
No we always publish open access.  
 
Is that - in an open access journal, or is that with a repository system, or... 
 
No, we... no, so we're very lucky because the [funder] then gives a pot of money to the 
[home university name] and I contact the [library staffer name] in the library and I say, 
"[name], we have this paper that's coming out in [journal], which - I mean in one case 
several years ago the [society name] journals were pretty slow actually at getting involved 
with open access publishing, and I think we published one of their first open access papers 
and it took poor [staffer name] about 20 or 30 emails back and forth for them to figure out 
how they could take our money. Even though they had this option "open". So there is 
somebody who will do it, and the [funder] will pay for it. All I have to do is to...is to make 
sure that that option gets ticked. Now where it becomes a bit of a pain is in some of these 
collaborations where we're not the communicating lab, but I'm an author on the paper. 
Those papers are also all supposed to be open, and other people don't necessarily have the 
money to do that. You know, if it's three - three or four thousand dollars [£3000-4000] a 
paper, they don't necessarily have that, so then we have to try to work out 
arrangements...where [home university name] can be billed for it. But the [funder], I mean - 
they're, they have been a bit of a pain, recently because now there are certain types of open 
access license that they like and other ones that they don't like. Like they don't like the open 
access at PNAS. But they're not going to tell me not to publish in PNAS, but they - they 
refuse to pay, the way PNAS publishes open access - well it's open access! I don't know 
what it is, it's some technicality over who owns what. But it is open access. No, they won't 
pay. What a pain. Then we have to figure out how to...you know, what to do about it. So 
sometimes it's quite - sometimes it is a drag. But in general, it - actually, we're blessed, it 
goes pretty smoothly, and the guy [library staffer name] who's in charge of doing it, he's 
great. I hope he retires after I do [laughs]. He's one of those people at [home university] 





Hang on I'll just check what time we're up to, because I want to - yep, make sure we stick 
within time. So going back a bit to the open data part of things, you - you gave me some of 
your views on that, before. So I'm assuming - does this mean that you don't practice that 




Do you do anything particular with - what form does raw data take for you, in your 
research? 
 
Raw data is lots and lots of image files... I mean the other thing about this is it's completely 
impractical. Alright. Suppose we make a movie of dividing cells. We make that movie over 
a weekend. Every thirty seconds, we sample five locations, and we take a stack of images. 
That movie is two terabytes. Suppose we make ten movies. How am I supposed to put 20 
terabytes online? Whose building network is going to transfer 20 terabytes of data? I mean, 
you know, just like - it's just not realistic. So imaging data - I mean, imaging is really 
interesting, imaging is sort of - has the potential to break the back of the computing 
revolution. Ever-faster, ever-bigger, ever-smaller, all this - but we can produce *massively* 
ever-more amounts of data. Just *huge* amounts of data. So we have huge amounts of 
image data, those are on a server. We have, for some of our publications the Journal of Cell 
Biology, for example, has something called the Data Viewer. And if you want, you can put 
all your raw data into the Data Viewer. You can either do it when you submit your 
publication - which seems a bit odd to me, because your publication might get rejected. But 
you can certainly do it after the publication has been - after it's been published, and we've 
done that. So, you know, if people want the raw - I don't have any problem with giving 
people access to the raw data, but I think that people should have access to the raw data 
that's in the publication, and that's backing up what's in the publication. And if I had to take 
500 pictures, and I come up with 20 pictures that end up - pieces, bit and pieces of them are 
in the publication, it's a lot more practical to make those, the raw files for those 20 images 
(which actually might end up as 80 individual original source images if we are working 
with four colours) available than all the 500 (which could be 2000 source images!), all the 




So I prefer - I prefer a model where we...we make the raw data available for what we - for 
the data that we publish.  
 
Mm. Do you see anyone doing something like that, in your field? 
 
Well people do do that through the JCB data viewer and through Omero servers – we are 
not experts at that yet, but are looking into it. I don't know...if any other journals are doing 
it. I mean they had to get grant money to do this I think, and - you know, it's expensive - it's 
a very large server which somebody has to maintain. 
 




Oh I think it probably - eventually something will happen. I'm not sure. I mean eventually 
we will go to electronic lab books in my lab - at the moment people use paper. Most people 
in the [funder] centre use paper. And...one of the reasons we're not moving to electronic lab 
books, is that there's no standard for what to choose. I'm not going to make my group learn 
how to use an electronic lab book and then have it come from, down from on high that we 
chose the wrong one, and we have to use a different one, and of course nothing is going to 
be compatible - you know, so we just... I'm just being very conservative on that. We'll see 
what happens. Eventually if a directive comes from the [funder], and it tells us which 
electronic lab book we have to use, then we will, we will figure out how to try to make it 
work.  
 
Mm. But that would be...a sort of private one...to your lab... 
 
Well, yes, but once you have electronic lab books then you can decide what you'll show. 
But I don't see any reason to show people data prior to acceptance in a journal. Except for 
my collaborators. And my friends. And people who I trust. You know... What I own, and 
nobody else can have, are my ideas. They come from inside my head, I generate them 
through the happiness and misery of my life, that's where the ideas come from. When I 
graduated university, I was going to be an artist I wasn't going to be a scientist. But I found 
that the process of designing beautiful experiments actually satisfied the same creative urge 
in me, but I do have sort of an artist's view of ideas - that ideas area really...really critical, 
and they're unique, and they come from your soul. And other people don't own them. So 
even in a totalitarian society - you just can't make people share ideas. I'll share my output. 
I'm happy to share my output, but my ideas are mine.  
 




Do you have particular views about them? 
 
Well, I have three papers on BioRxiv. 
 




Is that something that you - when do you put them on there, is it... 
 
Well - one we put onto BioRxiv because we weren't quite sure what we were do it - we 
weren't terribly worried that anybody else was going to come along, it was a computing...it 
was a computing paper, and it was something that a student actually figured out during a - 
during a PhD rotation which ended up being published. And so we put that onto BioRxiv 
and then that was quite interesting, because a journal editor contacted us and said "Would 
you submit that paper to our journal, if you haven't submitted it somewhere else?" And it 
ended up coming out in that journal. That's one. Another one was a paper that we've 
submitted around, to a bunch of journals - I have a very very talented senior [nationality] 
postdoc who finds it difficult to write in English and so she's always very, very slow. She 
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should have written the paper a year ago, but she didn't and she got scooped. Some parts of 
her story got scooped, other parts didn't but a whole series of journals had decided to only 
focus on the parts that got scooped, and so it was editorially rejected a number of times. 
And part way through that process, we said - well this is ridiculous, I mean we have good 
data here and we may as a well sort of put a marker down that we've done it, and so we 
decided to put it on BioRxiv. And so that's on BioRxiv. And then this big paper that we're 
working on for [prominent journal], even though it's an incredibly competitive area, we 
decided that we wanted to have it known that we had done it, so the authors all agreed and 
put that on BioRxiv. That's weird because that's even been referred to in a pa- ... I didn't 
know you could refer to things from BioRxiv, but it's been cited.  
 
Do you think that's - so that's a sort of new thing that - to put something in a competitive 
area out on bioarxiv, for you? 
 
Well - if people want to say "I did it first"... I mean I could- You know, it would have had 
an impact on me in the past. For example, I discovered the first proteins to be discovered at 
the centromere region of chromosomes, so these are the proteins that direct chromosome 
segregation. I discovered them and I had an awful fight to try to publish these papers, so 
after I discovered them it was over a year from the first time I submitted the paper - it was 
something like four or five journals later before finally anybody would publish them. I 
mean, the paper got me elected to the [prestigious organisation], but nobody would publish 
it. And... Then, it turns out that a month before my paper finally appeared in print, another 
person published a very small part of that story. In a specialised journal. And they published 
their paper in December of a year and my paper came out in January of the next year. And 
even though...I have the letters saying that my paper had been submitted the previous 
January - I can't... There are a few people who like to try to take me down a peg and say 
"Well you got scooped" - well, I didn't get scooped. I just...you know. It was the pu-... So if 
I had been able to put that on BioRxiv ...that would have answered the question, right?  
 
So do you see it as a positive development... 
 
Yeah. Yeah. Definitely - if you're worried about getting credit for an idea, and if...scientific 
journals will still take your paper - I mean I'm kind of amazed actually given how - it causes 
all sorts of weird problems, you know... So, [prominent journal] is going to accept a paper 
that's been on BioRxiv and yet they're...and they're going to put an embargo when the 
information on the paper can be released - except the paper was actually published a year 
ago. [Laughs]. It's...interesting.  
 
Yeah, yeah. Very interesting! 
 
Yeah. Well we'll see what happens, hopefully. It better get into [prominent journal].  
 
Yeah, yeah. Is there...you were saying before that you...you know, you work out who you 
can talk to, and who you can trust, and you don't like thinking about this sort of - you tell 
me something and I'll tell you something. But do you, would you say that you think about 
openness on, on an everyday basis - sort of, when you're talking to colleagues, or at 




I'm just, I'm a...I just tend to be open with - unless, unless there's somebody with whom I 
feel that I better not be open, I try to be open with most people. 
 
And what about with your students in terms of - do you find yourself needing to give them 
advice about what to say or not say? 
 
Yeah. Sometimes. I mean I - we had a visiting seminar speaker yesterday, and one of my 
students was gonna tell him something about his work, and he was very worried - you 
know, should I talk to him about this, what do you think, you know... I told him - first of all, 
I know the guy, he's very busy, he's not going to rush back and try to scoop us. Secondly, 
you've got a paper which you're revising for a journal, that's already been refereed and 
hopefully you'll be able to answer the referees' comments and get it published, in that case if 
you do, the paper will be published within a couple of months, so even a big lab isn't going 
to be able to start a project from scratch and beat you in a couple of months, so you don't 
worry about that sort of thing. But you don't feed people ideas...that they'll find irresistible. 
So you just... So, yeah, so I am not a big proponent of posters in meetings. So the people 
from my lab, we do posters, but we don't put our really interesting, tantalising, someday-to-
be-realised projects on posters. What we put on posters are things that are either done or 
almost done. In general. There are exceptions, but in general that's what we do. I don't want 
to put something out there for everybody to see unless if we had to, we could beat them. 
 
Okay. Yeah - just do another quick check of the time.  
 
I mean we have actually - I mean we have taken advantage of that ourselves. We went to 
the cell biology meeting, one year and we had a project that we were working on and the 
project was kind of mid-way. We went, and saw a poster - and somebody had discovered 
the same protein in a different system, by a completely different way, and...and they were 
studying it. I talked to that guy, and he had a paper that was actually in press at [journal], 
and we came back and - I had a, they were very good students, very organised group of 
people, they finished all of the experiments they needed to do in the next month, and we 
actually beat the [journal] paper to publication cause [journal] was slow. But... I was open 
with the guy from the meeting. He knew that we had the same protein and we were both 
working on it. But it - it, that was an example where seeing something - we said well, we 
have to get off our backsides and really push on this. And we did. You don't necessarily - 
depending on how competitive you're feeling, you know, whether - depending on how long 
it had been it is until you have to get your grant renewed the next time, you may or may not 
want to be...to do for the good of the scientific community and stimulate other people to 
hurry up - maybe you'd rather beat them. So that's a complicated issue. When it comes 
down to fighting for your survival, you do fight – but you can do it honourably and respect 
other people. I always want to win on my own merits because what we do is great 
objectively speaking – never because we are better than someone else. I do not see science 
as a competition. 
 
Yeah, yeah it is. I'm wondering if you've - a couple of situations, like have you ever faced a 
situation where you wanted to share more information than you did in the end, or you sort 





No, I generally share the information. I mean with the - so my two [nationality] 
collaborators, basically when I go to [country] I just - I talk to everybody in their lab, and 
people tell me everything they're doing, and when I talk to them I tell them what we're 
doing without holding anything back. And what comes out of that are, are... In one case, 
they weren't looking at their data in one particular way. Or there was another way to look at 
their data and I pointed it out to them, and we got a really nice big collaborative publication 
out of the changes that they made after I'd pointed that out to them. So that was really worth 
it. 
 
Yeah. And if you - I mean we've spoken about potential instances, of this, but have you 
ever felt like you regretted sharing as much information as you did, you sort of... 
 
Well, back in the distant past with that one person who wrote the grant to compete with me, 
I regretted - but on the other hand I needed him, my lab were not experts at molecular 
cloning, DNA cloning at the time, and this was in the early days of DNA cloning actually, 
and he was an expert at it, and we needed to clone something. So it was a marriage of 
convenience, which then became a friendship, but then unfortunately our interests clashed. 
Other than that...I don't think so. I don't think I've regretted it. Looking back from the 
perspective of many years later, I am glad that we worked so closely and productively 
together. There were huge benefits for both of us as well as some costs. But in hindsight, 
those costs were worth paying and friendship has survived. 
 
Okay. And so overall do you think - in your field which you describe as quite competitive - 
do you think there is a consensus about how people ought to behave with regard to 
openness? Or are people very different in the way they approach things?  
 
Different people are different. Sure. I mean there are people who talk about everything and 
don't...and just figure that it'll all be okay in the end, and there are people who are very very 
close-mouthed about what they say, and all they say are things which - they talk about 
things that are in press or published.  
 
Where would you put yourself there, do you think?  
 
In general if I'm talking at a meeting, I'll talk about stories that are - that I think are almost 
finished. But not necessarily in press yet. So...probably a little more open than some, 
and...probably, probably more open than most actually. I love to tell a story, but it might not 
be wise to tell a room full of writers the outline for the story you plan to write someday but 
haven’t started yet. 
 
And do you feel like anything should be different than how it is, in terms of how people 
behave around openness? Would you prefer... 
 
Well, so the only issue about openness that actually we didn't talk about, is openness in 
refereeing papers. I...I strongly believe that all refereeing should be open. And that people 
should know the identity of the referees. I think that - you know - the misery, the major 
misery of my life professionally has been dealing with vicious referees. I mean, we were - 
we were the first people to develop a system to do something that sounds impossible, which 
is we developed a cell-free system using ground-up cells to study cell death. You would 
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think, well how can you study cell death if everything's dead to begin with - but our system 
really revealed a lot of interesting things about apoptosis which is a type of cell death. The 
first reviews we got of that, we sent the paper to the journal [name], and we were told 
"There's nothing you can do that will make this paper suitable for publication." That was 
actually true, somebody wrote that down! And [journal] rejected our paper, and in the end 
they didn't know whether to take it or not take it, and they asked an expert, who came and 
told me later, they said, "How do we know if this is right or not?" And he said, "You don't 
know if it's right or not, you only know what you see." So they decided to reject the paper. 
So it got published in the [different journal name], and it became pretty influential. But then 
the original prestigious journal published three knock-off papers by big-name labs who just 
copied us. And because our paper hadn't blown up and turned out to be wrong… So the 
pioneer gets screwed over [laughs] and the copy cats get the big high impact publications. 
And that was - it's the quality of refereeing. In my first story where I identified the 
centromere proteins - people had never heard of me before, I was young at the time, they 
didn't know who I was, other people had tried to do this and they'd failed, and I got 
comments like, you know, "You couldn't possibly know the answer to this, you can't 
possibly be right, so-and-so's already tried this and they didn't get it to work, so I can't see 
how this can be working", you know, just - comments you wouldn't put down if you had to 
sign your name to them. And I frequently sign my reviews. If people don't like what I say, 
then they're free to tell me, but I never review papers vindictively. And I never ever tell 
people that they have to do a bunch of experiments just to do a bunch of experiments 
because it's a stupid - that's, it's not, in the end, it's their paper, it's not my paper, it's either 
good enough to get published or it's not good enough to get published. So the closed...I 
mean, students and post-docs waste so much of their lives - particularly people who want to 
publish in high impact journals - they waste so much of their lives doing make-work 
demanded of them by these anonymous referees. So... And if everybody had to be open, 
nobody would stab anybody - people wouldn't get even with you because you rejected their 
paper, because...you could - you know - you...they can reje-...you know, everybody knows 
who everybody else is and people wouldn't say the nasty things that they say if their name 
was going to be associated with it. 
 
Yeah. Do you think that it would be viable for junior scientists to review openly like that, 
do you think it would work? 
 
If everybody was doing it, yes. If the review process w-, if it was accepted that the review 




I mean how is somebody going to get even with you - they're going to get even with you by 
rejecting your paper? I guess they could get even with you by trying to stop you getting 
money or trying to stop you from getting a job or some really horrible thing, but that 
wouldn't - I would hope that even most cynical people would regard that as an overreaction, 
but if, you know, you think, if I reject their paper they're going to reject my paper? But if 
they reject your paper they'd have to sign it too. And if they did it for reasons that were just 
not sound, then everybody would know they were just doing it out of vindictiveness, and so 
they wouldn't do it. But I don't think it'll happen. Where I hope - what I hope will happen is 
that the process will break down, actually. And one way to break the process down is for 
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people to put their reviews online and then invite people to analyse them with text editor 
programs, and I think over the course of time text - text recognition programs will be able 




[Laughs] So I would be quite up for outing anonymous referees by identifying who they 
are.  
 
So when you talk about the whole thing breaking down, do you mean publishing, or... 
 
Not publishing, no, just the - this business of the protection of being anonymous and being 
able to say lots of vicious things.  
 
Oh okay, so it will technically no longer be possible to be anonymous. 
 
Well I think we are approaching a world where it's going to be, it's getting harder and 
harder to be anonymous. You know, people can walk around with a camera and take a 
picture of you and then they could figure out who you are. If they've got access to the right 




So that, you know, that - Actually there was a really interesting, very strange book called 
Super Sad True Love Story, about a world where people are walking arou-...it's written 
maybe ten years ago, in a  very prescient, it's written about a worl-...people are walking 
around with these things which are the equivalent of iPhones, and you walk into a room and 
you just take pictures of people and then you, you can immediately see everything about 
them, how much they're worth, everything. This is not in the impossible future.  
 
Yeah, not so distant maybe. 
 
Right, so why should we hide when assess somebody's work, why should we hide who we 
are.  
 




Just sort of stepping back from all of this - or maybe this is actually my final question, yeah. 
We'll see. Just stepping back from all this, I'm wondering if you could think about 
scientists, or a scientist that you really admire, or someone that you've looking up to in your 




Something like that. What do you think the qualities are of that person, what makes them a 




Well, one of the people who I most admire is one of the guys who I worked with as a PhD 
student. He wasn't my - he wasn't my titular advisor, but I worked in his lab, and we 
published papers together, and he was - he still is - he's in his 70s, upper 70s and he's still 
extremely active and he's just intellectually brilliant. He doesn't compromise. He loves 
science. He could be pretty tough, but then we sat together writing a paper once - which 
was an article in [prominent journal] actually - and he just sat there, and I, what I remember 
about the dialogue that we had when we were writing is that he was...he let me speak first. 
And then he would sort of modulate what I said, instead of telling me how he could say it 
better. He let me do things in my own words. And so it was a really, really sensitive 
experience. And I see him at meetings, and he still is really admired and - by the young 
people. And, you know - so he's scientifically excellent, but he's able to appreciate other 
people's contributions and make other people other feel that they're worth something.  
 
Do you think that those qualities or what he did have anything to do with - does that relate 
in any way with openness as we've been talking about it? 
 
I would think...I think he's sort of a standard...he has sort of a standard attitude to openness I 
think, he talks about work when it's, when they have a picture for what they're doing to do, 
you know, when they know where things are going to go. I don't think... He's a 
crystallographer, so a lot of - crystallographers, until you have crystals you don't have really 
- you can talk all you want, but you don't really have anything, if you don't have crystals 
you can't get a structure, if you're a crystallographer. And if you do have crystals then 
probably nobody else has the same crystals so you're probably okay, so - and that's a kind of 
community which is a fairly big community, where it's fairly safe to talk about things 
because it's hard to scoop other people. It's not like when it involves just growing some 
cells and seeing what they do. But I've worked with - I mean one of the really great people I 
worked with was the Nobel Prize winner [name], he was my [working relationship 
descriptor], and he was absolutely paranoid about secrecy. He wouldn't tell anybody 
anything. And he always felt that other people were trying to steal his ideas. So - but he was 
still a great and influential scientist and became [leadership role] of the [prestigious 
organisation], and all - and on and on. But that would be an aspect of him that I recognised 
even back when I was a post-doc that that was something that I didn't want to copy.  
 
Mm. Why didn't you want to copy it, did you... 
 
Well, because it's just unpleasant. I mean, and actually...it probably stopped a Nobel... It 
probably stopped a Nobel Prize from being awarded. So he and another guy did the first 
crystal structure of a [molecule] that was [specific molecule] a real landmark. And he 
became convinced somehow that the other guy had stolen his idea. Now I knew actually 
both of them, and - and I'm sure the other guy didn't steal his idea. But [name 1] was 
convinced that [name 2] had stolen his idea. When [name 2] would come to the [institution] 
lab at [city] they would put a padlock on the model room where they were building the 
models so they couldn't sneak in - as if he was going to sneak in and steal their ideas! And 
so basically the field just became so muddied by this - accusations - that I think the Nobel 
committee said - forget it, we're going to stay away from it. But it was the first crystal 
structure of a [molecule]. You know, it could very well have been a Nobel prize. So, you 
know, that was an example where just this... It wasn't that either of them wasn't going to get 
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credit. They both - they were both really admired people. So, you see that and you think: oh 
no, it's better to be open and take a few lumps along the way. But on the other hand, you 
know, I have to be careful, I can't go out and talk about... If my postdoc is working on 
something and she's discovered that this protein kinase is involved somehow in regulating 
cell division, and there's seventeen thousand papers on this protein kinase and nobody, none 
of them are about cell division because people haven't recognised this, I'm not going to go 
to one of these big huge labs with 30 or 40 people in it and talk to them in detail about what 
she's doing, before her paper is in press, because they could flatten us like a bug. So, as a 
lab head you have to be careful to protect the people who work for you, so you do have to 
sort of - there are some lines you have to tread, the things that you can say and things that 
you can't say. But it's better to be open.  
 
Mm, mm-hm. Do you think there's any aspect of, like - if you think about this, do you think 
there's a moral question about openness or is it mainly practical, or...some other way of 
deciding about what to do? 
 
Well I - the whole way I live my life with all my interactions with people is that I try to...I 
want to feel that I'm morally right. You know. Treat people...treat people right, and... But 
people don't see that, because they don't always necessarily recognise that being treated 
right can sometimes mean being treated quite harshly. As a scientist, if I think that you are 
following the wrong path in your work, it is my obligation to tell you that, even if it hurts 
your feelings. How can it be kind to let you go in what I think is the wrong direction? 
Sometimes [laughs] somebody can be quite critical of you, and you think they're being 
really mean, but you don't realise that actually they're bending over backwards to be as nice 
as they can. I mean, you know, you have to be...if you're a scientist, you have to be honest. 
But you know, in my experience, people are emotional animals and they do not always 
appreciate the honesty... 
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So to start with, could you just tell me – (I know that this is…because I know something of 
what you do, but) - could you tell me for the purposes of the interview, briefly about the 
research you're currently involved in?  
 
Well, I use comparative genomics to look at how sex - sex chromosomes and sex genes - 
evolved, and how they function. 
 
Mm-hm. And as part of that, how would you define the discipline that you fit into - or 
disciplines? 
 
It has become quite a cross-disciplinary thing. I mean it started off - molecular biology and 
cell biology, but of course it's gone right into genomics and particularly into evolution, and 
in fact right through to human genetics as well, so - you wouldn't believe the meetings I go 
to.  
 
So all sorts of things. Is- Do you have a primary identity, that you'd put yourself as, among 
those? 
 
I guess I call myself "animal genetics and genomics". It's a pretty big specialty! Is pretty 
descriptive. Or "comparative genomics" would probably cover most of my bases. 
 
Okay, so would you describe yourself as a geneticist or genomicist...? 
 
Well, I see the two as overlapping so much it's really hard - genomics is just a new 
technique that we geneticists use.  
 
And is that - In terms of your career, how consistent has this identity been for you? Have 
you changed how you would call yourself? 
 
I've always called myself a geneticist. I certainly, until recently, never called myself an 
evolutionary geneticist, but that's what I'm often called now.  
 
Mm. And thinking about all of this - sort of in relation to the discipline definition, people 
are part of different scientific communities, the sort of communities you go to meetings in, 
or review papers in. Are there distinct - Is there a distinct community or communities that 




Yes very much so, in fact, I've become very aware of their differences as I've moved from 
mammals to reptiles. Because it's a very different community. The herp community is very 
different from, for instance, the mouse community. The mouse community is very focused 
on human health, genetics does both, but the herp community are all about guys who love 
to go catch snakes in the outback! And they're very friendly to each other. It struck me quite 
forcibly when we got, started to get back review comments on our grants - they were just so 
incredibly friendly, I've never seen anything like that! And people took me aside and said, 
"Well the herp community supports each other." And they have made very conscious 
decisions to - for the good of the whole, the whole discipline, to support each other. And 
that really has been quite a major factor. I wasn't aware there were so many differences, you 
know, I'm part of the human genetics community and that's very medical. And it's just 
another planet from say, conservation genetics which is another group that I belong to, the 
conservation geneticists, you know, they live on the smell of an oily rag [laughs]. It's quite 
funny sometimes when we get... I organise a conference which has human genetics and 
genetics societies together, and the human genetics society - the two days of that was at the 
[name of upmarket hotel] in [place], whereas the genetics society was in the unheated 
bunkers of the [discipline] department at the university! [laughs] And we stayed at [name] 
college - again no heating! [laughs] So a very very different set of expectations in these 
communities, and I think the reptile community is - is different again. So I was just quite 
astonished to find what tremendous differences there were. Not just in their expectations 
and funding, but also in their attitude to each other. The mouse community is known to be 
extremely nasty to other mouse geneticists, whereas the herp community is extremely nice! 
 
Well actually exactly what I was going to ask about next, the character of those 
communities. Is there a certain community that you've felt like you've spent most time in, 
and that was formative, and the kinds of  - the character of that community? 
 
Well the genetics community, and genetics as defined in the 70s, 80s, and 90s when I was a 
young lecturer - again, it was not well funded, it was very far from being relevant to human 
health, that really only came to be a factor in the 80s. So before that it was quite a small 
community, generally rather supportive and friendly. Then there was quite a schism in the 
80s when the human genetics society was formed - and I'm talking about [country] 
specifically. And I think there was quite a good deal of ill-feeling on both sides, I think the 
human genetics community felt a bit ostracised from the genetics community - you know, 
we would laugh at their papers sometimes because they were based on one patient! And we 
thought these guys just don't know how to do science - well of course human genetics has 
come a long, long, long way since then, it's much more aligned to mainstream genetics. So I 
think the boot is sometimes on the other foot, because the human genetics community is 
extremely well-funded compared with anybody else. So I very much regretted that there 
was that schism, because [country name]’s a small country, and both the societies have got 
about 300 members which is really too small, it'd be a lot better if we could permanently get 
our act together, but I think that's just not going to happen because the lifestyle is *so* 
different. [Upmarket hotel] versus the [discipline] department! [laughs] 
 
Oh, that's really interesting! Yeah. Would you describe any of these communities as more 




I think human genetics community is *way* more competitive. And by human genetics, I 
would include in that model organisms like mouse. I think that the mouse community is 
extremely competitive. I - I did a little bit of work on mouse, and some work on human 
genetics as you probably know, but it was mostly in [country elsewhere] not in [home 
country]. But I had the experience, which was quite hilarious, whenever I put in grant 
proposals about [topic of expertise], I would get one referee who kept on saying, "Why [is] 
Professor [own last name] using [specific animal type]? Why not use transgenic mice like 
the rest of the world?" And I'd try and patiently explain that we could probably find out 
things that you can't find out via transgenic mice. And this happened for two years in a row, 
and it got a little bit personal, such that I was able to say by number, this referee has crossed 
the boundary, [they] shouldn't be a referee. But the next time it was the same referee, but 
this time [they were] saying, "It's alright for Professor [own last name], she can publish 
anything she likes - us poor mouse geneticists!" [laughs] "It's very competitive!" [laughs] 
So I could see where [they were] coming from, obviously [they’d] been battered down by 
the mouse community, and [they were] trying to sort of - include me in it.  
 
That is extraordinary. Wow. Okay that's great - I'd like to ask you about openness now. So, 
just very broadly I'm wondering if you could tell me what first comes to mind when think 
about openness in science? 
 
Well, it depends on whether you're talking about openness in publication or openness in 
science. So I see those as two somewhat different matters. I mean - for me, I've been on the 
edge, most of my life, I haven't been sort of in the mainstream human genetics community 
or the mainstream mouse genetics community, and I'm generally not at risk. So I'm 
probably much more likely to be open about what I'm doing, what I'm thinking, because I 
don't have the same sort of competition as human geneticists and mouse geneticists. We 
work on the [specific animal] - we're really not very concerned about other people rushing 
in our turf there. The same was always true of [specific animal 2] - you know, if I could 
find one person in the room who knew what end was what in a [specific animal 2] I'd be 
doing really well, so it was always easy me to be extremely open about what I was doing, at 
meetings - you know, no holds barred, I told my students and post-docs, you know, talk to 
anybody and everybody you possibly can because we need input and we also want them to 
know that what we're doing is actually relevant to what they're doing. So my experience is 
possibly not very typical but it has been quite a charmed life for me because it makes it very 
easy for me to say what I'm doing, to gather comments, and - and if other people are not 
being open about exactly what they're doing with their mice or their human it doesn't matter 
very much to me. 
 
Mm, mm, okay that's really interesting. And what about the openness in publishing? 
 
Well, I see and I really appreciate open publications that I can access - I mean that's just 
been a real revolution that I think has benefitted everyone. The fact that I can be sitting here 
writing my book, and think, oh, I better get back to that paper and find out - you know, 
exactly what the author says because maybe it's not what the reviewers say the author said. 
And I can get anything I like online, it's just absolutely fantastic. I love the fact that 
everybody can get at my papers too, and I certainly publish in open access journals 
wherever I can because I think it's very important that people have access immediately. I 
also have a lot of contacts, particularly in India, and in Thailand, and it's again been a game-
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changer for them that they have access now to lots and lots of journals that they didn't have 
access to previously. So I see that there's been a tremendous opening up of the flow of 
information.   
 
Mm, okay. [Dog barks] Hello dog! 
 
[laughs] [comments about dog] 
 
And I'm wondering, does openness feel like an issue that's relevant to you? Is it something 
you think about? 
 
It's something I really appreciate, it's not something that concerns me a great deal. For the 
reasons I outlined before, I do feel I'm somewhat immune from the risks, but I certainly 
appreciate the benefits.  
 
Mm, okay. And to perhaps attack the subject from a slightly different angle, particularly 
when you're talking about openness in science, could you describe to me what it is - what it 
looks like when science is open? Like... 
 
Well, what it looks like is...a lot like many of the meetings I go to, where there really seem 
to be no reservations, that people will talk about what they're doing and what they're 
thinking, that there'll be discussions that are very real. I guess I'm always - that's my usual 
kind of meeting. I am part of a number of international bodies, [genome-related org] comes 
to mind, as well, where there clearly are constraints, and some people are very hesitant to 
talk about what they're doing, other people refer very directly to competition - but this has 
not been my experience at all.  
 
Mm, okay. And you were saying that you - when talking to students, you advise them to 
talk to other people - have there ever been situations where you've though, I better advise 
the students not to talk about this, or anything like that? 
 
I actually have made a policy that generosity pays. And for me and I think for our whole 
group, that has generally been the case, that we get much more by soliciting other peoples' 
opinion on what we actually care about and what we're actually doing, than we lose. We 
have been burnt, I think two or three times - you know, one student - no she was a postdoc 
who came from [country] and she did some nice work, I suggested that she talk to [scientist 
name] about it, which she did and I think that was extremely helpful to her. I thought that 
she was ready to publish, but she never got around to it. You know, three years later she 
was outraged to find that [scientist name] had done those experiments and published them. 
And I had to say, well I'm sorry but you can't sit around for three years and expect people 
not to take the next step. So I felt very sorry about that, but I don't think that the problem 
was actually talking to somebody, I think the problem was not acting, on - in a timely 
fashion, and just letting it sit there and somebody was sure to do those experiments. And 
I've also been burnt a couple of other times myself, and again you just have to say well, no I 
think we gain a lot more than we lose. So, once or twice where, you know - I gave a talk at 
[institution name] and I guess in retrospect I could see somebody there who was more than 
just interested, who ran in and did the experiments and published before we did. But no 




Mm. And this sort of "generosity pays" policy, is that something that you came to at a 
certain time in your career, that you decided that that was the way to approach things? 
 
I don't know that I came to it, I think it was always part of my background, because - you 
know - in the 50s, in genetics, it was just not so competitive. I never had to - my first 
research was on the [hypothesis name], you know, [genetic phenomenon] in [specific 
animal], and I was only too grateful to find somebody who was actually interested in what I 
was doing. So I guess I was brought up thinking that, you know, it's a big wide world there, 
and if I can get anybody interested in my work that's wonderful, so competition never really 
entered into it until much later and by that stage I guess I'd already had positive experiences 
about the benefits of telling people what I was doing, and soliciting their advice.  
 
Mm, yeah, okay. 
 
It only became, sort of - a spoken policy much later when I think we observed that the 
world around us wasn't necessarily as generous with their sharing of ideas and data than, 
than we were. And so I really had to think about - well, is this good or am I putting my 
students at risk? 
 
Mm, yeah. Okay. I want to ask you about sort of, some specific forms of openness now, 
we've already talked a bit about open access - I'm wondering if I could ask again: so you 
said that you like to publish open access, is that a sort of rule for you, or something that you 
tend to do, or what's your thinking? 
 
It's not a rule but you know, the journals that are open access have become very much top 
of our priority list, and we do, we do publish still in some journals like [subject-specific 
research journal], that - you know, they're hobbling towards open access. The Springer 
journals just haven't quite got there yet, and that's a rather unique journal because there 
aren't very many good [genetic sub-field] journals, so [genetic sub-field] stuff, we do tend 
to send to either [specific journal] or [specific other journal]. But otherwise it's generally 
one of the PLOS journals or BMC journals. But of course, the main thing we're looking for 
is who is going to read this paper. We need to - the first thing I get my students or postdocs 
to do is tell me where the literature is mainly being published, because you want to be in 
that stream of literature. And more and more, in some of the open access journals. And we 




Starting [indistinct?] Nature [laughs]. 
 
[laughs] And, is open data, or sharing the primary data behind your results, is that 
something that happens in your field? 
 
In genomics of course, it happens pretty much automatically, any sequence we get goes 
immediately open on the website, so - you know, we can't publish any sequence without it 
being accessible. And that's been policy in genomics for a long time, and of course it - it has 
enormously advanced the field, I don't think anybody would tell you otherwise. So we 
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appreciate that and of course all the genome data is immediately published. Everything that 
we've got on the [specific animal] is already online. So people are already, even though we 
haven't published the data yet, people are already accessing it - of course, most of the 
people who are accessing it are actually authors on [specific animal] genome paper 
[laughs]. And that would have been the same, probably, for the [previously studied animal] 
genome, the [other previously studied animal] genome, again I think the interests of the 
authors are dual - you know, they're interested in the genome paper but they - they're all 
there for a very specific reason, some are interested in blood proteins, and so forth. So 
they're probably at the forefront of the people who are actually using the public data.  
 
Mm. And do you have other types of data that are the basis for your research as well, apart 
from genomic data? 
 
Well our lab, as you well know, has rather specialised in physical mapping, so we have 
tonnes and tonnes of mapping data. And there's no obvious repository for that data. In fact 
the original data which of course is quite voluminous because it's all photographs - I mean, 
it'd love it if there were some way of archiving that data that means that we didn't have to 
handle it [laughs] but there doesn't seem to be that. [Name of collaborator] who I'm sure 
you'll remember has tried to get some sort of systematic archiving at least of map positions 
if not actual original photographs, and I think that's a very good thing, I'd like that to be 
available as well, but there - so far - is no agreement on what's the best way to archive that 
data.  
 
Mm, okay. Is there - do you come under any pressure from sort of policies, institutions, 
journals, to archive that kind of thing that's quite hard to archive? 
 
No, quite the reverse, nobody cares at all [laughs]. I mean it would be a real benefit to us to 
be able to offload some of our data because it is very voluminous, but nobody wants it. I 
certainly don't want to throw out the original data, but it is quite difficult to store. 
 
Okay. And another - another potential form of openness is preprints. I don't know if you've 
come across these in biology - sort of, sharing of articles, possibly at the point of 
submission, in online repositories? 
 
Yeah, I've come upon that more as a reviewer than as an author, I mean we just published a 
paper that was - I was quite shocked to find, you know, we'd submitted a revision, and the 
next day it was online. And I thought, well uh, yes, I guess that's good! [laughs] I would 
have thought that, you know, somebody had to have a careful look at it before it went 
online, but - no no, there he is! And we were satisfied with it, but it hadn't been through a 
second review process, which is what I always thought the revision was aimed to do. So I 
was a little bit surprised to find that. But - we were happy about it, because we were already 
getting comments on it, so that's got to be good.  
 
Mm. So you don't - would your... 
 
Not sure whether original papers that have not been submi-...even heard...that have just 
been submitted, I'm not sure how valuable it is to have those online. You know, sometimes 
a paper will go through several iterations, and sometimes a paper - the premise, the whole 
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premise will be challenged - so I guess openness is great but I don't know that you want to 
be doing the editor's work for them, and the reviewers' work for them, you know. It almost 
becomes a popularity contest rather than a serious scientific debate. So I see it as rather 
undermining the whole review process.  
 
Mm. Okay. I'm working towards my last page of questions now. I think this may be covered 
a bit by what we've already said, but: I'm wondering, have you ever faced a situation in 
which you've wanted to share more scientific information than you did in the end? Or have 
you always felt that you're able to share as much as you wanted to? 
 
I've always been on the rash side. A couple of times I have wondered whether perhaps I've 




…The two instances that I already mentioned, the one talk I gave where I could *see* that 
somebody was, was acting very specifically, you know, questioning me very specifically - 
how did you do this and how did you do that and what did you look for - and in retrospect I 
could see that [they were] already planning to rush in and do the experiments and publish 
them before I got a chance to do it. But that was really the only occasion where I've, I've felt 
sorry that I was so forward with my suggestions. It wasn't data as much as ideas.  
 
Right. And knowing about it now would you - do you think you would have acted any 
differently, if you knew what was happening? 
 
Actually I don't think I would have [laughs]. Again, these are ideas I was floating, which at 
the time - this was about the [specific problem studying a gene] - and so I was talking about 
our attempts over ten years to [study this gene]. And my conclusion is [description of 
conclusion]. And my idea was [description of idea], and that we had already done that, but 
that was sort of taken up by a group of [discipline name] people who just went straight to 
the then unpublished [specific animal] data, and in fact they, they flouted the Fort - the uh, 
the Fort Lauderdale Agreement, that - you know - you wouldn't use unpublished data for 
something like this. So we were holding back from doing that work and they weren't. I 
think, you know, I got something out of that, eventually, I mean we were right, 
[conclusion], it's a very interesting story. And I'm sorry that, that my student wasn't the first 
one to demonstrate this, but I think - you know - the whole field moved forward.  
 
Okay, yeah. And this may be implicit in some of the things you've said, but do you feel 
there's a consensus your discipline about how open science should be, in this way we've 
been talking about?  
 
I certainly feel that very strongly in the...amongst the group that I largely work, do my 
research work with now, but that's the herp group. And I think it's always been very open 
and very friendly, and very open about their ideas. I'm not so much involved with the 
human genetics, but I think there still is a good deal of proprietorial information, and a good 
deal of fear that somebody else is onto it, I mean there's only one genome, and everybody's 
got the same information. So - again, it depends on which community you're talking about - 
the herp community loves it - YES! Go for it. You know, [journal name relevant to 
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community], everybody reads that online before it's published, and I think that's quite 
accepted now. I'm not sure that that's the same in some of the other, more medical 
communities.  
 
And do - do you think things should be different from how they are, in any of these 
communities? Would you push the consensus in a certain direction, in some areas, if you 
could?  
 
I'm not sure pushing is really required, I think there's sort of a rollercoaster there, and 
everything is rocketing towards very much more openness, it's going to be quite difficult to 
resist if you want to resist it. I think that's a good thing. I just hope we don't sort of stumble 
in our rush and end up with [an] incredible mess, and that's - I guess - why I'm a little bit 
anxious about submitted papers being available, because I can see the huge potential for 
mess when things are revised, and "oh, well, I read it in its first iteration, oh well and I read 
it in its 17th iteration". And there's somewhat different conclusions, who's right here? You 
know, it's just another dimension of - of data messiness - that I'm not sure the community 
needs.  
 
Yeah, so when you say there's a rollercoaster and we're rushing towards certain things, what 
kind of openness is that - is it the sort of online, preprint openness? 
 
Absolutely, I see that as being irresistible. I think it's taken much longer than I thought it 
would. I remember, [a society] meeting back - oh, it would have been 20 years ago, I think, 
[name] gave the talk about "what's going to happen in publishing". And she was predicting 
within a couple of years that there'd be complete turn - that, you know, we would now be, 
be paying for displaying our wares, rather than getting our data scientifically reviewed. And 
I think everybody was - it was a bit of a wakeup call - but then nothing happened for years 
and years and years. So it really surprised me that it was so long and some of the publishers 
were so very much dragging their feet. And still are. 
 
Mm-hm. Yeah.  
 
I think, you know, even the [region/subject-specific journal], which is one of the most 
conservative journals that I ever publish in, has seen the writing on the wall, and decided 
they at least have to have the option, of open - of open access. And I think [subject-specific 
journal] has done the same thing now, as well, so they have a sort of partial policy, but I 
don't think that even that is going to be tenable in the next few years.  
 
Mm. Are you aware of your funders or your institution having policies about open access? 
 
They've been very quiet on this score, and certainly - I'm a member of [number of] 
institutions as you probably know, and I don't know that *any* of them have policies, 
they're just sort of trying to run to keep up and figure out what's going on. So the only 
interest that most institutions have in publications is they want *more*. And they want their 
[national research assessment] scores... I mean it's all become very much scores, and impact 
factors and stuff like that, so bibliometrics. Whatever they say, gets into decisions about 
funding of institutions - so they don't care whether it's open or closed or whatever, they just 






So I don't see them has having done anything positive at all.  
 
Mm. Okay.  
 
[National research/funding councils] - I haven't seen anything, any policies from [particular 
council], there may well be, but I'm not aware of them.  
 




This is taking a step back from all of these things we've been discussing. I'm wondering if 
you could think about a scientist who you know, who you really admire, who you maybe 
have aspired to be like in the past. And if you could describe to me what sort of qualities 
they have, and what - what you think makes them a good scientist. 
 
Well there's - I mean I've never really had a mentor, but there's a scientist I've worked very 
closely with for many many years, who is distinguished by things that I'd like to think that I 
am also. And that is a tremendous energy, and a tremendous ability to integrate data from 
many sources. I'm not in the same league at all, but he's really gone from population 
genetics, to conservation genetics, to human genetics - and he can see a really really big 
picture. And that's something I aspire to, is being able to integrate such a lot of observations 
of genes and genomes and chromosomes, into a big picture of evolution. I think he's - 
somewhat similar to me...he's been in the [institution] in the [large country], and so has had 
all sorts of restrictions that I haven't had to face. I mean basically they wanted him to work 
on [health field] and he wanted to work on [contrasting field], so [laughs] there was bound 
to be some conflict there. But he managed to do everything, and managed to end up with 
what I think is a, a truly grand picture of the evolution of animals.  
 
So it's - is it a kind of breadth of interest, or a sort of intellectual capacity, or both of those 
things? 
 
It's both of those things and it's not just breadth, it's also depth. You know, he's got 
extremely deep knowledge of the human genome, he's worked on the human genome, he's 
worked on retroviruses, he's worked - he really invented the whole field of conservation 
genetics, so he's able to apply what he knows, he deeply understands the populations that he 
works on, which might be [examples of specific animal populations] and all sorts of things. 
So he just has a tremendous capacity and I found it very inspirational that you're able to 
bring things together and actually make them simpler to understand.  
 
Mm. Yeah. And thinking about all of that, do you think that has anything to do with 
openness by any measure that we've discussed today, or do you think that that's different? 
 
I know that some of the things he's worked on, particularly [health condition] has - you 
know - that's exactly the situation that you most want to avoid, where there is really is real 
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competition, there's real competition for funding, and for results, it's all very high profile. 
So he's certainly been in a milieu that I haven't been in, and had pressures that I haven't had 
to put up with. His response has generally been to talk more, not less. And [publish?] more, 
not less. He's been very big in genomics, and one of the founders of comparative genomics, 
and a big advocate for getting all the data online, immediately.  
 
Mm. Is that something that you think has influenced you at all, that attitude towards - or 
that you've grown with that in some way? 
 
Very much - I mean matched very much my attitude anyway, and so I found it very 
reinforcing that he was able to inhabit very much larger spheres than me using the same set 
of guiding principles, you might say.  
 
Mm, yeah. Okay, that's really interesting! Thank you so much [name]. 
 
Oh you're very welcome Ros, I can see that, you know, you're into some very deep 
questions there, and I guess you'll get such a lot of different answers [laughs]. 
 
Mm, yeah, no this is - I really love doing these interviews. 
 






Appendix F: Approach to interview analysis 
 
Figure 9 summarises my approach to interview analysis. My methods of interview 
analysis included close reading and commenting (Figure 10); mind mapping (Figure 
11); “coding” transcripts in NVivo (Figure 12); listing, visualising, and writing about 
themes identified through these activities (Figure 13); tabulating interviewees’ 
responses to certain themes once established (Figure 14); and writing summaries of 
interviews in relation to these established themes (Figure 15). These processes bore 
some relation to grounded theory’s progression from expansive coding, to a refined 
coding framework, to higher conceptualisation. They also shared with grounded 
theory an emphasis on iteration: repeated comparisons between emerging themes 
and the data on which they are built. However, using multiple improvised methods in 
addition to NVivo coding helped me to explore the data at different scales – from 
phrases to narratives and whole accounts – and to express my emerging 
interpretations not only as categories, but as visual associations and as nuanced, 
tentative forms of written reasoning. This allowed a non-linear, creative process: 
higher forms of conceptualisation could occur both at early and late stages, and 
interact with detailed, grounded observations. I did not apply all methods to each 
interview – some, e.g. mind mapping, were too time-intensive and detailed to be 
applied in every case. However, early, expansive methods built up my understanding 
to a point approaching theoretical saturation (Bryman 2012:421) at which analysis of 
new interviews reinforced my primary observations.  Although I began to solidify core 
analytical categories during this exploratory phase, my overall findings remained 
flexible into the writing up phase. 
 
Organised methods of analysis were accompanied and shaped by tacit processes of 
conceptual reflection that were an outcome of sustained, in-depth engagement with 
the interview data and the overall topic. Sometimes I was able to document these 
reflections, and often they were prompted by documentation: transcription, organised 
analysis, conference preparation, and writing. Sometimes they were ephemeral, or 
occurred outside time allocated for analysis: non-research conversations, 
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presentations, and readings. Where I was able to document, remember, or discuss 
these reflections with others, they often sparked further reflections and helped me to 
conceptualise the data. Figure 16 shows examples of captured reflections. 
 
 
Figure 9 | Summary of my approach to analysis of interview data. Includes both organised and tacit 
methods, from early to late stages of analysis.  
 
 
Figure 10 | Example of close reading and commenting. This method was useful for articulating and 
becoming sensitive to nuanced and tentative interpretations early in the process, but was too detailed to 




Figure 11 | Mind-map of interview with Ernie. One of several exploratory analytical methods; enlarged sections inset. See Appendix G: Mind maps for this and another mind-




Figure 12 | Word cloud of codes categorising interview data in NVivo. Size and shade of each code 
indicates in approximately how often I applied it, both within and between interviews. Shows 70 of the 
most used codes among 270. Based on comprehensive coding of the first 16 scientist interviews. 
“Interactive disclosure” was my early phrasing for “interpersonal openness”. This method was useful for 






Figure 13 | Using codes created in NVivo to guide conceptual thinking. I mapped the association between 
codes representing openness practices (rows) and other codes (↓ indicates an association). This helped 
identify common and distinctive features across openness practices, in scientists’ experiences. Full 




Figure 14 | Summary of scientists’ accounts in relation to established openness categories. Records three 
measures of salience for each interviewee and category: mention of the category in first response; any 
spontaneous mention of the category; and familiarity when I raises the category. Useful for a 





Figure 15 | Late-stage analysis: summary-writing in relation to established categories. This note 
summarises Olivia’s account in relation to interpersonal openness, and includes relevant quotes (more 
not shown). I recorded these summaries while writing up, to check my understanding with the data, and 




Figure 16 | Examples of analytical reflections. Captured (a) immediately after an interview; (b) while 
transcribing and reviewing transcripts; (c) at a conference; (d) while reading unrelated texts that spark 
ideas: my friend Zeba’s memoir (Talkhani 2019) and a book by shame researcher Brené Brown (2012). 
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Appendix G: Mind maps 
 
 
Links to download detailed PDF of mind maps used to analyse some 
interviews. Alternative avenues will be explored for long-term sharing of these data 































































































































↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ 
 
Context of data; Controlled access; Infrastructure & 
investment; Open but not open; Power; Relevance of 
openness; Stewardship & maintenance; Type of data; 
Using others’ data; Volume of data; Sensitive data. 
Interactive disclosure ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ - ↓ ↓ ↓ ↓ Long-term influences; Advising others; Capacity, 
resources & security; Claiming priority & scooping; 
Cliques & closed circles; Collaboration; Freedom; 
Generosity; “Holding the cards”; Honesty; Personal 
attribute; Talking. 
Open notebooks - ↓ ↓ - - ↓ - ↓ - ↓ - - ↓ 
Familiarity. 
Open peer review ↓ ↓ - - - - - - - ↓ - - - 
Familiarity. 




Publishing practices ↓ ↓ ↓  - - - - ↓ ↓ ↓ - ↓ Accessing publications; Copyright & licensing; 
Economics; Editorial, review & QC; Admin; Green & 
gold; Hybrid; Predatory publishing; Publishing 
decisions; Readership; ResearchGate; Role of 
publishers; Top journals & impact factor. 
Rarely discussed types 
 
Digital interlinking ↓ ↓ - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
In grant funding process ↓ ↓ - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Materials openness ↓ ↓ ↓ - ↓ - - - ↓ - ↓ - - 
 
Methods openness ↓ ↓ - - - - - - - - - - - 
 
Open code ↓ ↓ - ↓ - - - - - - - - - 
 
Open source ↓ ↓ - - ↓ - - ↓ - ↓ ↓ - - 
 
Personal frankness ↓ ↓ - - - - - - - - - - - 
 




With research participants ↓ ↓ - - - - - - ↓ ↓ - ↓ - 
Rights and ownership. 
 
